

POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XXV.

FROM JANUARY TO JUNE,

1814.

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1814.

LIST OF
HIS MAJESTY'S MINISTERS.
1814.

CABINET MINISTERS.

Lord Harrowby	Lord President of the Council.
Lord Eldon	Lord High Chancellor.
Lord Westmoreland	Lord Privy Seal.
Lord Clancarty	President of the Board of Trade.
Lord Liverpool	First Lord of the Treasury (Prime Minister).
Right Hon. N. Vansittart	{ Chancellor and Under-Treasurer of the Exchequer.
Right Hon. Charles Bathurst	
Lord Viscount Melville	Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.
Lord Mulgrave.....	First Lord of the Admiralty.
Lord Sidmouth.....	Master General of the Ordnance.
Lord Castlereagh.....	Secretary of State for the Home Department.
Lord Bathurst.....	Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Lord Buckinghamshire	{ Secretary of State for the Department of War and Colonies.
	{ President of the Board of Control for the Affairs in India.

NOT OF THE CABINET.

Right Hon. George Rose.....	{ Vice-President of the Board of Trade, and Treasurer of the Navy.
Lord Palmerston.....	
Lord C. Somerset.....	{ Secretary at War.
Right Hon. C. Long.....	
Earl of Chichester	{ Joint Paymasters-General of the Forces.
Earl of Sandwich.....	
Richard Wharton	{ Joint Postmasters-General.
Right Hon. C. Arbuthnot	
Sir Wm. Grant	{ Secretaries of the Treasury.
Sir Wm. Garrow	
Sir R. Dallas	Master of the Rolls.
	Attorney-General.
	Solicitor-General.

PERSONS OF THE MINISTRY OF IRELAND.

Lord Whitworth.....	Lord Lieutenant.
Lord Manners.....	Lord High Chancellor.
Right Hon. Robt. Peel	Chief Secretary.
Right Hon. W. Fitzgerald	Chancellor of the Exchequer.

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Record of the PRICES of Bread, Wheat, Meat, Labour, Bullion, and Funds, in England, during the time that this Volume was publishing; and also of the number of Bankrupts, during the same period; that is, from January to June, 1814, both months inclusive.

BREAD.—The average price of the Quartern Loaf, weighing 4lb. 5oz. 8drms. in London, which is nearly the same as in other parts of the country, 1s. 0½d.

WHEAT.—The average price for the above period, through all England, per Winchester Bushel of 8 gallons: 9s. 5d.

MEAT.—Per pound, on an average for the time above stated, as sold wholesale at Smithfield Market, not including the value of skin or offal. Beef, 9d.; Mutton, 10d.; Veal, 11d.; Pork, 1s. —N. B. This is nearly the retail price all over the country, the Butcher's profit consisting of the skin and offal.

LABOUR.—The average pay per day of a labouring man employed in farming work, at Botley, in Hampshire, being about a fifth higher than the wages throughout the whole country, 2s. 2d.

BULLION.—Standard Gold in Bars, per Oz. £5. 4s. 3d.—Standard Silver do. 6s. 11½d. N. B. These are the average prices, during the above period, in Bank of England Notes. The prices in Gold and Silver Coin are for an ounce of Gold £3. 17s. 10½d.; for an ounce of Silver, 5s. 2d.

FUNDS.—Average price of the Three Per Cent. Consolidated Annuitys, during the above period: 60½.

BANKRUPTS.—Number of Bankrupts, declared in the London Gazette, during the above period: 572.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PEACE.—At last there really does appear to be some prospect of this event. But, uncommon exertions are making, by the Anti-jacobin writers in this country, to prevent it. Their language is such as to make me fear, that they are not alone in their wishes; and, therefore, it becomes us, who wish to see peace before we die, to endeavour to counteract their malignant efforts.—The *Declaration of the Allies* was well calculated to move the gall of the Anti-jacobins, whom we find, at last, to be *haters of the French nation*, in a mass. Mere, vulgar haters of a whole nation; haters of 30 millions of people, inhabiting the fairest and richest part of the world, which is also the seat of science and the arts, and of perfect religious liberty.—The Anti-jacobins were for war against the *Republicans of France*; they were for eternal war against them, because they acted upon what were called “*disorganizing principles*.” Well, but the French are *no longer Republicans*. They own the sway of an Emperor, whose crown is hereditary. Why, therefore, do they now wish for war with France?—Is it because Napoleon is not a member of the *old family*, and that to sanction, by treaty, a change of dynasty in France, might prove a most destructive example?—Why, has *our* change of dynasty done us any harm? Do not we *boast* of a change of dynasty? Our old family was supplanted by a new one; to wit; but the *Illustrious House of Brunswick*, and we call the event a “*Glorious Revolution*.” Nay, a *foreigner* came here to reign in the stead of our old discarded king, and that *foreigner* came, too, with *foreign troops* to assist him.—To object, therefore, to peace with France, on account of the change in her dynasty, and to talk of continuing the war with her, in order to compel her to relinquish that change, would exhibit us to the world in the light of the most inconsistent and most impudent people that ever breathed.—Besides, are we not *now*, even at this moment, sanctioning, in the most unequivocal manner, a complete

change of dynasty in *Sweden*? Have we not, by the most solemn act, and in the name of *The Most Holy and Undivided Trinity*, acknowledged *Bernadotte*, a Frenchman, and not long ago a private soldier in the French armies, to be the lawful heir to the crown of Sweden? Nay, have we not ceded to him, in that capacity, an island, forming part of the territories formerly the Bourbon's territories?—Still more recently have we not sanctioned a change, that is to say, a revolution, in the government of Holland? That government has been, all of a sudden, changed from a *Republic* to a *Principality*, and we have approved of the change.—What, then, are the French alone not to be permitted to make any change in their rulers, or in the nature of their government? What assurance! what insolence, in us, to attempt to justify the continuance of war upon any such ground?—But, perhaps, the most striking instance is, our recognition of, and our war for, *Ferdinand VII.*, as King of Spain, while his father is still alive! We have a right to do this, as far as I know; but, I am quite sure, that, while we do this, we must be most unconscionably impudent, if we pretend, that a change of rulers, out of the settled course, in any country, is a justifiable ground for our hostility to that country.—What ground, then, is there for the war-men to stand upon in their opposition to peace with France?—If the political principles of the French nation, and the change in her government and rulers, no longer afford the smallest pretence for an objection to treat with her for peace, it follows, of course, that there now remains no objection except as to *TERMS*; and, our war-men should have waited till they could have plainly stated the *Terms* of the *Allies* before they proceeded to prepossess the minds of the people against peace.—This, however, is what they have not done. They have seized hold of the *Declaration of the Allies* as a text whereon to declaim against the *power* of France. They no longer talk of the *principles* of France. It is her *power* that they are now afraid of, and that, too, at a

moment when they tell us, that Napoleon is an object of contempt!—Thus they discover their insincerity; thus, by shifting their ground and belying their own assertions, they prove to us, that it is not *safety* they want, but *war*. They profit from the war; and, that is their *sole* real objection to peace.—The following publication, in the *Courier* of the 25th Dec., is well worthy of the reader's attention, especially if he bear in mind the *real source* whence it has issued.—He will be amused with the confusion purposely introduced as to *us*, and *the Allies*; and with the shifts, to which the writer is driven, in order to make out a *preliminary* objection to peace. And, then, the *softened tone* which follows the *melancholy* supposition, that the Allies may be disposed to treat separately, and to leave us in the lurch, notwithstanding the observation, said, in the news-papers, to have been made, the other day, by the Duke of Clarence, just after he told the company, at the Scotch Dinner, that he was a Scotch Prince and a German Prince too. The observation was: that we had successfully fought all Europe, *single-handed*. Why, then, does this cowardly writer soften his tone in case the Allies, or any considerable member of the alliance, should secede?—But, let us now hear this writer, keeping in mind the probable fact, that he is no more than the mere mouth-piece of others.—“We observe in the set of Frankfort Papers we have received, that Austria has republished, in a Supplement to the *Frankfort Gazette* of the 22d November, the Declaration she issued last August. *The motives that have led to the republication of this document, we are unable to explain.* We may be sure, however, that it has been *done designedly*. Surely Austria cannot mean that she republishes it to shew that in November her demands and conditions remain the same as they were in August. In that declaration it is stated, that if a *general peace* could not be made, a *preliminary continental peace might be negotiated*. Is such a design in contemplation now? Does Buonaparté wish to draw the Continental Powers into a separate peace, and is this the cause of Lord Castlereagh's visit to the Continent? We remark in the Speech a bitterness against England, and we recollect that in a previous Speech to the Senate, he had attempted to pique the Continental Sovereigns with saying, that their opinions were directed by Eng-

land. There is no doubt that he will leave no artifice unpractised to separate us and our Allies. In this attempt we trust he will fail; for the Allies see and feel that *their truest interests consist in the closest and most intimate alliance with this country*.—But the Allies should guard against their *generous feelings*; they should not be hurried into conditions of peace less than their situation and safety entitle them to claim. By peace, France will gain every thing. She will regain at least 300,000 of her best troops, one-half of her best officers, and seamen sufficient to man 50 sail of the line. The obstinacy and rashness of Buonaparté have thrown away the military means of France. Never again can Europe expect to find her so stripped of an army, so exhausted in her finances: never again can Europe expect to see a more formidable and victorious force opposed to France. The crisis is great, it is in favour of the Allies, not only beyond expectation, but beyond calculation, and if they do not reap the full advantage of it, they may soon pay dearly for their folly. In six months after a peace, France may have fifty sail of the line, well manned, and an army of half a million of men, commended by a great military genius. One victory may again give him possession of Vienna, and Europe may be re-plunged in all the miseries which it is now in her power to erect an effectual barrier against. This barrier is the ancient limits of France, as existing in 1789. Even those limits have been found too powerful for the balance of power in Europe, and shall we increase them now we can reduce them to a state of fair preponderance? If Buonaparté refuses such conditions, the Allies should occupy Paris, restore the Bourbon Family, re-create the Royal Party, and effect their purpose by that means. The restoration of the Bourbons might not, indeed, be made a *sine qua non at present*, but we should never forget that that measure alone can afford well-founded hopes of a permanent peace. But perhaps some of the Allies would not concur in insisting on conditions to the extent of reducing France to her ancient limits. In that case we must take just as much as the Alliance collectively will demand. We must take conditions far short of those which safety requires, and power enables us to dictate, rather than allow the secession of any material Member from the Alliance. Should

"more than her ancient limits be granted to France, Ministers will of course be prepared to shew that *they would have insisted on better terms* could they have prevailed on the Alliance collectively to have concurred with them. If not they are undone; the country will execrate them, and two-thirds of the Opposition will arraign them. The Opposition are now laying in wait in hopes that insufficient terms of peace will bring them into power. *The country expects that the terms will be sufficient.* It is extravagant, if not visionary, to hope that France can ever again be found so weak while the Allies are so strong. It is highly improbable that so favourable a crisis can ever again occur. Let us take full advantage of it, and not leave occasion for reproaching ourselves hereafter with a *silly generosity* to an enemy, whose highest triumphs inspired him only with a keener appetite for conquest, blood, and rapine. Buonaparté must *hate Austria* so deeply, that if he again masters her, he will extinguish her; and a very short time may place it in his power to revenge himself for the humiliating condition to which she has now brought him."—We will take this article in its own order; for, looking upon the writer as a *mouth-piece*, it is of considerable importance.—He is at loss to explain the motives of Austria in causing her former Declaration to be republished now; and says, "*surely*" her demands and conditions cannot remain the same as they were in August! Perhaps they do not remain the same *precisely*; but, it is probable, that they do not very widely differ; and, indeed, the republication of the declaration of August is a strong presumptive proof that such is the fact.—In August Austria proposed the negotiating of a Preliminary Continental peace, in case a general peace could not be made. That is to say, in case England would not agree to such a peace as the maritime states were willing to agree to, Austria proposed the negotiating of a peace on the land. There is no other sense in the words; and, indeed, it is not reasonable to suppose, that all the nations of Europe; that 150 millions of people are to live for years longer in a state of warfare, their several homes alternately exposed to plunder and violence, and their blood continually exposed to be shed, merely on account of the commercial interests of this Island.—We are told by this eternal-war man, that Austria must now see, that her "truest interest

"consists in the closest and most intimate connexion with this country," and that, therefore, no design of a separate peace can be entertained.—Why, I doubt, now, for my part, whether the Court of Vienna will see the thing in this light. I should not be at all surprised, if there were persons in that Court to assert, that it was to her connexions with this country, that Austria owed all her losses and disgrace in former wars for the last 20 years; and, that now is the time, before it be too late, for her to detach herself from us.—But, it is absurd to suppose that *all* the Allies can find it their interest to be so closely allied to us. *Tous*, and what are we? This presumptuous man says, in a subsequent paragraph, that, if it had not been *for us* the Allies would have been in a very *different situation*. True, they will probably say; for, if it had not been *for you*, we should never have been in the situation from which, by *our blood*, we have now been rescued. Yes, there will not be wanting people, even in Russia, to remark, that London was quite safe, while Moscow was in flames.—The Allies, this everlasting-war man says, should "*guard against their generous feelings.*" (Kind gentleman!) For, says he, "by peace France will gain a great army, and SEAMEN TO MAN 50 SHIPS OF THE LINE. In six months after peace she may have 50 ships of the line well manned." Well! And what is that to the Allies? How does this man know, that some of the Allies do not wish to see France with 50 ships of the line well manned? How does he know, that there is nothing they would more avoid than to destroy the navy of France?—We are always, as I said before, smelling after the French ships. We shall be deceived about these French ships.—It is very wonderful (if any thing in the impudence of these men can be wonderful), that our writers who are for eternal war, never seem to reflect on *our* fleets; on *our* conquests; on *our* aggrandizement. And, do they really believe? I should not wonder if their presumption were to go that length. Do they really and in good earnest; can they seriously believe, that the Allies mean to be urged on by us to cripple France (supposing them to have the power), and to destroy her last ship, while we are to be quietly left in possession of all the colonies of the world, together with the fleets of Holland, Portugal, Spain, and Denmark, and Sicily? Stupid men! They are so completely blinded in one eye by our self-

praises; by the endless braggings of our stage, our press, and our speechifyings, that they never see but one side of the question, if it relate to any dispute between us and any foreign nation.—France, this everlasting-war man tells us, may, in six months, under the great military genius of Buonaparté, be again in possession of Vienna.—I thought he was sunk so very low, the other day, as to be merely an object of contempt. Well; but he is not, it seems. But, if he be not; if it will take him so little time to assume his old attitude, is there not some *risk* in endeavouring to push him further *now*. Oh! no! there is no *risk* to us. Very true, and the Court of Vienna knows that very well.—After all, however, we are, it seems, to take such terms as we can get, rather than send off any material member of the alliance. But, we are afterwards told, that our *maritime rights* are not to become a subject of negotiation at any Congress. Very likely not; but, then, I am pretty certain, that peace will be made *without us*; because we, who will not suffer the Allies to treat of any thing of ours, cannot be, I should think, such fools, such impudent coxcombs, as to expect, that the Allies will suffer us to have any thing to say as to any thing of theirs. No, no! If we mean to be admitted to a Congress for a general peace, we must bring all our conquests and all our maritime claims into the general mass.—The tone of impudence which this writer takes towards the close, would excite indignation if it were not so very ridiculous. “Let us,” says he, “take full advantage of *our* high situation, and not leave occasion, here—after, for reproaching *ourselves* with *silly generosity*.”—Just as if we had an army on the Rhine! Just as if we had made any offer to treat, or had the power to prevent peace for one day.—The visit of *Lord Castlereagh* to the Allies is a matter of great moment. It is said, that he is going in order to *prevent delay in communicating* with our Allies. But; what makes the case so very urgent? If a Congress is about to be held, we, of course, if we are to be at it, shall have an Envoy there, with full powers to treat; and our Secretary of State for foreign affairs will be constantly wanted at home. No: it cannot be to *negotiate*, or to *assist negotiation*, that he is gone (if gone at all); but, to “explain” the views of our government,” as we are told; and, in fact, to endeavour to hold the alliance together, and to urge on the

powers to the crippling of France.—A very legitimate object, perhaps; but, one, I believe, in which he will not succeed.—It is rumoured, that *disunion* exists amongst the Allies; and, if so, it must be allowed, if we reflect on the grand capacity, which his Lordship displayed in *uniting Ireland* with England, that a more proper man could not have been sent to the Quarters of the Allies. His Lordship will, I dare say, be well furnished with arguments in favour of *union* upon this occasion; but, whether the same sort of arguments, which he so copiously and so successfully used to the members of the Irish parliament, will have a similar effect upon the Allies is more than we can yet be able to decide.—Be this as it may, it is downright folly to suppose, that he is gone to the Continent merely to *prevent delays* in communicating with our Allies. That cannot be. He must be gone upon some very important and very pressing business; some unexpected cause must have produced his journey; his object must be of a nature to admit of not a moment's delay.—It appears to me natural to suppose, that the Court of Vienna, not wishing either to destroy or to humble Napoleon, will by no means wish to weaken him on his *maritime* side, where he would be least formidable to her. It may also be very natural for her to say, that, if she has honourable terms of peace, it may be advisable to leave him at war with us. To prevent that, we must make application to her; and, with what face can we make that application, unless we offer, at the same time, to bring in our conquests, and our claims on the seas, to be disposed of and settled at a general peace?—The powers of the Continent have seen themselves, for many years, harassed on the one side by France and on the other side by us. They do wish, because they *must* wish, to see both nations reduced in point of power; and, if they cannot effect that reduction by *treaty*, the only means they have left, is, to leave us at war, while they enjoy peace, which, by a prudent line of conduct, they may now enjoy in safety.—From the Speech of Napoleon and that of the Orator of Government, it very clearly appears, that negotiations are about to be opened; and, I think, that there can be no doubt, that we have had no hand in the matter. It does not follow, that we shall be excluded; but, if we go into a Congress, we must go with all our budget of *conquests* and maritime claims.—It is easy for us, who run no

risk, to talk about marching to Paris, and there dictating terms of peace. The Allies do not want to lose two or three hundred thousand men, as they probably would, and be defeated into the bargain; for, after all, we see no signs of *disaffection* in France; we see no fear, on the part of the Emperor, to make known his difficulties in the most candid manner. His speech as well as that of Count Regnaud, who still retains his talent for eloquent composition, breathe confidence in every line. Language like this is not addressed to a people ready to fall down before an enemy. This point, which was the greatest of all (the *disposition* of the people of France) seems now to be decided in favor of Napoleon; and, if he has the people of France cordially with him, the Allies must be very ill-advised, if they do not choose this moment for treating; and, on the part of Austria, who means to leave Napoleon with great power, it must be madness not to treat, when she is certain of securing, by treaty, what she would run some risk, at least, of losing by war. —And, why do we wish to reduce France to a state of imbecility? The impudence of the proposition is sufficient to render us hateful in the eyes of the world; but, *why* do we wish it? To be sure our situation in peace will be very embarrassing. The Debt, which this war against the French has brought upon us, will hang about our necks like a mill-stone. Our system of paper-money, all that we see about us, seems to depend for existence on war, which secures to us a monopoly of trade and commerce, and which, from the unsettled state of Europe, has brought so much capital into the country. But, if there be a peace upon the Continent, upon such terms as will make the several countries safe, why should we keep on the war? Are we to have war for our lives merely because our paper-system would be endangered by peace? What a horrible, what a cruel idea! —We cut, at this moment, a very awkward figure. We have, for years past, been bragging of our *disinterestedness*. We said, that all we wanted to see was the *deliverance* of the poor oppressed nations of the Continent. But, now, behold, those nations being, as they think, sufficiently delivered, we are urging them, or, at least, some of our writers are, to *run new risks*. By invading France once, they were all reduced to the brink of destruction, and the moment they are recovered from that, we want them to invade France again! No: hang it! the hoax is too palpable.

It is impossible that they can consent to be made cat's paws of at this shocking rate.

—After all, what to think of the result, I must confess, I am wholly at a loss. There are very strong reasons why this system of things in England should shudder at peace. The moment peace is made, it will begin to feel the want of its old impetus. The heavy taxes that must still be paid will want a war to keep them in countenance. Men have had their eyes shut for a long while; but, peace will make them look about them. They will, like birds, whose cage door is open, all of a sudden, lift their heads, stare about them, and begin to try their wings. —Since the people of this island were shut in by war, wonderful changes have taken place in the world. Manufactures have been changing their place; money has been changing its value; the capability of living at ease has been changing its scite. —In short, there are quite grounds enough for apprehension; but, still, *how* is our government to avoid making peace, if the powers of the Continent make peace, and that, too, upon a *basis proposed by themselves*? I am aware, that there would be found wretches to justify them in so doing; but it could not do for any length of time. The war could not go on. When taxes were called for, men would ask what was the object of them. It could no longer be alledged, that they were wanted to defend us against France, with whom we might have had peace if we would. —But, are we certain, that, if we reject a peace proposed to us by the Allies, that none of them will become our enemies, and compel us to accept of such peace? I shall be told, that we have already fought them all *single-handed*. No. We have called them enemies, and have abused them too; but, they merely yielded to the dictates of France, by whom they themselves were oppressed. Their hostility towards us was *friendship in disguise*, which would not be the case *now*, if they were to declare war against us. —I do not know how to give an opinion; but, I am inclined to believe, that we shall be compelled to make peace, after having in vain endeavoured to prevail on the Allies to continue the war. —And, really, ought it not to make one happy to see the likelihood of such an event? Why should we not (it is a question I am always asking); why should we not trade and live in social intercourse with France? Why should the French not have our hardware and our cloth, and give us their wine and oil in exchange? Why

should we be penned up in this island all our lives, when, at a few leagues distance, we could see so many things to delight the eye and inform the mind? Why should those, who are able to travel, be forced to swallow fogs, while they might inhale the wholesome air of Languedoc? Why, above all things, should we hate the people of France? What have they done to us, which we have not done to them? We have beat one another by turns; but, it belongs to us only to deal in *abuse*. They have never abused us a nation; whereas our abuse of them, under all the changes of their government, has been unbounded. —Here I shall leave this subject for the present, waiting with no small anxiety the result of those able efforts, which my Lord Castlereagh is so likely to display in the way of effecting an *union* amongst our Allies. Some persons say, indeed, that he will not have so genial a soil to work upon as he had in Ireland, where, amongst those especially with whom he had to do, the enlightened state of mind was so very favourable for the reception of his arguments, all which going at once to the heart as well as head of his honest hearers, produced an effect exactly proportioned to their intrinsic value. There is some weight in this observation to be sure. It does require different arguments to produce conviction in different minds; or, at least, it requires a greater weight of argument. The arguments which were sufficient to convince the keen and docile Irish Members, might have been insufficient to work conviction in the ministers of the Court of Vienna. There is no doubt, however, as I said before, that Lord Castlereagh goes amply supplied with the most powerful kind of arguments, nor is there any fear of his wanting the zeal necessary to the making use of them. If his object be, as the *Courier* says it is, to prevent the Allies from granting peace to France upon too good terms for the latter; and, at the same time, to persuade them, that they must not think of meddling with the *maritime claims* of England; if this be object of his mission; if it be his object to induce the Allies to *unite* in this respect, he must, indeed, be well stocked with arguments. This task now is a fearful one, compared to that of convincing the Irish Members of the propriety of giving up their Parliament. He had then to do with men, quite open to conviction, which will not be the case now. —Well: time alone can show what this wonderful man is capable of performing.

TRAITORS IN CANADA.—The reader will not have forgotten, that, some months ago, I noticed a recommendation, in one of our newspapers, for our government to put to death, as traitors, such English born subjects as had been found in arms fighting against us, and made prisoners of war, in the American army.—The following document gives us the melancholy history of this affair; and, it may very soon be too late to endeavour to prevent the bloodshed which it threatens to produce.—GENERAL ORDERS.—Head-quarters, Montreal, Oct. 27.—“His Excellency the Governor-General and Commander of the Forces, “having transmitted to his Majesty’s Government, a letter from Major-General Dearborn, stating, that the American Commissary of Prisoners in London had made it known to his Government, that “23 soldiers of the 1st, 6th, and 13th regiments of United States’ infantry, made “prisoners, had been sent to England and “held in close confinement as British subjects, and that Major-Gen. Dearborn had “received instructions from his Government, to put into close confinement 23 “British soldiers, to be kept as hostages “for the safe-keeping and restoration in exchange of the soldiers of the United “States, who have been sent as above “stated to England:—in obedience to “which instruction, he had put 23 British “soldiers into close confinement, to be kept “as hostages; and the persons referred to “in Major-General Dearborn’s letter, being “soldiers serving in the American Army, “taken prisoners at Queenstown, who had “declared themselves to be British-born “subjects, and were held in custody in “England, there to undergo a legal trial, “—His Excellency the Commander of “the Forces has received the commands of “his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, “through the Right Hon. the Earl Bathurst, Secretary of State, to lose no time “in communicating to Major-General Dearborn, that he has transmitted the “copy of his letter, and that he is in consequence instructed, distinctly to state to “Major-General Dearborn, that his Excellency has received the commands of his “Royal Highness the Prince Regent, forthwith to put in close confinement forty-six “American officers and non-commissioned “officers, to be held as hostages for the “safe keeping of the twenty-three British “soldiers stated to have been put in close “confinement by the American Government.—And he is at the same time to

“ apprise him, that if any of the said British soldiers shall suffer death, by reason
 “ that the soldiers now under confinement
 “ in England have been found guilty, and
 “ that the known law, not only of Great
 “ Britain but of every independent State in
 “ similar circumstances, has been in consequence executed, he has been instructed
 “ to select, out of the American officers
 “ and non-commissioned officers, put into
 “ confinement, as many as may double the
 “ number of British soldiers who shall
 “ have been so unwarrantably put to death,
 “ and cause such officers and non-commissioned officers to suffer death immediately. — And his Excellency is further instructed to notify to Major-General Dearborn, that the Commanders of his Majesty’s armies and fleets on the coasts of America, have received instructions to prosecute the war with unmitigated severity against all cities, towns, and villages belonging to the United States, and against the inhabitants thereof, if after this communication shall have been duly made to Major-General Dearborn, and a reasonable time given for its being transmitted to the American Government, that Government shall unhappily not be deterred from putting to death any of the soldiers who now are, or who may hereafter be kept as hostages for the purposes stated in the letter of Major-Gen. Dearborn. — His Excellency the Commander of the Forces, in announcing to the troops the commands of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, is confident that they will feel sensible of the paternal solicitude which his Royal Highness has evinced for the protection of the person and honour of the British soldier, thus grossly outraged, in contempt of justice, humanity, and the law of nations, in the persons of 23 soldiers placed in close confinement, as hostages for an equal number of traitors, who have been guilty of the base and unnatural crime of raising their parricidal arms against that country which gave them birth, and who have been delivered over for legal trial to the just laws of their offended country. — The British soldier will feel this unprincipled outrage, added to the galling insults and cruel barbarities that are daily wantonly inflicted on many of his unfortunate comrades, who have fallen into the enemy’s hands, as additional motives to excite his determined resolution never to resign his liberty but with his life, to a foe so regardless of all sense of honour, justice,

“ and the rights of war. — (Signed) —
 “ EDW. BAYNES, — Adj. Gen. Brit. N. America. ” — I before stated very fully my reasons for believing, that the Englishmen, thus taken in the American army, could not be fairly considered as traitors. — Our government has, it seems, decided in the contrary; and, I suppose, we are to see these men tried. I hope, that the Americans will not retaliate, whatever they may consider as their right; but, I fear they *will*. That nation has been, by one mean and another, worked up to such a pitch of resentment, that I do not expect much forbearance at their hands. — I will not here go over the arguments, which I before used, having then, as I thought, exhausted the subject; but, I cannot refrain from remarking, that, if it was really intended to punish these men as traitors; as persons who deserved to be quartered and to have their bowels ripped out; if this was really intended, our writers have been very imprudent in their unbounded praises of *General Moreau*, who not only joined the enemies of his native country, but who performed a sea voyage for the express purpose of joining those enemies. He could not plead his attachment to the ancient family of France; for he had fought against that family, and had got great riches in the service of the revolutionary government. — It was, therefore, very imprudent in our writers to sing the praises of this man, seeing that our government considered the natives of England, found in the army of America, as determined traitors. — One more remark I must make. — It appears to me, that it is extremely unfortunate, to say the least of it, that our government should find it necessary to resort to such measures. For, in the first place, the fact will be written in blood, that England breeds traitors, and that, in order to *deter others from becoming traitors*, such measures are necessary. This is a most melancholy fact. — Will not the world wonder what it is that can induce Englishmen to become traitors in such numbers? — I have not heard of any such thing in any other country. The Americans do not seem to be afraid of their people becoming traitors! and yet, we are told, that their government and the war is unpopular! — Our law of treason, if acted upon in all its rigour, might produce very awful effects. — An Englishman, for instance, who emigrated with his father when a child, and who may now be living in some little sea-port, if he were to take up a gun or

sword to protect his family against a boat's crew of ours attacking his house, would, if taken, be liable to be cut in quarters and to have his bowels ripped out and flung in his face!—Horrid, however, as is the idea of this rigour, it is not impossible, that it may lead to good in the end. It will unquestionably tend to the complete separation of the two countries, which, in the opinions of many, would be likely greatly to benefit mankind. It will destroy the party, which, through the means of commercial influence, has divided America. It will diffuse the manufacturing arts. It will make America more independent than she was before. It will hasten the time when she, by being a great maritime power, will be able to interpose and prevent destructive wars between us and France. Her political principles are those of real and not of sham freedom; and, for the sake of her principles, we may (provided she do us no harm) when peace arrives, wish to see her power extended.—The Congress has lately received a report from a Committee on the acts of Great-Britain during the war; and the Courier says, that it is *quite sufficient* to say of it, that it is *wholly false*. I do not think so; for, though it be really false, it demands a *contradiction by authority here*.—The acts, charged upon us are so atrocious, that I, as an Englishman, cannot bring myself to believe, that they have been committed; but the same feeling, which makes me reject a belief in them, makes me anxiously wish to see them officially shown not to have been committed; because I know, that the people of *other* nations may believe, though I cannot.—There are persons, who suppose, that, in consequence of the late events on the Continent of Europe, we may do what we please with America. It is a great mistake. We could do nothing with her when her population amounted to only two millions of souls; and now it amounts to eight or nine millions.—Besides, do we suppose, that we shall be permitted to have a word to say in the Continental Peace without permitting the Continental powers to have something to say about our war with America? All these powers are more or less interested in the independence of the American trade. Her commerce is singularly beneficial to them all; and, what is more, they must naturally wish to see her a great naval power, able to form somewhat of a balance against England.—But, like the cock in Pope's Essay on Man, we think that the heavens and the

earth, and all that in them is, were *made for us*.—The peace, which is approaching, may tend to remove the delusion.

MR. MANT and CAPT. PATRICK CAMPBELL.—These two gentlemen, the latter late Captain, and the former late Surgeon, of the Frigate, *UNITE*, serving in the Mediterranean, are, in a dispute upon the subject of the management of *Prizes*, now dividing the opinions of people at Southampton, where they both live.—But, from what I have heard, and, indeed, from what I have seen in a printed paper, it appears to be impossible, that the discussion can long remain confined to such narrow limits.—Certainly the public, who pay so dearly for the maintenance of a navy, on which they are everlastingly told, that they solely depend for their safety, are deeply interested in the proper employment and use of that enormously expensive establishment.—It is very much to be desired, that this matter should be fully investigated; that the parties should have a fair opportunity of producing legal proofs; and that the public should see clearly where the fault lies, if there be any fault.—Mr. Mant is said to be preparing a publication on the subject, to which, in all probability, Captain Campbell will reply; so that the truth will come out, and, be it on which side it may, the truth *ought* to come out.

WM. COBBETT.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRENCH PAPERS.

Paris, Dec. 19th.

To day, Sunday, Dec. 19, his Majesty, the Emperor and King, set off at one o'clock from the palace of the Thuilleries, to repair in state to the Legislative Body, where, having been received with the usual ceremonies, his Majesty, after taking his seat, made the following speech:—

“Senators, Counsellors of State, Deputies from the Departments to the Legislative Body:

“Splendid victories have raised the glory of the French arms during this campaign: defections without parallel have rendered those victories useless; all has turned against us. France itself would be in danger; but for the union and energy of the French.—In these weighty circumstances, it was my first thought to call you around me. My heart has need of the presence, and of the affection of my subjects.

—I have never been seduced by prosperity. Adversity will always find me superior to its attacks.—I have several times given peace to nations when they had lost every thing. From a part of my conquests I have raised thrones for Kings who had forsaken me.—I had conceived and executed great designs for the prosperity and the happiness of the world. A monarch and a father, I feel that peace adds to the security of thrones, and to that of families. Negotiations have been entered into with the Allied Powers. I have adhered to the preliminary bases which they had presented. I had then the hope, that before the opening of this session the Congress of Mannheim would be assembled: but new delays, which are not to be ascribed to France, have deferred this moment, which the wishes of the world eagerly call for.—I have ordered to be laid before you all the original documents which are in my port-feuille of my department of foreign affairs. You will make yourselves acquainted with them by means of a Committee. The Speakers of my Council will acquaint you with my will on this subject.—On my side, there is no obstacle to the re-establishment of peace. I know and partake all the sentiments of the French,—I say of the French, because there is not one of them who would desire peace at the price of honour.—It is with regret that I ask of this generous people new sacrifices; but they are commanded by its noblest and dearest interests. It was necessary to recruit my armies by numerous levies: nations cannot treat with security except by displaying their whole strength. An increase of taxes becomes indispensable. What my Minister of the Finance will propose to you is conformable to the system of finance which I have established. We shall meet every demand without a loan, which consumes the future, and without paper money, which is the greatest enemy of social order.—I am satisfied with the sentiments which my people of Italy have testified towards me on this occasion.—Denmark and Naples alone have remained faithful to their alliance with me.—The Republic of the United States of America continues with success its war with England.—I have recognised the neutrality of the nineteen Swiss Cantons.

“Senators, Counsellors of State, Deputies from the Departments to the Legislative Body:—

“You are the natural organs of this throne: it is for you to give an example of

energy, which may recommend your generation to the generations to come. Let them not say of us, ‘They have sacrificed the best interests of their country!’ They have acknowledged the laws which England has in vain sought, during four centuries, to impose on France!’—My people cannot fear that the policy of their Emperor will ever betray the national glory. On my side, I feel the confidence, that the French will be constantly worthy of themselves, and of me!’”

Paris, December 21.

Legislative Body, under the Presidency of His Excellency the Duke of Massa.

After the usual introductory business, Count Regnaud de Saint Jean d'Angely spoke as follows:—

“Gentlemen, in the two last campaigns, without having been abandoned by victory, we have been betrayed by fortune.—In the first, one of those winters which afflict nature but once in a century; in the second an abandonment, defections, of which Europe offers few examples, have rendered sterile the most brilliant successes.—Happily, Gentlemen, the nation which had enjoyed prosperity without being intoxicated by it, has supported misfortune without dejection, and after having generously in the preceding wars, defended the territories of our allies from the evils of war, we are prepared courageously to preserve our own from them.—Called round the throne under weighty circumstances, the Emperor has just associated you, Gentlemen, in the views of his policy, as in the efforts of his administration.—I have said the views, and not the *secrets*, of his policy; and in short, this policy has always been the defence, and the independence, of the honour, of the industry, and of the commerce of France and her allies.—But nations, like governments, deeply impressed, strongly pre-occupied by the more recent events, forget those more distant, keep faintly in their memory first causes, and lose sight of the links of that historic chain which connects the past with the present.—God forbid, Gentlemen, that I should now describe here any past grievances, calculated to irritate any minds, to rekindle any resentments.—I do not carry back my thoughts; I do not call your's to the past, but because that in each of the pages in which the remembrance of it is preserved, one can discover with certainty who have been the provokers of the war.—War has existed in Europe for 20 years. The last was connected with

the first, and was the consequence of its origin.—To see to which must be imputed the misfortunes and the duration of this war, it will be sufficient to refer to its cause, and to recollect that the intervals of peace, or rather the short truces, during which nations have breathed, have been owing to France.—The aggression did not proceed from France, neither in 1792, when she was invaded; neither in the year Seven, when the treaty of Campo Formio was broken; neither in the year Eight, when the Russians came across Germany and Italy, to menace our frontiers; neither in the year Ten, when the treaty of Amiens was violated; neither at the epoch of the invasion of Bavaria, when the peace of Luneville was disavowed; neither at the epoch when the treaty of Presburg was placed in oblivion; neither when the engagements of Tilsit were abandoned, neither when the treaties of Vienna and of Paris were torn in pieces. And was it not on the contrary, France, who, victorious and conquering, consented to the armistice of Leoben, and the peace which followed it: who vanquished at Marengo only to treat at Luneville; at Austerlitz, but to restore the greater part of her conquests, or to endow thrones with them; who has not refused an armistice during the war, peace during negotiations, neither before the treaty of Presburg, nor before that of Vienna?—At this moment have not the preliminary bases, proposed by the coalesced powers, been adopted by His Majesty, who declares to his people, to his allies, to his enemies, *that, on his side, there are no obstacles to the re-establishment of Peace.*—These truths, Gentlemen, as far as relates to preceding wars, are consecrated by monuments already become the immutable patrimony of history; in what relate to more recent events, they will be proved by the documents contained in the port-folio of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, of which His Majesty calls a Commission, named from among you, to take cognizance.—Whilst negotiating, the coalesced powers wished the continuance of hostilities. By that they have shewn us the measures which the safety of the State and the honour of the Empire prescribe. Her Majesty has said to you, Gentlemen, ‘nations cannot treat with security, except by displaying their whole strength.’—But already the energy which manifests itself in all parts, the numerous levies which are in motion, sufficiently make known the resolution of the French nation to maintain the safety of its

territory, and the honour of its laws.—Thirst of glory, love for the country, and the wish for its prosperity, are passions which never become extinct in generous hearts.—They are a guarantee of the zeal with which you will associate yourselves, Gentlemen, in the efforts of the administration, to support, by powerful means of defence, *the negotiations which are going to be opened.* Less powerful, less strong, less rich, less fruitful in resources was France in the year Eight, when threatened on the North, invaded on the South, torn in pieces in her interior, exhausted in her finances, disorganized in her administration, discouraged in her armies, the seas brought her hope, the victory of Marengo restored her her honours, the treaty of Luneville brought back peace to her.—I describe this picture, Gentlemen; but for the purpose of again calling back, within and without, the energetic sentiment of our dignity and of our power; only that our friends and our enemies may, at the same time, understand the thoughts of the Monarch, and the force of the nation, the moderation of his wishes, his ardour for an honourable peace, his horror of a shameful peace.”

The Legislative Body gave an authenticated copy to the orators, from the Council of State, of the Imperial Decree, of which it had just received a communication, as well as of the speech of Count Regnaud St. Jean d'Angely, and ordered that the whole be entered in the minutes, and six copies printed.—After the departure of the orators from the Council of State, the Assembly adjourned till eleven of the clock to-morrow precisely.

LONDON GAZETTE EXTRAORDINARY,
Tuesday, Oct. 22, 1813.

(Continued from page 816.)

of Acken, on the left bank, a little lower down the river, was fortifying, under the direction of Count Woronzow, in such a manner as to render it a place of considerable strength, while preparations were accelerating for constructing a bridge there.—In the mean time, the enemy, who appear to have had no idea of the passage of the Elbe, at Acken, sent strong detachments of troops to occupy Dessau and the line of the Mulda, and employed themselves in throwing up works, as well before that town as in front of the *tele-de-pont* at Ross-lau, with intent to impede the passage there, and to obstruct the movements of the army

after the passage. This gave occasion to skirmishes between the enemy and the Swedish advanced-guard, which was obliged to relinquish Dessau, and to retire to the neighbourhood of the *tele-de-pont* at Ross-lau, and indeed to the right bank of the river.—Under these circumstances, the Prince Royal received intelligence from General Blucher, on the 1st instant, informing his Royal Highness, that he should, on that day, make a movement with his whole army on his right towards Hertzberg; that on the following day he should be at Jessen; on the 3d at Elster, and on the following day (to-day) would effect the passage of the Elbe at Elster, proceeding upon Kemberg against the French corps stationed there.—The bridge at Acken had just been completed, and yesterday, to-day, or perhaps to-morrow, was each spoken of as the probable day for passing the river.—General Blucher crossed the Elbe at Elster yesterday with some opposition, and attacked the entrenched village of Wartemberg, on the opposite bank, which he carried, after an obstinate resistance, making himself master of sixteen pieces of cannon. It is understood that this victory, which was carried against the corps commanded by Bertrand, was not obtained without considerable loss, particularly among the troops commanded by General D'Yorck; but the particulars have not been received.—The Prince Royal received this intelligence yesterday evening, while he was at Ross-lau, or immediately on his return here, and took the resolution of crossing the whole army to-day over the Elbe, at Acken and at Ross-lau, the Russians at the former, and the Prussians and Swedes at Ross-lau, somewhat later or otherwise, according as it should be understood whether the French would make a stand at Dessau. This, however, was not to be expected, when once the passage of the Russians was completed at Acken, particularly under the position of General Blucher's army, and in effect it was learnt this morning, that the French had retired from Dessau, where, consequently, I learn that the head-quarters of the Prince Royal will be established this evening. His Royal Highness left this place about nine o'clock this morning.—Yesterday evening Mr. Aldercrentz, a son of the General, and an Aid-de-Camp of the Prince Royal, returned here from the Imperial head-quarters, to which he had been sent after the battle of Donnawitz. He brings intelligence of the actual movement of the grand army, as was projected, on the 1st instant;

and it was calculated that it would be advanced as far as Chemnitz on yesterday, the 3d.—I am as yet without details of the affair of General Blucher; but Baron De Wetterstedt has engaged me to detain this messenger until I shall receive a dispatch from him this evening for M. De Rehausen, and he promised me (for he went to-day to Dessau), to transmit to me at the same time the same particulars, if he should obtain them. I shall keep this dispatch open for them.—We have indirect accounts of General Czernitscheff having taken possession, with his corps of Cossacks, of the whole city of Cassel, from which Jerome Buonaparté had fled. But nothing has yet been received from himself.—I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) E. THORNTON.

P. S. Ten p. m. I have the honour of transmitting to your Lordships enclosed, a letter which I have just received from Baron de Wetterstedt. (Signed) E. T.

Head-quarters, Dessau, Oct. 4, 1813.

According to reports received from Gen. Blucher, he has been engaged with the 4th French corps, commanded by General Bertrand.—The latter was strongly entrenched in a village between Wartemberg and Bledin.—General D'Yorck's corps dislodged and overthrew the enemy, taking above one thousand prisoners, sixteen pieces of cannon, and seventy tumbrils, with their train, were captured. A body of two thousand men threw themselves into Wartemberg; the remainder of the enemy's troops fell back upon Kemberg. General Blucher pursued them, and his head-quarters will be this evening at the latter place. His cavalry is at Duben.—By five o'clock this morning, the enemy's troops, under the orders of Marshal Ney, which were in this town, amounting to eighteen thousand men, had begun their retreat towards Leipzig.—Our advanced posts had, in the course of this evening, pushed on as far as Raguhn and Jesnitz, and to-morrow the junction with General Blucher will take place.—The van-guard of the Russian army, under the orders of Count Woronzoff, occupies Coethen. Bernbourg is garrisoned by Russian cavalry. To-morrow the two armies of the Prince Royal and of General Blucher will make a combined movement in advance, probably in the direction of Leipzig. They form together a total of one hundred and twenty-seven thousand, or one hundred and thirty thousand men. His Royal Highness will, without doubt, esta-

blish his head-quarters at Reguhn.—I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) DE WETTERSTEDT.

LONDON GAZETTE EXTRAORDINARY,
Wednesday Nov. 3, 1813.

Foreign Office, Nov. 3, 1813.

Mr. Solly arrived this morning at the Office of Viscount Castlereagh, from Leipsig, with duplicates of dispatches from Lieutenant-General the Honourable Sir C. W. Stewart, K. B. of which the following are copies.—The originals, by his Aid-de-Camp, Mr. James, are not yet received.

Skenditz, Oct. 17, 1813.

My Lord,—The glorious army of Silesia has added another victory to its list, and the brow of its veteran leaders is decorated with fresh laurel.—Forty pieces of cannon, twelve thousand killed, wounded, and prisoners, one eagle, and many caissons, have been the fruits of the victory of Radefeld and Lindenthal.—To give your Lordship the clearest idea in my power of this battle, I must revert to the position of the armies of Silesia and the North of Germany on the 14th inst. When we received certain intelligence that the enemy was withdrawing from the right bank of the Elbe to collect in Leipsig, at this time the Prince Royal was at Cothen, and General Blucher at Halle. The former occupied with the advanced guards the left bank of the Mulda, and the latter Merseburg and Schenditz.—General Blucher moved his head-quarters, on the 14th, to Gros Kugel, pushing his advance on the great road to Leipsig, and occupying the villages on each side of it. The enemy was in force in his front, still holding Deblitsch and Bitterfeld, with some troops along the Mulda. The Crown Prince of Sweden issued orders to march to Halle in the night of the 14th; but when his troops were in march, he took up his head-quarters at Sylbitz, and placed the Swedish army with its right at Wittin, and the left near the Petersberg. Gen. Bulow occupied the centre of his line between Petersberg and Oppin, and the corps of Winzingerode was on the left at Zorbig.—General Blucher found the enemy's forces, consisting of the 4th, 6th, and 7th corps of the French army, and great part of the Guard, under Marshals Marmont and Ney, and General Bertrand, occupying a line with their right at Freyroda, and their left at Lindenthal. The country is open, and very favourable for cavalry, around these latter villages; but the enemy was posted

strong in front of a wood of some extent, near Radefeld: and behind it the ground is more intersected; generally speaking, however, it is open, and adapted to all arms.—The disposition of attack of the Silesian army was as follows:—The corps of General Langeron was to attack and carry Freyroda, and then Radefeld, having the corps d'armée of General D'Yorck was directed to move on the great chaussée, leading to Leipsig, until it reached the village of Sitzchera, when, turning to its left, it was to force the enemy at Lindenthal. The Russian guards and advanced guard were to press on the main road to Leipsig.—The corps of General St. Priest arriving from Merseburg, was to follow the corps of General Langeron. The formation of the cavalry and the different reserves was made on the open ground between the villages. It was nearly mid-day before the troops were at their stations.—The enemy soon after the first onset gave up the advanced villages, and retired some distance, but tenaciously held the woody ground on their right, and the villages of Gros and Klein Wetteritz, as also the villages of Mockern and Mokau, on their left. At Mockern a most bloody contest ensued; it was taken and retaken by the corps of Yorck five times; the musketry fire was most galling, and this was the hottest part of the field; many of the superior officers were either killed or wounded; at length the victorious Silesians carried all before them, and drove the enemy beyond the Partha. In the plain there were many brilliant charges of cavalry. The Brandenburg regiment of hussars distinguished itself in a particular manner, and, supported by infantry, charged a battery of eight pieces, which they carried.—The enemy made an obstinate resistance also on their right, in the villages of Great and Little Wetteritz and Ilchhausen, and in the woody ground around them; and when they found we had forced their left, they brought an additional number of troops on Count Langeron, who was chiefly engaged with Marshal Ney's corps, which arrived from the neighbourhood of Duben. However, the Russians, equally with their brave allies in arms, made the most gallant efforts, and they were fully successful—night only put an end to the action. The Russian cavalry acted in a very brilliant manner. General Kolp's cavalry took a battery of 13 guns, and the Cossacks of General Emanuel, five. The enemy drew off towards Siegeritz and Pfosen, and passed

the Partha river. General Sachen's corps, who supported General Langeron, very much distinguished itself in the presence of Buonaparté, who, it seems, according to the information of the prisoners, arrived from the other part of his army at five o'clock in the afternoon.—The corps of General D'Yorck, which so conspicuously distinguished itself, had many of its most gallant leaders killed or wounded; among the latter are Colonels Heinmütz, Kutzler, Bouch, Hiller, Lowenthal, Laurentz; Majors Schon and Bismarck. The momentary loss of these officers is serious, as they nearly all commanded brigades, from the reduced state of General Officers in the Prussian army, and I have sincere regret in adding, that his Serene Highness the Prince of Mecklenberg Strelitz, who was distinguishing himself in a particular manner, having two horses shot under him, and whose gallant corps took five hundred prisoners and an eagle, received a severe, but, I trust, not a dangerous wound. Among the Russians are General Ghinchin, and several officers of distinction, killed and wounded; and I average General Blucher's whole loss between six and seven thousand men hors de combat.—I can add little to the catalogue of the merits of this brave army in endeavouring feebly, but I hope faithfully, to detail its proceedings. Your Lordship will, I am persuaded, justly appreciate the enthusiasm and heroism by which its operations have been guided. It has fought twenty-one combats since hostilities recommenced. Your Lordship is so well aware of the distinguished merit and very eminent services of General Gneisenau, that it is unnecessary for me on this fresh occasion to allude to them.—I attached General Lowe to General Blucher in the field; and being absent in the early part of the day with the Prince Royal, it is due to this very deserving officer to inform your Lordship I have derived every assistance from his reports.—My Aid-de-Camp, Captain During, an officer of merit, has, unfortunately, I fear, fallen into the enemy's hands.—I shall now put your Lordship in possession, as far as I am able, of the military movements of the grand army up to the 16th, and the disposition for the attack which was sent to the Prince Royal of Sweden and General Blucher, by Prince Schwartzenburg, and which was to be made this day. The corps of General Guilay, Prince Maurice Lichtenstein, Thieleman, and Platoff, were collected in the neighbourhood of Marktrasted, and were to move

forward on Leipsig; keeping up the communication on one side with General Blucher's army, and on the other, these corps were to detach to their right, to facilitate the attack of the corps of General Mereveldt, and the divisions Bianchi Weissenworf, on Zwackau and Connowitz, at which latter place the bridge across the Pleisse was to be carried. General Nostiltz's cavalry were to form on their right. In case of retreat, these corps were to retire towards Zeitz.—The reserves of the Russian and Prussian guards were to move on Rotha, where they were to pass the Pleisse, and form in columns on its right bank. The reserves of the Prince of Hesse Homberg, Generals Mereveldt and Wittgenstein, were also to take post at this station.—General Barclay de Tolly to command all the columns on the right bank of the Pleisse, Generals Wittgenstein, Kleist, and Kleinau, were to advance from their respective positions on Leipsig, the Russian guards forming their reserve. General Colloredo advanced from Borne, as reserve to General Kleinau. The retreat of these corps was to be on Chiemnitz. Generals Wittgenstein, Kleist, and Kleinau's, on Altenberg and Penig.—The army of General Bennigsen from Colditz was to push on Grimma and Wurtzen. The corps of Count Bubna had been relieved before Leipsig by General Tolstoy.—A very heavy firing continued all the day of the 16th from the grand army. A report arrived late at night to General Blucher; that Buonaparté had attacked in person the whole line of the Allies, and forming his cavalry in the centre, succeeded in making an opening in the combined army before all its cavalry could come up; he was, however, not able to profit by it, as it appears he retired in the evening, and the Allies occupied their position as before the attack.—Of the details of the above I am as yet wholly ignorant.—On the 17th all were ready to renew the attack on this side. The Prince Royal, who had his head-quarters at Landsberg, and his army behind it, marched at two o'clock in the morning, and arrived at Brittenfeld, with General Winzingerode's and General Bulow's corps towards mid-day on General Bulow's left. General Winzingerode's cavalry and artillery had moved forward in the night, near the heights of Faucha.—No cannonade being heard on this side of the grand army (though General Blucher's corps was under arms), and as it was also understood Gen. Bennigsen could not arrive until this day at

Grimma, and part of the Prince Royal's army being still in the rear, it was deemed expedient to wait till the following day to renew the general attack. The enemy shewed himself in great force in a good position, on the left of the Partha, on a ridge of some extent, which runs parallel to the river. There was some cannonading in the morning, and the enemy made demonstrations, and the hussars of Mecklenberg charged his advanced parties into the suburbs of Leipzig, and took three cannon and some prisoners of the hulans of the guards.—The state of our affairs is such, that the most sanguine expectations may be justly entertained, under the protection of Divine Providence, which has hitherto so conspicuously favoured us in the glorious cause in which we are engaged.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CHAS. STEWART, Lieut.-Gen.

Leipzig, Oct. 19, 1813.

My Lord,—Europe at length approaches her deliverance, and England may triumphantly look forward to reap, in conjunction with her Allies, that glory her unexampled and steady efforts in the common cause so justly entitle her to receive.—I wish it had fallen to the lot of an abler pen to detail to your Lordship the splendid events of these two last days; but in endeavouring to relate the main facts, to send them off without a moment's delay, I shall best do my duty, postponing more detailed accounts until a fresh opportunity.—The victory of General Blücher, upon the 16th, has been followed, on the 18th, by that of the whole of the combined forces over the army of Buonaparté, in the neighbourhood of Leipzig.—The collective loss of above a hundred pieces of cannon, sixty thousand men, an immense number of prisoners, the desertion of the whole of the Saxon army, also the Bavarian and Württemberg troops, consisting of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, many Generals, among whom are Regnier, Vallery, Brune, Bertrand, and Lauriston, are some of the first fruits of this glorious day. The capture, by assault, of the town of Leipzig this morning, the magazines, artillery, stores of the place, with the King of Saxony, all his court, the garrison, and rear-guard of the French army, all the enemy's wounded (the number of which exceed thirty thousand) the narrow escape of Buonaparté, who fled from Leipzig at nine o'clock, the Allies entering at eleven; the complete deroute of the French army; who are endeavouring to escape in all directions, and who are still surrounded, are the next objects of exultation.—The further result your Lordship can best arrive at from an account of our military position.—It will be my endeavour to give you as succinct and clear an account as I am able, first, of the general and combined operations determined upon by the grand army; and, secondly, to describe what immediately came under my own observations, namely, the movements of the Prince Royal and General Blücher.—My dispatches up to the 17th have detailed the position of the allied armies up to that date. It being announced by Prince Schwartzberg that it was the intention of their Majesties, the allied Sovereigns, to renew the attack on the 18th, and the armies of the North and Silesia being directed to co-operate, the following general disposition was made:—I must here observe, that the attack on the 16th, by the grand army, occurred in the neighbourhood of Liebert Wolkowitz. The country being particularly adapted for cavalry, a very sanguinary and hard combat ensued with this arm, and an artillery, exceeding in number six hundred pieces, between the opposed armies. Two solitary buildings, which the enemy had occupied with several battalions of infantry, and which formed nearly the centre of the enemy's position, were attacked by the Russian infantry, and after several repulses, carried with amazing carnage.—The whole of the enemy's cavalry under Murat, were then brought forward: they made a very desperate push at the centre of the allied position, which for a short period they succeeded in forcing.—To oppose this powerful cavalry, six regiments of Austrian cuirassiers charged in columns. Nothing could surpass either the skill or the desperate bravery of this movement: they overthrew all before them; destroying, I am told, whole regiments, and returned to their ground with many prisoners, having left seven hundred dragoons within the enemy's line.—Many officers were killed and wounded. General Latour Maubourg, who commanded the enemy's cavalry, under Murat, lost his leg. Both armies remained nearly on the ground on which the contest commenced.—While the grand army was to commence their attack on the morning of the 18th, from their different points of assembly, on the principal villages situated on the great roads leading to Leipzig, the armies of the North and Silesia were jointly to attack from the line of the Saale, and upon the

enemy's position along the Partha river. General Blucher gave to the Prince Royal of Sweden thirty thousand men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, of his army, and with this formidable reinforcement, the Northern army was to attack from the heights of Faucha, while General Blucher was to retain his position before Leipsig, and use his utmost efforts to gain possession of the place.—In the event of the whole of the enemy's forces being carried against either of the armies, they were reciprocally to support each other and concert further movements: that part of the enemy's force which for some time had been opposed to the Prince Royal of Sweden and General Blucher, had taken up a very good position on the left bank of the Partha, having its right at the strong point of Faucha, and its left towards Leipsig.—To force the enemy's right, and obtain possession of the heights of Faucha, was the first operation of the Prince Royal's army. The corps of Russians under General Winzingerode, and the Prussians under General Bulow, were destined for this purpose, and the Swedish army were directed to force the passage of the river at Plosen and Mockau.

—The passage was effected without much opposition. General Winzingerode took about three thousand prisoners at Faucha, and some guns.—General Blucher put his army in motion as soon as he found the grand army engaged very hotly in the neighbourhood of the villages of Stollintz and Probestheyda, and the infantry of the Prince Royal's army had not sufficient time to make their flank movement before the enemy's infantry had abandoned the line of the river, and retired over the plain in line and column, towards Leipsig, occupying Somerfeldt, Paunsdorff, and Schonfeldt, in strength, protecting their retreat.—A very heavy cannonade and some brilliant performances of General Winzingerode's cavalry marked chiefly here the events of the day, except towards the close, when General Langeron, who had crossed the river, attacked the village of Schonfeldt, met with considerable resistance, and at first was not able to force his way. He, however, took it, but was driven back, when the most positive orders were sent him by General Blucher, to re-occupy it at the point of the bayonet; which he accomplished before dark. Some Prussian battalions of General Bulow's corps were warmly engaged also at Paunsdorff, and the enemy were retiring from it, when the Prince Royal directed the rocket brigade,

under Captain Bogue, to form on the left of a Prussian battery, and open upon the columns retiring. Congreve's formidable weapon had scarce accomplished the point of paralysing a solid square of infantry, which after one fire delivered themselves up (as if panic struck), when that gallant and deserving officer, Captain Bogue, alike an ornament to his profession, and a loss to his friends and country, received a shot in the head, which deprived the army of his services. Lieutenant Strangways, who succeeded to the command of the brigade, received the Prince Royal's thanks for the services they rendered.—During the action twenty-two guns of Saxon artillery joined us from the enemy, and two Westphalian regiments of hussars and two battalions of Saxons; the former were opportunely made use of in the instant against the enemy, as our artillery and ammunition were not all forward; and the Prince Royal addressed the latter by an offer, that he would head them immediately against the enemy, which they to a man accepted.

—The communication being now established between the grand attacks and that of these two armies, the Grand Duke Constantine, Generals Platoff, Milardovitch, and other officers of distinction, joined the Prince Royal, communicating the events carrying on in that direction.—It seems the most desperate resistance was made by the enemy at Probothede, Stelleritz, and Counévitz; but the different columns bearing on these points, as detailed in my former dispatch, finally carried every thing before them. General Bennigsen taking the villages upon the right bank of the Reutshove, having been joined by General Bubna from Dresden, General Tolstoy having come up and relieved the former in the blockade of that city, and General Guilay manœuvring with twenty-five thousand Austrians upon the left bank of the Elster, General Thielman and Prince Maurice Lichtenstein's corps moved upon the same river, and the result of the day was, that the enemy lost above forty thousand men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, sixty-five pieces of artillery, and seventeen battalions of German infantry, with all their Staff and Generals, which came over en masse during the action.—The armies remained upon the ground on which they had so bravely conquered, this night. The Prince Royal had his bivouac at Paunsdorff: General Blucher's remained at Witteritz, and the Emperor's and the King's at Roda.—About the close of the day, it was under-

stood the enemy were retiring by Weissenfels and Naumburg; General Blucher received an order from the King of Prussia to detach in that direction. The movement of the Prince Royal's army completely excluded the retreat on Wittenberg, that upon Erfurt had long since been lost to them; the line of the Saale alone remains, and as their flanks and rear will be operated upon during their march, it is difficult to say with what portion of their army they may get to the Rhine.—This morning the town of Leipzig was attacked and carried after a short resistance, by the armies of General Blucher, the Prince Royal, and General Bennigsen, and the grand army. Marshals Marmont and Macdonald commanded in the town; these, with Marshals Angereau and Victor, narrowly escaped, with a small escort.—Their Majesties the Emperor of Russia, and the King of Prussia, and the Crown Prince of Sweden, each heading their respective troops, entered the town at different points, and met in the Great Square. The acclamations and rejoicings of the people are not to be described.—The multiplicity of brilliant achievements, the impossibility of doing justice to the firmness that has been displayed, the boldness of the conception of the Commander in Chief, Field-Marshal the Prince Schwartzenberg, and of the other experienced leaders; together with the shortness of the time allowed me for making up this dispatch, will plead, I hope, a sufficient excuse for my not sending a more accurate or perfect detail, which I hope, however, to do hereafter.—I send this dispatch by my Aid-de-Camp, Mr. James, who has been distinguished for his services since he has been with this army; he has also been with me in all the late events, and will be able to give your Lordship all further particulars.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) CHAS. STEWART, Lt.-Gen.

P.S. On the field of battle this day an officer arrived from General Tettenborn, bringing the information of the surrender of Bremen to the corps under his orders, and the keys of the town, which were presented by the Prince Royal to the Emperor of Russia. C. S.

LONDON GAZETTE, Nov. 2, 1813.

Downing Street, Nov. 1, 1813.

A Dispatch, of which the following is an extract, was yesterday received at Lord Bathurst's Office, addressed to his Lordship by Field-Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, dated Vera, Oct. 18, 1813.

The enemy moved General Paris's division from Oleron to the neighbourhood of St. Jean de Pied le Port, as soon as our left made its movement on the 7th instant.

—On the night of the 12th the enemy attacked and carried the redoubt in the camp of Sarre, which was held by a picquet of forty men of the army of reserve of Andalusia, who were taken, as well as one hundred pioneers. There is reason to believe that they were surprised, as the reserve for the support of the redoubt had not time to give the picquet assistance. This redoubt was certainly more distant from the line, and from the ground from which it could be supported, than I had imagined it to be when I had directed that it should be occupied, and it was so near to the houses of the village of Sarre as always to be liable to an attack by surprise, I have therefore not allowed it to be re-occupied. After having possession of the redoubt, the enemy made an attack on the morning of the 13th, upon the advanced posts of the army of Andalusia, under the command of Mariscal de Campo Don Pedro Gijou, with a view to regain possession of those works which they had lost on the 8th, which they constructed in front of the camp of Sarre. It was at first imagined and reported, that the real attack was on the side of the Hermitage of La Rhume, but it was confined entirely to the advanced posts of the army of Andalusia, and was repulsed by them without difficulty.—I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of Mariscal de Campo Don P. Giron, and the General Staff and other officers, and the soldiers under his command upon this occasion. I had again occasion to observe particularly the steadiness of the regiment of Ordenes, under the command of Colonel Hore.—Nothing of importance has occurred on any part of the line, but it appears that the enemy have been reinforced by considerable bodies of recruits, raised by the recent conscriptions.—I have received no reports from Catalonia since I addressed your Lordship last.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

ABUSE OF AUSTRIA. — I observed, some weeks ago, that the everlasting-war faction were beginning to abuse the Emperor of Austria and his advisers. They have, from that time to this, been increasing in the foulness of their insinuations against that leading Power of the coalition; till, in the COURIER of the 4th instant, they came to downright *abuse*; calling Austria a disgraced Power; asserting that the world owes its late degradation to her; and, insisting, that, if she pursue the line of policy marked out in her Declaration, *she ought to be opposed in the field by the Allies!*—These sentiments are not expressed in a brief, hasty paragraph; but are stated in an elaborate essay, evidently intended to prepare the public mind for the adoption of measures agreeing with such sentiments.—The writer, notwithstanding the sentiments of the Allies have been so clearly expressed in their Declaration from Frankfort, has the hardihood to speak of the rejecting of any peace, which should permit Napoleon to retain even his throne. The writer appears to treat that Declaration as the product of folly, which ought to be checked in its progress; and to be prepared to make war upon all those who issued it. He speaks, too, like one who is in *no fear of punishment* for this impudent attack upon the principal of the allied Powers; like one who is confident that he runs no risk; like one who feels that he stands upon safe ground.—Seeing the vast importance of the conduct of Austria in this crisis; seeing that the duration of the war and the nature of the peace, if peace be made, must depend materially, and almost entirely upon her will, it seems to me to be of the utmost consequence, that the people of this country should entertain correct notions relative to the conduct of that Power. I will, therefore, extract the particular passage, which has thus excited my attention, and will offer a few remarks upon it.—“If,” says this writer, “it be urged, that Austria, whose accession to the coalition was “the great lever by which the power of

“Buonaparté was overthrown, has made “this line of policy a *sine qua non* of her “adherence to that coalition, I answer, “that the impolicy of her determination “should be combated in the councils, but, “if that were invincible, it *should be rejected in the field by the Allies*. The “fate of Europe for generations must not, “ought not, to be compromised in the “mistaken feelings or latent ambition of “an individual. To that individual, it “must be recollected, *Europe owes the “disgrace of having grafted a branch of its “ancient dynasties upon the spurious ex- “crescence of a Corsican Pubescent*. To “that disgraceful submission, to which the “loss of empire and of life, in the repre- “sentative of the Cæsars, should have “been preferred, we owe the present aw- “ful and fatal pause in the decision of the “destinies of Europe. *The degradation of “Austria, alas! in the decline of her for- “tunes, has furnished the means for the “degradation of the world, in her eleva- “tion*. I feel ALMOST PROPHETI- “CALLY WARNED to the conviction, “that she will fall the first victim to the “vigour of the refreshed giant, and that “her fate will be the precursor of the sub- “jugation of Europe.”—The reader will, I am sure, agree with me, that this is, at least, a very violent attack upon the House of Austria; not upon the Govern- ment only, but upon the person and family of the Sovereign. It is an attack in that part where human nature tells us men feel most acutely; and, therefore, under the present circumstances, it must be clear to every one, that, even if just, such an at- tack was very impolitic and imprudent. But, as I said before, the writer seems to have wished to prepare the public mind for actual measures corresponding with his sentiments; and, if so, it might be deemed prudent to begin by times to endeavour to excite, in the people of England, suspicion and contempt of the Government and So- vereign of Austria.—I, however, look upon this attack as being *unjust* as well as *impolitic*; and, as I most anxiously wish that a peace may be made, founded on the

principles of the Declaration of our Allies, dated at Frankfort on the 1st of December, I shall endeavour to show, that Austria, with whom, I hope, we shall continue in cordial alliance for the purpose of making peace, does not merit the abuse, which this lover of war has heaped upon her; or, at least, that she is free of all blame upon the points which he has selected as matters of accusation against her.—This writer insists, that *no peace* ought to be made with Napoleon; that he ought to be extinguished; that the Bourbons ought to be restored; or, at the very least, that he ought to be shut up within the ancient boundaries of France; and, of course, that the extended limits, of which the Declaration speaks, ought not to have been offered, and ought not to be conceded.—Now, in the first place, it does not appear, that Austria *alone* issued that Declaration: It was, on the contrary, issued by *all* the continental Allies: by “*their Imperial and Royal Majesties.*” Supposing, therefore, that instrument to contain what is wrong, I see no reason for accusation against Austria, any more than against Russia and Prussia. Why, therefore, this virulence against Austria alone? It has always been the custom of the everlasting war-faction to fall foul upon the continental Powers, upon the slightest surmises, when those seemed indisposed to sacrifice their all to gratify the selfish views of this horrible faction. Is it any wonder if England is disliked upon the Continent, and if her cheerings to war are listened to with caution?—But, supposing the Declaration to have been owing solely to Austria, and that her design was and is to leave Napoleon an extension of territory. How can she be reasonably blamed for this by *us*? What right have *we* to complain of her and to abuse her for this? She is, surely, the best judge of the means of giving peace and security to her own dominions and to the petty States within her vortex. It is possible that she may be deceived; it is possible, that she may leave France too strong for her; but, what have *we* to do with that? How does that justify *us* in endeavouring to rouse and arm the rest of the Powers against her?—I shall be told, perhaps, that if her Declaration were put in execution, it would leave France too strong for *us*; and that, therefore, we have a right to complain.—But, if we stand upon this ground, we make a very awkward figure; for, the fact escapes, that, after all our professions of disinterestedness, we, at bottom, look upon the Allies

as fighting for *us* as much as for themselves; nay *more* than for themselves, because *we* are not satisfied with that peace, which, in their own opinions, would give *them* perfect security, and that would ensure happiness to their several dominions. The Declaration says, that they will not lay down their arms, till they have ensured the *permanent peace and stability of all the States of Europe*; and yet this writer abuses Austria, looking upon her as the author of this Declaration, which he imputes, as we shall see by-and-by, to a selfish and even a base motive.—It will be said, perhaps, that that Declaration was issued without consulting *us*. Very likely; but, if it was, what could it embrace more than the independence, the permanent security, the happiness, the honour, *of all the States of Europe*? And, I beg to know, *who* was to issue this Declaration but those who had the arms in their hands; but those who had won the victories which had driven the French across the Rhine? Were the Powers, whose territories bordered on France; were they, to whose people peace and safety were of such great importance, to stop till they had the *leave of England* to declare the grounds upon which they were ready to sheathe the sword? The idea is so presumptuous, that the bare starting of it is enough to excite disgust.—Besides, what claim had we upon the Allies? Had we avowed our readiness to submit to them the settling and determining *the extent of our power*?—They had won the victories themselves, and that, too, at the risk of their very crowns. Their capitals had been once entered by the Power with whom they had to contend. Those capitals had been spared; but they might not have been spared again. They risked their *all*; perhaps the very existence of the Sovereigns themselves, and, if they had failed, should *we* have indemnified them? Upon what ground, then, can we, who *risked nothing*, condemn them for offering such terms of peace as to them appear likely to ensure the permanent stability of their thrones and the happiness of their States? And, more especially, what ground could we have to complain, if we had not made known to them our readiness to submit our conquests and the limits of our extended power to their discussion and control?—So far from this, however, we see it daily asserted by the very same writers who are most forward in abusing Austria, that *our* maritime rights and pretensions; that *our* blockading even

of the ports of the Allies; that our practice of stopping neutrals upon the high seas and of taking persons out of them at the discretion of our officers; that *none of these are to be suffered to be brought into discussion by the Allies*; and yet, these same writers abuse the government and insult the Sovereign of Austria, because that power is willing to leave Napoleon with an *extension of territory*! And because she has dared to do this without first obtaining *our approbation*!—These writers seem always, in these cases, to forget that we, too, have been, and are, *conquerors*. They dwell at great length on the ambition and on the conquests (which they call *robberies*) of Napoleon; but, they overlook our conquests; they overlook our capture of colonies and of whole kingdoms; they overlook that extension of maritime power, which has enabled us to engross all the commerce of Europe; they overlook that extension of power, by the means of which we have been enabled to dictate the law upon every coast, to shut out or let in, to seize or give pass-ports at our will and pleasure. But, if they overlook these things, do they suppose that the Allies will overlook them too, and that the latter, before they abridge the power of France to the degree requested by England, will not ask a question or two about the increased extent of the English power? Or, do these vain men imagine, that the Allies are not only to go on reducing France merely to please us, without inquiring what use we shall make of our increased power, but, that they will run the risk of being again beaten, and of being totally ruined, in the contest; in a contest *for us*, who will not suffer them so much as to discuss the subject of our pretensions; no, not even where those pretensions affect themselves? Do these writers imagine this? I believe they do; but, if their imaginations are acted upon, it is not difficult to foresee, that the result must be disappointment and disgrace. —The writer, upon whose sentiments I am commenting, is ready, it seems, to set *Austria at defiance*, in case she does not change her policy. Of this brilliant project I will speak by-and-by, when I have adverted to the other accusations against this power. —The writer says, and he speaks like a man who feels no fear on the score of the *libel law*, “that Europe owes *its disgrace* to Austria,” and desires it to be “*recollected*,” that, out of fear, the Emperor of Austria, *disgracefully submitted* to the ingrafting a branch of its ancient

dynasty “upon the *spurious excrescence* of “a Corsican Plebeian.”—Now, without commenting upon the indecency of this language, does not every one see how base is this accusation? This writer is daily praising the Crown Prince of Sweden; he knows that we have acknowledged the *legitimacy* of his authority; that we have ceded an island to that Prince; and that that Prince is one of the very dynasty for uniting himself with which this writer censures the Emperor Francis, calling the union disgraceful, and imputing it to the basest of all possible motives! Besides, why, if this were just ground of censure, confine it to the Emperor Francis? Has not the Elector of Bavaria given his daughter in marriage to Eugene Beauharnois; and is not our late Princess Royal (the Queen of Wirtemberg) the mother-in-law of Jerome Buonaparte? Why, then, is this malicious and foolish charge confined to the Emperor of Austria? How can it have been *disgraceful* to him to ally himself with the head of that family of which the Crown Prince is a member, unless it be disgraceful to us to have recognized the validity of the Crown Prince's title? Austria is, by this inflammatory writer, said to have been *degraded* by the marriage of the daughter of the Emperor with the Emperor of France; and yet, we are by no means degraded by our recognition of the Crown Prince's title, which stands upon no other base than that of the recommendation of this same Emperor of France. —It is to be observed, too, that this writer puts the connexion in the most odious light. He represents Austria as having consented to the marriage; namely, as having been produced by the fears of Austria; as if the Emperor Francis gave up his daughter as the price of his own safety! —It is added, that he ought to have *preferred the loss of empire and of life too* to such *disgraceful submission*. This is the way of these writers. They think nothing of the *loss of empire and of life* amongst the powers of Europe. They think, or, at least, they write as if they thought, that all those powers were created and are sustained for no other earthly use, than that of fighting against those whom *we* wish to pull down. It is very easy for us, safe behind the ocean, to talk thus lightly of the loss of empire and of life. But, when it suited our purposes to make peace, we made it, and left our ally the King of Sardinia to shift for himself. —We made peace with Napoleon, leaving him in Italy and in part

of Germany, and leaving him, in fact, master of Holland; and, by what rule of morality are the Allies to refrain from making peace with him now? Why are they to consult us, who never consulted them at Amiens?—As to what this writer says about *selling Austria at defiance*, it is little better than the dream of a maniac. She is to be first combated in council; but, if that fails, the other of the Allies are to *reject her policy in the field*; that is to say, they are to *fight her*; for there can be no other meaning in the words. They are to fight her in order to compel her to continue fighting against France! In other words, a new war is to commence, in which France and Austria and Naples are to fight against Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and us; for, as to Holland, the work is not yet above half done in that country.

If this were to take effect, we should see the French at Berlin again in two months, and much sooner than that at Amsterdam.—What can these writers mean, then, by thus abusing and insulting Austria?—One would imagine, that they meant to do all the mischief in their power. They do, in one respect, for they wish to *prevent peace* at any price. But, their efforts must be unavailing if the Emperors of Austria and France agree upon the basis of peace. These two powers may dictate a peace to the Continent; and, as they have both the same interests with regard to Russia and Prussia, I think, that there can be no doubt of peace taking place.—Russia, owing to the connivance of France, has poked her nose a good distance into the system of Europe. It has always been the policy of the Court of Vienna to keep her back. This policy will now revive, and will more easily admit of being enforced. Austria will no longer stand in need of the aid of Russia or Prussia. In short, every thing seems to me to combine to render peace between France and Austria a work of facility and of cordiality.—A general peace must be the consequence, unless we stick out; and, if we stick out, we shall have a war of the most irksome, and, very soon, of the most unpopular kind, to sustain.—The *terms*, which have been talked of, seem not likely to have been proposed; but, I think it probable, that the boundary of France will extend to the Rhine, Austria receiving an indemnity elsewhere. If this be the case, *Antwerp* will remain in the hands of Napoleon; and, indeed, if Austria abandons all pretensions to her territories in that quarter, she can

have no desire to diminish the *maritime* means of Napoleon, especially as she so well knows how Holland will stand with regard to us.—Our increased maritime power will, in her opinion, perhaps, stand in need of something to balance it. That balance is not to be found in Holland, where we have an army, and where we have so close a connexion with the rulers. Austria and Russia too may, therefore, not wish to destroy or to cripple the navy of France; but, rather to see it rise to something like a match for ours. In this case, the fleet in the Scheldt will not be destroyed, even supposing the Allies to have the power of destroying it.—There is no doubt that our government will endeavour to procure such terms of peace as shall drive the French across the Rhine and out of the Brabants; but, it requires a larger view of things than we have been, of late, accustomed to take, in order to be able to judge, with any chance of correctness, what is likely to be the result of the measures and projects now on foot; but, at any rate, it is impossible that it can be wise in us to abuse the Austrian government, who has so much in its power as to the making of peace.

INVASION OF FRANCE.—France is, at last, actually invaded by a large army, and the Emperor Napoleon appeals to the *French people, and calls on them to rally round him*. We shall now have complete proof, in a very few weeks, upon the most interesting of all points: namely, whether the people of France be really *for or against him*. They will now, if they wish to cast him off, have the power to do it with safety; and, if they do not do it, we must take it for granted, that they desire not to change.—As to the act of invasion it is nothing in itself. It is only walking across an undefended boundary, which boundary is of no other nature than that between Middlesex and Essex. If Napoleon has an army of any thing like the numerical force of the invaders, he will, if the people be on his side, assuredly beat these invaders; and, one battle lost by them will lose them the half of what they have gained.—Perhaps the invasion has proceeded upon the supposition that in France the invaders will find friends. It is not impossible that they may; but, in such a case, disappointment will be death.—The measure which Napoleon has adopted of sending *Extraordinary Commissioners* into the several countries menaced by the enemy puts one

in mind of the Commissaries, sent into the departments, during the revolution; and, it certainly shows, that he thinks great precautions to be necessary.—Yet, the language of himself and that of the Reporter from the Committee do not discover *fear of the result*. There is no attempt made to *disguise* any thing from the people; and this, to me, is a sign, that he has confidence in them.—We are not told what particular preparations are made, or are making, to receive the enemy and to repulse him; but, we are not to conclude from that, that very great preparations are not made; and, it is by no means impossible, that Napoleon may wish to suffer the enemy to penetrate to a certain distance before he gives him battle.—All this, however, is merely conjecture. A few weeks, or a few days, may furnish us with facts.—In the mean while, our newspapers are publishing and re-publishing, day after day, the Proclamation of Louis XVIII. and giving their readers to understand, that it is *our* object to push on the war, till the Bourbons are on the throne. It must be very encouraging to the French people to see, that this Proclamation is patronised by those, who scruple not to designate the whole French nation as worthy of *punishment* for their past sins, and, at other times, to urge the necessity of crippling France for the good of mankind in general.—If these benevolent persons should live to see their wishes fulfilled, we may save ourselves the trouble of pitying the French; for, certainly, they will deserve no pity. They tell us, that, if the Bourbons were restored, there would be “*no fear of the ancient abuses being re-established,*” which is confessing, at once, that the French did right in getting rid of the Old Government, though these people would have them punished for so doing.—If Napoleon is to fall, it is not beyond the compass of hope, that the *Republic* may revive; or, at least, that a something will arise, that will give a little new energy to the minds of men. It is of far less consequence who rules in France, than that France, the finest part of the world, should contain the elements for putting the rest of Europe in motion. Nothing is so much to be dreaded as a quiet, calm despotism, let who will be the despot.—Who knows, that, out of all this a state of things may not arise, in which men may not again, from the press of Paris, utter wholesome *truths*, without the fear of being killed for so doing? If

such should be the effect of our pushing on the war, we shall yet have to thank those who are urging it forward.—There is one passage in the Report of the *Count de Fontanes*, which is truly diabolical. After blaming the Allies for appealing to the people, in the Declaration from Frankfort, he proceeds thus:—“May not this example be fatal? Should it be given, especially at this period, when people’s minds, agitated by all the *diseases of pride*, are so averse to bending under the authority which protects them, while it represses their audacity? And against whom is this indirect attack aimed? Against a great man, who merited the gratitude of all Kings, because by re-establishing the throne of France, he has closed up the crater of the volcano which threatened them all.”—This is, perhaps, one of the most wicked, as well as one of the most impudent paragraphs that ever dropped from the lips of mortal man. This is really making a merit of one’s shame. It was enough, one would have thought, for the people of France to know, that their sacrifices for freedom had been made almost in vain, without being insulted in this style; and being told, that their ruler, who now calls upon them to bleed afresh, had been the cause of their failure, and that he gloried in it. Let us hope that this is not a fair translation. If it be, Mr. Fontanes deserves to be tossed down into the deepest well in Paris. What! have the impudence to tell the people of France, that it is a merit in Buonaparté to have prevented them from destroying all those, by whom their country is now invaded! I should not be sorry if this paragraph were to be crammed down the throat of Monsieur de Fontanes at the point of a Cossack’s spear.—But, what have the Antijacobins to say against it? It is in their style and manner, and breathes their sentiments. They went to war against the French people, in part, because they appealed to the people against their government. This was one of our alleged grounds of the war. The famous decree of November 1792 was alleged by us as a ground of war against the French; and, therefore, those who approved of that war, cannot find fault with the sentiments of Monsieur de Fontanes.—Monsieur de Fontanes speaks of the Proclamation of the Duke of Brunswick, and of the indignant spirit which that roused in the French. But, Monsieur de Fontanes, a word in your ear! The French people were not then told by

their government, that "their minds were agitated by all the diseases of pride, and that they ought to bend under the authority that repressed their audacity." No: they were then called upon to deliver their country from the invasion of despots; that they were going to meet death or secure liberty. They were not told, that it was for thrones that they were to shed their blood; and, accordingly, they met, at once, and defeated the foe. It was the people who were then directly appealed to on both sides. There were no committees, making reports to Emperors, and Emperors making speeches to committees. The call was direct and plain, and it was answered by the voluntary march of hundreds of thousands.

—This speech, or rather this part of the speech of Monsieur de Fontanes, is more offensive than any thing I ever read as coming from the government of France. It indicates almost as great a contempt of the people as the sentiments which we sometimes hear uttered by pampered insolent men in this country; sentiments, the utterance of which I thought would not have been endured in any country but our own.

THE BOURBONS.—Insolent, however, as is Monsieur de Fontanes, we must not put the sway of Napoleon in comparison, for a moment, with the horrible government of the Bourbons. Our newspapers have published, for the third time, a Proclamation of Louis XVIII; and, in my next Number, I will, in behalf of the French people, give an answer to this Proclamation.

WM. COBBETT.

ECCE HOMO.

MR. COBBETT.—I trust I shall not incur the charge of dogmatism when I state, that there is nothing regarded amongst mankind in general of greater importance than religion. It is by instilling its mysterious doctrines into the minds of youth, that character is formed;—it is by unceasingly inculcating these tenets, during their riper years, they are tutored to fill that place in society to which they are destined; it is in the execution of all their after projects through life, that religion is allowed to exercise its imposing influence; and finally, when death approaches to close this mortal scene, it is then that the aid of Religion is sought for, above all things, to encourage the wretched, and to console the virtuous.

of the fate of nations: fraught with

consequences so decisive of the happiness, and of the misery of the human race, where is the individual who can regard with indifference the discussion of topics which involve concerns of so vast a magnitude? —Who is the man that can put his hand upon his heart, and say, "I am no way interested in the fate of Religion?"

These reflections, Mr. Cobbett, have arisen in my mind, on observing that the doctrines of Christianity—of that religion which all Europe acknowledges to be divine, have been lately attacked in a most unprecedented manner; and which, in my humble apprehension, is calculated to overthrow our national faith, if an antidote is not provided against so terrible an evil. That I am not now writing at random, but from a deep conviction of the truth of what I say, will appear when you consider the following facts:—I have now almost reached my fiftieth year. I was brought up with a strict and pious regard for all the observances of the Church; and, I think, I entertained as sincere a belief of its more essential doctrines as any of my neighbours. —In fact, till within these few months, it never once entered into my mind, that it was possible to doubt the truth of any part of a religion, which had been professed, in this quarter of the globe, for so many ages—which had been warmly cherished by the learned, whose province it is to judge of these matters—and adopted by men celebrated in every country for their probity and talents. A circumstance, however, has occurred, which has somewhat shaken this conviction.—I am a constant reader of your Register, in which I have recently observed frequent allusion made to a work, entitled, "Ecce Homo," written, it appears, for the express purpose of bringing the Christian Religion into discredit. Unaccustomed as I had been to look into works of that description, it will not be supposed, considering my state of mind, that I was very curious about this dangerous production. Indeed, I felt no desire to see it; and, probably, I would have continued equally indifferent respecting it, had you, Mr. Cobbett, not come forward, and given importance to the book by candidly acknowledging that a perusal of its pages had staggered your faith; or at least had created considerable doubts in your mind as to some of the leading points of our religion. This avowal led me immediately to purchase *Ecce Homo*, which I have since perused with a mind as much divested of prejudice as could be expected in my situation. In that work I have found

much to shock my feelings, but more to confound my understanding. Its perusal has in fact had the same effect upon me that it had upon you: it has given rise to so many difficulties in my mind, that I find it impossible to get over them without the assistance which you also are in want of. Most cordially, therefore, do I concur in your intention to submit your doubts to the head of the Church, because, in doing that, there is a chance of my difficulties, and the difficulties of thousands more, who have read *Ecce Homo*, being removed by the splendid talents which are so very conspicuous in the whole body of the clergy.

It is particularly gratifying to find, that the prosecution which was commenced against the publisher of *Ecce Homo*, has been abandoned.—I trust I shall not be disappointed in regarding this as a pledge of the intention of the secular power to combat the reasonings of the writer by reason rather than by the sword. *Ecce Homo* might no doubt be easily suppressed, but this would not convince any one of the falsehood of its doctrines: on the contrary, it would tend to confirm their doubts, and give to the arguments of the author greater weight than they probably deserve; whereas candid and open discussion must expose his errors, if he has committed any, and finally ensure the triumph of truth over falsehood and infidelity.—I am respectfully yours,

A LOVER OF TRUTH.

London, Jan. 6, 1814.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRENCH DOCUMENTS.

(Continued from Vol. XXIV, page 832.)

ders the questions of the moment in their consequences towards her, because his conduct during the continuation of his residence at Prague has been irrevocably regulated by the obligation of his Court towards that whose mediation she had accepted.—He avails himself of this occasion, &c.

(Signed) D'ANSTETT.

Prague, July 26 (Aug. 7), 1813.

Copy of a Note from M. De Humboldt to his Excellency Count de Metternich.

The undersigned Minister of State, and Plenipotentiary from his Majesty the King of Prussia, yesterday received the Note of the French Plenipotentiaries, which his Excellency Count de Metternich, Minister of State and for Foreign Affairs, and Plenipotentiary from his Majesty the Emperor of

Austria, had the goodness to communicate to him.—When their Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Russia hastened to accept the mediation of the Court of Vienna, and thereby proving both their desire of terminating the calamities of war, and their deference for his Imperial and Royal Austrian Majesty, they might have supposed that their adversary would have equally respected this mediation, and that they would have been safe from seeing so false and injurious an interpretation given to their intentions. The Note which has been just communicated to the undersigned proves, that this expectation was illusory. The conduct of the French Plenipotentiaries is deficient in all the respect due to the mediating Court, and destroys at once all hopes of peace, by gratuitously supposing, in the Allied Courts, views contrary to its re-establishment; and they pervert, instead of answering, in a plain and natural manner, the Notes of the Mediator; so that, throughout, there has not been one represented in its true light, or was presented on its proper day. The undersigned abstains from analyzing the passages which regards the mediation of Vienna. To repeat its words, would be to hurt the sentiments which his Court has continually professed towards his Majesty the Emperor of Austria. The most simple notions of mediation, and the mere perusal of the Convention of the 30th of June, will be sufficient to enable us to form a judgment upon it.

—The form of the negotiations could not be agreed upon separately at Dresden between the mediating Court and the French Government. The unlimited confidence of the Allied Courts at the first rendered all further explanation useless on this point. The French Plenipotentiaries, therefore, cannot be astonished at not seeing the conferences opened, which, according to the proposal for the form of the transactions in writing, could not take place. But the undersigned might have expressed his just surprise at the delay in the arrival of the French Plenipotentiaries, and the length into which the negotiation was protracted, if it had not been the resolution of his Court to refer whatever concerned this negotiation solely to the mediating Power.—It was his regard for the benevolent mediation of his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, which alone could cause his Majesty the King of Prussia to condescend to suffer his Minister to wait during fifteen days to no purpose, for the French Plenipotentiaries; and his Excellency Count de Metternich

would certainly feel it natural, that without the same sentiments, the undersigned should deem it his duty not to continue his abode here until the actual moment, nor expose himself to see a false light thrown by France on the pure, upright, and benevolent intentions of the allied Courts.—The form of negotiation proposed in the note of the French Plenipotentiaries may be judged by i self. An union of the two opposite forms of transaction by writing, and conferences, was not possible, unless by so depriving the former of the advantages which caused it to be proposed, that they could only be preserved to appearance: therefore, it would not have been useful in any manner; and the undersigned thinks it almost superfluous to say, that he ought to continue on insisting on the form proposed by his Excellency the Count de Metternich, and which has served for the basis to a known and memorable peace. Although the note of the French Plenipotentiaries affects to apply solely to the conduct and the views of the Court of Russia (an affection which is extended to the Ministers of the two Courts), whilst the steps of Prussia and Russia, as likewise those of their agents, have constantly presented the most perfect concordance, the undersigned has no need to say, that his Majesty the King, his master, can but doubly resent that passage in it which concerns his august ally; and that it is impossible to apply to it the name which it deserves. It would be beneath all dignity to vouchsafe a reply to it. The people cannot be mistaken as to the authors of their evils. The Sovereign who, after having repulsed the most unjust aggressions, and after having succeeded, by the efforts of his faithful subjects, in destroying an army which had dared to invade his empire, has professed the most pure and the most noble desire of re-establishing a stable and solid peace, is not the one that should ever be charged with the wish of putting it off, or of prolonging the miseries of war.—The great and important question in the present transaction is, without doubt, that of peace; and Europe and posterity will easily judge, which of the two parties has opposed itself to its prompt re-establishment; whether it be the allied Courts, which, as well as the mediating Courts, have, by departing from the grand principle, to which they will ever remain faithful, of restoring a state of good order, and the general balance of power to Europe, have done every thing not to lose a single instant of those precious

moments which the repose of arms offered for the work of pacification; or whether it is the Government which, after having deferred, without any plausible pretext, the commencement of the negotiations, and after having followed up one delay by another, does not hesitate in causing to be sent, four days before the expiration of the armistice, a note similar to that which the undersigned has just examined, not without a lively and deep sense of pain, in seeing those questions on which the welfare and tranquillity of nations depend treated in such a manner.—The undersigned has the honour, &c.

(Signed)

HUMBOLDT.

Prague, August 7, 1813.

No. XXXVII.—*Note from his Excellency Count de Metternich to the Plenipotentiaries of France.*

The undersigned Minister of State and for Foreign Affairs to his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, Plenipotentiary from the Mediating Court, at the same time that he discharges himself of the communication of the official paper, dated the 7th, from the Plenipotentiaries of Russia and Prussia, thinks it his duty to reply on his part to the note which their Excellencies the Duke of Vicenza and the Count de Narbonne, Plenipotentiaries from his Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, did him the honour to address to him the day before yesterday.—As a negotiator of the convention of the 30th of June, he never consented to the two points anterior to the signature of the Act of which mention is made in their Excellencies' note. To demonstrate the error which has dictated this assertion, it will be sufficient to assure, that it would have been contrary to the dignity of his august Court, to enter into an engagement of being impartial, as that of not binding itself by any convention, even eventual, during the negotiation; and the parts of Mediator and Arbitrator are too widely different, for Austria in charging itself with the former, with the consent of the Powers interested, ever to think of arrogating to herself the attributes of the other.—Neither can the undersigned admit that he has detained his Excellency the Duke of Bassano, by the form of the conferences to be adopted in the negotiation.—The particular attention which the two Courts of Russia and Prussia might, with a regard to their political attitude, find themselves inclined to observe, relative to the choice of that form

of negotiation, has in truth been the subject of several conversations between the undersigned and his Excellency the Duke of Bassano; but the forms of a negotiation could not be unalterably regulated by the Mediator and one of the Powers concerned in the negotiation, to the exclusion of the other parties; and the arrival of the French Plenipotentiaries having experienced some delay, the mode of negotiation was touched upon by Count de Bubna, by virtue of orders which were addressed to him under date of the 17th of July, and the conferences in this respect did not lead to any result.—The undersigned formally protests against the assertion, that the pretended concert established on this subject, was caused by the manifestation of the intention of Russia to open the negotiations with a view of compromising Austria. His Majesty the Emperor would not have charged himself with the mediation between the Belligerent Powers, if he had not had confidence in their reciprocal good faith; and his penetration could no more be taken by surprise, than his impartial sincerity.—The forms of negotiation proposed to their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of France could not have been unforeseen, as being specified in the overtures made in this respect by Count de Bubna; and they are so far from being unusual in similar transactions, that they were admitted as the basis of the negotiations at Teschen, cited in support of the proposal made by the undersigned. The reasons which engaged him to prefer them at that time still subsist, and he renews his invitation to their Excellencies to adhere to them on their part.—He avails himself of this occasion, &c.

(Signed) The Count de METTERNICH.

Prague, Aug. 8, 1813.

No. XXXVIII.—*Note from the Plenipotentiaries of France to Count de Metternich.*

The undersigned Plenipotentiary from his Majesty the Emperor of the French, have received, together with the two notes, which his Excellency Count de Metternich, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and Plenipotentiary of the mediating Court, has done them the honour of addressing to them yesterday, the copies of those of the Russian and Prussian Plenipotentiaries. Penetrated with the sacred obligation, which the nature itself of their mission imposes on them, that of banishing discussion which does not tend to the realising the dearest hopes of nations, the undersigned

ed will not consider any thing in the notes transmitted to them, but those points which have a direct tendency to the works of pacification. They will likewise avoid enlarging in protestations of their desire of peace, because, however natural it may be to do ourselves that honour, this desire may regulate the spirit of negotiations, but not the progress of affairs, which ought to be treated according to established usages in their proper order, and in removing difficulties as they may occur.—It is with equal surprise and regret, that the undersigned perceive that the notes which have been transmitted to them, had for their aim the rejection of a proposal, which had to them appeared, and which in fact is, the only proper one for conciliating the diversity of opinions which has arisen concerning the form of the negotiations.—In this state of affairs, they address themselves with confidence to the Mediator, to represent to him what it is impossible not to acknowledge, that the only overture which has actually tended to commence the negotiation, was made by them. In fact, the contrariety of sentiment of the two parties, leaving the question undecided, and the opinion of the Mediator, whatever weight his wisdom and enlightened knowledge may give him, not having been able to decide it, the undersigned, influenced as much by deference to the Mediator, as by the desire of smoothing all difficulties, have consented to adopt entirely the mode which he had proposed, merely demanding that their proposal should be likewise admitted.—This would then be one step forward, for it would be unjust not to consider as such in a negotiation the total sacrifice of the pretensions of one party to the other. They were authorized to hope that after this step on their part, taken in the form desired by the Mediator, he would at length have decided on giving effect to those motives not less founded on reason, than on custom, with which they have supported their proposal in the frequent official conferences that they have had with Count de Metternich on this subject. They nevertheless see that the allied Plenipotentiaries, without combating this proposal, without replying to the considerations which have dictated it, and even without alleging any other reason than their own will, persist in their pretensions, and that the Plenipotentiary of the mediating Court, ranges himself entirely on their side, although it cannot be dissembled, that the only motive he has been able to adduce in justification of

this preference, has no longer any foundation, since that the undersigned have admitted the form proposed by him.—All the objections which could be made against the mode which they have pointed out by their note of the 6th, will fall to the ground themselves, if we reflect that it conciliates all pretensions, that it unites all the advantages of the different forms, the authenticity of negotiating in writing, with the facility and celerity of a verbal negotiation.—It would be superfluous to attend to the strange assertion, that this mode is unusual, as the most simple examination of facts would be sufficient to destroy that objection. No person can be ignorant that in the principal congresses of which history makes mention, in those in which, as at present, interests, equally complicated and various, were to be discussed at Munster, at Nemeguen, at Ryswick, this double form was always employed. Would not to refuse it at this present time be evidently to shew that the pacific intentions which so much pains are taken to announce, are not those which are actually meant? It is affected continually to instance Teschen, and to take for a rule that which has been an exception, and constantly to appeal to the result of this negotiation, as if those which have been cited had had a less favourable issue, and as if they had not equally regulated the interests of sovereigns, and the tranquillity of states. Whatever it may be, we ask again for the motive which gives preference to a form which was solely followed under a circumstance where there was only one object to treat upon, and of which even the basis had already been settled beforehand. It is easy to judge, from the actual state of the question, who ought to be accused of the delays occasioned to the negotiation, those who, by raising a pretension opposed to the received usage, reject a proposal which ensures to them all the advantages they desire, or those, who having on their side the usage universally followed, consent to adopt entirely the form adopted by the adverse party, and confine themselves to demanding, that a mode of treating, which in despite of all allegations to the contrary, can alone produce speedy results, should not be excluded.—The undersigned flatter themselves, that these considerations will be so much the more felt by his Excellency Count Metternich, as it cannot have escaped him, that if the exclusive form of written negotiations offer some advantages, it is not, at least if we may judge from the notes which

he has communicated to the undersigned, that which will assist in conciliating all minds; they will, no doubt, likewise remark, that the proposals made by the undersigned, have on the contrary been a fresh proof of their constant desire to remove all difficulties in the way of peace, even when their adversaries appear to have renounced it. They therefore renew the proposals which they have not ceased to make, of exchanging their full powers, in order immediately to open the negotiations, according to the form proposed by the mediating Power, without, however, excluding the form of conferences, in order to preserve the means of explaining themselves verbally.—The undersigned have the honour, &c.

(Signed) CAULINGOURT, Duke of Vicenza.
L. NARBONNE.

Prague, Aug. 9, 1813.

No. XXXIX.—*Note from his Excellency Count de Metternich to the French Plenipotentiaries.*

The Minister of State and for Foreign Affairs to his Imperial and Royal Austrian Majesty, Plenipotentiary from the mediating Court, yesterday delivered to the Plenipotentiaries of Russia and Prussia the Note of the 9th of this month, which their Excellencies the French Plenipotentiaries did him the honour of addressing to him. He has just received, in reply from Baron d'Anstett and Baron de Humboldt, the Notes of this day's date, of which the annexed are copies, and which he is desirous not to delay transmitting to the French Plenipotentiaries.—The undersigned seizes this opportunity, &c.

(Signed) METTERNICH.

Prague, Aug. 10, 1813.

Note from M. d'Anstett to Count de Metternich.

The undersigned has just received the Copy of the Note which the French Plenipotentiaries have addressed, under yesterday's date, to his Excellency Count de Metternich, Plenipotentiary of the mediating Court. It has not been surprised to see, that endeavours are made, on the last day of the negotiations, to throw all the blame both on the Mediator and on the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Powers. This proceeding is nothing novel. On the whole, all that this paper affirms to-day, has been refuted beforehand. But when the French Plenipotentiaries say, that our official notes have not been of the proper nature to conciliate men's minds, it will be necessary to

remind them of the serious insult offered to Russia, in their Note of the 6th, to judge who has departed from received usages in the conduct of a work, in which all that calmness and dignity ought to preside which are required in negotiations of this kind. It is a new reason to convince the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Powers, that the form by writing is the only admissible one, because the papers would be read, and such unjust charges recoil upon their authors.—Finally, if the example of the Congress of Utrecht is so strongly insisted on, why then have not the French Plenipotentiaries judged it proper to adopt its preliminary forms, by causing their powers to be countersigned by the Mediator. This would have been effectively one step taken. But it is not for the undersigned to discuss a question which directly concerns the mediating Powers, and he hastens to avail himself of this opportunity to renew, &c.

(Signed) D'ANSTETT.

Prague, 29th July (10th Aug.) 1813.

Note from M. De Humboldt to his Excellency Count de Metternich.

The undersigned Minister of State and Plenipotentiary of his Majesty the King of Prussia, has seen, by the Note of the French Plenipotentiaries, of the date of which his Excellency Count de Metternich, Minister of State and for Foreign Affairs, and Plenipotentiary of his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, has done him the honour of communicating to him, by his Note of the same day, that the French Plenipotentiaries continue to decline the form of negotiation which has been proposed to them by the mediating Court, and which those of Prussia and Russia were willing to accept.—It is true that the French Plenipotentiaries have said, in their Note, that they entirely adopted the mode proposed, by demanding simply that their proposals should likewise be admitted. But it being evident that the form of transactions by writing, and some conferences had been proposed by Count de Metternich, as two forms entirely different and even opposite, in his Note of 29th July, it is clear that their union could not be effected without the mode of transacting by writing conjunctly with conferences losing its whole characteristic, and being in reality sacrificed to the other; which, in its turn, if the transactions by writing were joined to it, would no less prevent all the inconveniencies so clearly stated in the Note before cited.—This is

what the undersigned thinks he has shewn by his Note of the 7th of this month; he would nevertheless enlarge still more on this subject, were he not prevented by the date of the Note of the French Plenipotentiaries, and that of his reply to it. Forced again to explain himself on the mode of the negotiations, on the very day when they ought to have terminated, he thought it useless to enter into a more ample detail. That date, the continuance and the tenor of the papers, which have been exchanged, and the entire progress of the negotiation, equally dispense the undersigned from replying to the different charges, direct and indirect, which are contained in the Note of the French Plenipotentiaries.—Ever esteeming himself fortunate when he can avoid replying to communications so little adapted to conciliate men's minds, he confines himself simply to renew to his Excellency Count de Metternich the assurances of his high consideration.

(Signed) HUMBOLDT.

Prague, 10th Aug. 1813.

(A true copy) (Signed) METTERNICH.

No. XL.—Note from the French Plenipotentiaries to Count de Metternich.

The undersigned, &c. have just received the Note which his Excellency Count de Metternich, &c. has done them the honour of addressing to them, to which is annexed that of the Plenipotentiaries of Russia and Prussia. They might begin by observing, that these Notes contain sundry imputations upon them, which, to say the least, are not accurate, such as that they demanded the form of the negotiations of Utrecht, negotiations which they have not cited, as they could not be ignorant that they took place without the intervention of a mediator; and that they refused to have the copy of their full powers attested by the Plenipotentiary of the mediatory Power. But faithful to their resolution of setting aside every thing which might obstruct the progress of the negotiations, they confine themselves with replying to assertions no less incorrect, but which are of much greater importance, contained in the said Notes.—The Allied Plenipotentiaries ground the advantage of the form which they have proposed on the facility it gives for all the papers of the negotiation to be read.—Far from having it to be laid to their charge, that they wished to envelope themselves in a veil, as appears to have been intimated, they have rather shewn a desire for this publicity, because they have

not only adopted this form, but besides, in requesting some conferences for the purpose of adding the advantage of verbal discussion, they proposed that a protocol should be held, which might preserve the very words of each of the negociators.—The passage which regards the date of the Notes, and which appears to prejudge the period at which the negociations should be terminated, does not seem to be a fresh proof of the fear which the Allied Plenipotentiaries appear always to have had of their being opened? The words, *last day of the negociations*, carry with them a very mournful reflection, by seeming to signify, that for this present all ideas of conciliation are renounced, while the Convention signed at Neumarkt, by establishing a term before which it is not permitted to denounce the Armistice, makes it by no means an obligation, nor does it otherwise in any manner announce, that when that time is arrived the negociations should cease. Will not the Mediator consider it his most sacred duty to concur in causing an interpretation to be rejected which would destroy the hope of a nearer approach to reconciliation, which the undersigned wish to hasten by all their efforts.—The replies of the Allied Plenipotentiaries do not even wish, still less refute, the reasons presented by the undersigned in their note of yesterday; they think they ought to insist with the Mediator, and request him with all the means placed in his power, by the part with which he is charged, to engage the Plenipotentiaries of Russia and Prussia to discuss the questions, instead of abruptly breaking them off, and in fine, to adopt the only proposal which can produce a happy result, as it excludes no means of conciliation, and assures to each party all the advantages it wishes to preserve.—The undersigned flatter themselves that these explanations will determine the Mediator to convince the Russian and Prussian Plenipotentiaries that reason, the spirit of conciliation and a sincere desire of peace, are on the side of those who defend the principles and usages of all times.—They avail themselves, &c.

(Signed) CAULINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.
L. NARBONNE.

Prague, Aug. 10, 1813.

No. XLI.—*Note from Count de Metternich to the French Plenipotentiaries.*

The undersigned Minister of State and for Foreign Affairs to his Imperial and Royal Austrian Majesty, and Plenipotentiary from

the mediating Court, has the honour of transmitting to their Excellencies the Duke de Vicenza and the Count de Narbonne, Plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, a copy of the papers which they have just received on the part of the Plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and of his Majesty the King of Prussia, by which they declare to him that the term of the Armistice being expired, they consider the Congress united, met for the negociation of peace, as dissolved.—It is with sincere regret that the undersigned sees, in consequence, his functions as a Mediator at an end, without deriving any other consolation from his fruitless endeavour to bring the pacification of the Belligerent Powers to a satisfactory conclusion, than that of not having on his part neglected any means to consummate so salutary a work.—The undersigned embraces with avidity the opportunity of this last official communication, to offer their Excellencies the assurances of his high consideration.

(Signed) Count de METTERNICH.

Prague, Aug. 11, 1813.

Note from M. D'Anstett to Count de Metternich.

The final term of Mediation and the negociations opened at Prague having expired before the day of the 10th, the undersigned has express orders to declare formally, that his full powers cease from this moment.

—Being on the point of leaving this city, he could not do it without acquitting himself of the sacred duty of offering to the Count de Metternich, the expressions of his lively remembrance, for those marks of confidence and kindness, with which he has been pleased to honour him personally.

—With regard to the impartiality, the nobleness, the spirit of conciliation, and the purity of principles, which his Excellency has manifested in his quality of Mediator, it does not belong to the undersigned to anticipate the assurances which the allied Courts will render of them to Count de Metternich. He confines himself to renewing to him those of his highest consideration.

(Signed) D'ANSTETT.
METTERNICH.

Prague, July 29 (Aug. 10), 1813,
at midnight. (A true copy.)

Note from M. de Humboldt to his Excellency the Count de Metternich.

The term of the negociations which had

been opened under the mediation of his Imperial and Royal Austrian Majesty having expired with the day of the 10th August, the undersigned Minister of State and Plenipotentiary to his Majesty the King of Prussia, is charged by express orders from his Court, to declare formally to his Excellency Count de Metternich, Minister of State and for Foreign Affairs to his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, that his full powers, as well as his character of Plenipotentiary, are now at an end.—The undersigned, in consequence, would not lose a moment in requesting his Excellency Count de Metternich to assure his Imperial Majesty how greatly his Majesty the King of Prussia, whilst feeling the most lively and sincere regret, that the beneficent intention of the mediating Court has not been able to produce the desired result, is sensible of the fresh marks of interest and confidence which his Majesty the Emperor has been pleased to give him on this important occasion.—These efforts, made with common accord, to give a lasting and solid peace to Europe, could not fail to add to those sentiments of friendship and attachment which both Sovereigns mutually feel; and his Excellency the Count de Metternich knows of how much value every thing which related to his sentiments is in the eyes and dear to the heart of his Majesty.—The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to present to his Excellency Count de Metternich the expression of his most particular gratitude for all the proofs of kindness and confidence which his Excellency has personally shewn him; and begs him, at the same time, to accept the assurance of his high consideration.

(Signed) HUMBOLDT.

(A true copy) METTERNICH.

Prague, 10th Aug. 1813, at midnight.

No. XLII.—*Note from the Plenipotentiaries of France to Count de Metternich.*

Prague, 11th Aug. 1813.

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the Emperor of the French, have received with the Note which his Excellency Count de Metternich has this day done them the honour of addressing to them, the copies of those which his Excellency has just received from the Russian and Prussian Plenipotentiaries. They have with pain, but without surprise, perceived by this communication the eagerness with which the Allied Plenipotentiaries have seized the opportunity for depriving the work of pacification of the little time that

still remains for it; and they should have expected that the Mediator would have used his whole influence to preserve to the negotiation moments which might bring about the tranquillity of Europe. The undersigned, convinced of their not having neglected any thing to fulfil the pacific intentions of their August Master, of which they have again given an instance, by renewing, in pressing terms, in their Note of yesterday, the most conciliatory proposals, unfeignedly regret, that there now remains to them no other duty to fulfil, than to lay before his Imperial and Royal Majesty the Notes which have been addressed to them by Count de Metternich.

(Signed) CAULINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.
L. NARBONNE.

Prague, 11th Aug. 1813.

PARIS PAPERS.

Extract of a Letter written to His Excellency the Minister at War, by General Count Decaen, commanding the Catalan Army.

Gerona, Oct. 7, 1813.

Monsieur, —I had ordered the General of Division, Lamarque, to march upon Olot Petit's brigade, composed of the 67th and 113th regiments, and a squadron of the 29th, in order to observe the movements of the Spaniards, who were said to have some designs upon La Cerdagne, or the frontiers of France.—General Petit manœuvred according to the instructions he had received.—On the 28th September he was at Campredon; on the 29th he returned to Olot; on the 1st and 2d October he marched to the foot of the Grau and towards St. Privat, and took advantage of the presence of his troops, to exact payment of the contributions, and collect some requisitions for the subsistence of his brigade.—The Spaniards, annoyed by those movements, approached Olot on the 2d, and took a position, in number from 3 to 4,000 men, upon the heights of Saint Privat.—General Petit reconnoitred them on the 3d, he resolved to attack them on the 4th, and drive them from his neighbourhood, which was executed with vigour and judgment.—General Petit set out from Olot at break of day; he arrived about 7 in the morning, in presence of the enemy; he found him stronger than on the preceding evening; the regiments of Burghos, Tarragona, Ansonia, &c., crowned with two lines of infantry the mountains to the right and left of Saint Privat; a squa-

dron of St. Narcisse's hussars was in order of battle in the valley, protected by the infantry.—The French brigade halted, to form and take a little rest; the enemy took this as the effect of hesitation; he descended with loud cries, and briskly attacked some companies of Voltigeurs, which formed the advanced guard. General Petit immediately ordered the charge to be beaten; his four battalions instantly marched in the directions which had been prescribed them; the enemy, astonished at this attack, retired from position to position; they were all carried, and covered with his dead.—The difficulties of the ground, which slackened our march, allowed the Spaniards to frequently rally; the fire was very brisk from 8 o'clock till noon, and lasted to 4 in the evening. Every thing was at last obliged to give way before the indefatigable courage of our troops, who pursued the enemy several leagues from the field of battle, and completely dispersed him. We only took some prisoners from him; but he lost many men in his retreat by the fire of musketry, and a great number in their flight threw themselves down the precipices.—This action cost us 2 officers and 7 subalterns or soldiers killed; 7 officers and 61 soldiers wounded. I have the honour to remit with this to your Excellency, a state of each particular regiment's loss.—The good dispositions and conduct of General Petit are worthy of eulogiums. He has been excellently seconded by the devotion of the 67th and 113th regiments, the mounted chasseurs, and a battalion of the 11th regiment of the line. Some companies of this battalion placed in reserve upon Mount Olivet, under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Jacques, made a skilful and bold movement, which was useful to the general attack.—I shall have the honour of sending your Excellency, by the first Courier, the names of the officers, sub-officers, and soldiers, who particularly distinguished themselves, and who have been recommended by the General of division Lamarque. I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) COUNT DECAEN.

Paris, Oct. 15.—Letters have to-day been received from Bayonne. They announce that the armies were still in presence of each other, but that no event had taken place. The Duke of Dalmatia had received some reinforcements, and was still to receive more.

Frankfort, Oct. 12.—We have just re-

ceived *Westphalian Monitors* to the 10th inst. Several columns entered on the 8th, as well as General Alix, who has caused different Proclamations to be published.—This Gazette contains the following article:—Certain intelligence, given by General Rigaud, commanding a corps of French troops at Rothembourg, announces, that the Prince Royal of Sweden, beaten by the French army, had been driven to the right bank of the Elbe, after having suffered a considerable loss.

Paris, Oct. 29.

Her Majesty the Empress Queen and Regent has received the following accounts of the situation of the armies up to the 4th of October.—General Count Lefevre Desnouettes was attacked, on the 28th of September, at seven o'clock in the morning, at Altenberg, by 10,000 cavalry and 3,000 infantry. He effected his retreat before so superior forces; he made some fine charges, and did the enemy much injury. He lost 300 of his infantry; he arrived upon the Saale. The enemy was commanded by the Hetman Platoff and General Thielman. Prince Poniatowski marched on the 2d upon Altenberg, by Nossau, Waldheim, and Golditz; he overthrew the enemy, took more than four hundred prisoners, and drove him into Bohemia.—On the 27th the Prince of the Moskwa took possession of Dessau, which a Swedish division occupied, and drove that division back upon the *tele-du-pont*. On the following day the Swedes arrived to retake the town. General Guilleminot allowed them to advance till within grape shot, then unmasked his batteries, and repulsed them with considerable loss.—On the 3d October the enemy's army of Silesia marched by Konigsbruck and Elsterwerda upon the Elster, threw over a bridge at the bend, which the Elbe forms at Wartemberg, and passed that river. General Bertrand was placed on an isthmus, in a fine position, surrounded by banks and marshes. Between nine o'clock in the morning and five in the evening, the enemy made seven attacks and was always repulsed. He left 6,000 dead upon the field of battle; our loss was 500 killed or wounded. This great difference was owing to the good position which Morand and Fontanelli's divisions occupied. In the evening General Bertrand, seeing new forces debouche, thought proper to effect his retreat, and took a position upon the Mulda with the Prince of the Moskwa.—On the 4th, the Prince

of the Moskwa was at Dalitzsch, upon the left bank of the Mulda. The Duke of Ragusa and General Latour Maubourg's corps of cavalry were at Eulenburg. The 3d corps was at Torgau. Two hundred and fifty partisans commanded by a Russian Major General, had marched upon Malhausen, and learning that Cassel was without troops, they attempted a surprise upon the gates of Cassel. They were repulsed; but the following day the Westphalian troops having disbanded themselves, the partisans entered Cassel. They gave up to pillage every thing which fell into their hands, and a few days after left it. The King of Westphalia had retired upon the Rhine.

Her Majesty the Empress Queen and Regent has received the following intelligence of the situation of the army on the 13th October:—On the 7th the Emperor left Dresden; on the 3th he slept at Wurzen; the 9th at Eulenburg, and on the 10th at Duben.—The enemy's army of Silesia, which had marched upon Wurzen, immediately retreated, and repassed to the left bank of the Mulda; it had some engagements, in which we made some prisoners and took several hundreds of baggage waggons.—General Regnier marched upon Wittenberg, passed the Elbe, marched upon Roslau, turned the bridge of Dessau, seized upon it, afterwards marched upon Aken, and took possession of the bridge. General Bertrand marched upon the bridges of Wartenbourg, and seized upon them. The Prince of Moskwa marched upon the town of Dessau; he met a Prussian division, General Dalma's, overthrew it, and took 3,000 men and six pieces of cannon. Several Cabinet Couriers, among others Sieur Kraft, with dispatches of importance, were taken.—After having thus taken possession of all the enemy's bridges, the Emperor's intention was to pass the Elbe, to manoeuvre upon the right bank from Hamburg to Dresden, to threaten Botsdam and Berlin, and to take for the centre of operations Magdeburg, which, for this purpose, had been supplied with warlike stores and provisions; but, on the 13th, the Emperor learned at Duben that the Bavarian army had joined the Austrian army, and threatened the Lower Rhine.—This inconceivable defection made the defection of other Princes be foreseen, and induced the Emperor to come to the resolution of returning towards the Rhine. Unfortunate

change! as every thing had been prepared to operate upon Magdeburg; but it would have been requisite to have remained separate and without communication with France for a month; this was not inconvenient, at the moment when the Emperor fixed his plans; it was no longer the same when Austria was about to have two new disposable armies, the Bavarian army, and the army opposed to Bavaria. The Emperor therefore changed with these unforeseen circumstances, and removed his headquarters to Leipzig.—Meanwhile the King of Naples, who remained in observation at Freybourg, received orders on the 7th to make a charge in front, and march upon Geurg and Freybourg, operating upon Wurzen and Wittenberg. An Austrian division which occupied Augustesbourg, rendering this movement difficult, the King received orders to attack it; he defeated it, and afterwards effected his removal to the right. Nevertheless the right of the enemy's army of Bohemia, composed of Wittgenstein's Russian corps, had marched upon Altenbourg, upon intelligence of the King of Naples' change in front. It marched upon Freybourg, and afterwards by the left on Borna, placing itself between the King of Naples and Leipzig. The King did not hesitate respecting the manoeuvre he ought to make; he faced about and marched upon the enemy, overthrew him, took nine pieces of cannon, one thousand prisoners, and drove him beyond the Elster, after having made him experience a loss of from four to five thousand men.—On the 15th the position of the army was as follows: The Emperor's headquarters were at Reidenitz, half a league from Leipzig: the 4th corps, commanded by General Bertrand, was at the village of Lendenau; the 6th corps was at Libenthal.—The King of Naples, with the 2d, 8th, and 5th corps, had his right at Dalitz and his left at Liberwolkowitz.—The 3d and 7th were in march from Eulenburg to flank the 6th corps.—The Grand Army of Bohemia had General Guilay's corps opposite Lendenau; a corps at Zwerickaw, and the remainder of the army; the left leaning on Grobun, the right on Naunsdorf.—The bridges of Wurzen and Eulenburg, upon the Mulda, and the position of Taccha, upon the Partha, were occupied by our troops. Every thing announced a great battle.—The result of our different movements, in these six days, has been 5,000 prisoners, several pieces of cannon, and doing much injury to the

enemy. Prince Poniatowski has in those affairs covered himself with glory.

Her Majesty the Empress Queen and Regent has received the following intelligence respecting the situation of the Army on the evening of the 16th:—On the 15th Prince Schwartzenburg, commanding the enemy's army, announced in an order of the day, that the following day, the 16th, there would be a general and decisive battle. In effect on the 16th, at nine in the morning, the grand Allied Army debouched upon us. It constantly operated to extend upon its right. At first three large columns were seen marching, one along the river Elster, against the village of Doelitz, the 2d against the village of Wachau, and the 3d against that of Liberwolkowitz. These three columns were preceded by 200 pieces of cannon. The Emperor immediately made his dispositions. At 10 o'clock the cannonade was most violent, and at 11 the two armies were engaged in the villages of Doelitz, Wachau, and Liberwolkowitz. These villages were attacked six or seven times; the enemy was constantly repulsed, and covered the avenues with his dead. Count Lauriston, with the fifth corps, defended the village on the left (Liberwolkowitz). Prince Poniatowski, with his brave Poles, defended the village on the right (Doelitz) and the Duke of Belluno defended Wachau.—At noon, the sixth attack of the enemy had been repulsed; we were masters of the three villages, and had made 2,000 prisoners. Nearly at the same moment, the Duke of Tarente debouched by Holzhausen, marching upon an enemy's redoubt, which General Charpentier carried at the *pas de charge*, seizing the artillery and making some prisoners. The moment appeared decisive. The Emperor ordered the Duke of Reggio to march upon Wachau with two divisions of the young guard. He equally directed the Duke of Treviso to march upon Liberwolkowitz with two divisions of the young guard, and take possession of an extensive wood which is upon the left of the village. At the same time he caused to be advanced upon the centre, a battery of 150 pieces of cannon, which General Drouet directed. The whole of these dispositions had that success which

was expected from them. The enemy's artillery went to a distance. The enemy retired, and the whole field of battle remained in our possession.—It was three o'clock in the afternoon; all the enemy's troops had been engaged; he had had recourse to his reserve. Count Marfield, who commanded the Austrian reserve, supported with six divisions, all the troops in all the attacks, and the Imperial Russian guards, who formed the reserve of the Austrian army, supported the centre. The cavalry of the Russian guards, and the Austrian Cuirassiers, precipitated themselves by their left upon our right, they seized upon Doelitz, and came wheeling upon the Duke of Belluno's squares. The King of Naples marched with Latour Maubourg's cuirassiers, and charged the enemy's cavalry by the left of Wachau, at the time the Polish cavalry and dragoons of the guard, commanded by General Latort, charged by the right. The enemy's cavalry were defeated, two entire regiments remained upon the field of battle. General Latort made 300 Austrian and Russian prisoners. General Latour Maubourg took some hundreds of the Russian guard. The Emperor immediately ordered Curial's division of the guard to advance to support Prince Poniatowski. General Curial marched upon the village of Doelitz, attacked it with the bayonet, carried it without firing a shot, and made 1,200 prisoners, among whom was the General in Chief Merfeldt. Affairs thus re-established on our right, the enemy put himself in retreat, and the field of battle was no longer disputed with us.—The reserve artillery of the guards, which General Drouet commanded, were with the tirailleurs. The enemy's cavalry came and charged them. The artillerymen formed their pieces in a square, which they had the precaution to load with grape shot, and fired with so much agility, that in an instant the enemy was repulsed. Upon these events the French cavalry advanced to support the batteries. General Maison, commanding a division of the 5th corps, an officer of the greatest distinction, was wounded. General Latour Maubourg, commanding the cavalry, had his thigh carried off by a ball. Our loss this day has been 2,500 men killed and wounded.
(To be continued.)

[The readers of the Register are respectfully informed, that the Index to Vol. XXIII. is ready for delivery; and that for Vol. XXIV. will be delivered next week.]

ANSWER TO THE BOURBON PROCLAMATION.

This document having been published so often by those persons, who are so eager for overthrowing the present ruler and government of France, I think proper to publish what I deem an answer to it; first inserting here, for the convenience of my readers, the Proclamation itself. A few preliminary observations, however, appear necessary. —First, I must observe, that the Bourbons are by no means to be *blamed* for this act, in itself considered. It is perfectly natural in them to wish to recover their former state, and no one can deny them the perfect right of using such means as this to accomplish their object; more especially as the French people do now submit to the government of a monarch, having laid aside their Republican institutions. —But, having premised thus, we have an equal right to examine the views of those by whom the Proclamation was issued, and to offer our opinions upon it and upon the probable effect of its success. The House of Bourbon having invited the French people to return under its sway, we have a right, and it is our duty, if we have the means in our hands, to shew what was the nature and effect of their government in France; and to inquire, whether it be, or be not, likely, that the people of that country would be made more happy by returning to them, than they are under the new dynasty. —We have so long been in fear of France; her government, under one form and another, has so long appeared to us to be a terrific object, that we have, at last, forgotten, or we seem to have forgotten, what the *old government* of France was. We have been ashamed to acknowledge, that our hatred of the new government arose out of *our fear* of it; and, therefore, we have, for twenty years, been speaking of it as being a most horrible despotism, affecting to lament its existence out of our

generous compassion for the people of France, whom, however, at times, we have reproached with *baseness* for submitting to such unparalleled oppression. —Thus have the mass of the people, who adopt, without any inquiry, the sentiments delivered out to them, through the various and endless channels of deception, come habitually to the conclusion, that the governments of France, since the Revolution began, has been a series of despotisms; and, that, before that period, the people of that country enjoyed a state of comparative blessedness. —Lately, indeed, as the prospect of humbling France approached, the tone of these censors of her governments has been a good deal changed. . They now profess to see danger in the *greatness* and *prosperity* of France. But, the delusion has taken fast hold of the country. The general belief is what I have described it; and, it is my intention to shew, in this paper, how the *facts* really stand. —The following is the Bourbon Proclamation, which has been published three or four times by the papers, which generally speak in favour of all the acts of our government.

“The moment is at length arrived when
“ *Divine Providence* appears ready to break
“ in pieces the *instrument of its wrath*.
“ The Usurper of the Throne of *St. Louis*,
“ the devastator of Europe, experiences
“ reverses in his turn. Shall they have
“ no other effect but that of aggravating
“ the calamities of France; and will she
“ not dare to overturn an odious power, no
“ longer protected by the illusions of vic-
“ tory? What prejudices, or what fears,
“ can now prevent her from throwing her-
“ self into the arms of her King; and
“ from recognising, in the establishment of
“ his legitimate authority, the only pledge
“ of union, peace, and happiness, which
“ his promises have so often guaranteed to
“ his oppressed subjects. —Being neither
“ able, nor inclined to obtain, but by
“ their efforts, that throne which his rights
“ and their affection can alone confirm,
“ what wishes should be adverse to those
“ which he has invariably entertained?
“ What doubt can be started with regard

“to his paternal intentions?—The King has said in his preceding declarations, and he reiterates the assurance, that the *Administrative and Judicial bodies shall be maintained in the plenitude of their powers; that he will preserve their places to those who at present hold them, and who shall take the oath of fidelity to him; that the Tribunals, Depositories of the Laws, shall prohibit all prosecutions bearing relation to those unhappy times of which his return will have for ever sealed the oblivion; that, in fine, the code polluted by the name of Napoleon, but which, for the most part, contains only the ancient ordinances and customs of the realm, shall remain in force, with the exception of enactments contrary to the doctrines of religion, which, as well as the liberty of the people, has long been subjected to the caprice of the tyrant.*—*The Senate, in which are seated some men so justly distinguished for their talents, and whom so many services may render illustrious in the eyes of France, and of posterity—that corps, whose utility and importance can never be duly appreciated till after the restoration—can it fail to perceive the glorious destiny which summons it to become the first instrument of that great benefaction which will prove the most solid, as well as the most honourable guarantee of its existence and its prerogatives?*—On the subject of property, the King, who has already announced his intention to employ the most proper means for conciliating the interests of all, perceives in the numerous settlements, which have taken place between the old and the new landholders, the means of rendering those cares almost superfluous. He engages, however, to interdict all proceedings by the Tribunals, contrary to such settlements,—to encourage voluntary arrangements, and, on the part of himself and his family, to set the example of all those sacrifices which may contribute to the repose of France, and the sincere union of all Frenchmen.—The King has guaranteed to the army the maintenance of the ranks, employments, pay, and appointments which it at present enjoys. He promises also to the Generals, Officers, and soldiers, who shall signalize themselves in support of his cause, rewards more substantial, distinctions more honourable, than any they can receive from an Usurper,—always ready to disown, or even to dread their service. The

“King binds himself anew to abolish that pernicious conscription, which destroys the happiness of families and the hope of the country.—Such always have been, such still are the intentions of the King. His re-establishment on the throne of his ancestors will be for France only the happy transition from the calamities of a war which tyranny perpetuates, to the blessings of a solid peace, the guarantee of which foreign Powers can only find in the word of the legitimate Sovereign.”

“LOUIS.”

To take this paper in the order, in which it lies before us, we find, then, according to it, that all that Napoleon has done, i.e. has done under the sanction of *Divine Providence*, whose instrument he has been. If this be the case, is it not rather bordering upon the impious to call him an *usurper*, seeing that he has acted under the immediate direction of the Deity? Is it not sinful to attempt to cast blame on him for having done that which God wished him to do; nay that God forced him to do? The Attorney General, Gibbs, who is now Judge Gibbs, did not prosecute *my pen* for having written the article about the flogging of the Local Militia-men at the town of Ely. He did not prosecute the *instrument*, nor did he harangue against it. He prosecuted *me*, who used the instrument, and the Judges caused *me* to be imprisoned for two years, and to pay a thousand pounds to our good old King. Yet, upon the principle, with which this Proclamation sets out, it was the *pen*, and not I, who ought to have been prosecuted. In short, if Napoleon be held to have done what he has done at the instigation of God; if he has been a mere instrument in the hands of God, it cannot be doubted, that it is great and flagrant impiety to blame, much more to abuse him, for what he has done, or, rather, for what he has been the instrument in doing.—If a master command his servant to contract debts in his name; if the servant, by the master's command, commit a trespass; if a coachman drive wantonly over sheep or pigs by his master's order; the laws are open against the master and not against the servant. The maxim of the law, in this respect, is: “He who does an act by the hands of another, does it himself.” Couple this with the assertion of the Proclamation, and we shall find, that, according to this doctrine, it is *Divine Providence* who has done, who has been the *real doer*, of all that we have attributed to Napoleon; and that all which

Sir Robert Wilson's book falsely ascribes to him, if it had been true, would have been attributable to Divine Providence, and not to Buonaparté, any more than my flogging publication was attributable to my pen.—The *Times* news-paper, of a few days ago, under the name of a person of the name of BURDON, asserts, in addition to all the other abominable falsehoods vomited forth against this great soldier and legislator, that he caused, in Italy, many thousands of persons to be *buried alive*, even soldiers of his own army. But, supposing this to be as true as it is false, does not this Proclamation sanction the deed, by asserting that Napoleon has been an instrument of the wrath of Divine Providence? That is to say, by asserting, that God forced him to bury these people alive? Nay, it asserts, in fact, *that God did the act*; because no act can be said to be done by the tool made use of in doing it; and because the law says, that "he who does an act by another, does it himself."—What injustice, upon the principle of this Proclamation, is it, therefore, to call for *vengeance*; for punishment; and even for the *Divine vengeance*; upon the head of Napoleon? For, if men are so wicked, so impious, as to wish to punish a fellow man for having executed the will of God, what a horrible idea is it, that God should punish a man for doing what he himself has induced him, enabled him, and *compelled* him to do?—But, the Proclamation goes further; for, it not only asserts, that Napoleon has been an instrument in the hands of God, but says, that he has been an instrument of God's *wrath*. This embraces all the acts of *severity* imputed to Napoleon and his armies. It was, according to this Proclamation, God who made him go to Moscow; to overset the Bourbons in Spain; to kill the Duke of Brunswick; to capture Berlin and Vienna; to drive out the King and Queen of Naples; to eject the Italian Princes; to take away the dominions and power of the Pope; and to keep the Bourbons from their throne. According to the principle of the Proclamation, all these persons and places *merited* what has been done to them, unless the authors of it are ready to say, that Divine Providence has been *unjust*.—At any rate, if we adopt this principle, we must acquit Napoleon of all blame; and, if we suppose the people of France to be endowed with only common sense, and a very small portion even of that, we must suppose, that they will see the matter in the same light.—The Pro-

clamation promises, that the persons holding the *administrative* and *judicial powers* shall *keep their places*. It promises the same as to the *Senate*. Now, either these persons are the best that could have been found in France, or, they are not. If the latter, is it just to keep them in their places? If they are not fit persons, and do not properly administer the laws, would it not be a detestable act to keep them where they are, and to leave the property and lives of the people at their disposal? And, if they are the fittest men that could be found in France; if they do take good care of the property and lives of the people, what can the people of France wish for *more*? And what are they to get from the proposed change? What does this proposition offer them but a mere change of sovereigns, without any offer, without any hope, of being *better*, with a *risk*, at least, of being *worse* off?—When one man, in common life, wishes to supplant another, be it in whatsoever line it may, he offers to the parties interested some *advantage* or other. Let me, says A to B, supply you with shoes instead of C. *For what?* says B. Why, says A, you shall have your shoes of the same quality cheaper; or, of a better quality at the prices of C. Here is a motive for the change; but, what *motive* does the Proclamation hold out? None at all, if we except the mighty consideration of being again under the sway of the descendants of *St. Louis*; and, I dare say, that, by this time, the people of France have very little preference for the persons of *sainted kings*.—But, the *Senate* is to remain; and, moreover, it is designated as containing men *justly distinguished by their talents and their services*.—Be it, in the first place, remembered, that it was Napoleon who instituted this body; that it was he who chose these men of talents and of services; that, in short, it was he who made this very thing, which the Bourbons promise to support.—The writers of the Proclamation may, indeed, say, that it was not *he*, but God through him; so that here he would not appear as the instrument of God's *wrath*, but of his blessings. However, if you deprive him of the *merit* here, you must, in common conscience, exonerate him from the *blame* as to all the rest of his acts, and must suppress all your vindictive wishes against him.—But, leaving Divine Providence, for the present, out of the question, what *motive* is there here held out to the people of France to accept of the offer of the Bourbons? They are told, that

the Senate contains men of great talents and virtues, and that it shall remain a part of the government. Well, then, the people of France need *no change* whatever to secure to them the services of the Senate. They have the Senate now. They are promised nothing *more*; and, they may very reasonably suppose, that no one is so likely to preserve this body as he who has created it. The offer, in short, which they here have again, is that of a *risk* of loss, without even the hope of any gain to counterbalance that risk.——Was there ever, in the whole world, any man, in his senses, that accepted of such an offer? Men very often give the ready money out of their hands, and risk the loss of it upon a promissory note; but, as a compensation for this risk, they have the interest of their money, which, by lying dead in their hands, would bring them nothing. But, who changes his money against a promise to be paid the same sum again? Who ever voluntarily runs a *risk* without the hope of *gain*?——The same observations apply to the promise, made in the Proclamation, as to the ownership of *property*.——It “engages to interdict all proceedings in the Tribunals, contrary to the settlements now in existence.”——This refers to the property, which includes a great part of all the lands of France, which was, by the Republican government, taken from the Crown, the Church, and the Nobility, and sold to individuals.——What will these proprietors say, in answer to such a promise? I know very well what I should say, if I were one of them. I should answer thus: ‘You *may* be perfectly sincere, but I do not *know* that you are; and, if I *knew* you to be sincere, I should not know, that you would have the *power* to act according to your intentions. If you are restored, you must restore the Nobility and the Church; and, what would these be without property? Be your intentions, therefore, what they may, I cannot be certain, that they will be acted upon, and that your promise will be fulfilled. But, I know that I *have* my property now; I know, that the quiet possession of it is secured to me, not only by the settled laws, but by the interests of all my rulers, great and small. I know, that, if no change take place in my rulers, my property is safe. I know, that I cannot *gain* by your offer; and I know, that I *risk* the loss of my *all*. Therefore, I not only reject any proposition, tending to shift the government into your

hands; but, common sense, self-preservation, dictate to me to make every exertion in my power to prevent such a change.’——To the *Generals and Soldiers*, indeed, who shall *signalize themselves in his cause*, the King offers rewards *more substantial*, distinctions *more honourable*, than those they possess. That is to say, he will reward them if they will, by means of a civil war, or any other means in violation of their oath to Napoleon; to him who has created the *Tribunals and Senate* (which are to remain) assist in restoring the Bourbons! However, there is *something* in this. *More* is offered than what is at present enjoyed. But to *whom*? Why, to that part of the nation who have *arms in their hands*. To those who have little, or nothing, to lose; to those, who, before they accept of the offer, must betray him, to whom they have sworn fidelity; to those who have it in their power, perhaps, to *compel the people to risk the loss of their property* in exchange for a promise, which the promiser will not, perhaps, have the power to fulfil.——If this offer be calculated to gain the army, I am sure it is calculated to excite indignation in the rest of the people; and that, upon the whole, it must make more against the Bourbons than for them.——We now come to the most important promise of all; namely, TO PRESERVE THE CODE NAPOLEON.——We will pass over the words, “*polluted by the name Napoleon*,” as a silly expression, interpolated, let us hope, by some cock-a-hoop parasite, and not emanating from the mind of Louis XVIII, of whom I would avoid speaking with any degree of disrespect, and the sincerity of whose intentions I do not wish to call in question. To the same source we will impute the strange assertion, that *this Code*, “for the most part, contains only the *ancient ordinances and customs of the realm*,” for, to ascribe this assertion to Louis XVIII, would be to do him great dishonour, seeing that nothing was ever more untrue.——We shall, by-and-by, see what those “*ancient ordinances and customs*” were; we shall see how they ground an industrious, an ingenious, a gallant people, in the fairest part of the world, down into slaves of the lowest cast; how they peopled the galleys and the jails; how they spread misery and death around them. And those who have read the Code Napoleon, civil as well as criminal, know, that it has completely abolished those horrible laws and customs.——But, for the

sake of the argument, and to place the value of this promise as high as possible, let us, for the present, suppose all the interlarded assertions to be true.—If it be true, then, that Napoleon has formed a code, for the most part consisting of the ancient ordinances and customs of the realm, only that these are here so embodied and arranged as to give them a more uniform effect, and a more easy application, with what justice: . . . no, I will not talk of *justice* in a case where he is the object of attack; but, with what *consistency*; with what *sense*, is coupled with this assertion, the assertion that his government is that of a *capricious tyrant*? If he rule by the *same laws* that the Bourbons ruled by, and, if he be a *capricious tyrant*, what were they? And, what is still more worthy of being asked, what do they *intend to be*, if they intend to govern by the same code which *he has established*?—Here, as in the former instances, there is a *risk* of loss, without the offer of any *gain*, even contingent. Either the Code, as it now stands, is good or bad. If bad, what motive is held out to the people to make a change which is only to perpetuate it? If good, what motive to run even the slightest risk of losing it, or of seeing it impaired? Is it reasonable to suppose, that the people of France will think this Code safer in the hands of those, who wish to overthrow and utterly destroy him who has established it, than in the hands of that person himself?—The promise, in this case, as in all the others, amounts to nothing more than that of *not injuring* the people of France; but, to this generous, this munificent promise, there is, in the present case, a *reservation*; yes, a reservation tacked by way of rider even to a promise, which, in its greatest extent is no more than a *negative*.—There is an *exception* made with regard to the *doctrines of religion*.—Some priest must have advised this. The good sense of Louis XVIII, and his sufferings from this source more than from any other, would surely have prevented him from the making of this exception.—What is meant by “the *doctrines of religion*?” The Code Napoleon does not meddle with those *doctrines* in any other way than as it leaves every man to follow his own opinions as to religion, and compels no man to belong to any particular sect, except the Royal Family, whose religion is to be that of the Roman Catholic. This exception, therefore, leaves room, and very little would be wanted to inge-

nious priests, to make the *property of the church* closely connected with the doctrines of religion; and thus, without any breach of promise, the whole of those persons who have purchased that property, might be left to beg their bread, not without some danger of being punished as heretics.—Here, at any rate, the Proclamation is a denunciation against the proprietors; and the only thing that astonishes one is, how any man in his senses could suppose it likely to seduce the people of France from their present ruler.—After all, and upon a review of the whole matter, what does this Proclamation amount to? What does it hold out to the people of France? What boon does it promise them? What are the blessings which they are to enjoy if they accept of the King's generous offer? Why, they are to enjoy the same property which they now enjoy; the same degree of liberty; the same law-makers; the same laws; the same executors of those laws; and the same army. This is the offer; this is the boon tendered to them; these are the only blessings, which an exiled king can find out to promise his people as a reward for their undertaking a civil war for his restoration.—Is it possible, for the mind of man to invent a higher compliment to the person who now governs France? Is it possible to discover more forcible means of convincing them, that they ought to venture the shedding of the last drop of their blood to maintain the government of that person?—And, I should be glad to hear what can be said by those unprincipled men, in this country, who are incessantly crying out against the “tyranny” of Napoleon, when they see it, in so solemn a manner, avowed by him whom they call the King of France, that, if restored to his throne, the utmost that he can promise is to secure to his people that which they now enjoy under this same Napoleon? One would think, that, if this Proclamation be calculated to produce no other good effect, it might produce that of striking dumb their calumnious impudence.—But (I had nearly overlooked it) there is one thing, promised by the Proclamation, which, though still of a *negative* kind, would make a *change for the better*; namely; the promise to *abolish the conscription*. Yes, and so will Napoleon, when he has made peace. The conscription is founded on no established law; it is not a thing of permanent duration; it is to meet the emergencies of war; and, though we affect not to perceive the fact, it is, and must be, well known

to the people of France.—Besides, what is a *conscription*? What is it but a *ballot for military service*? And, have not we ballots for military service? The nature of the service differs in some degree; but are not we too compelled to wear soldiers' clothes, to carry arms, and to submit to military discipline and law, and to be flogged too, if we disobey that law?—I shall be told, that we are not compelled to go on *foreign* service. Ours is an island. France is not so situated. If our Local militia were in France, they would, if in a county on the frontier, be liable to meet the enemy. Besides, the arming of men always must suppose the possibility, and even the *strong probability*, of their being called upon to use those arms; else why are they armed at all? Why are they compelled to submit to military law?—So that, after all, this conscription; this ballot for military service, an end of which is the only thing which the Proclamation speaks of as a change for the better, amounts to just nothing at all; besides, that the conscription falls indiscriminately upon the whole nation, while, as we shall soon see, the ballot for the militia did, under the Bourbons, fall upon the common people only.—So much, then, for this famous, this published and re-published Proclamation, which, as, I think, I have clearly shown, taking it in its best light, supposing the Bourbons to be perfectly sincere in their professions, and to have full power to give effect to their intentions, is calculated to unite the French nation as one man in defence of their present ruler and his house, instead of inducing them to side with those who wish to overthrow him.—But, in estimating the probable power of this document in effecting the object which it has in view, we must not, blind as we are, quite overlook its local origin and the channels, through which it is passing, and by which it is recommended to the people of France. They will not fail to perceive, that it comes to them (supposing them to see it) from *England*. If they read it in the *Times* news-paper, or in the *Courier*, or in almost any of our prints, they will see it accompanied with the most outrageous attacks upon themselves. They will also see, that those very persons, who patronise this Proclamation, do, in the very same prints, breathe destruction, not only to Napoleon, but to the power of the French nation; that they insist upon the necessity of humbling, reducing, *punishing* the French people themselves for their past

actions. The people of France, putting these facts together; seeing that the Proclamation is applauded and circulated by those, who wish to see them punished, will not fail to draw the appropriate conclusion.—We might now leave this Proclamation to make its way in the world. But, justice to the Emperor Napoleon; and, a still more powerful motive, justice to the people of France, who seem to remain firm in their attachment to him; these demand an inquiry into the nature and effect of the Bourbon government; into the situation of the people of that fine country, while they were ruled by those ancient *Ordinances and Customs*, of which the Proclamation says, the Code Napoleon, for the most part consists.—WHAT, then, were those *Ordinances and Customs*? How did they affect this industrious and gallant people? Were they free and happy, or were they slaves, and miserable, under those *Ordinances and Customs*? It is notorious, that, for ages, previous to the French revolution, we, in this country, constantly described the French as slaves; our histories, our moral essays, our political writings, our poems, our plays, all describe them as slaves, and as cowards for submitting to such a government as then existed. Now, indeed, our conductors of news-papers, with a degree of impudence absolutely without parallel, abuse the French people for having destroyed the PATERNAL sway of the *Bourbons*!—Let us now see, then, what was the nature of that "*paternal sway*;" and, when we have taken a full view of it, and of its effects, we shall be able to judge, whether it be probable, that the people of France will listen to those, who are endeavouring to bring them back to the blessings of that "*paternal sway*."—But, how are we to get at a *true* account of the nature and effects of the Bourbon government? We must resort to some *authority*; to somebody's word, whose word is to be relied on.—The authority, to which I am about to refer, is that of Mr. ARTHUR YOUNG, who is, and who has been, for many years past, *Secretary to the Board of Agriculture*, with a salary, paid by the public, of £500 a year.—Mr. Young is, in the first place, a man of great talents; and, perhaps, it is impossible to find out a person so fit to be referred to as Mr. Young. His studies had been of that kind, which peculiarly fitted him for an inquiry of this description; and, he was in France at precisely the time for making it.

He made, during the years 1787, 1788, and 1789, an agricultural and politico-economical survey of the kingdom of France. He was there when the revolution began; he was there during its progress until the new constitution was formed. He was not only living in great intimacy with many of the most respectable leaders in that work; but, he himself, crossing the kingdom in all directions, made himself minutely acquainted, by the means of personal inquiry and the evidence of his senses, of every particular, relating to the nature and effect of those "*ancient Ordinances and Customs*," of which the Bourbon Proclamation boasts.

—During his travels, he gives an account of these, by citing numerous instances, of the abominable tyranny, under which the people groaned; and, at the close of his work, he publishes *reflections on the Revolution*, beginning with a summary description of the state of the people under the Bourbon government, and, to the evidences of his own observation, adding, as he proceeds, the complaints, contained in the *Cahiers*, that is to say, the lists of complaints, made to the National Assembly by the most respectable people of the different provinces, to which *Cahiers* he refers in the notes. — This part of Mr. Young's work, I am now about to insert. I beg the reader to go through it with attention. He will see how every part of it applies to the subject on which we are, and also to the present crisis. — When he has read it to the end, not omitting the *Notes*, I shall have to trouble him with some further observations of my own.

ON THE REVOLUTION OF FRANCE.

"The gross infamy which attended *telles de cachet* and the Bastille, during the whole reign of Louis XV. made them esteemed in England, by people not well informed, as the most prominent features of the despotism of France. They were certainly carried to an excess hardly credible; to the length of being sold, with blanks, to be filled up with names at the pleasure of the purchaser; who was thus able, in the gratification of private revenge, to tear a man from the bosom of his family, and bury him in a dungeon, where he would exist forgotten, and die unknown. — But such

excesses could not be common in any country; and they were reduced almost to nothing, from the accession of the present King. The great mass of the people, by which I mean the lower and middle ranks, could suffer very little from such engines, and as few of them are objects of jealousy, had there been nothing else to complain of, it is not probable they would ever have been brought to take arms. The abuses attending the levy of taxes were heavy and universal. The kingdom was parcelled into generalities, with an intendant at the head of each, into whose hands the whole power of the crown was delegated for every thing except the military authority; but particularly for all affairs of finance. The generalities were subdivided into elections, at the head of which was a *sub-delegué*, appointed by the intendant. The rolls of the *taille*, *capitation*, *vingtièmes*, and other taxes, were distributed among districts, parishes, and individuals, at the pleasure of the intendant, who could exempt, change, add, or diminish, at pleasure. Such an enormous power, constantly acting, and from which no man was free, must, in the nature of things, degenerate in many cases into absolute tyranny. It must be obvi-

—an ambassador in France, about the year 1753, negotiating the fixing of the limits of the American colonies, which, three years after, produced the war, calling one day on the minister for foreign affairs, was introduced, for a few minutes, into his cabinet, while he finished a short conversation in the apartment in which he usually received those who conferred with him. As his lordship walked backwards and forwards, in a very small room (a French cabinet is never a large one), he could not help seeing a paper lying on the table, written in a large legible hand, and containing a list of the prisoners in the Bastille, in which the first name was Gordon. When the minister entered, Lord Albemarle apologized for his involuntarily remarking the paper; the other replied, that it was not of the least consequence, for they made no secret of the names. Lord A. then said, that he had seen the name of Gordon first in the list, and he begged to know, as in all probability the person of this name was a British subject, on what account he had been put into the Bastille. The minister told him, that he knew nothing of the matter, but would make the proper inquiries. The next time he saw Lord Albemarle, he informed him, that, on inquiring into the case of Gordon, he could find no person who could give him the least information; on which he had had Gordon himself interrogated, who solemnly affirmed, that he had not the smallest knowledge, or even suspicion, of the cause of his imprisonment, but that he had been confined 30 years; however, added the minister, I ordered him to be immediately released, and he is now at large. Such a case wants no comment.

* An anecdote, which I have from an authority to be depended on, will explain the profanity of government, in respect to these arbitrary imprisonments. Lord Albemarle, when

ous, that the friends, acquaintances, and dependants of the intendant, and of all his *sub-delegués*, and the friends of these friends, to a long chain of dependance, might be favoured in taxation at the expense of their miserable neighbours; and that noblemen, in favour at court, to whose protection the intendant himself would naturally look up, could find little difficulty in throwing much of the weight of their taxes on others, without a similar support. Instances, and even gross ones, have been reported to me in many parts of the kingdom, that made me shudder at the oppression to which numbers must have been condemned, by the undue favours granted to such crooked influence. But, without recurring to such cases, what must have been the state of the poor people paying heavy taxes, from which the nobility and clergy were exempted? A cruel aggravation of their misery, to see those who could best afford to pay, exempted because able!—The inrolments for the militia, which the *cahiers* call *an injustice without example*,^a were another dreadful scourge on the peasantry; and, as married men were exempted from it, occasioned in some degree that mischievous population, which brought beings into the world, in order for little else than to be starved. The *corvées*, or police of the roads, were annually the ruin of many hundreds of farmers; more than 300 were reduced to beggary in filling up one vale in Lorraine: all these oppressions fell on the *tiers état* only; the nobility and clergy having been equally exempted from *tailles*, militia, and *corvées*. The penal code of finance makes one shudder at the horrors of punishment inadequate to the crime.^c A few features will sufficiently characterize the old government of France.

^a *Nob. Brieg*, p. 6, &c. &c.

^c It is calculated by a writer (*Recherches et Consid. par M. le Baron de Corméré*, tom. ii. p. 187.) very well informed on every subject of finance, that, upon an average, there were annually taken up and sent to prison or the galleys, Men, 2,310. Women, 896. Children, 201. Total, 3,407. 300 of these to the galleys (tom. i. p. 112). The salt confiscated from these miscreants amounted to 12,633 quintals, which, at the mean price of 8 liv. are - 101,064 liv.

2,773 lb. of salted flesh, at 10 s. 1,386

1,066 horses, at 50 liv. - 54,300

54 carts, at 150 liv. - 7,800

Fines, - - - - - 53,287

Seized in houses, - - - 105,530

323,287

1. Smugglers of salt, armed and assembled to the number of five, in Provence, a fine of 500 liv. and nine years galleys;—in all the rest of the kingdom, death.

2. Smugglers armed, assembled, but in number under five, a fine of 300 liv. and three years galleys. Second offence, death.

3. Smugglers, without arms, but with horses, carts, or boats; a fine of 300 liv. if not paid, three years galleys. Second offence, 400 liv. and nine years galleys.—In Dauphiné, second offence, galleys for life. In Provence, five years galleys.

4. Smugglers, who carry the salt on their backs, and without arms, a fine of 200 liv. and, if not paid, are flogged and branded. Second offence, a fine of 300 liv. and six years galleys.

5. Women, married and single, smugglers, first offence, a fine of 100 liv. Second, 300 liv. Third, flogged, and banished the kingdom for life. Husbands responsible both in fine and body.

6. Children smugglers, the same as women.—Fathers and mothers responsible; and for defect of payment flogged.

7. Nobles, if smugglers, deprived of their nobility; and their houses rased to the ground.

8. Any persons in employments (I suppose employed in the salt-works or the revenue), if smugglers, death. And such as assist in the theft of salt in the transport, hanged.

9. Soldiers smuggling, with arms, are hanged; without arms, galleys for life.

10. Buying smuggled salt to resell it, the same punishments as for smuggling.

11. Persons in the salt employments, empowered if two, or one with two witnesses, to enter and examine houses even of the privileged orders.

12. All families, and persons liable to the *taille*, in the provinces of the *Grandes Gabelles* inrolled, and their consumption of salt for the *pot* and *salière* (that is, the daily consumption, exclusive of salting meat, &c. &c.) estimated at 7lb. a head per annum, which quantity they are forced to buy whether they want it or not, under the pain of various fines according to the case.

The *Capitaineries* were a dreadful scourge on all the occupiers of land. By this term, is to be understood the paramountship of certain districts, granted by the king, to princes of the blood, by which they were put in possession of the property of all game, even on lands not belonging to them; and, what is very singular, on manors granted

long before to individuals; so that the erecting of a district into a *capitainerie*, was an annihilation of all manerial rights to game within it. This was a trifling business, in comparison of other circumstances; for, in speaking of the preservation of the game in these *capitaineries*, it must be observed, that by game must be understood whole droves of wild boars, and herds of deer not confined by any wall or pale, but wandering, at pleasure, over the whole country, to the destruction of crops; and to the peopling of the galleys by the wretched peasants, who presumed to kill them, in order to save that food which was to support their helpless children. The game in the *capitainerie* of Montceau, in four parishes only; did mischief to the amount of 184,263 liv. per annum.^d No wonder then that we should find the people asking, "*Nous demandons à grand cris la destruction des capitaineries & celle de toute sorte de gibier.*"^e And what are we to think of demanding, as a favour, the permission—" *De Nettoyer ses grains de Jaucher les prés artificiels, & d'enlever ses chaumes sans égard pour la perdrix on tout autre gibier.*"^f Now, an English reader will scarcely understand it without being told, that there were numerous edicts for preserving the game which prohibited weeding and hoeing, lest the young partridges should be disturbed; steeping seed, lest it should injure the game; manuring with night soil, lest the flavour of the partridges should be injured by feeding on the corn so produced; mowing hay, &c. before a certain time, so late as to spoil many crops; and taking away the stubble, which would deprive the birds of shelter. The tyranny exercised in these *capitaineries*, which extended over 400 leagues of country, was so great, that many *cahiers* demanded the utter suppression of them.^g

Such were the exertions of arbitrary power which the lower orders felt directly from the royal authority; but, heavy as they were, it is a question whether the others, suffered circuitously through the nobility and the clergy, were not yet more oppressive? Nothing can exceed the complaints made in the *cahiers* under this head. They speak of the dispensation of justice in the manerial courts, as comprising every species of despotism: the districts indeterminate—appeals endless—irreconcilable to liberty and prosperity—and irrevocably proscribed in the opinion of the public^h—augmenting litigations—favouring every species of chicane—ruining the parties—not only by enormous expenses on the most petty objects, but by a dreadful loss of time. The judges commonly ignorant pretenders, who hold their courts in *cabarets*, and are absolutely dependant on the seigneurs.ⁱ Nothing can exceed the force of expression used in painting the oppressions of the seigneurs, in consequence of their feudal powers. They are "*vexations qui sont le plus grand fléau des peuples.*"^k—*Esclavage affligeant.*^l—*Ce régime desastreux.*^m—That the *feodalité* be for ever abolished. The countryman is tyrannically enslaved by it. Fixed and heavy rents; vexatious processes to secure them; appreciated unjustly to augment them: rents, *solidaires*, and *revenchables*; rents, *chéantes*, and *levantes*; *sumages*. Fines at every change of the property, in the direct as well as collateral line: feudal redemption (*retraite*); fines on sale, to the 8th and even the 6th penny; redemptions (*rachats*) injurious in their origin, and still more so in their extension: *banalité* of the mill,ⁿ of the oven, and of the wine and cyder-press; *corvées* by custom; *corvées* by usage of the fief; *corvées* established by unjust

^d *Cahier du tiers état de Méaux*, p. 49.

^e *De Mantas and Meulan*, p. 40.—Also, *Nob. & Tiers Etat de Peronne*, p. 42. *De Trois ordres de Montfort*, p. 28.—That is: "We most earnestly pray for the suppression of the *Capitaineries*, and that of all the game laws."

^f *De Mantas and Meulan*, p. 38.—That is to say, "the favour to weed their corn, to mow their upland grass, and to take off their stubble, without consulting the convenience of the partridges, or any other sort of game."

^g *Clergé de Provins & Montreuil*, p. 35.—*Clergé de Paris*, p. 25.—*Clergé de Mantas & Meulan*, p. 45, 46.—*Clergé de Laon*, p. 11.—*Nob. de Nemours*, p. 17.—*Nob. de Paris*, p. 22.—*Nob. d'Arras*, p. 29.

^h *Reunee*, art. 12.

ⁱ *Nervernois*, art. 43.

^k *Tiers Etat de Vannes*, p. 24.—That is: "Vexations which are the greatest scourge of the people."

^l *T. Etat Clermont Ferrand*, p. 52.—That is: "Cruel Slavery."

^m *T. Etat. Auxerre*, art. 6.—That is: "This ruinous system of governing."

ⁿ By this horrible law, the people are bound to grind their corn at the mill of the seigneur only; to press their grapes at his press only; and to bake their bread in his oven; by which means the bread is often spoiled, and more especially wine, since in Champagne those grapes which, pressed immediately, would make white wine, by waiting for the press, which often happens, make red wine only.

decrees; *corvées* arbitrary, and even phantastical; servitudes; *prestations*, extravagant and burthensome; collections by assessment incollectible; *aveux, minus, impunissements*; litigations ruinous and without end: the rod of seigneurial finance for ever shaken over our heads; vexation, ruin, outrage, violence, and destructive servitude, under which the peasants, almost on a level with Polish slaves, can never but be miserable, vile, and oppressed.^o They demand also, that the use of hand-mills be free; and hope that posterity if possible, may be ignorant that feudal tyranny in Bretagne, armed with the judicial power, has not blushed even in these times at breaking hand-mills, and at selling annually to the miserable, the faculty of bruising between two stones a measure of buck-wheat or barley.^p The very terms of these complaints are unknown in England, and consequently untranslatable: they have probably arisen long since the feudal system ceased in this kingdom. What are these tortures of the peasantry in Bretagne, which they call *chevanchés, quintaines, soule, saut de poison, baiser de mariées; chansons; transporte d'œuf sur un charrelle; silence des grenouilles;^a corvée à miséricorde; milods; leide; couponage; cartelage; barage; fouage; marehaussée; ban vin; ban d'abut; trousses; gelinage; civerage; taillabilité; vingtain; sterlage; borde-lage; minage; ban de vendanges; droit d'accaple.^r*

In passing through many of the French provinces, I was struck with the various and heavy complaints of the farmers and little proprietors of the feudal grievances, with the weight of which their industry was burthened; but I could not then conceive the multiplicity of the shackles which kept them poor and depressed. I understood it better afterwards, from the conversation and complaints of some grand seigneurs, as the revolution advanced; and I then learned, that the principal rental of many estates consisted in services and feudal tenures; by the baneful influence of which, the industry of the people was almost exterminated. In regard to the oppressions

of the clergy, as to tithes, I must do that body a justice, to which a claim cannot be laid in England. Though the ecclesiastical tenth was levied in France more severely than usual in Italy, yet was it never exacted with such horrid greediness as is at present the disgrace of England. When taken in kind, no such thing was known in any part of France, where I made inquiries, as a tenth: it was always a twelfth, or a thirteenth, or even a twentieth of the produce. And in no part of the kingdom did a new article of culture pay any thing: thus turnips, cabbages, clover, chicoree, potatoes, &c. &c. paid nothing. In many parts, meadows were exempted. Silk worms nothing. Olives in some places paid—in more they did not. Cows nothing. Lambs from the 12th to the 21st. Wool nothing.—Such mildness, in the levy of this odious tax, is absolutely unknown in England. But mild as it was, the burden to people groaning under so many other oppressions, united to render their situation so bad that no change could be for the worse. But these were not all the evils with which the people struggled. The administration of justice was partial, venal, infamous. I have, in conversation with many very sensible men, in different parts of the kingdom, met with something of content with their government, in all other respects than this; but upon the question of expecting justice to be really and fairly administered, every one confessed there was no such thing to be looked for. The conduct of the parliaments was profligate and atrocious. Upon almost every cause that came before them, interest was openly made with the judges: and woe betided the man who, with a cause to support, had no means of conciliating favour, either by the beauty of a handsome wife, or by other methods. It has been said, by many writers, that property was as secure under the old government of France as it is in England; and the assertion might possibly be true, as far as any violence from the King, his ministers, or the great was concerned: but for all that mass of property, which comes in every country to be litigated in courts of justice, there was not even the shadow of security, unless the parties were totally and equally unknown, and totally and equally honest; in every other case, he who had the best interest with the judges, was sure to be the winner. To reflecting minds, the cruelty and abominable practice attending such courts

^o *Tiers Etat Rennes*, p. 159.

^p *Rennes*, p. 57.

^a This is a curious article: when the lady of the seigneur lies in, the people are obliged to beat the waters in marshy districts, to keep the frogs silent, that she may not be disturbed; this duty, a very oppressive one, is commuted into a pecuniary fine.

^r *Resumé des cahiers*, tom. iii. p. 316, 317.

are sufficiently apparent. There was also a circumstance in the constitution of these parliaments, but little known in England, and which, under such a government as that of France, must be considered as very singular. They had the power, and were in the constant practice of issuing decrees, without the consent of the crown, and which had the force of laws through the whole of their jurisdiction; and of all other laws, these were sure to be the best obeyed; for as all infringements of them were brought before sovereign courts, composed of the same persons who had enacted these laws (a horrible system of tyranny!) they were certain of being punished with the last severity. It must appear strange, in a government so despotic in some respects as that of France, to see the parliaments in every part of the kingdom making laws without the King's consent, and even in defiance of his authority. The English, whom I met in France in 1789, were surprised to see some of these bodies issuing arrets against the export of corn out of the provinces subject to their jurisdiction, into the neighbouring provinces, at the same time that the King, through the organ of so popular a minister as Mons. Necker, was decreeing an absolutely free transport of corn throughout the kingdom, and even at the requisition of the National Assembly itself. But this was nothing new; it was their common practice. The parliament of Rouen passed an arret against killing of calves: it was a preposterous one, and opposed by administration; but it had its full force; and had a butcher dared to offend against it, he would have found, by the rigour of his punishment, who was his master. Inoculation was favoured by the court in Louis XV.'s time; but the parliament of Paris passed an arret against it, much more effective in prohibiting, than the favour of the court in encouraging that practice. Instances are innumerable, and I may remark, that the bigotry, ignorance, false principles, and tyranny of these bodies were generally conspicuous; and that the court (taxation excepted), never had a dispute with a parliament, but the parliament was sure to be wrong. Their constitution, in respect to the administration of justice, was so truly rotten, that the members sat as judges, even in causes of private property, in which they were themselves the parties, and have, in this capacity, been guilty of oppressions and cruelties, which the crown has rarely dared to attempt.

It is impossible to justify the excesses of the people on their taking up arms; they were certainly guilty of cruelties; it is idle to deny the facts, for they have been proved too clearly to admit of a doubt. But is it really the people to whom we are to impute the whole?—Or to their oppressors, who had kept them so long in a state of bondage? He who chooses to be served by slaves, and by ill-treated slaves, must know that he holds both his property and life by a tenure far different from those who prefer the service of well treated freemen; and he who dines to the music of groaning sufferers, must not, in the moment of insurrection, complain that his daughters are ravished, and then destroyed; and that his sons' throats are cut. When such evils happen, they surely are more imputable to the tyranny of the master, than to the cruelty of the servant. The analogy holds with the French peasants—the murder of a seigneur, or a chateau in flames, is recorded in every news-paper; the rank of the person who suffers, attracts notice; but where do we find the register of that seigneur's oppressions of his peasantry, and his exactions of feudal services, from those whose children were dying around them for want of bread? Where do we find the minutes that assigned these starving wretches to some vile petty-fogger, to be fleeced by impositions, and a mockery of justice, in the seigneurial courts? Who gives us the awards of the intendant and his *sub-delegués*, which took off the taxes of a man of fashion, and laid them with accumulated weight, on the poor, who were so unfortunate as to be his neighbours? Who has dwelt sufficiently upon explaining all the ramifications of despotism, regal, aristocratic, and ecclesiastical, pervading the whole mass of the people; reaching, like a circulating fluid, the most distant capillary tubes of poverty and wretchedness? In these cases, the sufferers are too ignoble to be known; and the mass too indiscriminate to be pitied. But should a philosopher feel and reason thus? should he mistake the cause for the effect? and giving all his pity to the few, feel no compassion for the many, because they suffer in his eyes not individually, but by millions? The excesses of the people cannot, I repeat, be justified; it would undoubtedly have done them credit, both as men and christians, if they had possessed their new acquired power with moderation. But let it be remembered, that the populace in no country ever use power with moderation;

excess is inherent in their aggregate constitution: and as every government in the world knows, that violence infallibly attends power in such hands, it is doubly bound in common sense, and for common safety, so to conduct itself, that the people may not find an interest in public confusions. They will always suffer much and long, before they are effectually roused; nothing, therefore, can kindle the flame, but such oppressions of some classes or order in the society, as give able men the opportunity of seconding the general mass, discontent will soon diffuse itself around; and if the government take not warning in time, it is alone answerable for all the burnings, and plunderings, and devastation, and blood that follow. The true judgment to be formed of the French revolution, must surely be gained, from an attentive consideration of the evils of the old government: when these are well understood—and when the extent and universality of the oppression under which the people groaned—oppression which bore upon them from every quarter, it will scarcely be attempted to be urged, that a revolution was not absolutely necessary to the welfare of the kingdom. Not one opposing voice* can, with reason, be raised against this assertion: abuses ought certainly to be corrected, and corrected effectually: this could not be done without the establishment of a new form of government; whether the form that has been adopted were the best, is another

* Many opposing voices have been raised; but so little to their credit, that I leave the passage as it was written long ago. The abuses that are rooted in all the old governments of Europe, give such numbers of men a direct interest in supporting, cherishing, and defending abuses, that no wonder advocates for tyranny, of every species, are found in every country, and almost in every company. What a mass of people, in every part of England, are some way or other interested in the present representation of the people, tithes, charters, corporations, monopolies, and taxation! and not merely to the things themselves, but to all the abuses attending them; and how many are there who derive their profit or their consideration in life, not merely from such institutions, but from the evils they engender! The great mass of the people, however, is free from such influence, and will be enlightened by degrees; assuredly they will find out, in every country of Europe, that by combinations, on the principles of liberty and property, aimed equally against regal, aristocratical, and mobbish tyranny, they will be able to resist successfully, that variety of combination, which, on principles of plunder and despotism, is every where at work to enslave them.

question absolutely distinct. But that the above-mentioned detail of enormities practised on the people required some great change is sufficiently apparent."

Now, reader, that you have seen what were the nature and effects of the Bourbon government; and, that you have, doubtless, felt your heart bound with joy at the reflection, that the oppressed people rose against and destroyed it; let me ask you, what you think of the men, who, in English news-papers and other works, have the impudence to call upon us to wish for the restoration of that "*paternal sway*," under which this government existed?—But, says some one, that is not now the real question. What, then, is the real question? Why, say they, the real question is, whether the *present* government is not worse than the old one, without reference to the person at the head of either.—The Bourbons themselves have answered that question sufficiently; for they promise the people of France, that if they are restored, they will . . . do what? Why, *maintain the laws and government as they now are*, a promise which they would not make, if they were not well convinced, that the people find the present laws and government *better* than the former laws and government.—This I take to be quite conclusive. But, we must not stop here. The Bourbons have asserted, in the most solemn manner, that the *Code Napoleon* consists chiefly of the "*Ancient Ordinances and Customs of the Realm*."—I have read the *Code Napoleon*, both civil and criminal. Any one may read the former in Mr. Bryant's excellent translation, accompanied with his own illustrations and remarks. Now, I say, and I defy any one to shew the contrary, that this *Code*, on the civil part of which Mr. Bryant, an English lawyer, has bestowed the highest eulogium, and on the criminal part of which the Edinburgh Reviewers have manfully ventured to speak as being, in many respects, *much preferable to our own criminal code*; I assert, that this *Code*, taking the two parts together, has completely done away *all the dreadful oppressions* described by Mr. Young in the above extract, which I have made from his work.—What, then, is meant, when it is said, that this *Code* consists, for the most part, of "*the ancient Ordinances and Customs of the Realm*?" And, why venture to

put forth such an assertion?—The letters de cachet; the game laws; the gabelles, the seigniorial jurisdiction; the arbitrary taxation; the accursed parliaments; the sale of Justice; the dominion and oppressions of the church; the cruel corvées; the endless vexations of the feudal system; the murderings of the provincial judges. All are done away, not a trace of them remains. Where, then, are we to look for those “ancient Ordinances and Customs,” which are said to be revived in the Napoleon Code? Taxation, heavy as it may be, is now uniform; it falls impartially upon the rich as well as upon the poor; all public expenses are borne by the general purse of the public; the law is the same in all parts of the country; judges are not of local origin, but proceed from the nomination of the crown; no man can be punished, or even imprisoned, for more than twenty-four hours, without substantial evidence of his guilt being made appear upon oath, to the satisfaction of, at least, two inferior judges. No man can be punished until found guilty by a jury, impartially taken, and not then, unless three out of five judges concur in the sentence. No man can be kept, in any case, more than three months in prison without being tried. The Judges of Assize sit every three months, and are compelled to decide all cases and causes before they quit the places of sitting respectively. The *Attornies General*, of which there is one in every district, are for the protection of the people, as well as of the rights of the Crown. If a house be robbed, for instance, information is immediately given of it to the Attorney General, who is personally to attend at the spot, collect the evidence, cause search to be made for the offender, and, if he be found, to bring him immediately before an inferior tribunal with a WRITTEN account of all the facts and of all the evidence on which he has proceeded. That inferior tribunal, consisting of not less than three Judges, are then to decide whether the evidence be such as to justify their commitment of the accused. They are not only to read the written account of the proceedings, but are to re-examine, upon oath, the several witnesses. If they find any difficulty in deciding, they themselves are to proceed to the spot where the offence has been committed. And, after all, unless two out of the three are for the commitment, the accused is set at liberty; and, in no case, can any one be confined more than

twenty-four hours, unless these Judges decide for his commitment.—Compare this with the operation of “the ancient Ordinances and Customs of the realm,” and say, who can, that the people of France are likely to wish for the return of the Bourbons.—I have read the Code Napoleon with great attention, and with not less admiration. Till I read it, I had no idea that it was possible for any Code of laws so effectually to provide for the security of property and of personal liberty.—The man who has been robbed, or otherwise injured criminally, has no trouble, no plague, no expense, to encounter in pursuit of the criminal. It is the duty of the Attorney General to do every thing necessary to detection and conviction, and the expense is wholly borne by the public. There is some sense in calling such an officer an Attorney General.—What, then, are we to think of those men, who are daily telling the people of England, that Napoleon has *thousands of Bastilles*? Who daily assert, that his government is a *military despotism*; that he imprisons and punishes people without any form of trial; that no man’s property or life is safe for a single hour: what are we to think of these men? Why, doubtless, that they are wholly ignorant of the subject on which they write, or, that they knowingly make use of the press for the promulgation of the most daring falsehoods.—Amongst the consequences of the improved situation of France, as to her laws and government, has been the wonderful progress of the sciences and the arts, in which respect it is notorious that that country has, within these twelve years, surpassed, in the midst of war, all the other nations of Europe put together, though many of them have, for a great part of that time, enjoyed profound peace. It is, therefore, not a little whimsical to hear the Allies holding out to the French people, that, by compelling their Emperor to come to their terms, the arts will be revived in France! It is probable that the quantity of skill in the sciences and arts, at this moment existing in France, greatly surpasses the aggregate quantity existing in all the rest of the world; a proof indubitable of the security of property and persons; a proof of the wisdom of the laws and the discernment of the person at the head of the government.—Do I approve, then, of the sort of government established in France? Is it the sort of government that I, if I could have my wish,

would like to see in that country?—Plainly I say, NO. I should like to see the government of France that which the *Convention* intended it to be. But I am speaking of what it *is*, compared with what *the old government was*; and, if prudence did not restrain my pen, I would speak of it as compared with what some *other governments now are*. We are not here speaking about *wishes*, but about *facts*. Our wishes ought not to be directed in favour of *this* or of *that* man, or nation, exclusively. We may be excused for wishing ourselves to be best off; but, our next wish ought to be on the side of the happiness of mankind.—With these facts, then, before us; with the view, which we have now taken of the situation, past and present, of the people of France; with this view in our eye, we have to decide, not whether the people of France are likely to desire the return of the Bourbons (for that must be a point settled in the negative, I think); but, whether they are likely to wish to put down Napoleon, and, as a natural consequence, whether the allies are likely to succeed ultimately against him.—It is said *here*, that there is no *fear* that the Bourbons now endeavour to restore the old government. There is no *fear* to *us*; but can the people of France see the thing in the same light? It is impossible. They must always associate the ideas of *gabelles*, *corvées*, and all the long list of oppressions, with the restoration of that family; and, I imagine, that it will be very difficult to persuade them, that that restoration is not inseparable from the success of the allies, who, though they do not use the *language* of the Duke of Brunswick, do, as he did, *invade France*. Besides, the allies, though they profess to wish for the prosperity of France, do not shew any haste in making peace, while, on the other hand, Napoleon repeatedly declares, that he has actually accepted of the preliminaries, which they have proposed to him.—The people of France must, hence, naturally conclude, that the Allies are not so moderate in their views as they profess to be; they must conclude that some latent design exists of putting in execution schemes not yet avowed; and, in this state of mind, it appears to me very improbable, that they should aid the cause of the Allies by any rising against Napoleon, or by any unwillingness to repel the invaders.—It is not to be doubted, that France contains a great number of disaffected persons; but, these must

chiefly be *Republicans*; and, it is impossible to say how far their disaffection might carry them in the hope of rebuilding the Republic upon his ruin. They may, too, be more powerful, in a moment of alarm, than he supposes. It is possible, that his death, and the meeting of a provisionary republican government, may be announced to ever-gaping London without a moment's previous warning. But, if this be very *unlikely*, it is, I think, many degrees *more unlikely*, that the people of France should declare for, or in any way side with, those powers, from whose success they must naturally dread the overthrow of their present laws, which are the sole guarantee of their property.—If, indeed, we believe what our news-papers assert respecting Napoleon, we ought to suppose, that every man in France has a dagger for his heart. If we believe, that he poisoned his own sick soldiers, and that, upon another occasion, he buried some of them alive, and threw hot-lime into the pits upon them; if we believe these things, we must believe that all France holds him in abhorrence. But, common sense, to say nothing of the *want of proof*, and of the strong presumptive proofs on the other side, forbid us to believe those bloody tales, the fruit of a desire to profit from the credulity and the fear-begotten prejudice of the most credulous and duped people in the whole world.—Under the name of BURDON, it is, in the Times news-paper, asserted, that Buonaparte caused his wounded soldiers to be buried alive at a certain place in Italy; and the way the publisher goes to work to *establish* the fact is this. “The fact,” says he, “has been published, in this country, these *nine years*, and has never yet been *disproved*. Let it be disproved if it can be; and, if it be *not disproved*, it must, of course, be admitted to be true. *Therefore*, Napoleon caused his wounded soldiers to be buried alive.”—Now, reader, what must that public be supposed to be; in what a light must the public intellect and justice be viewed, when a public writer can make use of such a mode of *establishing* an important historical fact? What, in short, is the state of mind, to which that public is arrived, to whom an interested writer, wishing to *please* that public, could address such an article?—Is this the way that just men, that men impartial and not blinded by prejudice, go to work to establish, or to verify, accusations? Upon this principle

all the ill, asserted of any man, must be believed without any proof. What was asserted, for example, against the Prince Regent by Messrs. Hunts, must, upon this principle, be regarded as *quite true*, because it has not been *disproved*. If one man accused another of theft, the business, at the trial, would not be to produce *proof of the guilt*, but *proof of the innocence*. So, that this Mr. BURDON, whoever he is, is to accuse any one whom he chooses to pick out of any crime that he chooses to name, and the accused party is to be looked upon *as guilty*, until he comes forward and produces proof of his innocence.—Yet, upon this principle, it is, that the accusations against the humanity of Napoleon have obtained a currency in this country. There is not, as far as I have observed, any one of those accusations, which stands upon proof, which would be thought sufficient to commit a man on an accusation of stealing turnips or robbing an orchard. It is all assertion, founded on mere hearsay, or sent forth without even alleged hearsay to sanction it. The assertions respecting his heroic humanity stand upon a different foundation. The facts are recorded in the histories of his campaigns; they are published amongst a people, who could not be easily deceived; they are accompanied with precise dates, with the names of parties present, with numerous minute details, and they appeal to a great number of living witnesses. CRETELLE, in his history of the Revolution, relates, that Buonaparté, during his campaign in Asia, and at a time when many of his soldiers were dying with the plague, finding the soldiers in health disinclined to attend the sick for fear of the mortal contagion, went himself to the pest-house, and, in the presence of his aids-du-camp and others, went up to the beds of those who were in the worst stages of the malady, took them by the hand, saluted them in the kindest manner,

and thus, by risking his own life, overcame that fear which prevented his unfortunate comrades in arms from receiving the assistance so necessary to their recovery.—It is impossible to doubt of the truth of this fact. *How* invent it? *Why* invent it? Why should the author, a man of great talents and great literary reputation, hazard his reputation in such a way? This fact stands upon a foundation very different indeed from the facts of Sir Robert Wilson, Mr. Burdon, and all that anonymous and abusive rabble of writers, in this country, who administer food to the prejudice of a public, who, in the case of Napoleon, will bear to be told, that the burden of proof lies, not on the *accuser*, but on the *accused*.—If this fact be true, is it likely, that those of Sir Robert Wilson and Mr. Burdon are true? Is it *possible*? I think that any man of common sense and common candour must answer in the negative.—If we were not wilfully blind, we must perceive, besides, that Napoleon has many qualities (qualities which no one denies him), calculated to make him an object of respect with the people.—Upon all occasions he shares the toils and the dangers of his armies. His attention to public business is almost incessant. He is sober. His associates, or those who appear to be most confided in by him, are men famed for their talents, in their several stations, for their wisdom, for their application to business. His hours of recreation are not spent at the gaming table, but in the manly exercises of the field.—And yet this is the man, whom our news-writers denominate a *monster*, though he is the son-in-law of our august ally, the Emperor of Austria! This is the man, because they submit to whose sway, these writers call the people of France *base slaves*, deserving the severest chastisement!—If, indeed, Napoleon were a half-mad tyrant; if he were a sort of malignant idiot, who, while he kept

his own worthless carcass safe within the palace of St. Cloud, made it his sport to send forth armies to butcher or be butchered; if he were a drunkard, a sot, a gambler, a swindler, a man, who, if in common life, would be kicked out of every hotel in Paris; if he were an emaciated creature, incapable of any sort of exertion bodily or mental; if his mornings were spent in bed, his noons at the toilette in the midst of washes, pastes, and baubles; his nights, sometimes amongst that description of battered females who would condescend to flatter the loathsome impotence from which youth and beauty would turn with disdain, though approaching them in a shower of gold, and sometimes amongst roaring drunkards, professed gamblers, blacklegs (if there be any such in France), rotten rakes, parasites, and pimps.—If, indeed, Napoleon were a man, if *man* such a wretch might be called; if he were a man of this description, then might we *justly* accuse the people of France of *baseness* in patiently submitting to his sway; then, indeed, when we heard them cry, *Vive l'Empereur!* and thus glory in their shame, we might justly call them the *basest* of slaves. In such a case every expression of praise, bestowed on him or his house, would stamp him who used it with the character of slave. In

such a case to *boast* of being under his sway would call, with irresistible voice, for our hatred, and not only for the hatred of this nation but for that of all mankind; for, in such a case, the people of France would be a dishonour to the name and form of man.—But, if Napoleon be none of this; if he be *precisely the contrary* of the imaginary character that I have drawn, with what justice do we, or some of us, revile the people of France; with what justice do we abuse them, load them with every epithet and term expressive of contempt, for submitting to be ruled by him?—I have now done with my proposed subject; and I have only to add, that, if what I have said, contain any force, whether in the facts or the arguments that I have advanced, it will require, to answer it, something more than mere *certainty of me*, or than the *imputation of bad motives*. I have not the vanity to hope, that what I have said will produce much effect; but, I am of opinion, that, unless the people of this country, by their discountenance thereof, put a stop to this incessant torrent of outrageous abuse against the French Emperor and nation, they will in vain look for that *peace* which they appear so anxiously to desire, and which is so necessary to the prosperity of all Europe.

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TO THE READERS OF THE REGISTER.

The Number, containing the INDEXES, TABLES, &c. necessary to complete the last Volume, that is to say, Volume XXIV, is now ready for delivery.

NOTIFICATION.

For some time past; indeed, for some years past, the state of this country, and of all Europe, has been, as to politics, such as to offer but very meagre materials for discussion. On the one side we have seen nothing but the boundless dominion and influence of France on the land, and, on the other, a similar dominion and similar influence of England on the sea and sea-coasts of Europe. The discussions, or, rather, the remarks (for there has been little room for discussion) have been confined, in this country, to mere invectives against France, on the one side, and, on the other, to such slight efforts as some few persons have dared to make, in order to check the growth of the prejudices which such invectives were calculated to propagate and to nourish, not against France only, but against every known principle of freedom. To meddle with our own *internal state*, in a way that the conductor of this work wished to do, no man has dared; nor does any man now dare. To notice cursorily any public wrong; to censure in a mild manner; to express a thousandth part of what the case calls for, and that, too, almost in parables, is to beggar one's feelings; is to rob one's indignation; is to desert, and almost betray, the sacred cause of *Truth*, by making, in her name, claims so far short of her just demands.

In such a state of things, there seemed little hope of again seeing any room for ex-

ertion in that way, in which alone it was wished to make exertion in this work. But, a new and most interesting change having taken place in the affairs of Europe; a reverse of fortune with him who has, for so long a time, been the terror of European kings; a great, and almost general *concussion* being, according to all appearances, upon the eve of breaking out; a multitude of new topics, deeply interesting to mankind, starting now, every hour, forth for discussion, an irresistible desire to take part therein has led to a determination to devote not only more time and attention to the REGISTER than it has had bestowed on it for some years past, but more than it has had bestowed on it at any former period. There are times, when it becomes the duty of men to make, in part at least, a sacrifice of their taste for retirement; and, such a time the present seems to be.

But, besides time and labour, there requires, in order to give effect to the intention above spoken of, *space*; more space than this work, as now conducted, will allow. It is, therefore, intended, to *exclude*, in future, all the *Public Papers* and other official documents, except those of very great and general interest, and the insertion of which is absolutely necessary to a clear understanding of the discussions relating to them. This will give room for that original matter, which the crisis promises to call for; it will enable one to catch the subjects as they rise; and to leave very few of great importance wholly unnoticed.

In times like the present, when the great questions, not only of peace and war, but of liberty and slavery, with all their rami-

lying causes and effects, are to be discussed, a considerable part of the time of those, whose object is to make a stand on the side of expiring freedom, more than to secure any private advantage from their labours, must necessarily be employed in combating that part of the press, which is incessantly labouring for the destruction of all that ought to be deemed most valuable in civil society; that part of the press (forming nineteen twentieths of the press in this kingdom), which is incessantly employed in habituating the minds of the people to all those notions, which have a tendency to make them base as well as foolish, and, in the end, to render this country what one of our poets has described another to be: "A land of tyrants and a den of slaves." Nor, must the reader suppose, that it is here meant to speak of the *news-paper* part of the press only. The remark and description applies, and, perhaps, with a smaller proportion of exception, to all those *books* and *pamphlets*, whether individual or periodical, which treat of the subject of politics, or matters closely connected with politics: as history, biography of public men, law, religion, military and naval undertakings and establishments, political economy, and the like. To face, and to make head against, or, at least, to expose, this part of the press, which, though a slower-motioned, is, perhaps, a more sure engine for permanently blinding the eyes, debasing the minds and corrupting the hearts of the people, has always been a much-desired, and may now be, in some degree, a practicable object. It is not to be supposed, that *all* the works of the above description can even be *noticed* in consequence of the additional space that will be obtained; for, by the aid of sources so powerful as those to which they might here be traced, they are forced out in such abundance as even to overwhelm a public greedy of novelties

and enamoured of delusion; but, at any rate, some of the most mischievous of these works may be met and counteracted; or, at the least, the public may be put upon their guard with respect to them; while, on the other hand, such works, upon the subjects above mentioned, as appear likely to produce beneficial effects, may be described and recommended.

To state precisely the *mode of arrangement*, which will be given to the proposed future contents of this work would be unnecessary. The nature of the contents is alone material. But, it is necessary distinctly to state, that *communications from correspondents will not be wholly excluded*; for, it would be great presumption in any conductor of a periodical work to suppose, that no one is able to aid him in the execution of any thing intended for the public good. Yet it is as necessary to lay down certain rules, as to the admission of such communications. The first of these is, that their insertion, or rejection, must, in all cases, be understood to be left entirely to the judgment and discretion of the person to whom they are offered: and this for two very obvious reasons; first, because the very act of addressing them to him necessarily supposes a submission to his judgment; and, second, because on him lies all the responsibility, literary and legal, for promulgating them to the world. And, that he may freely and impartially exercise his judgment, *no communication should be accompanied with the real name of the author.*

—Another rule is, that correspondents should, whatever may be their feelings, so far master them as to refrain from every thing that may, in any degree, leave a pretence for legal accusation. How many valuable papers! What volumes of useful information; of fine reasoning; of noble exertion in the cause of freedom and truth, have been committed to the flames, in order to get rid of the perilous temptation, because

it was impossible to separate the reasoning from the *facts*; because it was impossible to separate public good from the personal danger of doing it! In looking back upon the destruction of these masses of useful labours, one is ready to fling the pen from one for ever, and to shut one's eyes against every thing in the shape of letters. It is, however, obvious, that every correspondent should constantly bear in mind, that a publication is not, in this country, *less libellous* because it is *true*; and that libel is a crime, punished with more severity than the greater part of felonies.—A third rule, though of less consequence, is, nevertheless, necessary to be observed by all correspondents; namely; to convey their sentiments and facts, in a *legible hand*, writing in an *illegible* hand being much about the same, as to the effect, as writing in an incomprehensible style, or in a language which no one but the writer understands. The first object of writing, as of speaking, is to be understood: how blameable, then, must be that negligence, or how much worse than contemptible that affectation, which produces, under the name of writing, an assemblage of marks, which puzzle the heads and waste the time of the persons to whom they are addressed, and who generally avenge themselves by resorting to the use of the flames!—It is

only necessary to add, upon this head, that no communication will be inserted, unless addressed to MR. BAGSHAW, the Publisher, the postage being paid. That is the regular channel. To make use of any other is attended with great inconvenience.

The *motives* to this revival and extension of exertion have been truly stated at the out-set of this address. With motives, however, the public have little to do. It is the principles, the reasoning, the facts, in which they are interested. The question always ought to be: is this *just*; is this *true*; is this *right*? And not, *whence* comes this? *Who* has put it upon the paper? To eradicate the prejudices, which, by the means, principally, of a hireling press, have been so widely spread and so deeply implanted, is a task which it would be madness to hope to accomplish; but, it is not too much to hope, that they may be checked in their growth; that they may be impaired in their strength, and that their natural fruit, slavery and misery, may be diminished. At any rate, though the attempt should wholly fail, he who makes it will have the satisfaction to know, that he is one amongst those, who have a right to say, that they are free from all share in the degradation of the country, while they are, at worst, in no worse a state than their neighbours.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

EULOGIUM ON GENERAL MOREAU.—
One would have thought, that, if this person had had any *real friends*, they would have used all the influence they possessed to ensure the burying of his name in everlasting oblivion. But, the desire to find occasions for invective against Napoleon, and to blacken his character, seems, with some persons, to have got the upper-hand, not only of all considerations of moral obligation and of discretion, but even of common sense.

"Lie still, if you're wise:
"You're damn'd, if you rise."

This was the well-known witty and pithy answer to an epitaph, promising a glorious resurrection to a notoriously wicked man; and, if the publication, on which I am going to remark, contains a true account of Moreau, a similar sentiment will apply to his case. The bare fact of a man's losing his life in fighting in foreign ranks against the armies of his country; this bare fact, without any thing more, requires a great deal to wipe away dishonour from the party; it being, upon the face of it, a crime which has ever been looked upon as worthy of the most ignominious of deaths.—Therefore, he, who undertook the vindica-

tion and even the eulogium of Moreau, ought to have been well prepared with infallible materials. Whether this was the case with the eulogist in question, we are now going to see.—The publication before me professes to be a *Biographical Memoir* of General Moreau, “by PAUL “SVININE, charged (by the Emperor of “Russia) to accompany the General on “the continent.” The author is a Russian; was an agent of Russia in the American States; and is now, as it appears from his own account, in the service of Russia. The Memoir has been translated and published in England; and, it is said, that the author has met with a *most liberal reward*.—The objects of the publication are two: *first*, to vindicate and eulogize Moreau; *second*, to blacken the character of Napoleon; but, in lieu of having succeeded in these objects, the author of the Memoir has stated facts, which sink the character of Moreau even lower, nay, a great deal lower than it before stood, and which, at the same time, raise the character of Napoleon. In short, if what this Memoir says, be *true*; for, I myself profess to know nothing at all of the facts; if what this Memoir says be *true*, Moreau was one of the *meanest and most perfidious of wretches*, and Napoleon is one of the *most magnanimous of men*!—Now, reader, if you should be one of those, whose sense of moral rectitude, whose love of truth, are nearly extinguished by long habitual fear and prejudice, and to whose reason an appeal is made almost in vain. If you should be one of those, who are willing, and even eager, to hug to their bosom traitors and assassins in alliance against an open enemy; if you be one of that description, throw down the paper and avoid the mortification here approaching; but take along with you the disgrace of having forfeited all claim to those qualities which distinguish man from the beast, or, of having a mind too much corrupted to be able to endure the contemplation of truth.—Reader, you whose mind is open to conviction; you who seek for truth; you who desire that justice should prevail; you who are able to understand, and ready to listen to, the voice of reason; to you I address myself upon this occasion; to you I observe, that the source of my facts is a work written for the express purpose of vindicating and eulogizing Moreau and of blackening Napoleon; to you I observe, that I will not avail myself of numerous other facts, making in favour of my positions, and better authenti-

cated than these; to you I observe, that it is out of the adversary's own lips that I mean to draw his conviction: and, proceeding, as I do, upon ground so fair, to you I confidently appeal; to your reason and your rectitude I appeal for a decision.—The *first* of the two objects of the Memoir, is, to elevate the character of Moreau, whose *example* it is thereby obviously wished to induce other French generals to follow. To this point, therefore, we will, in the first place, direct our attention, taking Moreau up where we find him at the out-set of the French Revolution. He was, at that time, the Memoir says, *Provost of Jurisprudence at Rennes*. He was not, therefore, a man to be *deluded* by the revolutionists. He was not a man either of an age or of a capacity to be surprised into any act of consequence of a public nature; and, to this we must add, that he was in an employment, which had been confided to him by the then King of France. The grounds, however, upon which he became so active and so efficient a revolutionist, might be good, and the act praise-worthy; but, to *justify* his taking such a part, we must take it for granted, that a very learned, very acute, and very wise man (for such the Memoir represents him), saw the old government of France in so odious a light, that it became the bounden duty of even persons holding offices under that government to array themselves in arms against it; and, if such was the government of the Bourbons, what shall we say of Moreau, by and by, when we find him *plotting* to effect the restoration of those same Bourbons?—Looking forward to the proof of this latter fact, we now follow him in his career, as a republican general, till the time of his *dencouncing Pichegru* to the Directory! But, before we enter fully upon this important act of his life, we must stop to observe, that he proceeded, with regular steps, in the service of all the different governments at Paris. That he served under the Girondists, under Robespierre, under Barrere and his colleagues, and, upon no occasion signified openly his disapprobation of any of the acts, even of that monster Robespierre. We are told of his *fine feelings*; of his *compassionate heart*; of his *noble and angelic soul*. But, still he served! Still he fought in support of Robespierre! We are even, quite to surfeiting, told of his *loyalty*. But, we find him serve, we find him uphold, those who cut off the head of the king, in whose service he had been; the

head of the queen; and who had, in some way or other, put the Dauphin to death. Moreau, the kind-hearted; Moreau, the compassionate, the fine-feeling, the *loyal* Moreau, continued to serve, to uphold, to maintain and increase the power, of those who had committed these acts. Now, either these acts were *just*, or they were most *horrible murders*. If they were just, what becomes of the character of the Bourbons, and how unjust are all the charges, which, on this score, have been preferred against the Republican rulers? And, if these acts were *most horrible murders*, is the man to be *eulogized*, who continued voluntarily to serve those, by whom these murders were committed; and who thereby did his best to enable them and encourage them to commit fresh murders?—However, there was, it seems from the Memoir, one occasion when the fine-feeling, the compassionate Moreau, did entertain the design of quitting the republican service, on account of the cruelties practised by the government. But, what was this occasion? Why, when *his own father* had been put to death by the Jacobins of Brest. Then he did, it seems, meditate, *what? Emigration!* That is to say, desertion from his army, and not any design to avenge his murdered father. However, if the Memoir speaks truth, he did *feel*; he did think of quitting the service. Admit this to be true and give him full credit for his *feeling*; but, then, it must be borne in mind, that, with all his *loyalty*, the deaths of the king, queen, dauphin, and the king's sister, all put together, did not produce any such effect upon his mind.—This fine-feeling, however, even in the case of the *murder* of his own father (for such it is called), was not of long duration. He appears to have very soon forgotten it; and, we now find him, in 1794 and the following years, pushing on in that *career of glory*, as the Memoir calls it, during which he gained so many victories, and took so many towns, in the service of Robespierre and the Directory. And, what was the *motive* which prevented him from emigrating? What was the motive that retained him in the service of the murderers of his king, his queen, and his own father? Why, we are told, “that Pichegru observed to him that he was *not sure, that he would be well received by the Austrians*,” and, therefore, he did not emigrate; therefore he did not desert; therefore he continued to serve Robespierre; therefore, he persevered in com-

bating against the House of Bourbon and its Allies.—But, a time was to come when his *fidelity*, public as well as private, was to be put to the test. Pichegru; his old friend Pichegru, who had promoted him, and who is represented as having been his kind and constant friend; a time was to come, when the fate of Pichegru was to be in his hands.—The facts, as related in the Memoir (for I will not go out of that), were these: From papers which Moreau had seized in the baggage of an Austrian General, it appeared, “that an *understanding* subsisted between Pichegru (who was still in the republican service), the *Prince of Condé*, and the *English minister Wickham*.—This correspondence, which was in the cipher, had been very slowly made out, and Moreau shewed the greatest repugnance at communicating it to the Directory. At length seeing the strife between that body and the council, settled, and guessing what would be the issue of it, the General *felt that he would lose himself by his silence, without saving Pichegru*, and being particularly pressed by his chef d'état Major, who announced to him that *if he persisted in his silence, he should be obliged to reveal every thing*, he wrote that letter with which he has never been reproached, unless because *the imperious necessity* to which he had yielded, was unknown.”—And, what was this “*imperious necessity*”? Why, that of *saving himself*! Oh! the noble-minded man! Oh! the “*great and good Moreau*!” He denounces his friend and protector, who is sent off to Cayenne in consequence of the denunciation; and the motive is, the “*imperious*” motive is, the saving of himself!—I remember, that, in some verses, in the Anti-jacobin paper, written chiefly by Messrs. Canning and Frere, this act of Moreau was severely lashed. Whether it would now be expunged, if a new edition were to be printed, is more than I can say.—But, it is not his conduct towards Pichegru, that we have here to comment on. It is on his conduct towards the government, whom he was serving, that country whose bread he was eating, and that army whose blood was flowing to gain him fame, and to gain him those riches, of which we shall, by and by, find him, all of a sudden, possessed.—If it be true, that there was proof, discovered by Moreau of an understanding between Pichegru, the *Prince of Condé*, and the *English minister Wickham*, there can be no doubt, that Pichegru was a

traitor to his own government and country, into whose service he had voluntarily entered, in whose service he was still with his own will. Therefore it was the bounden duty of Moreau to denounce him. If he failed to do that, he became a traitor himself. Well, he, at last, yields to the calls of duty; but *when, and why?* When his Chef d'état Major threatens to impeach him, and from the fear of *losing himself!* And, this was a *noble-minded* man, was he! This discovered fine-feeling; a high sense of honour; and a contempt of personal safety! Taking this relation for true, then, it appears, that Moreau, from motives of *friendship* and *gratitude*, would fain have screened treason against his country, and that he was, at last, induced to reveal it from a most *dastardly motive*. Such a man is a proper object for the praises of this Russian author; but, I will yet hope, that he will find few Englishmen so very base and corrupt as to adopt his sentiments.

—We are now to follow the eulogized General into scenes, *where he comes in close contact with Napoleon*, and where, of course, he will appear in a character more interesting to the world.—The Memoir says, that Moreau lent Buonaparté *his aid* in putting down the Directory; but, it adds, that, "*some days*;" only some days, after the 18 Brumaire, he saw that he had *been mistaken*, and feared, *that he had concurred in giving a tyrant to his country*. Indeed! So soon! Oh! yes; for it was thought necessary that Moreau should, thus early, begin to perceive what Buonaparté would turn out to be. But, notwithstanding his prognostic fears upon this head, away he goes to take the command of the army of the Danube and Rhine, and "to put the seal to his *great military reputation* "*in a new campaign*." Was that all? Did he not go, too, to fight for the support of the First Consul? Did he not go to endeavour to add to his power? Did he not go to serve him, to aid him, to obey him, who he feared would be the tyrant of his country? Is it possible for all the arts of sophistry to find the means of justifying such conduct? Either what this Russian has asserted, in this respect, is false; either Moreau thought well of the character and the designs of Buonaparté, or the former was one of the meanest and most unprincipled of men.—We, after this, find him finishing his military career with the famous battle of Hohenlinden, which induced the Austrian government to sue for peace. Upon

his return to Paris, the Memoir says, that Buonaparté, in placing in his hands a pair of magnificent pistols, said, "that he had wished to have engraved on them all his victories, but there could not be found room enough for them." The Memoir asserts, that Buonaparté was filled with *secret jealousy*, at this time, of Moreau; and that he hated him for having acquired *more glory than himself!*—Reader, just and candid reader, suppress your indignation. Such assertions become the author of such a work; such assertions become a Russian, who was charged with the office of bringing Moreau into the ranks of the enemies of France; but you, who can see no means that this man had of penetrating the heart of Buonaparté, will impute this present and this compliment to their only apparent and natural source, the greatness of mind of the man, to defame whom is one of the principal objects of this Russian writer.—We are now approaching the events, which are made use of by the Russian to blacken the character of Napoleon, and which I say, prove him to have acted, upon this occasion, at least, the part of the most magnanimous of men.—But, we must first look, for a minute or two, at Moreau's *pecuniary* circumstances. The Memoir tells us, that, after peace had been made with Austria (and it was soon after made with England), he thought solely of living in retirement; and that, having married a Miss Hullot, in praise of whose mental and personal endowments much is said, he settled on the estate of *Grosbois*, which he had *bought of Barras*. The Russian, who is so circumstantial upon other points, does not tell us how Barras came by Grosbois, what emigrant family it had been seized from, nor how Moreau came by the money to buy it. The dealing with Barras does seem to call for some explanation; but we have it not.—We find him, as described in the Memoir, with a fine estate in the country, with a town-house in New York, living in the greatest splendour of any man in the country, courted and admired by men of all parties, and extremely liberal to the *distressed*. He must have been very sharp-sighted to find any such in America. But, this is the description of the Russian's Memoir, which adds, that his *fortune* had been greatly diminished by the expenses of the law-proceedings carried on against him in France.—Where got he this fortune? From his *prerogative* before the revolution? Did his condemned and executed father

leave it him? Or, did he acquire it, during his campaigns; during the time, that he served under the Brissotines, Robespierre, the Directory, and Buonaparté; during the time that he was in the service of his country; aye, that very country, in fighting against the armies of which he, at last, received the wound that put an end to his life? In the midst of those "sweets of conjugal union," which the tender Russian tells us he enjoyed at Grosbois and at Morrisville; in the midst of all the hospitality and charity, in which he delighted to dwell, did he not, now and then, look back and trace his fortune to its source? The Memoir does not do it for him; and, therefore, I will leave the task, not a very difficult one, to the good sense of every candid reader, who will, I am sure, join me in laughing at such an attempt at the tender sublime as is exhibited in this history of Morrisville and Grosbois.—At Grosbois, however, we left him, and back again we must go to join him at Grosbois, where, as we read in the Memoir, he *blamed*, with great frankness, *all* the acts of Napoleon; and that *all Paris* were well acquainted with what he said.—Notwithstanding this, however, there he lived unmolested. It is not to be supposed, that *all Paris* knew what Napoleon was ignorant of; and, therefore, the inevitable conclusion is, that the latter either despised the blame of Moreau, or that he did not wish to hurt him, or, else, that the laws were such, that he could not hurt him.—The Russian may take which supposition he pleases.—But, we now come to more serious matter. In the beginning of 1802, the Memoir tells us, that an Abbé David conceived the idea of "*approximating* Pichegru and Moreau, foreseeing that their union might one day be useful to France, and sound from the very first overture, that Moreau was *delighted* with the idea." David took a letter from Moreau to Pichegru, but was stopped by the Police, and was sent to the Temple, "to expiate the wrong of having wished to re-establish between two great men, that confidence and friendship which had once united them."—And, was that *all* that this good son of the church had in view? Was that *all*? The sequel will shew us that it was not. Pichegru was in England. What could this *approximation* mean? Did the Abbé intend to work a miracle, and bring Poland Street, where Pichegru lived, close to Grosbois?—We are told, that Buonaparté, during the examination of the Abbé, "hid

"himself behind a screen, because, in his impatience to find pretexts for destroying Moreau, he could not wait for the report."—Now, mind, nothing was done to Moreau upon this occasion. The thing was either overlooked by Napoleon; or, there was not sufficient evidence to proceed upon against the accused. If the former, it shews the *magnanimity* of Napoleon; if the latter, it shews, that the law, as established by himself, was above his arbitrary will. Take it which way you choose, the fact redounds to his honour; for, upon the confession, and even the boasting, of this Russian, the Abbé was the bearer of a letter of friendship and approximation from Moreau to a man, whom that very Moreau himself had denounced as a traitor.—We now come to the last and grand scene, on which Moreau appeared in France; to his participation in the plot of Pichegru and Georges; his accusation; his trial, and his banishment.—We will here take the very words of the Russian, and, I think, that, before the English reader gets to the end of the extract, he will exclaim: if I must have some one to defend my memory, God defend me from the scribbling subjects of the Emperor of all the Russias!—"Pichegru, sure of what were the sentiments of his early friend," had directed General Lajolais to him in 1803, in order to become acquainted with the projects which occupied him; but Moreau having but little esteem for the latter, had confined himself to assurances of the entire interest he took in the fate of his friend, and of the desire which he had of soon seeing him again in France. Lajolais fancied he could interpret this avowal as an invitation given to Pichegru to repair thither, in order to concur in the overthrow of the government of Buonaparté; and he came to London to bring the positive assurance, that Moreau was ready to connect himself with any kind of project which should have that for its object; and that he ardently desired the presence of Pichegru at Paris. He took good care not to say, that Moreau had testified to him so little confidence, that he refused to lend him fifty louis d'or for his journey.—For several months General Georges was in Paris, to PREPARE the means of CARRYING OFF BUONAPARTE by main force, in one of his rides from Paris to St. Cloud. The plan he had concerted with Pichegru was just at its maturity; and from day to day, advices were ex-

pected which were to determine the departure of the latter with two Princes of the house of Bourbon. But what Lajolais announced of the intentions of General Moreau, appeared too important not to encourage an attempt to profit by them immediately; and it was decided that, as this General earnestly desired the presence of Pichegru in Paris, the latter should set out directly to concert with him. Moreau in fact testified to his early friend how happy he was to see him, but he was far from guessing the project which brought him, and still more so, that every thing was ready to realize it.—Without disputing the NECESSITY OF THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BOURBON FAMILY, Moreau still wished to prepare for it by gradations, which should bring over his own party, in which he counted several republicans, to approve and second it. Pichegru, who had concerted every thing with Georges, and who felt that any slowness of proceeding might occasion the loss of the latter, and of the people whom he had collected for the audacious enterprise in contemplation, wished that Moreau should declare himself immediately, and unconditionally bind himself to the cause, of which he secretly desired the success. At length Moreau, sacrificing his scruples to the security of his friend, and to his warm entreaties, had agreed that those who had prepared the plan should execute it; and that in case of success, he should place himself in advance with his party, to protect them against the measures which the partisans of Buonaparté might take at the first moment to avenge him. He decided too late: the police, enlightened by what Guerelle revealed, knew of the presence of Pichegru and Georges at Paris, and of their connexion with Moreau; the latter was first arrested.—All Europe knows the details of this disastrous affair.—Yes, the result is known. Georges was hanged; Pichegru hanged himself in prison; Moreau was banished; and great numbers of the inferior actors, with some of the principal ones, were pardoned.—We are here relieved from the necessity of resorting to conjecture. Evidence itself would now be useless. All room for dispute and doubt are now completely removed; for here is the friend, the eulogist, the companion of the last months of Moreau's life, the identical man who was selected for

the purpose, like another Ulysses, of bringing this Achilles to the battle, but against his country instead of for it: here we have the plain and distinct avowal of this very man, whose work is circulated by the great means above spoken of, that Moreau is fully entitled to the honour of being ranked with Georges and Pichegru in the memorable plot of 1803, and that he was not hanged, but banished, and suffered to carry away a brilliant fortune.—If it be asked; if any one can ask, what crime he was guilty of, I will not name any. I will content myself with a recapitulation of the facts.—What were they, then, as stated in this *Memoir*? That, in 1803, England being at war with France, Georges and Pichegru went from London to Paris, where, with divers others, they prepared a plot for CARRYING OFF the sovereign of that country, with whom England had recently made a treaty of peace and friendship, and for libelling whom Mr. Peltier had recently been found guilty in the English Court of King's Bench, the Chief Justice laying it down, that Buonaparté was the sovereign of France in fact, and ought to be so considered by us; that Georges and Pichegru, being at Paris for this purpose, and having prepared the means for putting it into execution, made known their designs to Moreau, who approved of those designs; and who agreed to be ready, with his party, to protect them in the execution of them; that the ultimate consequence was to be the restoration of the Bourbons.—These are the facts. And, is it possible for any man, not divested of every just sentiment, to deny, that, in only banishing Moreau, Napoleon discovered more magnanimity than, in a like case, was to be expected even from the greatest of men?—As to its being the design of these men to CARRY OFF Buonaparté, every reader of common sense will laugh at the idea; and, I cannot refrain from believing, that the English translator, knowing the taste of his readers better than his Russian original, has made free with the text, putting "carry off" for "take off." But, then comes the outrageous absurdity of the thing. To suppose, that Georges and Pichegru and Moreau, with a band of desperate men at their back; to suppose, that they could mean to take Napoleon away as a girl is carried away to Greta Green, is something so farcical, that I will not longer dwell on it; but will leave the reader to characterize the real design; to put himself, for a moment, in the place of him against whom it

was meditated; to compare his conduct upon this occasion, with that of other sovereigns under similar circumstances; and, then, to say whether Moreau had cause of complaint, and whether all history affords such a proof of magnanimity, as was here displayed by him, who is now the Emperor of the French. I will not waste many words upon the assertion of the Memoir, that a crowd of Generals, when they saw Moreau going to his trial, told him, that they had sworn on their swords to *defend his life*. Why did they not defend him from *banishment*? As in the case of Job, of old, I suppose, they gave him up to Napoleon with an injunction not to touch his life! If Napoleon "*thirsted* for his blood," as we are told he did, and if he was, as it is asserted, an absolute tyrant, what restrained him? Why was not that blood shed? And why did not the same sword-swearing Generals save the lives of Generals Georges and Pichegru? Why was the latter "*illustrious friend*" of Moreau abandoned? That "*illustrious friend*," whom Moreau himself had denounced as a traitor, and whom he had afterwards embraced for the purpose of *carrying off* Buonaparté? Why was not he saved too?—What more need be said? The question is discussed. Let the reader decide.

THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON'S LATE CAMPAIGNS.—If we are to believe the conductors of the press in this country, we shall be forced at last to acknowledge, that the French Emperor is neither a brave soldier nor a profound politician; that he is, in fact, a coward; that all the victories which have attended him in his career, have been more the effect of low cunning than the fruits of superior military talents; that in his recent campaigns, which have proved so fatal to the glory of France, he displayed nothing but imbecility, and an unjustifiable contempt of his opponents; and that, for these reasons, he ought, and was, justly detested and abhorred by the French people, who were ready to submit to any sacrifice, provided they could get rid of him. This, we are gravely and positively assured, by the *Times* and the *Courier*, is the exact situation of Buonaparté; and, therefore, it is but reasonable, according to them, to conclude, that his downfall will be speedy and certain, and happiness and prosperity be secured to Europe, in the restoration of the balance of power which these profound politicians

take it for granted, must result from Napoleon's overthrow. Were such advantages really to follow the humiliation of Buonaparté; were prosperity and happiness, even to half the extent which these advocates for the deliverance of Europe promise themselves, to be the consequence of confining France to her ancient boundaries, I should rejoice if the first accounts from the continent announced the overthrow of Napoleon, and the restoration of the Bourbons. But, entertaining no such sanguine views; being firmly persuaded, that the existence of France, as a great and independent nation, occupying an extent of territory equal, at least, to what she does at present, is essential to the safety and security of the other continental powers, I cannot subscribe to the opinion, that curtailing Buonaparté's empire, far less dethroning him, will promote the interests of humanity. But why should we trouble ourselves with calculations upon the effect of causes, until we have ascertained whether or not these causes exist? Why should we promise ourselves prosperity and happiness from an event which, as far as I can at present judge, has no other existence than in the brain of those who desire it? Are we certain that the French people are inimical to Buonaparté? Are we sure that they are prepared to second the views of those who wish his overthrow? Can we rely upon its being the intention of his enemies to restore the Bourbons on his dethronement? Or is it absolutely certain that the Jacobins would not assume the reins of government, on that event taking place? Ever since the result of the battle of Leipsic was known, we have been amused with accounts, from high authority, of France being ready, to a man, to drive the "*Corsican Usurper*" from the throne, and of that people only waiting for the countenance of the Allies to restore the Bourbons. Every Frenchman's mind, we were told, was so completely estranged from the Buonapartean family, and the way to the throne for Louis XVIII. so secure, that there was not an individual in France who was not ready to shed the last drop of his blood in this holy cause.—In strict conformity with these views, it was said, that the Confederates addressed their declaration to the French people on the 1st of December. To second this measure, it was thought necessary, not only to publish the Proclamation of Louis the XVIIIth in this country, but to translate, and circulate thousands of printed copies of that document, through all the territory subject to

the sway of Buonaparté. Such unexampled activity surely merited its reward. The voluntary exertions of men actuated, as they pretended, by a motive so pure as that of restoring thirty millions of people to liberty; of breaking the chains with which they had been so long held in thralldom, and restoring them to that elevated rank which they are entitled to hold among nations, could not expect less than complete success as the consequence of their meritorious efforts.—In these flattering views, however, we find that these restorers of the rights of men have hitherto been disappointed: the magic effect expected to be produced by their different appeals is yet to be felt; and all Frenchmen, as far as can be discovered, seem disposed, by their conduct, to *negative* the assertion, that they were hostile towards the existing government. Instead of shewing any disposition to break in pieces their chains, they appear to embrace them the closer; and if private accounts, recently received, as to the state of France, are to be relied on, the call which Buonaparté has made upon his subjects to arm and repel their invaders, has not been made in vain. In these accounts it is stated, that “large founderies for the manufacture of arms of all descriptions are working with great rapidity” in several departments of France; that “considerable quantities of artillery are collected;” that “numerous detachments of troops, many of whom are not such mere boys as had been represented,” are marching in all directions; that these troops are “perfectly disciplined,” and are composed partly of “veteran cavalry, well mounted,” and that their horses are “apparently in good condition.”—How is all this? Whence is it that this activity has arisen? Is it for the purpose of overturning the throne of Buonaparté? No; for we find that it is the consequence of his activity? Is it, then, to restore the Bourbons? No; for it is openly avowed, that it is the determination of Frenchmen to resist, with these very arms, all attempts to alter their form of government. From all this I am apprehensive that the French have been lately *thinking* of their situation, and comparing notes; that they have been drawing contrasts between the condition of their fathers under the reign of the Capets, and their own situation under Buonaparté. On turning our attention to the Proclamation of the Allies, it must be admitted, however well we may think of it, that it was their object in publishing it to persuade the French people

to separate their interests from Napoleon's. They complained of his inordinate ambition, they attributed all the evils with which Europe has been afflicted, to this cause; and, in order, evidently, to induce his adherents to desert his fortunes, they held out the prospect of securing to France a greater extent of territory than she ever enjoyed under her former kings. Again, when we look at the Proclamation of the Bourbons, we find that every thing was to be conceded to the people, which their heart could desire; and that, in addition to the many advantages they enjoyed by virtue of the Napoleon Code, their religion, of which they had been deprived under the reign of terror, and which Buonaparté had not recognised to its fullest extent, was to be restored. It might have been expected, that documents which *promised* to secure so many *blessings* to the French nation, would have been hailed by that people with delight; that they would have received with rapture these harbingers of the restoration of a family, under whose sway they were to realize all that the poets had depicted as peculiar to the golden age. But no; this stupid, this incorrigible people are insensible to these advantages. Though we are constantly assured, that their government is more tyrannical, and more despotic, than all other governments put together; though the news-papers all agree in telling us, that they are the most miserable, the most abject, and the most wretched people existing on the face of the earth; that, in fact, they dare neither eat, drink, nor think, without permission from Buonaparté; yet amidst all this moral and political degradation, and which truly forms a striking contrast to what they were only a few years ago; the French nation are so much wedded to despotism, and so deeply in love with their oppressor, that they actually *refuse* to be delivered, and *reject*, in scornful silence, the boon of emancipation which has been offered them. Taking experience for our guide, we might have supposed that past events would have convinced the enemies of Napoleon, that it was folly to attempt to supplant him by means of the Bourbons. But this far from being the case:—Determined to force a King upon France of their own choosing, and indignant at the conduct of that people for rejecting their proffered mercy, they are regardless of experience; their arrogant pride will not permit them to concede that they are wrong; and they cling to their favourite

project of destroying Buonaparté, even after hope itself is gone. With this view the *Times* newspaper lately put forth a *manifesto*, in which it is attempted to depreciate the military character of Buonaparté, for the professed purpose of exciting a revolt among his subjects. All his splendid successes are represented to have been the fruits of his cunning and intrigue; his maintaining his position on the Elbe, in spite of the storm which was gathering around him, is ascribed to foolish temerity; his return to Paris after the battle of Leipzig, is regarded as proof of his cowardice; and a charge is preferred against him of having created a fictitious famine in France, by monopolizing the corn, for the double purpose of screening himself from the vengeance of his subjects, which was ready to burst upon him, and to give facility to the Conscription, which it is asserted, was "filled up by the actual fear of famine." If these accusations are well founded, is it credible that the French nation should be ignorant of them? and if acquainted with them, is it possible that, believing them, they should not inflict a signal punishment upon the author of the calamities to which they have given birth?—So far, however, from the sufferings which are alleged to have arisen from these supposed enormities, having incensed the French against their Emperor, his conduct seems to have endeared him the more to them. There were obvious reasons for submitting to his yoke when victory followed his footsteps, and when nearly a million of soldiers were devoted to his service; but now that the tide of fortune has turned against him; that at the moment he returned to his capital, not as a conqueror, but humiliated by defeat, and with only a handful of men to support him, he should not only be received and acknowledged as the lawful sovereign of the French Empire, but new levies be raised to give stability to his government; are circumstances that can only be accounted for by admitting, that all that we have been told about the predilection of Frenchmen in favour of the Bourbons, is false; and that the charge of cowardice and other imputations thrown upon Buonaparté's character, by a vile and prostituted press, are disbelieved in France, and entirely without foundation. It is a melancholy truth that there are people so besotted in this country, as to give implicit credit to these falsehoods, and who would even assent to other fabrications, ten times more absurd, upon the bare statement of such

newspapers as the *Times* and the *Courier*, rather than give themselves the trouble of exercising their own judgment, even for a single moment. Thinking appears to them the greatest of all evils, which they are always desirous to avoid, lest, perchance, they might discover something connected with their favourite project, the deliverance of Europe, neither congenial with their feelings, nor with their interest. But while these men enjoy their fancied security, let us not shrink from the vindication *even of an enemy*, when he is wantonly abused; but let us on all occasions be forward to undeceive the less credulous, who may be honest in their inquiries after truth; but who, in this age of abominable deception, in which sophistry and cunning are paramount, may find the inquiry somewhat difficult.—As to the charge brought against Buonaparté, of having monopolized all the corn in France, for the purpose of compelling his subjects to comply with his measures, it is a sufficient answer, that it rests upon the bare assertion of the writer of the *Times*.—No authority is referred to in support of the accusation. Having been advanced as a matter of *fact*, and not as a vague speculation, it was incumbent upon this writer to mention the source of his information, that others might have it in their power to examine it. His silence upon this essential particular shows that the story is of a piece with what has been so often said, and as often *disproved*, about Buonaparté poisoning his sick at Jaffa. Besides, had France been lately afflicted with a famine, all Europe must have heard of it; yet we find that every press in Europe has been silent as to this occurrence, except the press of this country. But we are told that it is impossible to justify the conduct of Buonaparté in his invasion of Russia, for that *heaven* manifested its displeasure at his impious attempt by destroying his army. Well then, if it was *heaven* that defeated his purpose, how is Buonaparté to be blamed for this? or why are the French people to drive him from his throne, because a power, which no mortal can resist, chose to fight against him? It would seem, if any thing is to be inferred from this circumstance, that it was not with Buonaparté that the Almighty was offended, but with the people of France, for it was his subjects and not himself that *heaven* sacrificed in its wrath. If it is insisted that Buonaparté was preserved to convince him of the folly of his conquests, ought not this to afford a striking lesson to

the Allies at the present moment, even supposing they should have forgot the fate of the Duke of Brunswick, who, upon their own principles, was driven out of France because he meditated the conquest of that country? Are the Allies certain that none of the feelings which at that time influenced them, now occupy their minds? Are not the acquisitions which Sweden has obtained at the expense of Denmark, a pledge that others of the confederation are to share a portion of the spoil? Time, perhaps, will show whether we have been mistaken in our conjectures. But in the meanwhile can it be believed that Buonaparté was so mad as to calculate upon retaining Moscow, and of annexing all the countries he had conquered in his progress to that capital, to the French empire? No man of common sense, can believe this, without also admitting that it is the intention of the Emperor Alexander, to annex the German States which he has overrun, to his own dominions—nay, even France itself, should he be so fortunate as to succeed in planting the Russian Eagle on the walls of Paris. What then was the motive which led Buonaparté to Moscow, and where are we to seek for a disclosure of his views? When we wish to discover the intentions of any Power, we always look for these to their public documents; at least this is the rule which generally obtains, and we see no reason why it should not be adopted as to France. Now in the *Exposé* published by Buonaparté previous to setting out on his expedition to Russia, it was distinctly stated, that the *only* cause of renewing hostilities against Alexander, was his violation of the treaty of Tilsit; and in all the subsequent declarations of Buonaparté, he insisted upon that infraction alone, which the Court of Russia never denied, or even attempted to palliate. If the infringement of treaties then is recognised, in the laws of nations, as a justifiable cause for going to war, why should Buonaparté be abused for availing himself of it?—Or why should his subjects wish to dethrone him, for pursuing the same line of policy pursued by other monarchs? There is nothing in the argument, that France had dictated terms to Russia when Russia was prostrate at her feet; because all the powers of Europe have, at one period or another, acted in a similar manner. If treaties, deliberately and solemnly entered into, are not to be respected by the contracting parties, because one of them may afterwards find that some of the terms are not so favourable to

his interest as he could have wished; I am afraid that there is not a single treaty in existence which might not be set aside on the same ground; and if such a principle were once admitted, mankind, in the present state of the world, need lay themselves out for no other occupation than that of interminable war. France then invaded Russia, because Russia violated her engagement with France. In acting thus, France conformed to the laws of nations, and to the admitted policy of European states. Buonaparté cannot be accused of burning Moscow; he could not prevent that conflagration; the only thing he could do was to punish those he found active in executing the decree which occasioned it. But such is the enmity some men bear towards him, that even this act, which in any other sovereign would have been extolled as an act of inflexible justice, was condemned in him as an instance of savage barbarity. His subsequent stay at Moscow was evidently occasioned by an expectation, that the Court of St. Petersburg would renew her alliance with France. When he saw there remained no hopes of this, he resolved on withdrawing his army; but here, the hand of Heaven, which had done so much for him, and on more than one occasion, had enabled him to dictate a peace in the capital of his enemy, determined, at last, to arrest his career, and to send him back to his people, stript of his laurels. If they had been indignant at Buonaparté for his failure in this expedition, now was the time to show this. But, instead of blaming him, they applauded his conduct; for, in a few months after, we find him, by the prompt levies which were raised, again able to take the field, and obtaining new victories over the enemies of France. Every thing, therefore, has hitherto demonstrated the falsehood of the assertion, that Buonaparté is unpopular among his subjects on account of his disasters. Let us now examine whether the charges of cowardice, of a foolish temerity, and of being actually ignorant of military tactics, which are so lavishly brought against him, ought, in justice, to be applied to Buonaparté. If success is to be regarded as the criterion of valour, and the want of it a proof of cowardice, then is Buonaparté to be held a coward, for he not only did not succeed in his views against the Allies, but he found it necessary to abandon all the advantages he had obtained, and is now, in turn, obliged to defend his own territory against the attempts of those he formerly invaded,

But if this rule be adopted in the case of Buonaparté, we cannot avoid applying it to all other cases of a similar nature. What shall we then say of the Dunkirk and the Helder retreats? or the famous Walcheren expedition? Are we to infer, from these disasters, that the commanding officers were cowards? Or in what light are we to consider the conduct of Marquis Wellington, when he found himself obliged to make a precipitate retreat to Torres Vedras? The news-papers were loud in extolling this movement as a proof of his superior skill. Nothing but the *Fabian* exploit was talked of: every one was louder than another in sounding the praise of the Noble Marquis, for the generalship he displayed in escaping from the clutches of Massena. But how could the public be so stupid as to pronounce this circumstance a proof of military skill and valour in our general, when, at this day, they regard a similar retreat by another general, as evidence of cowardice? This nation were once disposed to allow General Moreau credit for his skill in managing retreats. Amidst all the honours, however, which the sovereigns of Europe are conferring upon his memory for making common cause with them against his own country, I do not see that they can avoid detracting from his merit, if the rule by which they now determine cowardice is to be held inviolable. For my part, I admit of no such rule, and, therefore, cannot subject myself to the inconsistency in which its supporters necessarily involve themselves. I consider the character of Buonaparté for valour, too well established before the battle of Leipzig, to be overthrown by that event. Had he, instead of maintaining his ground, and giving battle to his opponents, fled from the field without firing a shot, I might then, perhaps, have subscribed to the charge; but finding him, amidst the innumerable difficulties with which he was surrounded—pressed on all sides by troops superior to his own in numbers and discipline; and struggling to counteract the defection of his Allies, whose forces constituted his chief strength; I cannot but admire that undaunted courage which led him to risk a battle in such trying circumstances, and that superior knowledge of military tactics which he displayed in securing the retreat of so large a portion of his army, after the fatal result to him of that memorable battle. Had any other general than Buonaparté extricated himself in the manner he did from so many perils, his name

would have been immortalized; and the historian, in detailing the events of that tremendous day, could not fail to record, as a proof of the great talents of the man who was forced to yield only to superior numbers, that *treason* existed in his camp; that at the moment victory hovered over his standard, the desertion of at least a third of his troops, who instantly turned their arms against him, was the real cause of his quitting the field. This fact is too notorious to be denied: it was admitted in our government bulletin, which first announced the retreat of Buonaparté: it was afterwards acknowledged, though with apparent reluctance, in the dispatches received by government from Lord Cathcart, and Sir Charles Stewart; and it was fully confirmed by the French bulletins, which, upon that occasion, were generally admitted to contain a faithful report of the extent of Buonaparté's disasters. It is true, every exertion has been made, by a servile and prostituted press, to obliterate the impression which this fact was calculated to produce on the minds of the people of this country. Knowing well that it was sufficient of itself to protect the reputation of Napoleon, the editors of all our newspapers carefully kept it out of view, while they dwelt with exultation on the profound dispositions, the extraordinary military talents, and the undaunted bravery of the Crown Prince of Sweden, who, it is now gravely asserted, far surpasses his former master in every quality essential to the formation of a great man, and an able general. But although this sort of *deception* is attended every day with a success exceeding the most sanguine expectations of those engaged in practising it, we are not to suppose that the people of France are ignorant of the true cause of their reverses; or that they are so infatuated as to hate their sovereign because he could not command victory when it was impossible to command it, and because he could not avert calamities which no other human being could either foresee or prevent. But supposing Buonaparté had been fairly beaten by equal numbers, I cannot admit that even this would have afforded a just cause for his subjects to revolt against him. Neither do I see how the man that thinks differently can, consistent with his opinion, avoid censuring the inhabitants of Russia, of Austria, and of Prussia; for these people not only tolerated their sovereigns after they had been repeatedly humbled by France, but even, in the midst of these disasters, evinced the greatest regard

and affection for them. If Buonaparté is that *great monster*, which the public journals represent him to be, how could the good people of Russia look upon Alexander with indulgence, after being contaminated, as he must have been, by his frequent personal interviews with the "Corsican"—during one of which, the sovereign of all the Russias actually *embraced* the "vile catiff?" Or how could the Emperor Francis justify himself to his subjects, for sacrificing his beloved daughter, by giving her in marriage to "the most unprincipled tyrant that ever disgraced human nature?" The *devotion* of the Prussians to the successor of the *great Frederick*; to that monarch, whose numerous and well disciplined armies were so recently and so often defeated by the French, is so great, we are told, that they actually adore him; so much so, indeed, that, like another celebrated personage whose name is so famous in modern annals, it was with difficulty this beloved monarch escaped suffocation when he entered his capital, such was the eagerness of the ladies to embrace him. These patriotic females were, no doubt, prevented from demonstrating, in this way, their loyalty to so good a king; but so high was their enthusiasm, so determined were they to support his cause, in spite of all his misfortunes, that we are positively assured, upon the authority of the Spanish minister, resident at Berlin, "every Prussian female has delivered up her jewels and trinkets to the treasury to support the war." If the people of Russia, of Austria, and of Prussia, could shew so much indulgence, and so much attachment to their governments, as we see they have done, notwithstanding all their reverses, is it reasonable to suppose that the French nation, for whom Buonaparté fought so many battles, gained so many splendid victories, and who conferred upon them a Constitution which is the envy even of his *enemies*? Can it, I say, be supposed, that they will not succour him in his distress, and submit to every sacrifice which a grateful, a brave, and a high minded people ought to make, to enable him to recover his fallen fortunes? It is impossible but what they must; unless, indeed, we can believe they are prepared themselves to submit, and to look with indifference upon the submission of all Europe, to a worse despotism than that which the revolution of France so effectually annihilated.—The truth is, there is not a people in this quarter of the globe among whom such gross and barbarous notions prevail respecting

France, as what are every day promulgated by the press of this country. It cannot be surprising then if other nations entertain more correct ideas as to the conduct and policy of their rulers, than what are entertained by the majority of Englishmen. Nor will it appear any way extraordinary, if, in opposition to what has been so often asserted here, the rest of the people of Europe should concur with me in believing, that the subjects of Buonaparté neither hate him, nor desire a change of sovereigns.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRENCH PAPERS.

Paris, Dec. 27.

IMPERIAL DECREES.

Palace of the Thuilleries, Dec. 26, 1813.

Napoleon, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, Mediator of the Swiss Confederation, &c. We have decreed and do decree as follows:—**Art. I.** There shall be sent Senators, or Counsellors of State, into the military divisions, in quality of our Commissioners Extraordinary; they shall be accompanied by *maitres des requetes*, or auditors.—**II.** Our Extraordinary Commissioners are charged with accelerating, 1. The levies of the conscription. 2. The clothing, equipment, and arming of the troops. 3. The completing of the provisioning of fortresses. 4. The levy of horses required for the service of the army. 5. The levy and organization of the National Guards, conformably to our decrees. Our said Extraordinary Commissioners shall be authorized to extend the dispositions of the said decrees to towns and places which are not comprehended in them.—**III.** Those of our said Extraordinary Commissioners who shall be sent into countries threatened by the enemy, shall order levies *en masse*, and all other measures whatever, necessary to the defence of the country, and commanded by the duty of opposing the progress of the enemy. Besides, special instructions shall be given them, according to the particular situation of the departments to which they belong.—**IV.** Our Extraordinary Commissioners are authorized to order all measures of high police, which circumstances, and the maintenance of public order, may demand.—**V.** They are likewise ordered to form military commissions, and summon before them; or before the special courts, all persons accused of favouring the enemy, of being in communi-

cation with him, or of attempting the public tranquillity.—VI. They shall be authorized to issue proclamations, and pass decrees. The said decrees shall be obligatory upon all citizens. The judicial authorities, civil and military, shall be bound to conform themselves to them, and cause them to be executed.—VII. Our Extraordinary Commissioners shall correspond with our Ministers upon the objects relative to each service.—VIII. They shall enjoy in their respective capacities, the honours allowed them by our regulations.—IX. Our Ministers are charged with the execution of the present decree, which shall be inserted in the bulletin of the laws.

(Signed) NAPOLEON.

By the Emperor,
The Minister Secretary of State,
(Signed) The Duke of BASSANO.

Palace of the Thuilleries, Dec. 16, 1813.

Napoleon, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the Rhenish Confederation, Mediator of the Swiss Confederation, &c.—In consequence of our Decree of this day, we have named and name for our extraordinary Commissioners.—[Here follow the names.]

CONSERVATIVE SENATE.

Sitting of Monday, Dec. 27, 1813.

His Serene Highness the Prince Arch-Chancellor of the Empire President.—In the name of the Special Committee appointed in the Sitting of the 22d of this month, the Senator Count de Fontanes, one of its Members, obtained permission to speak, and made to the Assembly the following report:

"*My Lord,—Senators,—*The first duty of the Senate towards the Monarch and the people is truth.—The extraordinary situation in which the country finds itself, renders this duty still more obligatory.—The Emperor himself invites all the great bodies of the State to express their opinions freely: a truly loyal idea!—The salutary developement of those monarchical institutions, in which power centred in the hands of one, is strengthened in the confidence of all; and which, giving to the throne the guarantee of the national opinion, gives to the people in their turn the consciousness of their dignity, the too just reward of their sacrifices.—Such magnanimous intentions ought not to be deceived.—Accordingly, the Committee named in your Sitting of the 22d of December, whose organ I have the honour to be, has

made the most serious examination of the official papers submitted to their inspection by the orders of his Majesty the Emperor, and communicated by the Duke of Vicenza.—Negociations for peace have commenced; you ought to be acquainted with their progress. Your judgment must not be prejudiced. A bare enumeration of facts, by guiding your opinion, must prepare that of France.—When the Austrian Cabinet had laid aside the character of a mediator; when every thing gave room to judge that the Congress at Prague was ready to be dissolved, the Emperor determined to make a last effort for the pacification of the Continent.—The Duke of Bassano wrote to Prince Metternich. He proposed to neutralize a point on the frontiers, and there to resume the negociations of Prague, even during the continuance of hostilities. Unhappily these overtures had no effect.—The time when this pacific step was taken, is important. It was on the 16th of August last. The remembrance of the days of Lutzen and Bautzen was recent. This wish against the prolongation of the war may then be said to be in some degree contemporary with the date of two victories.—The efforts of the French Cabinet were in vain; peace became more remote; hostilities began again; events assumed another face. The soldiers of the German Princes, but now our allies, shewed more than once, while fighting under our banners, a fidelity but too dubious: all at once they ceased to dissemble, and joined our enemies.—From that moment the combinations of a campaign, so gloriously begun could not have the expected success.—The Emperor perceived that it was time to order the French to evacuate Germany. He returned with them fighting at almost every step; and on the narrow route where so many open defections and silent treacheries confined his progress and his motions, new trophies marked his return. We followed him with some uneasiness in the midst of so many obstacles, over which he alone could triumph. With joy we saw him return to his frontiers, not with his accustomed good fortune, but not without heroism and without glory. Having returned to his capital, he turned his eyes from those fields of battle where the world had admired him for 15 years; he even detached his thoughts from the great designs which he had conceived. I use his own expressions; he turned to his people, his heart opened itself, and we read in it our own sentiments. He desired peace, and as soon

as the hope of a negotiation seemed possible, he hastened to seize it. The events of the war led the Baron de St. Aignan to the headquarters of the Allied Powers. There he saw the Austrian Minister, Prince Metternich; and the Russian Minister, Count Nesselrode.—Both, in the name of their Courts, laid before him in a confidential conversation the bases of a general pacification. The English Ambassador, Lord Aberdeen, was present at this conference. Observe this last fact, Senators, it is important.—Baron St. Aignan, being desired to acquaint his Court with all he had heard, faithfully acquitted himself of this commission.—Though France had a right to hope for other proposals, the Emperor sacrificed every thing to his sincere wish for peace. He caused the Duke of Bassano to write to Prince Metternich, that he admitted as the basis of negotiation, the general principle contained in the confidential report of M. de St. Aignan. Prince Metternich, in reply to the Duke of Bassano, seemed to think there was something vague in the acceptance (*adhesion*) given by France. Then, to remove every difficulty, the Duke of Vicenza, after having taken the orders of his Majesty, made known to the Cabinet of Austria, that his Majesty adhered to the *general and summary basis communicated by M. de St. Aignan*. The Duke of Vicenza's letter is of the 2d of December; it was received on the 5th of the same month. Prince Metternich did not answer till the 10th. These dates must be carefully observed; you will soon see that they are not without importance. Just hopes of peace may be conceived on reading the answer of Prince Metternich to the dispatch of the Duke of Vicenza; only at the end of his letter he announces, that before the negotiations are opened, it is necessary to confer about them with the Allies. These Allies can be no other than the English. Now their Ambassador was present at the conversation of which M. de St. Aignan had been witness. We do not desire to excite distrust; we relate.—We have carefully noted the date of the first correspondence between the French and the Austrian Cabinets; we have said that the Duke of Vicenza's letter must have been received on the 5th, and that the receipt

was not acknowledged till the 10th.—In the interval a Gazette, now under the influence of the Allied Powers, published to all Europe a declaration, which is said to be furnished with their authority. It would be melancholy to believe it.—This declaration is of a nature unusual in the diplomacy of Kings. It is no longer to Kings like themselves that they explain their grievances, and send their manifestoes. It is to the people that they address them: and from what motive do they adopt such a new method of proceeding? It is to separate the cause of the people from that of their governors, though the interest of society has every where united them.—May not this example be fatal? Should it be given, especially at this period, when people's minds, agitated by all the diseases of pride, are so averse to bending under the authority which protects them, while it represses their audacity? And against whom is this indirect attack aimed? Against a great man, who merited the gratitude of all Kings; because, by re-establishing the throne of France, he has closed up the crater of the volcano which threatened them all.—It must not be dissembled, that, in certain respects this extraordinary manifesto is in a moderate tone. This proves, that the experience of the coalition has gained perfection.—It may be remembered, perhaps, that the Manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick irritated the pride of a great people. In fact, even those who did not join in the opinions prevalent at that period, when they read this insulting Manifesto, found themselves offended in the national honour. Another language has therefore been assumed. Europe fatigued, has more need of repose than of passions.—But if there be so much moderation in the councils of our enemies, wherefore, while they continually speak of peace, do they still menace our frontiers, which they had promised to respect, when we should have no other barrier than the Rhine?—If our enemies are so moderate, why have they violated the capitulation of Dresden? why have they not done justice to the noble complaints of the General who commanded in that place?—If they are so moderate, why have they not established the exchange of prisoners, conformably to
(*To be continued.*)

The Readers of the Register are informed, that the sheet containing the INDEXES of Volume XXIII, and also the sheet containing the Indexes of Volume XXIV, are now printed and ready for delivery; so that those Gentlemen, who wish to have those Volumes completed and bound, may now have it done as soon as they please.

The Register will in future be published at 10 o'clock on Saturday morning.

NOTIFICATION.

For some time past; indeed, for some years past, the state of this country, and of all Europe, has been, as to politics, such as to offer but very meagre materials for discussion. On the one side we have seen nothing but the boundless dominion and influence of France on the land, and, on the other, a similar dominion and similar influence of England on the sea and sea-coasts of Europe. The discussions, or, rather, the remarks (for there has been little room for discussion) have been confined, in this country, to mere invectives against France, on the one side, and, on the other, to such slight efforts as some few persons have dared to make, in order to check the growth of the prejudices which such invectives were calculated to propagate and to nourish, not against France only, but against every known principle of freedom. To meddle with our own *internal state*, in a way that the conductor of this work wished to do, no man has dared; nor does any man now dare. To notice cursorily any public wrong; to censure in a mild manner; to express a thousandth part of what the case calls for, and that, too, almost in parables, is to beggar one's feelings; is to rob one's indignation; is to desert, and almost betray, the sacred cause of *Truth*, by making, in her name, claims so far short of her just demands.

In such a state of things, there seemed little hope of again seeing any room for exertion in that way, in which alone it was wished to make exertion in this work. But, a new and most interesting change having taken place in the affairs of Europe;

a reverse of fortune with him who has, for so long a time, been the terror of European kings; a great, and almost general *concussion* being, according to all appearances, upon the eve of breaking out; a multitude of new topics, deeply interesting to mankind, starting now, every hour, forth for discussion, an irresistible desire to take part therein has led to a determination to devote not only more time and attention to the REGISTER than it has had bestowed on it for some years past, but more than it has had bestowed on it at any former period. There are times, when it becomes the duty of men to make, in part at least, a sacrifice of their taste for retirement; and, such a time the present seems to be.

But, besides time and labour, there requires, in order to give effect to the intention above spoken of, *space*; more space than this work, as now conducted, will allow. It is, therefore, intended, to *exclude*, in future, all the *Public Papers* and other official documents, except those of very great and general interest, and the insertion of which is absolutely necessary to a clear understanding of the discussions relating to them. This will give room for that original matter, which the crisis promises to call for; it will enable one to catch the subjects as they rise; and to leave very few of great importance wholly unnoticed.

In times like the present, when the great questions, not only of peace and war, but of liberty and slavery, with all their ramifying causes and effects, are to be discussed, a considerable part of the time of those, whose object is to make a stand on the side of expiring freedom, more than to secure any private advantage from their labours, must necessarily be employed in combating that part of the press, which is incessantly labouring for the destruction of all that ought to be deemed most valuable in civil society; that part of the press (forming nineteen twentieths of the press in this kingdom), which is incessantly employed in habituating the minds of the people to all those notions, which have a tendency to make them base as well as foolish, and, in the end, to render this

country what one of our poets has described another to be: "A land of tyrants and a den of slaves." Nor, must the reader suppose, that it is here meant to speak of the *news-paper* part of the press only. The remark and description applies, and, perhaps, with a smaller proportion of exception, to all those *books* and *pamphlets*, whether individual or periodical, which treat of the subject of politics, or matters closely connected with politics: as history, biography of public men, law, religion, military and naval undertakings and establishments, political economy, and the like. To face, and to make head against, or, at least, to expose, this part of the press, which, though a slower-motioned, is, perhaps, a more sure engine for permanently blinding the eyes, debasing the minds and corrupting the hearts of the people, has always been a much-desired, and may now be, in some degree, a practical object. It is not to be supposed, that *all* the works of the above description can even be *noticed* in consequence of the additional space that will be obtained; for, by the aid of sources so powerful as those to which they might here be traced, they are forced out in such abundance as even to overwhelm a public greedy of novelties and enamoured of delusion; but, at any rate, some of the most mischievous of these works may be met and counteracted; or, at the least, the public may be put upon their guard with respect to them; while, on the other hand, such works, upon the subjects above mentioned, as appear likely to produce beneficial effects, may be described and recommended.

To state precisely the *mode of arrangement*, which will be given to the proposed future contents of this work would be unnecessary. The nature of the contents is alone material. But, it is necessary distinctly to state, that *communications from correspondents will not be wholly excluded*; for, it would be great presumption in any conductor of a periodical work to suppose, that no one is able to aid him in the execution of any thing intended for the public good. Yet it is as necessary to lay down certain rules, as to the admission of such communications. The first of these is, that their insertion, or rejection, must, in all cases, be understood to be left entirely to the judgment and discretion of the person to whom they are offered: and this for two very obvious reasons; first, because, the very act of addressing them to him necessarily supposes a submission to his judgment: and, second, because on him lies

all the responsibility, literary and legal, for promulgating them to the world. And, that he may freely and impartially exercise his judgment, *no* communication should be accompanied with the *real name* of the author.

—Another rule is, that correspondents should, whatever may be their feelings, so far master them as to refrain from every thing that may, in any degree, leave a pretence for legal accusation. How many valuable papers! What volumes of useful information; of fine reasoning: of noble exertion in the cause of freedom and truth, have been committed to the flames, in order to get rid of the perilous temptation, because it was impossible to separate the reasoning from the *facts*; because it was impossible to separate public good from the personal danger of doing it! In looking back upon the destruction of these masses of useful labours, one is ready to fling the pen from one for ever, and to shut one's eyes against every thing in the shape of letters. It is, however, obvious, that every correspondent should constantly bear in mind, that a publication is not, in this country, *less libellous* because it is *true*; and that libel is a crime, punished with more severity than the greater part of felonies.—A third rule, though of less consequence, is, nevertheless, necessary to be observed by all correspondents; namely; to convey their sentiments and facts, in a *legible hand*, writing in an *illegible* hand being much about the same, as to the effect, as writing in an incomprehensible style, or in a language which no one but the writer understands. The first object of writing, as of speaking, is to be understood: how blameable, then, must be that negligence, or how much worse than contemptible that affectation, which produces, under the name of writing, an assemblage of marks, which puzzle the heads and waste the time of the persons to whom they are addressed, and who generally avenge themselves by resorting to the use of the flames!—It is only necessary to add, upon this head, that no communication will be inserted, unless addressed to MR. BACSHAW, the Publisher, the postage being paid. This is the regular channel. To make use of any other is attended with great inconvenience.

The *motives* to this revival and extension of exertion have been truly stated at the out-set of this address. With motives, however, the public have little to do. It is the principles, the reasoning, the facts, in which they are interested. The question always ought to be: is this *just*; is this *true*; is this *right*? And not, whence

comes this? *Who* has put it upon the paper? To eradicate the prejudices, which, by the means, principally, of a hireling press, have been so widely spread and so deeply implanted, is a task which it would be madness to hope to accomplish; but, it is not too much to hope, that they may be checked in their growth; that they may be impaired in their strength, and that their

natural fruit, slavery and misery, may be diminished. At any rate, though the attempt should wholly fail, he who makes it will have the satisfaction to know, that he is one amongst those, who have a right to say, that they are free from all share in the degradation of the country, while they are at worst, in no worse a state than their neighbours.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

EULOGIUM ON GENERAL MOREAU.—

"What!" the Reader will, perhaps, exclaim, "have you not already sufficiently demolished him; cannot you now suffer his torn and tattered reputation to sink out of sight; must you still rake him up to our view; have you no bowels even for the dead?"—It is not I who have raked him up. It is his eulogist. The act is that of the Russian agent and of the English translator. His *ashes* are said to have been so dear to the Emperor Alexander, that he has ordered them to be carried to Petersburg. There they might have remained for me; but, it having been thought proper to rake them up and throw them in our faces; it having been thought proper to make Moreau the subject of an high-wrought eulogy, through the channel of the English press; it having been thought proper to hold forth a man, who lost his life in fighting against his native country, as an *example* to be imitated, it becomes the duty of every one, who is able, to endeavour to counteract the effect of such eulogy, especially at a time, when our own government is insisting upon the right of treating as *traitors* all those, who, though citizens of America, are found in arms against us, even upon the American shores. It is well known, that, only a few months ago (not two years) some British subjects were sentenced to the most horrid of deaths for fighting on the side of France against us. Ought we not, therefore, to be very cautious how we suffer a man to be applauded for fighting against his own country; it being very clear, that, generally speaking, if such an act be praise-worthy in one man, it cannot be criminal in another man?—I have much to say upon what the Memoir of the Russian agent states with regard to the last months of Moreau's life; but, let us first discuss the question in a *legal* point of view; for, if his conduct would have made him a *traitor* in the eye of our own law, it is most wicked, and most inhuman,

to hold him forth as a person, whose conduct Englishmen ought to admire.—The Memoir says, that the Duke of Cumberland was amongst those who went to compliment Moreau, and that the King of Prussia told Moreau, that he "*admired*" the MOTIVES which had urged him to "repair to the army of the Allies."—Such being the language and the assertions; such being the *example* held forth to the soldiers and sailors of this country and to all its inhabitants, it seems necessary, it seems to be an imperious duty, in those, who, like myself, abhor traitors, and, of course, wish to prevent my countrymen from being seduced into the commission of treasonable acts, to state, upon this occasion, what the law of England is, in this respect, and to prevent my countrymen from being tempted, upon any occasion, to follow the example of General Moreau.—According to our law, *any native of this kingdom or its dependencies, who shall be found in arms against the forces of this country, by land or sea, is considered as a traitor, and is liable to the horrible punishment, which I shall, by-and-by, more particularly describe.*—To constitute this crime, the highest that our law knows of, it is not necessary, that the guilty party assist in an *invasion of the country*; or, that he assist in making any *attack upon the country directly*. If he be found in the *service of the enemy* (having *voluntarily* entered it), whether on the sea, or on the land, at the furthest corner of the world, he is still deemed to be a *traitor*, and to have justly incurred the penalty of an ignominious death. We have two recent cases in point. In May, 1812, seven men were condemned (out of 59 accused) as traitors, at the Sessions House in Southwark, for having been found, at the Isle of France, in the service of Napoleon. They had been prisoners of war to the French, and had *voluntarily* entered into their service.—The other case is that of the British-born subjects, lately taken by us in the American army, serving in Ca-

nada. These persons appear to have become citizens of the United States; but, our government, in spite of the remonstrances of the Americans and in spite of all their threats of retaliation, has persisted in regarding these persons as *traitors*, and our Commander in Chief in Canada has not only stated, that he will retaliate two-fold the retaliation of the Americans, but he has, at the same time, told his army, that, in this proceeding they will not fail to see a striking proof of the paternal regard of the Prince Regent, who has, in an official declaration, distinctly stated, that no British-born subject can ever cease, *while he has life*, to be a British subject; and, of course, that, under no circumstances whatever, can he voluntarily take up arms against our forces by land or sea, without incurring the charge of *high treason*.—When, therefore, we take these principles of our law, and these awful practical illustrations of it, into view, we are astonished to hear Moreau applauded to the skies; we are astonished to see him represented as the most faithful, the most noble-minded, the most virtuous of men; and, it is impossible not to believe, that there is great danger in the holding forth of such a man as an *example* to the world.—He was not a prisoner of war, like the sailors in the Isle of France; he was not a settler in and citizen of, Russia or Germany, as the soldiers taken in Canada were of the American States; he was not a man ignorant of his duty; he was pressed forward by no temptation of rescuing himself from suffering like the sailors in the Isle of France; he had in Russia or Germany no property or family to defend as the soldiers taken in Canada might have. No: he was far distant from the scene of action and of danger; and, as the Memoir states, he came from America, he crossed the Atlantic, for the express purpose of serving the Emperor of Russia against the armies of his native country.—The Chief Baron, Macdonald, when he passed sentence upon the Isle of France traitors, observed, that their offence was *much greater than that of Murder*; “for,” said he, “how much more aggravated a crime is it to aid and assist the enemy in their efforts to destroy a whole people.” Thus, you see, this was the extent given to the tendency of the crime, though the miserable men were found upon an island in the South Seas.—And what was their punishment? “To be drawn on a hurdle to the place of execution, there to be hanged by

“the neck, not till they were dead, but to be cut down, and whilst yet alive, their bowels taken out, their heads cut off, their bodies cut into quarters, and those quarters to be at the disposal of the king.”—Such was the punishment of men, who, being prisoners of war, entered into the service of the enemy in the Isle of France.—Now, what is urged in defence of the eulogized Moreau? That it was not against France, but against Napoleon, the oppressor of France, that Moreau went to fight. But, has it ever been known, that any man was acquitted on such ground? If such a pretext could avail, no man, serving against his country, could ever be found guilty; for no one would ever want such a pretext. Was such a ground of defence wanting to any of the persons executed for treason in Ireland? They all alleged the same ground; but did that avail them aught? Did that save any one's life? In short, if you set up this as a defence, you, at once, make every man the judge of the occasion when he shall take up arms against his country; and yet, you must do this, or it is impossible for you to justify Moreau upon such ground.—There is, however, another ground; but, I imagine, it will not be found more solid than the foregoing. It is this. That Napoleon is an *Usurper*; that he is *not the lawful sovereign of France*; and that, therefore, Frenchmen have a right to make war against him, in order to get rid of his usurpation.—Now, though a *royalist* Frenchman might, with some apparent reason, put forward such a ground of defence, Moreau seems to have had no right to do it, though the Allies had been making war with the avowed purpose of over-setting an usurper. But, the awkward circumstance is, that the power, into whose service he had entered, and in whose service he lost his life, had twice, by solemn treaty, recognized Napoleon as Emperor of the French and King of Italy. All the Allies, except England, had, by treaty, recognized him in this character. England had recognized him, while First Consul, as the legal sovereign, de facto, of France, and such he had been declared to be in the English Court of King's Bench. Nay, since the death of Moreau, and even to this hour, the Allies, one of whom became a Crown Prince through his influence and at his nomination, have, in their public declarations, styled him the Emperor of the French, and, in that character, have tendered him terms of peace, and avowed

their intention of leaving him an extent of territory greater than France, under her kings, ever knew. And, in the face of all this, will any man pretend to say, that Moreau fought against an *unlawful ruler*? Will any man attempt to deny, that Napoleon is in fact and in law too the sovereign of France?—What, then, as to this important point, is the obvious conclusion? Why, that our laws of treason; that all the laws of treason existing in Europe, are monstrously unjust and horribly cruel; or, that there is no justification for General Moreau, if the Russian Memoir give a true account, if his *eulogist* give a true history of his conduct from the time that he left the American States.—I have dwelt longer upon this head than I, at first, intended; but, once entered on the subject, it would not have been right to leave any doubts with regard to an example, which, in its probable consequences, was likely to be so fatal to individuals, and so injurious to the country.—But, this is not all. We must leave no part of this eulogy undemolished; we must leave no assertion that it contains without a suitable comment. We must follow the hero of this curious history from America to the field of battle. But, first, we must go back, for a little, and keep him company a while, in the conspiracy of Pichegru and Georges; because, in my haste to conclude, last week, I omitted to introduce a most material document relating to this most important transaction of Moreau's life.—At the time when Moreau was confined in the Temple, under the charge of having conspired with Georges and Pichegru, *he wrote a letter to Buonaparté*, which letter was published in the *Moniteur*, and was republished in most of the public prints in England. This document I am now about to insert; and, when the reader has gone through it with attention, he will have the goodness to follow me in a short examination of its contents, as compared with the statements now put forth by his *eulogist*.—The passages worthy of particular attention I have pointed out by the use of *italic characters*.

AUTHENTIC LETTER OF GENERAL MOREAU
TO THE FIRST CONSUL.

The Temple, May 7, 1804.

It is now near a month since I have been detained as an accomplice of Georges and Pichegru, and I am, perhaps, detained to

appear before the Tribunals, and vindicate myself from the charge of Conspiracy against the safety of the State, and against its Chief Magistrate.—I was far from expecting, that after having passed through the Revolution and the War, free from the slightest reproach of incivism or ambition, and more especially, after having been at the head of great and victorious armies, which would have given me the means of satisfying such passions (if I possessed them), that it would be at the moment when I was living a private life, only engaged with my Family, and only seeing a very *small circle of friends*, that I could be accused of *such an act of madness*. I have no doubt but that my former connexion with General Pichegru has been the motive of my accusation.—Before I speak of my justification, permit me, General, to trace this connexion to its source, and I doubt not but you will be convinced, that the connexions which one may keep up with an old friend, and a man who has been formerly one's Commander, however divided in opinion, and however attached to different parties, are far from being criminal.—General Pichegru took the command of the Army of the North at the beginning of the second year of the Republic. I had been then, for six months, a General of Brigade, and sometimes discharged the functions of General of Division. Pleased with some successes of mine, and with some military dispositions, he soon obtained for me that rank, the duties of which I at that time discharged.—In entering upon the campaign, he gave me the command of half the Army, and confided to me the most important operations.—Two months before the end of the campaign, his ill health obliged him to absent himself from the Army. The Government then, upon his request, intrusted me to finish the conquest of Dutch Brabant and Guelderland. After the winter campaign, which made us mas-

ters of the rest of Holland, he went to the Army of the Upper Rhine, and marked me as his successor; and the National Convention intrusted me with the command which he then resigned. A year after, I replaced him at the Army of the Rhine; he was called up to the Legislative Body, and our correspondence was no longer frequent. —In the short campaign of the 5th year, we took the papers belonging to the *Etat Major* of the Enemy. They then brought me a quantity of papers, which General Dessaix, who was then wounded, amused himself with reading. It appeared by this Correspondence, that General Pichegru had been in correspondence with the French Princes. This discovery gave us much uneasiness, but to me more particularly. We agreed to let it rest in oblivion. Pichegru, in the Legislative Body, had less means of hurting the common cause, as Peace was their ruin. I took precaution, however, for the safety of the Army against that system of espionage which might have ruined it. The researches that I made, and the deciphering of this Correspondence, has placed all those pieces in the hands of several persons. —The events of the 18th Fructidor were then announced, and the public anxiety was very great: in consequence of which, two officers, who were informed of this correspondence, prevailed upon me to inform the Government of it, and gave me to understand, that it had began to be pretty public, and that at Strasburgh they were already preparing to inform the Directory of it. —I was a Public Functionary, and I could no longer keep silent; but without addressing myself directly to the Government, I informed the Director Barthelémy, confidentially, of it, begging of him, at the same time, to give me his advice, and informing him, that those pieces, although undoubtedly authentic, could not be proved in a Court of Justice, as they were not signed, and

mostly in ciphers. —My letter arrived in Paris a very short time after Citizen Barthelémy had been arrested: and the Directory, to whom it was sent, demanded from me the papers of which it made mention. —Pichegru then went to Cayenne, and from thence to Germany and England, without my having any correspondence with him. Some time after the Peace with England, M. David, uncle to General Souham (who had passed a year with him at the Army of the North) informed me that General Pichegru was one of those banished in Fructidor, and that he was astonished at hearing that it was from my opposition alone that you refused to permit his return to France. I replied to M. David, that so far from opposing his return, I should make it my business to solicit for him this permission. He shewed this letter to some persons, and I have learnt that the demand was positively made to you. —Some time after M. David wrote to me, “that he had applied to Pichegru to demand of you directly to be erased from the list; but that he had answered, that he would not make the demand, unless he was certain that it would be complied with;” that moreover, he desired him to thank me for the answer I had given, and to assure me, that he had never supposed me capable of acting in the manner that was imputed to me; that he even knew, that in the affair of the correspondence of Klinglin, I had been placed in a most delicate situation. M. David wrote me three or four more unimportant letters on this subject. After his arrest, he wrote to me to take some steps in his favour. I was very sorry that the distance between me and the Government prevented me from giving some light to your justice in this respect; and I do not doubt but it would have been easy to have removed that prejudice which had been given you upon this subject. —I no longer heard Pichegru spoken of, except

indirectly, and by persons whom the war obliged to return to France. From that epoch to the present moment, during the two campaigns in Germany, and since the peace, there have been distant overtures made to me, to know whether it was possible to prevail on me to enter into correspondence with the French Princes. I considered these proposals *so ridiculous, that I did not even make any answer.*—As to the actual conspiracy, I can equally affirm, *that I am far from having the least share in it.* I confess even that I am at a loss to conceive how a handful of individuals, dispersed, could hope to change the face of the State, and to restore upon the throne a family that the combined efforts of all Europe, and of Civil War, could not succeed in restoring, or how it can be supposed, that I could be so void of reason, as to join in such a plan, *by which I should lose the whole fruit of my labours, which would only in such case draw upon me continual reproaches.* I repeat it to you, General, that whatever proposition was made to me, I have rejected from opinion, and *always considered it the greatest folly;* and when it has been represented to me, that the chances of the Invasion of England were favourable to a change in Government, I replied, that the Senate was the authority round which all Frenchmen would unite, in case of troubles, *and that I would be the first to obey its orders.* Such overtures made to me, an insulated individual (who had not chosen to preserve any connexion, either in the army, of which nine-tenths had served under my orders, or with any constituted authority), could obtain *no other answer than a refusal.*—The part of giving information to Government was repugnant to my character, an office which is always judged of severely; it becomes odious, and marked with the seal of reprobation, against the man who is guilty of it, with respect to persons to whom he owes

gratitude, and with whom he has had long habits of friendship. Duty even may sometimes yield to the cry of public opinion. —This, General, is what I have to say, as to my connexion with Pichegru; they will surely convince you, that very false and hasty conclusions have been drawn from actions, which, though, perhaps, imprudent, were very far from being criminal; and I have no doubt, but that if, by your authority, I had been asked for explanations on those points, which I would have readily given, it would have saved you the regret of ordering my detention, and me the humiliation of being imprisoned, and, perhaps, obliged to go before the tribunals, and say that I am *not a Conspirator*, and to appeal, in support of this vindication, to the uniform probity of my life for the last 25 years, and to the services I have rendered to the country. I will not speak of those, General: I can say, they are not yet effaced from your memory; but I will recal to your recollection, that if ever the desire of taking part in the Government of France had been the aim of my ambition and of my services, the cover was open to me in the most advantageous manner before your return from Egypt, and surely you have not forgotten the disinterestedness with which *I seconded you on the 18th of Brumaire.* Enemies have kept us at a distance since that time. It is with much regret that I find myself compelled to speak of myself or my services, but at a time when I am accused of being the accomplice of those who only considered of acting *under the guidance of England,* perhaps I may have to defend myself from the snares which that Power may prepare against me. *I have self-love enough to suppose, that England may judge of the evil which I am still capable of doing her, by what I have already done.*—If, General, I can gain your full attention, then I shall have no doubt of your justice. I shall

await your decision on my fate with the calm of innocence, but not without the uneasiness of seeing that those enemies which are always attracted with celebrity, have triumphed.—I am, with respect

The General MOREAU.

Now, reader, if, as I must presume, you prefer truth to falsehood; if you abhor the act of giving the highest of praises to the foulest of deeds, follow me, for a moment, while I compare the contents of this letter with the statements of the Russian Memoir.—In my last Number, at page 111, I quoted the Memoir, at full length, as far as related to the conspiracy of Georges and Pichegru. Referring you, then, to that extract, what do we see? Why, we see, that the Russian Eulogist states, that Georges and Pichegru were in Paris for the purpose of *carrying off* Buonaparté; that Moreau was made acquainted with their designs; that the project, besides, was to *restore the Bourbons*, the necessity of which Moreau did not dispute, but *wished to prepare for it by gradations*; that Moreau secretly *desired the success* of the project; and, finally, that Moreau *“agreed,”* that the others should begin the thing, and that *“in case of success, he should place himself in advance with his party, to protect them against the measures, which the partisans of Buonaparté might take, at the first moment, to avenge him.”*—To *“avenge him,”* mind! What! to *avenge* him of being *carried off*?—But, let that pass; for no one can doubt, for a moment, *what* it was that the conspirators meant to do to Buonaparté.—Here, then, we have the confession, the open avowal, the boast even, that Moreau had agreed to lend his assistance, and that of his party, to a plot for carrying off Buonaparté and for restoring the Bourbons. This is asserted, mind, by his *eulogist*; by a man who says, that he was his companion in his last moments, and that he had been the person who accompanied him from America.—Now, then, what does Moreau say, in his letter above inserted? Why, he says, *“I am far from having the least share in the conspiracy.”* He says, that he must be void of reason to join in a plan by which he would *lose the whole fruit of his labours*, that is to say, his money and his estate of Grosbois, which he had bought of Barras; that, if Buonaparté had been absent, during any such attempt, he, Moreau,

would have been the first to obey the orders of the Senate for the preservation of the Government; that the overtures made to him had obtained no other answer than a refusal.—These were his solemn protestations in 1804; and these protestations are directly in the teeth of the assertions, of the confessions, the avowals, now made, in his name, by his eulogist.—But, besides the light, in which these facts place him, we find Moreau, in the letter above-inserted, considering the conspirators as *acting under the guidance of England*, from whence they had come to France; and, we find him, too, imputing the *false* accusation against himself to the *suars which England might have prepared against him*, observing, that he had *“vanity enough to suppose, that England might judge of the evil which he was still capable of doing her by what he had already done.”*—When he wrote that letter, he little suspected, I dare say, that he was one day to sail from America with the connivance of an English Admiral, and still less, that he was to become the subject of the praises of every man in England and in Europe hostile to the glory and prosperity of France.—Yet, all this is not enough; for, while the Russian Memoir asserts, that, in a few days after the 18th Brumaire, Moreau feared he had assisted in giving a tyrant to his country, and that he found Buonaparté to be cruelly and inexorably unjust; while the Russian eulogist asserts this, Moreau, in the above letter, makes a merit, in 1804, of having seconded Buonaparté on the 18th Brumaire, 1799, expresses his regret that enemies have lately kept them at a distance from one another, and declares, that if he can obtain a full hearing of Buonaparté, he has no doubt of his justice.—Now, either Moreau acted, upon this occasion, not only the part of a conspirator; he was not only guilty of high treason, and worthy of an ignominious death, but, he was also, a mean and despicable hypocrite; OR, the assertions of his Russian Eulogist are base and abominable fabrications.—Let the author and the patrons of this eulogy take their choice.—Well, then, have we not now enough of this *“modern Coriolanus,”* as the Times news-paper, I think it was, called him the other day; this Coriolanus of Grosbois? Have we not now enough of him? Yes; we have quite enough for Moreau; but, not quite enough for me. Since I have begun him, I am resolved to finish him. Justice demands it: justice to the people of England, and justice to the people of France.

—We have before seen him in America, rolling in wealth, and we have now seen, by the letter from the Temple, that that wealth was *the fruit of his labours*; that is to say, the fruit of his service under those who made the republic, and who put the king to death; under the Girondists, the Robespierreans, the Directory, and Buonaparté; or, in other words, the fruit of his invasions of foreign countries, the aggregate amount of his *plunder*.—I am not using this word in any odious sense. I am not insinuating any blame in him for having amassed a great deal of property in this way. Plunder is the soldier's legitimate harvest, and we know what abundant harvests of this sort we read of in *Holy Writ*, as having been expressly commanded by God himself, a memorable instance of which we have in the case of the Midianites, who were first stript, by God's chosen people, of *all* their goods and chattels to an immense amount, and were then, by the command of Moses, the servant of the Lord, all slaughtered, man, woman, and child, except the *maiden women*, or girls, whom Moses, the servant of the Lord, ordered the army to *keep alive for themselves*.*

—Therefore I am very far indeed from

* The passage of the inspired writings, to which I here refer, is found, in the Book of Numbers, Chapter XXXI, verses 6 to 18, inclusive, as follows:

6. And Moses sent them to the war, a thousand of every tribe, them and Phinehas the son of Eleazar the priest, to the war, with the holy instruments, and the trumpets to blow, in his hand.

7. And they warred against the Midianites, as the Lord commanded Moses; and they slew all the males.

8. And they slew the kings of Midian, besides the rest of them that were slain; *namely*, Evi, and Rekem, and Zur, and Hur, and Reba, five kings of Midian; Balaam also the son of Beor they slew with the sword.

9. And the children of Israel took all the women of Midian captives, and their little ones, and took the spoil of all their cattle, and all their flocks, and all their goods.

10. And they burnt all their cities wherein they dwelt, and all their goodly castles with fire.

11. And they took all the spoil, and all the prey, *both* of men and of beasts.

12. And they brought the captives, and the prey, and the spoil unto Moses and Eleazar the priest, and unto the congregation of the children of Israel, unto the camp at the plains of Moab, which are by Jordan near Jericho.

13. ¶ And Moses, and Eleazar the priest, and all the princes of the congregation, went forth to meet them without the camp.

14. And Moses was wroth with the officers of the host, with the captains over thousands, and captains over hundreds, which came from the

calling in question Moreau's fair claim to his plunder, and am by no means inclined to deny his right to the quiet possession of *Grosbois*, which he *bought of Barras*. But, if we allow Moreau's right to *his* share of the plunder which he made, I hope we shall be too just to reproach the other Marshals of France on that score. The Duke of Dalmatia and the Prince of Essling have certainly as much right to *their* share of plunder as Moreau had to *his* share of plunder. It is impossible to load the former with the reproach of rapacity, without, in the same breath, condemning the latter.—We are told, in the Memoir, that Moreau would have left the United States somewhat sooner than he did, had it not been for a circumstance, which is slipped over in great haste in the Memoir; but which we must dwell upon with some care, it being not only of great importance, but of the very *first* importance, in the making of our estimate, not of *Moreau's* character (for that is settled, I think), but of the character of Napoleon, as viewed, at bottom, by Moreau himself.—The Memoir tells us, that in *Mademoiselle Hullot*, now *Madame Moreau*, whom he married in 1802, “were combined all the qualities of the “mind with all the graces of beauty, brilliant talents, and solid virtues.”—Very well.—Then it tells us, that this lady, while her beloved husband was in the Temple, was, “with her infant in her arms, made to wait in the open air, in a “cold and rainy season” (month of *May*) “until it was convenient for the jailer to open “the gates;” and that, “sometimes, she passed whole hours, exposed to the inclemency “of the weather, unless when the sentinels “allowed her to get under their sheds.”

—It is strange that this should have been; seeing, that Moreau was possessed of an ample fortune, and that there are all sorts of carriages and hackney coaches at Paris as well as in London. The fact, therefore, is a very strange one; but, agreeably to my mode of proceeding, I will

15. And Moses said unto them, Have ye saved all the women alive?

16. Behold, these caused the children of Israel, through the counsel of Balaam, to commit trespass against the Lord in the matter of Peor, and there was a plague among the congregation of the Lord.

17. Now therefore kill every male among the little ones, and kill every woman that hath known man by lying with him.

18. But all the women-children that have not known a man by lying with him, keep alive for yourselves.

not call it in question. I admit it to be true, till it be confronted by some other fact from the same source.—Upon this ground, then, and others stated in the Memoir, Moreau regarded Napoleon as the *most cruel of men*. Napoleon is said, in the Memoir, to have been so jealous of Moreau as to have *thirsted for his blood*. In short, the Memoir makes Moreau speak of and regard Napoleon as *the most bloody and inexorable of mankind*, while his government was a government of spies and bastiles.—The Memoir says, besides, that Moreau deeply deplored the *enslaved state* of his country; and predicted, that, on this account, the French would become more despicable than the Jews.—Here, in these sentiments, observe, we are led, by the Memoir, to look for the *cause* of Moreau's coming to Europe to *serve against France*. And, now for the circumstance that retarded his departure from America. His wife and child, whom, we are told, he loved to an excess of tenderness; that same amiable and beautiful wife, who, with the same beloved child in her arms, had been so cruelly treated at the gates of the Temple; these two "*cherished beings*" (to use the words of the Memoir) were, at the time of Moreau's departure from America, WHERE, think you, reader? They were not with the good, the affectionate, the fine-feeling, the "*angelic-souled*," General. But, *where* do you think they were? You will never guess They were IN FRANCE! Ay, in France! in that same France whose people were about to become more despicable than the Jews. Exposed to the *inexorable cruelty* of Buonaparté; nay, within his grasp. And, what is more, they had, as the Memoir avows, been in France *ten months*; ay, ten months, at the time when the angelic husband and father first thought of leaving America!—"His heart," says the Memoir, "was agitated between his duty to his country, and the love he bore to his consort and child, who had both been in France *ten months* for the sake of their health. He shuddered to leave these two *cherished beings*, under what he called the *claws of the tyrant*."—Yes, yes; this is all very pretty; and we may expect to see the incident introduced into the next dish of nauseous nonsense which the London stage shall present to its foul-feeding customers; but, how came he to send them to France; how came he to send them under those "*claws*?" It is rather singular, that they,

considering how beautiful Madame Moreau was before she was married, and (if report say rightly) how beautiful she still is, and how inseparable health is from beauty, that she and her child should have both been in ill health at the particular time referred to. This is rather singular; but, suppose it to be true, why not send them to Madeira; to Lisbon; to Minorca; to Sardinia; to Sicily? Why not place them under the guardianship of our commanders? There were places enough to choose; and, if they must be sent away for their health's sake; if they were actually both afflicted, at one and the same time, with that sort of complaint which required a change of climate, why not choose amongst the countries I have mentioned? why not, if a more northern country was wanted, send them to these happy islands, the place of refuge of Pichegru, Georges, Dumourier, Sarazin, and others? Why send them; why send these "*two cherished beings*" to France, into the "*claws of the tyrant*?"—However, to France, they were sent; there they remained, as long as they pleased, unmolested; and, when they chose to come away, come away they did unmolested too, though they were coming to England; and though it is next to impossible, that the Emperor should not have been fully apprised of all their movements.—Now, then, reader, what are the conclusions, which truth and justice bid us draw from these premises? Why, either that Moreau was wholly destitute of all regard even for the lives of his wife and child; or, that he was guilty of base hypocrisy in describing Napoleon as a cruel tyrant; OR, that this Russian Memoir is, as to this matter, a string of atrocious falsehoods.—And, besides this, we have here the acknowledged and notorious fact, that the wife and child of a man, whom Napoleon had such strong reasons for disliking, were suffered to remain quietly in France as long as the wife chose, and suffered to quit France when she chose, without the least molestation; without any complaint to make, even against the police.—Can there be, if we take the whole of these facts together; can there possibly be, a more complete proof of the magnanimity of Napoleon; can the impartial reader want any thing more to convince him, that Moreau, who pretended that it was *duty* to his country that brought him into the ranks of Napoleon's enemies, had, at the bottom of his heart, a firm persuasion, that Napoleon was incapable of committing, *even against him*, an act of deliberate cruelty?—

There can now remain no doubt as to the real character of the man, on whose eulogy I have been observing. If any thing were wanting to give to that character a finishing touch, it would be found in the fulsome, the disgusting, the loathsome, the nauseous adulation, which the Memoir says that this "noble-minded, this angelic" man paid to the Emperor of Russia and other princes, enemies of his country.—Reader, behold this man, who once slept on beds made of the colours wrenched from Russia and Austria and Prussia, by his valiant countrymen under his command, and urged on by the cry of liberty; behold this man, this *Coriolanus of Grosbois*, now ranged on the side of combined kings against the armies of his country, exclaiming, at the first interview with the Emperor of Russia: "Ah! my dear Svinine, what a man is 'the Emperor! from this moment I have 'contracted the *sweet and sacred* obligation 'of *sacrificing my life* for that angel of 'goodness;" behold this man, rebuking sharply a Russian General for calling the Emperor "the best of princes," instead of calling him "the best of men;" behold this man, this great captain of the republican revolution, who asserted his *civism* even when in the Temple, discovering, at first sight, in the mind of the Grand Duchess of Oldenburg (the Emperor's sister, I believe) "the *Great Catherine* herself, with a genius that astonished and "with manners that captivated all who knew "her;" behold this man, who, while in the Temple, told Napoleon, that he was vain enough to believe himself entitled to the hatred and the revenge of England, reciprocating the compliments said to have been paid him on his death bed by the Duke of Cumberland; to conclude, reader, behold this man, who owed his renown and his fortune to the arms of his valiant countrymen, receiving, while in the ranks of the enemy, his death-blow from the hands of those countrymen, and using his *last breath* in dictating a letter of praise to his now and "angel" of a sovereign!—Behold him thus, for thus the Memoir represents him to us; behold him thus, taking into view all the foregoing facts, arguments, and conclusions, and then pronounce decidedly and aloud your judgment upon his conduct and character.

MR. MANT AND CAPT. CAMPBELL.—I, some weeks ago, noticed a very serious dispute, existing between these gentlemen, both resident at Southampton, on the sub-

ject of *Prize concerns*, and stated, that I had learnt, that Mr. Mant was about to make a publication respecting it.—I now have that publication before me; and, from its contents, I am persuaded, that it must lead to serious investigation.—From this publication, it appears, that about five years ago (the publication being in point of dates very deficient), Captain Patrick Campbell commanded the Frigate, *Unité*, and had also the command of a squadron of cruisers in the Adriatic, and that Mr. Thomas Mant was the *surgeon* of the *Unité*.—It appears that Mr. Mant was sent to the town of Trieste by the Captain to manage the pecuniary matters, relating to prizes; and that the Captain has accused him, and perseveres in accusing him, of *peculation*, in that management. This charge the publication rebuts, and, as far as the proofs on one side can go, it does, I think, rebut the charge with success.—But, this is far from being the most important branch of the subject, which, indeed, would not have required my notice of it, had it not been for that other branch of it, in which the *public*; in which the *interest and honour* of the nation, appear to me to be deeply concerned.—To enter upon this important matter I must, however, have more room to spare than I have at present. I must, therefore, put it off till my next.

WHY ARE WE AT WAR WITH FRANCE? This is a question which few people will be at the trouble of asking, and which still fewer are willing to investigate, even although they could bring their minds to put it to themselves. I am not surprised at this reluctance, when I consider how often the enemies of France have changed their views, at least pretended to change them, respecting that devoted country. To enter into an exposition of all the absurd projects, and all the different plans laid down, from time to time by the Confederates, as necessary to be adopted by the French people, before they would acknowledge their independence, is a task which I do not intend to impose on myself. It is sufficient for my present purpose to state, that these projects always appeared to me deserving of contempt, and that for the best of all reasons, namely, that France, the party whose interest was more deeply involved in these proposed arrangements than all the other States of Europe, was never consulted respecting them. In one view her importance was regarded by these

States of sufficient magnitude to satisfy them that it would require the whole of their military strength to bring her to a compliance with their wishes; but, in another view, they would not allow that she deserved any consideration, when the questions came to be discussed,—Who were to be her rulers? What should be the limits of her territory?—But though I do not mean here to illustrate these topics; though I am disposed at present to spare these men the mortification, which a recurrence to them would occasion; I think it may not be amiss to carry them back to the commencement of the war; and to place before their view a few of those circumstances connected with that eventful period; many of which bear a strong resemblance to the occurrences of the present day, and cannot admit of an equivocal construction.—In 1792, the affairs of France were at as low an ebb as they are now represented to be, and then, as at this moment, her territory was invaded by the combined forces of Europe.—A resemblance so very striking, naturally carries the mind back to the early periods of the revolution; and if the causes of this similarity are impartially inquired into, we may perhaps find that the motives which actuate the conduct of the enemies of France in 1814, and those which influenced them in 1792, are not materially different. At the latter period, nothing was so much thought of, nothing so loudly talked of, and nothing so earnestly wished for, as the destruction of the revolutionists of France. The consternation, which an event that professed to carry with it so many terrors to the oppressor; which promised emancipation to the enslaved, and ultimately to deliver Europe from the grasp of civil and religious despotism, was well calculated to arouse from their lethargy those who felt interested in the continuance of established systems. Whatever may be said of the enormities which stained the early part of the French Revolution, or of the extravagant views of many of those who figured in that extraordinary scene, it cannot now be denied that, if the people of France had been left to themselves, the furor with which they were then agitated, and which is, perhaps, inseparable from great political convulsions, would have exhausted itself and subsided into a calm; that all the bloodshed, which has since desolated the earth, would have been prevented; and, instead of the torch of war blazing among civilized nations, mankind might have been universally cultivating the arts and sciences in the

bosom of peace. But, no; France had declared herself free: her sons had ascended that proud eminence which nature gave them a right to ascend. This, in the eyes of their oppressors, was treason against their authority; was a crime of the deepest die, which could never be forgiven. Liberty, which had “marshalled her way to “renovated France,” after she had in vain sought an asylum in other countries, was assailed in France by the cry of the despot; was here doomed to struggle for existence against the united efforts of prejudice, of superstition: against all which interest, which intrigue, and which the arm of power were capable of accomplishing. By a strange infatuation, millions of human beings, who assumed the name of freemen, gave their support to a cause, which its very partisans openly proclaimed to be inimical to the dearest rights of humanity; and actually sacrificed their lives for the declared purpose of imposing slavery upon a whole nation born like themselves to be free. It is a fact known to every man in the least acquainted with the history of France, that its government previous to the revolution, was one of the most despotic in Europe; that, in contrasting it with the British constitution, no one hesitated to pronounce it an absolute tyranny; and that the French people, who lived under it, were base and contemptible slaves. This was the opinion which universally prevailed among Englishmen; it was the theme of their public and private conversations; and it formed the topic of animadversion in every publication which contained any allusion to France. It cannot be supposed that this frequent recurrence to a subject so distressing, proceeded from envy, or that any man who reflected upon it, could be so destitute of all generous feelings as to wish this state of vassalage to be perpetuated. No; the sensation which universally prevailed, proceeded from the interest which every one took in the degraded condition of the people of France, and from a sincere desire to assist them in liberating themselves from so disgraceful a bondage. Accordingly, the moment it was known here, that attempts at freedom were making in France, the event was hailed by a vast majority of the people, and by many of the higher ranks, as propitious to the happiness of nations. Frenchmen had done no more than had been done by Englishmen. The latter had accomplished, by revolutionary means, the establishment of a constitution which imposed limits, and restrictions upon the power of the crown:

the former had established a limited monarchy in France. What could be more desirable, what more congenial with the wishes of the inhabitants of Britain? We shall very soon, however, find that a party existed in this country, who were enemies to the rights of the people; who censured all attempts at ameliorating their condition. But as the favourable opinion entertained here of the French revolution, prevented its opposers for some time from declaring themselves, let us direct our attention for a little to the conduct pursued by the coalesced powers. It has been already observed, that an event of such magnitude as the revolution in France, was well calculated to alarm some other governments, particularly those in its immediate vicinity. Among these the Emperor of Germany was not the last who evinced his fears. Under pretence of maintaining the *inviolability* of the crown of France; dissatisfied with the restrictions imposed by the people upon the exercise of the sovereign power; stimulated by the clergy to insist for indemnity for the losses they had sustained by the new order of things; and afraid lest the example of France should have an effect upon his own subjects; the head of the Electorate prevailed upon the German Princes to enter into his views, and to make common cause against France, for the purpose of restoring the ancient government. At the very moment this resolution was adopted, the French people were peaceably engaged in forming for themselves a constitution, in which the right of the Bourbons to continue the sovereignty was unequivocally recognized. Louis the XVIth had no doubt incurred the displeasure of his subjects by attempting to escape from France, a circumstance, considering the state of the public mind, no way calculated to remove the suspicions entertained by many, that he was in secret correspondence with the enemies of his country, and approved of their measures. But the nation were willing to overlook this. Their earnest desire was to see their country restored to liberty; and although they had received innumerable and repeated insults from surrounding states, they were inclined to submit even to these injuries, rather than give up the advantages which they promised themselves in a state of liberty and of peace. The Confederation which had reared its formidable head against them, was, however, resolved to oppose this. Application had been made in vain to the Emperor of Germany to withdraw from the league, and refuse his pro-

tection to the emigrants. Instead of complying with this request, he augmented his armies on the frontiers of France, which rendered it no longer doubtful that he meditated an invasion of the country. In these circumstances the National Assembly brought matters to an issue by a Declaration of War against Austria, in which, after enumerating her causes of complaint, it was stated, "that the French nation, faithful to the principles of its constitution, which forbid it every kind of conquest, and from arming against the liberty of any people, is now arming only for its own freedom, its independence and its sovereignty." Had the Confederation been disposed to admit the justice of the principle, that no nation has a right to arm itself against the liberties of another people, Louis the XVIth might yet have been alive; the throne secured in the family of the Bourbons, and the war which has desolated Europe for more than twenty years, been averted. But the Allied Sovereigns, forgetting that the happiness of a people alone constitutes a monarch's greatness, regarded the recognition of these principles as a new crime committed by France; and because the government which she had chosen for herself, had resolved on *defending* her territory; this was held as a sufficient reason for inflicting the severest punishment that could be devised on all who had patriotism enough to give it their support.—What in every age of the world was esteemed the highest virtue; what in this country was so recently, and so strenuously recommended by our own government, by the senate, and from the pulpit, as the first of duties; the taking up arms to defend us from invasion; was considered in the French people a crime so enormous as to merit utter extermination. This threat was conveyed to the French nation, in a Manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick, as Generalissimo of the Allied Armies, dated Coblentz, 25th July, 1792. As this extraordinary and celebrated document serves more to lay open the views and designs of the coalition than any other part of their proceedings, and as I will afterwards have frequent occasion to notice its contents, I shall here give it at length, before proceeding any farther in my remarks.

"Declaration of his Serene Highness the reigning Duke of Brunswick and Lüneburgh, Commander of the Combined Armies of their Majesties the Emperor and the King of Prussia, addressed to the Inhabitants of France.

"Their majesties the emperor and the

king of Prussia, having intrusted me with the command of the combined armies, assembled on the frontiers of France, I think it my duty to inform the inhabitants of that kingdom of the motives which have influenced the conduct of the two sovereigns, and of the principles by which they are guided.

“After arbitrarily suppressing the rights, and invading the possessions of the German princes in Alsace and Lorraine; after having disturbed and overthrown in the interior part of the kingdom all order and lawful government; after having been guilty of the most daring attacks, and having had recourse to the most violent measures, which are still daily renewed against the sacred person of the king, and against his august family—those who have seized on the reins of government have, at length, filled the measure of their guilt, by declaring an unjust war against his majesty the emperor, and by invading his provinces of the Low Countries. Some of the possessions belonging to the German empire have been equally exposed to the same oppression, and many others have only avoided the danger by yielding to the imperious threats of the domineering party and of their emissaries.—His majesty the king of Prussia, united with his imperial majesty in the bands of the strictest defensive alliance, and as a preponderant member himself of the Germanic body, could not refuse marching to the assistance of his ally and of his co-estates. It is under this double relation, that he undertakes the defence of that monarch and of Germany.

“To these high interests is added another important object, and which both the sovereigns have most cordially in view; which is, *to put an end to that anarchy which prevails in the interior parts of France, to put a stop to the attacks made on the throne and the altar, to restore the king to his legitimate power, to liberty, and to safety, of which he is now deprived, and to place him in such a situation, that he may exercise that legitimate authority to which he is entitled.*

“Convinced that the sober part of the nation detest the excesses of a faction which has enslaved them, and that the majority of the inhabitants wait with impatience the moment when succours shall arrive, to declare themselves openly against the odious enterprises of their oppressors; his majesty, the emperor, and his majesty the king of Prussia, earnestly invite them to return without delay into the paths of reason and of justice, of order and peace. It

is with this view that I, the undersigned, general commandant in chief of the two armies, do declare,

“1st, That, drawn into the present war by irresistible circumstances, the two allied courts have no other object in view than the welfare of France, without any pretence to enrich themselves by making conquests.

“2d, That *they do not mean to meddle with the internal government of France*, but that they simply intend to deliver the king, the queen, and the royal family, from their captivity, and to ensure to his most Christian majesty that safety which is necessary for his making, without danger and without obstacles, such convocations as he shall judge proper, and for endeavouring to ensure the welfare of his subjects, according to his promises, and to the utmost of his power.

“3dly, That the combined armies shall protect the towns, bourgs and villages, as well as the persons and property of all those who shall submit to the king; and that they will concur in the immediate restoration of order and police throughout all France.

“4thly, That the national guards are called upon to preserve, provisionally, tranquillity in towns and in the country, to provide for the personal safety and property of all Frenchmen until the arrival of the troops belonging to their imperial and royal majesties, or until orders be given to the contrary,—on pain of being personally responsible: that, on the contrary, *such national guards as shall fight against the troops of the two allied courts, and who shall be taken with arms in their hands, shall be treated as enemies, and punished as rebels to their king, and as disturbers of the public peace.*

“5thly, That the general officers, the subalterns, and soldiers of the regular French troops, are equally called upon to return to their former allegiance, and to submit immediately to the king, their legitimate sovereign.

“6thly, That the members of departments, districts, and municipalities shall be equally responsible, *on pain of losing their heads and estates*, for their crimes, all the conflagrations, all the murders, and the pillage which they shall suffer to take place, and which they shall not have, in a public manner, attempted to prevent within their respective territories; that they shall also be obliged to continue their functions, until his most Christian majesty, when set at full liberty, shall make further arrange-

ments, or until further orders be given in his name.

"7thly, That the inhabitants of towns, bourgs, and villages, who shall dare to defend themselves against the troops of their imperial and royal majesties, and to fire upon them, either in open country, or through half open doors or windows of their houses, shall be punished instantly, according to the rigorous rules of war, or their houses shall be demolished or burned. On the contrary, all the inhabitants of the said towns, bourgs, and villages, who shall readily submit to their king, by opening their gates to the troops belonging to their majesties, shall be immediately under their safe-guard and protection; and estates, their property, and their persons shall be secured by the laws, and each and all of them shall be in full safety.

"8thly, The city of Paris and all its inhabitants, without distinction, shall be called upon to submit instantly and without delay to the king, to set that prince at full liberty, and to ensure to his and to all royal persons that inviolability and respect which are due, by the laws of nature and of nations, to sovereigns: their imperial and royal majesties, making personally responsible for all events—*on pain of losing their heads pursuant to military trials, without hopes of pardon*, all the members of the national assembly, of the department, of the district, of the municipality, and of the national guards of Paris, justices of the peace, and others whom it may concern; and their imperial and royal majesties further declare, on their faith and word of emperor and king, that if the palace of the Thuilleries be forced or insulted, if the least violence be offered, the least outrage done to their majesties, the king, queen, and the royal family, if they be not immediately placed in safety and set at liberty, *they will inflict on those who shall deserve it, the most exemplary and ever-memorable avenging punishments, by giving up the city of Paris to military execution, and exposing it to total destruction, and the rebels who shall be guilty of illegal resistance, shall suffer the punishments which they shall have deserved.* Their imperial and royal majesties promise, on the contrary, to all the inhabitants of the city of Paris, to employ their good offices with his most Christian majesty, to obtain for them a pardon for their insults and errors, and to adopt the most vigorous measures for the security of their persons

and property, provided they speedily and strictly conform to the above injunctions.

"Finally, Their majesties, *not being at liberty to acknowledge any other laws in France except those which shall be derived from the king*, when at full liberty, protest beforehand against the authenticity of all kinds of declarations which may be issued in the name of the king, so long as his sacred person, and that of the queen, and the princes, of the whole royal family, shall not be in full safety: and with this view, their imperial and royal majesties invite and entreat his most Christian majesty to name a town in his kingdom, nearest to the frontiers, to which he would wish to remove, together with the queen, and the royal family, under a strong and safe escort, which shall be sent for that purpose; so that his most Christian majesty may, in perfect safety, send for such ministers and counsellors as he shall be pleased to name, order such convocation as he shall think proper, and provide for the restoration of order and the regular administration of his kingdom.

"In fine, I declare and promise in my own individual name, and in my above quality, to cause to be observed, every where, by the troops under my command, good and strict discipline, promising to treat with mildness and moderation, those well disposed subjects who shall submit peaceably and quietly, and to employ force against those only who shall be guilty of resistance or of manifest evil intentions.

"I therefore call upon and expect all the inhabitants of the kingdom, in the most earnest and forcible manner, *not to make any opposition to the troops under my command, but rather to suffer them every where to enter the kingdom freely, and to afford them all the assistance, and show them all the benevolence which circumstances may require.*

"Given at General Quarters at Coblenz, July 25, 1792.

"CHARLES GUILLAUME FERDINAND, DUC DE BRUNSWICK LUNENBOURG."

Such was the *conciliating* language held out to France by the Sovereigns of Europe: such the prospect which was presented to the people of that devoted country, if they dared to defend themselves against an army which threatened to occupy the kingdom, and to destroy every vestige of liberty: such the punishments denounced against *all persons whatsoever*, not merely for their own supposed offences, but for *all events*

occurring in France which their invaders choose to denominate crimes.

(To be continued.)

• OCCURRENCES OF THE WAR.—Under this head I intend in future to notice every article of public intelligence, possessing an official shape, connected with the views and operations of the Belligerents.

From a dispatch of Lord Wellington's, published in last Saturday night's Gazette, it appears that the French, under Marshal Soult, had made an attack upon one of our positions near St. Jean de Luz, from which they drove our troops; but his Lordship having concentrated and moved forward a considerable portion of his army, "the enemy were forthwith dislodged, without loss on our side, and our posts replaced where they had been." A misunderstanding having arisen between us and the Spanish Government, it has been thought necessary to withdraw our troops from Cadiz and Carthage. A letter of Lord Wellington's has appeared upon this delicate subject in the Lisbon papers, in which his Lordship says:—"I should have deferred this measure till the Spanish Government had made known to me its wish on this particular, if I had not read *the libels which are circulated in Spain upon this subject, impeaching the honour and good faith of his Britannic Majesty; and if I had not perceived the efforts which have been made to persuade the public that the troops of his Majesty continued in those two places with sinister views*;" an assertion equally without foundation, and contrary to the honour of his Majesty, as clearly appears from the faithful relation of what passed on this point when the English troops were destined for Cadiz and Carthage.

The Crown Prince of Sweden has at last succeeded in detaching the Court of Copenhagen from its adherence to France, and induced it to join the coalition against Buonaparte. This was announced by an official bulletin, and by the firing of the Park and Tower guns. I should have thought that the particulars of an event so joyful, would have been forthwith communicated to the public; but it has been thought otherwise; for, although a Gazette Extraordinary was published, announcing the fact that Mr. Thornton and the Swedish Minister had signed Treaties of Peace with the Pleni-

potentiary of his Majesty the King of Denmark," both these documents have been withheld from the public eye. But if we may judge from the terms of the bulletin, the Danes seem to me to have made a better bargain than could have been expected in their circumstances. Although a considerable portion of their territory had been conquered by Sweden, at the expense of a good deal of blood and treasure, this has all been given up, and the same terms which were proposed before the sword was drawn, namely, the exchange of Norway for Pomerania, have been agreed to by Sweden. Great Britain is to retain Heligoland, and Denmark to furnish a contingent of 10,000 troops, for which she is to receive as an equivalent from this country a subsidy of £400,000 during the present year! Was it this last circumstance which occasioned the firing of the Park and Tower guns?

There has been some trifling affairs between the troops of the Allies on the Rhine and those of the French. A dispatch from Sir Charles Stewart, mentions an action which took place between the French, under Marshal Victor, and the Bavarians, under General Wrede, in which the former, in the first instance, are admitted to have gained some advantage, but they were afterwards obliged to retire. On the whole, it does not appear that the "march to Paris" has been very progressive since the Allies entered the territories of France.

The American President's Message to Congress, which was opened on 7th December, has reached this country. It is decidedly hostile towards Great Britain. The *Courier* says, "From a Halifax paper of the 15th, we learn, that an act for laying an embargo has passed by a large majority. This is one of the acts of suicide, to which the American Government has so frequently had recourse." I should have supposed that a single suicide would have been sufficient for their purpose.

MR. CANNING has been, I perceive, making another Speech to the sons of war at Liverpool. I was in hopes that I should have passed the remainder of my life without more speeches of this frothy orator to answer. But, I must, for my sins, answer him again, which I promise to do in my next Number.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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NOTICE.

Some of those Gentlemen, who preserve the Register in *Volumes*, having expressed their regret, that the STATE PAPERS, and other important DOCUMENTS of a public nature, are, in future, to be excluded, and their representations appearing to have great weight in them, it has been determined on to continue the publication of these Official Papers; not, however, in the *Weekly Numbers* of the Register, but in a compilation, to be published once in 2, 3, or 6 months, as shall hereafter appear to be best adapted

to the purposes in view. It is intended to print these documents in the same type, form, and size of paper with the Register itself. The price will, of course, be proportionably lower, because no stamps will be required, as it will be unnecessary to dispatch this part of the work by post. There will be, as at present, an *Index-Sheet*, to the Weekly Numbers, and another *Index*, to the Public Papers. The latter publication may be taken, to be bound up with the Weekly Numbers, or not, at the option of the Reader.

ANSWER

TO MR. CANNING'S LIVERPOOL SPEECH.

It appears, from a Liverpool news-paper, that, a few days back, this gentleman was treated to a dinner by his partisans at Liverpool, at which, it is said, nearly 400 of them attended. At this meeting he is said to have made a *Speech*, which, as published in the *Liverpool Mercury*, though full of offensive matter; though full of sophistry, and falsehood, and impudence, has on its side, the circumstance of its being uttered in a place, which does not afford it the iron shield of privilege, but leaves it open to be commented on by those, who may think it their duty to deny its statements and controvert its doctrines.—After having dispatched the local topics, Mr. Canning proceeds, in this Speech, to those of a public nature, beginning with congratulating his hearers on the happy change in the situation of Europe, and here he observes, that he and those who think with him, that is to say, the Anti-freedom party, have a *right to exult*; that there is nothing improper, nothing unbecoming, nothing base and cowardly in their exultation *now*; because they formerly had to endure *similar exultation* on the side of their opponents.—This is not true. The friends of freedom were not *at liberty to exult*; they dared

not openly rejoice at those events, which gave pain to the sons and daughters of corruption; they were charged, as with a crime, of *rejoicing inwardly*. So that there is no *reciprocity* in the case. It is not *turn and turn about*. The liberty to exult is all on one side; and, therefore, the exultation of Mr. Canning, at this time, is as cowardly as the conduct of a man, who makes an attack upon another, while he knows that the law shuts the mouth of the party so attacked,—Nay, even this speech, though delivered at a tavern, and not shielded from being commented on, he knows cannot be *freely* answered; he knows, that there are many of his positions, which, though wholly false, no man will dare to deny in print. He knows, that he has introduced characters and institutions, which he has eulogized, and which might easily be shown to be detestable; but, he also knows, that he is safe here, for that the man who should dare to exhibit them in a *true* light, would expose himself to utter ruin and to probable death.—Therefore, such a speech is a cowardly speech; it is the act of a man, who is bold behind a wall of brass; it is the bravery of a man who fights only because the hands of his adversary are tied.—If the people of France, assuming the attitude and actuated by the principles of 1792, were to drive the enemy from their

territory, or slaughter them on that territory, and were to pursue them to the midst of their own dominions; would any man dare, in England, openly to express, in print, his *exultation at the change*? Mr. Canning knows that no man would dare do this; and, therefore, is his present exultation cowardly and contemptible.—His next topic is, the *cause* of the recent change in the affairs of Europe, and of the reverses of Napoleon. These, he says, and I agree with him perfectly, have *not* been produced by any *change in the principles* of the war.

—He alludes here to the observations of Mr. WHITBREAD, that the allied sovereigns have now *got their people with them*; that the war has become a war of the people and *not a war of courts*; and that, *therefore*, it is that the Allies have been successful. The same sentiments are daily rung in our ears by the MORNING CHRONICLE, who is not willing to allow the Ministers the merit of success, but wishes to attribute it to the "*Whig principles*." When shall we see an end of this superannuated folly!

Mr. Canning says, and very truly, that the principles of the war have undergone *no change*; that no change has taken place in the motives of our government or its supporters; that the sovereigns of the continent are actuated by the same principles that actuated them at the beginning of the war against the Republicans; that, in short, the motives of 1814 are those of 1792.

—I perfectly agree with him here, and join him in his protest against the claims of the old dotard Whigs to a share in the honour of having so far restored the good old order of things, the regular government of 1792.

—But, if I agree with him here, he ought to agree with me, that it is extremely unjust to blame the friends of freedom for appearing to give their good wishes to *all the successive governments in France*. This has been charged upon them, and particularly on the Americans, as a most glaring trait of *inconsistency*. It has been said, that this their adherence to all the different governments in France, not excepting that of Napoleon, shows that it is the *enemy of England* and not the *cause of freedom* that they are attached to. But, if the principles of the war have not changed; if they have continued the same from 1792 until this day; if the same principles led to war against the limited French monarchy; against the Republic; and against a despotic Emperor; if the principles were so steady, was it not natural and necessary, that those who opposed these principles at first should

continue to oppose them? The friends of freedom, the American government, for instance, could not fail to perceive, and to regret, that the French nation had lost under Napoleon much of what it had gained of freedom; but, that government perceiving, that the *principles of English warfare had not changed*; that those principles still continued the same, could not but still lean, in consistency, towards that, with which those principles were at war.—

Mr. Canning's assertion completely clears all those who have continued, since 1792, steady in their attachment to the cause of France. He, at any rate, ought to reproach no one for adhering to Buonaparté as firmly as to the Republic; for, if the principles of the war, on our part, have *never changed*, that adherence, to be consistent, must have been as strong towards the one as towards the other.—If I am to judge from the tattered speeches of Mr. Canning, he, and all those who are with him, are the bitterest enemies of freedom. To them we may add a herd innumerable of writers in newspapers and other publications, the mere corrupt mouth-pieces of others. Every principle of liberty they are continually at war against. They are the supporters of every thing, of every act, be it what it may, in any part of the world, hostile to freedom. And, when we hear these men, at the same time; railing, in such terms of bitterness, against the present government of France, is it not enough to make us suspect, that, at the bottom, that government is *not* so very despotic? At any rate, is it not enough to make us suspect, that the destruction of that government, and the substituting in its place a something, no matter what, which these known mortal enemies of freedom desire, would not be likely to benefit the cause of freedom?—And, if a man entertain this reasonable, this just suspicion, or, rather, if he be convinced of this truth, can it be expected, that he will wish for the overthrow of the government of France, unless he be well assured, that a government *more hated* by these men, that is to say, a government *more free*, will be established in its stead?—In short, this is the way that the friends of freedom reason. "That person, no matter *who*, that is most "*hated and dreaded by our worst enemies*, "*is not a person for whose annihilation we ought to wish*."—What has here been said will serve as a preface to the next topic of the Speech; namely, the *instruments by which Napoleon has been defeated*.—Upon this point we will take the gen-

tleman's very words: — "Gentlemen, there is another question to be asked. By what power, in what part of the world, has that final blow been struck which has smitten the *tyrant* to the ground? I suppose by some enlightened *republic*. I suppose by some nation which, in the excess of *popular freedom*, considers even a representative system as defective, unless each individual interferes directly in the government of the national concerns. I suppose by some nation of enlightened patriots, every man of whom is a politician in the coffee-house as well as in the senate. I suppose it is from such government as this that the conqueror of despots, the enemy of monarchical England, has met his doom. I look through the European world, Gentlemen, in vain; I find there no such government: but in another hemisphere I do find such a one, which, no doubt, must be the political David by whom the Goliath of Europe has been brought down. What is the name of that glorious republic to which the gratitude of Europe is eternally due; which, from its *hatred to tyranny*, has so perseveringly exerted itself to liberate the world, and at last has successfully closed the contest? Alas! Gentlemen, such a republic I do indeed find; but I find it enlisted, and, *God be thanked, enlisted alone, under the banner of the despot*— (APPLAUSE). — But where was the blow struck? Where? Alas, for theory! The blow was given in the wilds of *despotic Russia*. It was followed up on the plains of Leipzig—by Russian, Prussian, and Austrian arms."—Now, this is all mere flippancy; for, *why* should any "enlightened republic;" *why* should any "nation loving *popular freedom*;" *why* should any "nation of patriots," have been expected to strike the blow, or to wish to see the blow stricken, if, as Mr. Canning himself asserts, the principles of the war have not changed; if those principles are the same that they were at the outset of the war? *Why* should any "enlightened republic" have been expected to join in the war against Napoleon, if the war against him be the same in principle as was the war in 1792 against the Republic of France?—Mr. Canning thanks God, that he finds the American Republic enlisted under the banners of the *despot*. Suppose this to be as true as it is false, where would be the wonder, if the American Republic were to be enlisted on the side of him, against whom war was carried on upon the

same principles as it was carried on against the Republic of France?—But, this is not all. America, though enlisted, as he calls it, has sent neither ships nor men to his assistance, while we know, that the Emperor of Russia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of Austria have been in alliance with him, offensive and defensive; that the two latter, within a few short months, have aided him with their armies to combat and invade the former; and that the latter of the three has even given Napoleon his daughter in marriage. This was something like being *enlisted* under him; nor did the military engagements of the two latter cease, till Napoleon met with reverses of fortune. Amongst the rest of the Allies the sovereigns of Bavaria and Wurtemberg were made *kings* by him, and accepted of his protectorship; and, the Crown Prince of Sweden, a Frenchman, and formerly a private soldier in the revolutionary army, was by Napoleon made heir to the throne of Sweden.—If, therefore, it were as true as it is false, that America were enlisted under his banners, would she find no apology in the example of all these our Allies? *No*, not in the eyes of the friends of freedom, with whom such an example would be no justification; but, one would imagine, that the eulogists of those Allies ought to hold their tongues, while that example is before the eyes of all the world.—There is not one of those Allies, except the Crown Prince, who has not been an ally of Napoleon *against us*; and, therefore, if the fact had been true instead of false, what ground of reproach would it have been to America to have acted in the same way; unless we also make it a ground of reproach to the Allies?—The truth, however, is, that America has fought, and is fighting, *her own battles*, with her own means. She has made no treaty, she has sought no treaty, she has desired no treaty, with France, for the purposes of war. We insist upon taking out of her vessels, upon the high seas, such persons as, in the discretion of our naval commanders, it shall seem meet to take, America being at peace with all the world. She says, that we shall not do this. *Thereupon* we go to war. And how can she be said to have, by such war, *enlisted herself* under the banners of Napoleon?—Was there ever a more false or a more impudent assertion? The notion of this Gentleman, and of all the war faction, is this: that, in order to succeed in a war against France, we have a right to do towards other nations whatever

we find best suited to answer our views; and that, if any one of those nations complain, or, at least, if it *resist*, we have a right to consider it as enlisted under the banners of France. The same mode of arguing they have adopted at home amongst ourselves, where every man, who has questioned the principles or policy of the war, has, without hesitation, been denominated a *friend of France*, and, by inference, an *enemy of*, and *traitor to*, England.—But, to whatever degree this notion may prevail *here*, in America it will make no progress. There the people understand their rights; they are made acquainted with the acts and the real motives of their government; they know what they are at war for; they have real representatives, who speak their voice, and who, if they were so minded, could not delude them. The American people will not want the avowal of Mr. Canning to convince them, that the *principles* of the war, on our part, are the *same now* as they were in 1792, when we were at war with the *Republic of France*. They know very well what those principles are, and, it would be strange indeed to see them, in support of *those principles*, enlisted on the same side with those, who, Mr. Canning tells us, gave the blow “in the *wilds of despotic Russia*.”—The next topic of Mr. Canning is that of “*instinctive patriotism*,” or an *attachment to the soil*, prior and paramount to all political considerations. This is always a favourite doctrine with the enemies of political freedom.

‘No matter,’ they say, ‘what oppressive you suffer; if you be stripped of the fruits of your labour and your genius; if, instead of comfort and ease, you be clad in rags, half-starved, worked like horses, and beaten like asses if you dare to complain; if your Lords buy and sell you as a chattel: no matter, you must still cling to the soil, or earth, where you were born, or you are unnatural wretches.’ This they denominate “*instinctive patriotism*,” and, wherever it prevails, it is very properly so called; for, most assuredly, it is precisely that of the more stupid sort of *beasts*. Thus neat cattle and pigs, though better fed and lodged in a *new situation*, are always hankering after the place where they were bred. An “*instinctive patriot*” of the former sort lately found its way from Botley to Ringwood, in spite of hedges and turnpike gates.—But, as to the *fact*, which Mr. Canning takes for granted as being applicable to *all communities*, though I by no means deny, that, in

some of the countries whose governments he appears to admire, there may be found millions of these “*instinctive*” or cattle-like patriots, these patriots of the earth, or the dirt; though I do not deny, but am afraid it is but too true, that millions of men are to be found in this state, so degrading to human nature; yet I do deny the fact as applied to any society deserving the epithet *civilized*.—In such a society men, who are strongly attached to their country, have their attachment founded in their love of the laws, the institutions, the fame of that country, or in that interest, which arises out of the property they own or the profession they follow in it. Take all these from them, and then ascertain the amount of their attachment to the mere earth where they were born. What sends so many thousands annually from Ireland, and Scotland, and England, to America? Why do we make roads and build bridges in the Highlands, but in consequence of a report to the parliament, that it was necessary to lay out money in this way, in order to prevent the inhabitants from emigrating to America? Why have we laws to punish artisans for attempting to leave the kingdom, and for punishing commanders of vessels who afford them shelter? What, in short, is it that has peopled North America, given eight millions of citizens to that Republic, which is the object of Mr. Canning’s deadly hatred, and has made her our rival in commerce, manufactures, and maritime war? Not, surely, that “*instinctive patriotism*,” that love of one’s breeding place; not, surely, that patriotism, which induced the Ringwood cow to elope from Botley. No; but that desire, which every rational being has to get rid of some evil, or to mend his situation. Mr. Canning, in confirmation of his degrading doctrine, quotes Goldsmith, who, speaking of the Swiss peasant, says:

Dear is that *shed*, to which his soul conforms,
And dear that *hill* which lifts him to the storms.

That is to say, that a poor creature, living on a bleak hill in a hovel, sets great value upon the *hovel and its contents*, and likes the hill, in as much as it is the site of the *hovel*. But, what does this amount to, at last, but his attachment to what he calls *his*, and which, miserable as it is, is *his all*? However, a more unhappy illustration could not have been found, it being notorious, that the Swiss get out of their country as fast as they can find shoes to bear them away; that they become lackeys, and butlers, and porters all over Europe; and that, to complete

the proof of their "*instinctive patriotism*," they hired themselves as *soldiers* to the French, the Germans, the Prussians; or any body else, and were not unfrequently opposed to each other in battle by the princes to whom they let themselves out to hire, until the French revolution, by an exposure of the infamy of such a traffic, put a stop to it; though now, perhaps, amongst the other good things, which Mr. Canning anticipates from the great approaching change, this traffic may possibly be revived.—There is, however, such a confusion of ideas in this part of the speech, that I must quote it, in the speaker's words, in order, not that the reader may comprehend its meaning (for that is impossible, I think); but that I may not be chargeable with having garbled it.—"The order of nature could not subsist among mankind, if there were not an *instinctive patriotism*, a love of national independence, I do not say unconnected with, but prior and paramount to, the desire of political amelioration. It may be very wrong that this should be so. I cannot help it. Our business is with the fact. And surely it is not to be regretted that tyrants and conquerors should have learned from experience that the first consideration suggested to the inhabitants of any country by a foreign invasion, is not whether the political constitution of the state is perfect, but whether the altar at which he has worshipped, and the home in which he has dwelt from his infancy, whether his wife and his children, whether the tombs of his forefathers, whether the palace of the sovereign under whom he was born, and to whom he may owe, or fancy that he owes, allegiance—should be abandoned to violence and profanation?"—That in the infancy of the French Revolution, many nations in Europe were unfortunately led to believe and to act upon a different persuasion, is undoubtedly true;—that whole countries were over-run by reforming conquerors, and flattered themselves with being proselytes till they found themselves victims. Even in this country, as I have already said, there have been times when we have been called upon to consider whether there was not something at home which must be mended before we could hope to repel a foreign invader with success.—Gentlemen, it is happy for the world that this sort of question should have been tried, if I may so say, to a disadvantage;

that it should have been tried in countries where no man in his senses will say that the frame of political society is such, as according to the most moderate principles of regulated freedom it ought to be: where I will venture to say, without hazarding the imputation of being myself a visionary reformer, political society is not such, as, after the success of this war, and from the happy contagion of the example of Great Britain, it is sure gradually to become. It is happy for the world that this question, as to the value of national independence, should thus have been tried on its own merits; that after twenty years of controversy we should be authorized by undoubted results to revert to truth and nature, and to disentangle the genuine feelings of the heart from the obstructions which a generalizing philosophy had wound around them.—What Goldsmith has beautifully applied to the physical varieties and disadvantages of a country has been found to be not less true with respect to political institutions. The sober desire of improvement, the rational endeavour to redress wrong or correct imperfection in the political frame of a government, are not only natural but laudable in man: but it is well that it should have been shown by irrefragable proof that these sentiments, where they exist, supersede not that devotion to native soil which is the foundation of national independence. And it is right that it should be understood and remembered that this sentiment of national independence alone—aroused where it had slumbered—enlightened where it had been deluded—and kindled into enthusiasm by the insults and provocations of the enemy, has been found sufficient, without internal changes, or compromises, of sovereigns and governments with their people, without relaxations of allegiance or abjurations of authority, to connect the nations of the continent in one common cause, to lead them against their tyrant, and to shake and (may we not hope to overthrow) the Babel of his power?"—Here is, as I said before, such a confusion of ideas, that one hardly knows where to begin the work of separating and comparing them and bringing them to the test of reason.—We are told, that it is an "*instinctive patriotism*," a "*devotion to native soil*, which is the foundation of "*national independence*." We will, by and by, inquire what is meant by these two

last words, the use of which is so common, and the meaning of which is so very vague; but, at present, let us suppose that the Speaker means, that the effect of this “*instinctive patriotism*,” this “*devotion to native soil*,” is, the exertion of a people to keep any enemy out of their country. In other words, that there requires nothing but this love of their native soil to make men fight against an invader; that this feeling, this “*genuine feeling of the heart*,” is quite sufficient without any other consideration. But, not to speak of the *fact* again yet, how does this agree with the Speaker's observation, that men fight for the *homes* in which they have dwelt; for their *wives and children*, and other objects? They fight, he says, against an invader, because these objects, so dear to them, should not be *exposed to violence*. In short, they hazard their lives in repelling invasion, because they fear that the invader will take away their *property and make them miserable*; and, not because they fear he will insult or dishonour the dirt upon which they walk, or the place where they happen to have been born, and upon which particular spot not one out of five hundred is living.——What becomes, then, of his doctrine of “*instinctive patriotism*,” if it be for houses, goods, chattels, churches, wives and children, that men repel invasion? These are under the safe-guard of laws, that is to say, *political institutions*, without which there can be no property, or ownership, in any thing.——What becomes, then, of his degrading doctrine; what becomes of his assertion, that a mere cattle-like attachment to the earth, is of itself sufficient to make men fight against an invading enemy?——Even in those countries, where the wretched inhabitants are bought and sold with the estates, in which they are bred, and where the human form is animated with a degree of intelligence little superior to that of a brute, it is not the mere love of the soil which produces resistance to an invader; for, though the vassal be a sort of beast, the lord knows *his* interest, and he drags forth the vassal to war, not from a love of the soil, but from *his* love of the *profits* of the soil. In short, for the sake of *his property*; for fear of losing more than he has any chance of gaining.——But, why need we have made these observations? What need had we of an argument drawn from the reason of the case, when Mr. Canning himself has told us (what, indeed, we well knew before), that, in spite of this fine “*instinctive patriotism*”

in spite of this “*devotion to native soil*,” in spite of this “*genuine feeling of the heart*,” that, in spite of this “*foundation of national independence*,” that, “*many nations of Europe were unfortunately led to believe and to act upon a different persuasion; that whole nations were over-run by reforming conquerors, and flattered themselves with being proselytes, till they found themselves victims.*” In plain words, many nations of Europe, in the hope of bettering their condition, received the French invaders with open arms; but, at last, finding themselves “*victims*,” finding that they had been “*deluded*,” being “*insulted*” and “*provoked*” by their new masters, they joined with their old sovereigns to drive the new masters out. Let us take all this for granted; for it completely drives away the notion of “*instinctive patriotism*.” Here we see nations, *many nations*, receiving the invader with open arms, because they *thought* he would *better their lot*; and we see them driving him out again, because he had *rendered their lot worse than it was before*.——Here we see “*many nations*” actuated, in this question of invasion, not by any “*instinctive*” feeling about the *soil*; but by motives of self-interest; by considerations connected with their property and political institutions; we see them, in short, making *calculations*, putting the good against the evil likely to arise to them from the invasion of their country; and deciding in favour of the former. We see “*whole nations; many nations*,” acting thus; Mr. Canning himself exhibits them to us as thus acting; and yet, with the statement of this fact, this notorious fact, upon his lips, he, from his innate love of cattle-like feeling in the people, he tells his hearers, that a twenty years' war has decided this great question, has put reforming philosophy to shame, and has clearly proved, that “*a devotion to native soil*” alone is the foundation of national independence, and that it is quite sufficient for the purpose of keeping out or driving out an invader, without the aid of any motive connected with political institutions.——Yes, Mr. Canning could not disguise the fact, that “*instinctive*” patriotism had not prevented the Brabanters, the Dutch, the Italians, the Germans, the Prussians, the Poles, from receiving the French invaders with open arms, and with the avowed hope of *bettering their condition*; he could not disguise this fact, so well known, and so directly in the teeth of his doctrine; and,

therefore, he says, that this "*instinctive patriotism*," this "*devotion to native soil*," this "*genuine feeling of the heart*," "*slumbered*," that it was "*deluded*," till "*enlightened and kindled*" by the *insults and provocations* of the invaders. A strange sort of *instinct* this? Instinct is a feeling wholly unconnected with *reason*; wholly distinct from *mind*. How, then, could it be enlightened; how could it be kindled; how could it slumber; how be deluded?—But, this confusion of ideas, this floundering, this slipshod trash, was well enough suited to Mr. Canning's audience. It is possible that he thought that he himself understood what he was talking about; but, whatever might be his thoughts as to that matter, he knew well enough, that his audience was incapable of detecting any absurdity that might escape him. The darker the deeper he knew for them.—There was, however, to be drawn from this monstrous doctrine of "*instinctive patriotism*," a practical inference of great import to *ourselves*. It was this: that, whereas, "there have been times when we have been called upon to consider, whether there was not something *at home*, which must be mended before we could hope to repel a foreign invader with success." This question, says he, is now settled; *because* we have seen that people who have less liberty than the people here enjoy, have, by the operation of "*instinctive patriotism*" alone, repelled the invader.—There the premises are false; for we know, that the nations of Europe did *not* repel invaders; that they received the invaders with open arms, as Mr. Canning acknowledges; and that, whatever they have now done to assist their old masters, has been in the driving out of *new masters*, by whom, as he says, they had been insulted and provoked.—Besides, whatever may be Mr. Canning's opinion of the power of "*instinctive patriotism*," in this country, none of the ministris, to which he has belonged (and he has belonged to almost every one for twenty years past), appear to have placed much reliance upon it. They have acted upon notions very opposite indeed. They have kept on foot a large regular army; they have had an army of reserve; they have had all sorts of militias; they have established camps, built barracks near every considerable town; they have had recourse to yeomanry and volunteers, clothed as soldiers, and placed under officers appointed by the crown and paid by the peo-

ple; nay, they have brought a very considerable *army of foreigners* into the country, upon the ground, expressly alleged, of their being necessary; districts of England itself have been under the command of some of these foreigners.—Now, if the "*instinctive patriotism*" of a people be sufficient to induce them to repel an invader, and if this "*genuine feeling of the heart*" be not less powerful in England than in Germany, why all these military establishments? Why all the enormous expense of camps, barracks, armies of reserve, yeomanry, volunteers and foreigners, amounting to not less than ten or fourteen millions sterling a year? As a speech-maker at Liverpool, Mr. Canning found it convenient, in support of his principles, as an enemy of reform of corrupt abuses, to broach his doctrine of "*instinctive patriotism*;" but, as a minister, he was too wise to trust to that patriotism for the repelling of an invader; or, if he did trust to it, he wisely chose to clothe his "*instinctive patriots*" in uniform, and to furnish them with arms, pay, lodging, coals, candles, and with bread and meat at a given price. I am by no means calling in question the wisdom of these measures; I am not endeavouring to show, that the camps, barracks, and all the other causes of expense, above enumerated, were not necessary, *in our situation*, for the repelling of invasion; but, I must insist upon it, that the practice of Mr. Canning and his different sets of colleagues has been in direct opposition to the doctrine that he now holds.—Mr. Canning tells his audience, that the Reformers have said, that *without a reform, the country could not be defended against an invader*. Now, says he, this is not true, for we have seen the contrary on the continent, where no reform has been made or promised; and, therefore, the question is *decided* against the Reformers.—In the first place, I repeat, that invasion was *not repelled* on the continent. It was a *new master* that was driven out; and, in the next place, I deny, that the Reformers have ever said, *that, without a reform the country could not be defended against an invader*. What the Reformers have said is this: that, to ensure the repelling of an invader the people must be better satisfied with the state of the representation; OR, that an enormous expense must be incurred for the support of an army of some sort in the country. This is what the Reformers have said; this is what they still say; and is there any thing

that Mr. Canning, or any one else, can produce in the change of governors on the Continent, or in any of the events there for the last twenty years, which does not make *for*, instead of *against*, this position? And, as to what has happened *here*: it is true, that no reform has taken place, and that yet, we have not been invaded with any considerable degree of success; but, the army at home has added many *scores of millions* to a debt, which no peace, no state of prosperity, which nothing short of an event which no minister will dare look in the face, will ever get rid of, or materially diminish.—The money, which this home army has cost, might easily be shown to surpass £10,000,000 a year. This, during the 20 years of war, amounts to 200 millions. Thus, 200 millions of the national debt is due to this cause, and this imposes upon the people of this country 10 millions a year of interest *for ever*; that is to say, about one half of the amount of the Property Tax. So that, if a 5 per centum tax, or one half of this terrible tax, under which the farmers and tradesmen and handicraftsmen are writhing with such impatience, should be kept on *after the war*, the country will probably begin to feel, that it would have been better to have a *reform and no domestic army*, during the last 20 years.—The Reformers have asserted, and MAJOR CARTWRIGHT has brought forward arguments to prove, that, with reform, this army might have been dispensed with. It is possible that the Reformers may have been wrong, and that Major Cartwright may have reasoned erroneously; but, his reasoning has never been shown to be erroneous; and Mr. Canning has not now produced any thing to shake the assertion of the Reformers.—So that this speech fails in its main object, which was to produce a belief, that, because the French armies had been driven back by nations, having no political liberty, political liberty is not at all necessary to the safety of a country against the attacks of a foreign enemy.—This was the main drift of the speech. The object of the speaker was to impress upon the minds of his hearers, and, through the press, on the minds of the people at large, that *Reform* has not been, and is not *necessary*. This was what he was aiming at. ‘Here,’ says he, ‘we are in a state of triumph; we have not been invaded; we have beaten France; we have got out of all our dangers; we have done this *without any reform*, which clearly shows, that no reform was necessary;

‘nay, we see, besides, that nations having not even the name of political liberty in use amongst them, have fought heartily against the French and defeated them; which clearly shews, that “*instinctive patriotism*” alone is sufficient to induce a people to defend their country.’ And hence the speaker leaves us to infer, that *even if the mass of the people of England were reduced to the state of those of Russia, there would be no danger of their siding with the invader*.—This, this is the result at which he aimed. With this object the speech was made. This was the account to which the speaker endeavoured to turn the recent successes of the Allies.—The friends of freedom, under the name of Jacobins, Levellers, Democrats, or what not, have often been accused of wishing success to the French; of rejoicing at their triumphs; and of mourning at their reverses. This was a very foul and base way of opposing arguments in favour of a reform of notorious abuses; but, really, if Mr. Canning’s doctrine, if his mode of arguing, if his inferences were right, the friends of freedom might with pride plead guilty to the charge; for, if the defeat of the French by the armies of nations who enjoy no political liberty be taken to be a proof, that rotten boroughs and sinecure places are good things, and that Englishmen need no political liberty; if such a conclusion be to be drawn from the defeat of the French by the Allies, ought not Englishmen to lament that such defeat has taken place, and is it not natural for them to wish to see the ground of such a dangerous doctrine speedily removed?—According to this doctrine of Mr. Canning, it is not only natural for a man who is attached to the rights and liberties of his country to lament that his own government is successful, but it is his duty to endeavour to prevent such success; because this gentleman tells us, that we are to take that success as a proof, not only that no reform of abuses ought to take place; but, also, as a proof, that no political liberty at all is necessary to the defence and safety and happiness of the country.—Such is the state, to which the prevalence of this abominable doctrine would reduce the friends of freedom in every country in the world where abuses exist. A due regard for their own liberties and those of their fellow citizens would compel them to wish to see their government and its armies defeated.—It is absolutely necessary, to show the falsehood and the absurdity of this

doctrine in every way that it presents itself to us.—Success in war being, by Mr. Canning, taken as a complete proof, that no reform is wanted in the government which has obtained that success, we may ask him, why he has, for the last twenty years, been crying out against the several governments in France; seeing, that under them, far greater successes in war have been obtained than by all the other governments in Europe put together within the two last centuries. If success in war be a proof, or even a mark, of a good government, the French have, for twenty years past, been blest with the best government that ever existed; and yet Mr. Canning has been incessantly scolding and railing against the French government, during the whole of that period.—The American government, too, which Mr. Canning so hates, and the President at the head of which the Times newspaper calls a “hypocritical villain,” must, according to Mr. Canning’s doctrine, be a pretty good one; for, it is notorious, that its forces have been victorious by sea and land; that in the war of frigates, they have beaten ours three times out of four; that, in several instances, their inferior ships of war have beaten ours with an equal force; that they have defeated us upon the lakes; and that they have invaded and possess a large portion of our North American dominions.—The flashy gentleman, as he was dashing along, seems to have forgotten these things; but we must stop him and pin him down here, and make him acknowledge, that the American government is an excellent one, and that the French government for the last twenty years has been excellent; or, make him eat his words, and confess, that success in war is *not* a proof that the government obtaining it is excellent and stands in need of *no reform*.—I now come to inquire a little into the meaning of the words “national independence,” so often made use of by Mr. Canning, and of which he appears to have no very distinct idea. He says, that his famous nostrum of “instinctive patriotism,” is of itself, without any political considerations, sufficient to ensure “national independence,” by which, from the context, it would seem that he means the *keeping out of invaders*, for he states the effect of his wonderful instinct to be the defending of property from plunder. But, are nations, then, to be regarded as independent in all cases except while they have invaders in their territories? May not a nation be placed in a

complete state of dependence on others, or on another, without being invaded? All the world knows, that they may; and, it is equally well known, that a nation, whose rulers are turned out by foreign aid, and who receives a foreigner for their sovereign, may still be *independent nations*. In that revolution, which we style “*Glorious*,” a foreigner was put upon the throne of this kingdom, and brought with him foreign troops to assist him against the partisans of our king. No one will, I imagine, attempt to say, that England was *degraded*, or that she lost her *independence*, in consequence of that Revolution. In Sweden we see in the heir to the throne, a *Frenchman*, in no wise related to the Royal family; a man who was not long ago a private soldier in the service of France; a relation by marriage of Buonaparté himself. No one will, I imagine, be inclined to dispute the *legitimacy* of his title to the Crown of Sweden, or to say that Sweden has been degraded, or lost her *independence* by his being placed over her. He is one of our august Allies; we have, in the most solemn manner, acknowledged his heirship to the crown, and to an island which we have ceded to Sweden.—What, then, becomes of all the outcry about the loss of *national independence* in those countries where Frenchmen have obtained the sway? Why should Naples, or Italy, be looked upon as *degraded* by their change of sovereigns any more than England was, or than Sweden is, by the change of sovereigns in those countries?—Why should it be a crime in a Neapolitan, or an Italian, or a Dutchman, or a German, to have favoured and sought for a change of rulers, if it was no crime, but a great merit, as Mr. Canning will not deny it was, for Englishmen and Swedes to favour and seek for such a change?—The words “national independence,” like the word “*constitution*,” are made to take whatever meaning may best suit the purposes of those, who use them with a sinister view. But, unless Mr. Canning be prepared to go the length of condemning our glorious revolution, and the more recent glorious revolution in Sweden, he must acknowledge, that men may love their country, that they may be very meritorious men, that they may be entitled to every mark of respect, and every epithet of praise, notwithstanding that they effect, or endeavour to effect, a change in their rulers, even with the assistance of foreign troops.—What then, become of all these loose and unqualified invectives against re-

volutionists? Where is the justice of this sweeping charge of "*folly*" and "*base-ness*," preferred against those nations of the Continent, who received with open arms the men who came to change their rulers? We call William the Third our "*deliverer*;" and why are we to call the people of the Continent foolish and base, because they hailed Frenchmen as their *deliverers*?—We are told by the hirelings of the Times and other newspapers, that we can never expect solid peace with France while Napoleon is on the throne, because he is not the *lawful* possessor of the throne. How, then, are we to expect a solid peace with Sweden, where the Crown Prince has no other title than that of the choice of the states any more than Napoleon has; and where the newly introduced prince is not only not a *native* of the country, but a Frenchman. It is true, that Louis XVIII. is alive to dispute the sovereignty with Buonaparté. And, is not the poor king of Sweden, our formerly august and eulogised Ally still alive also?—In short, this talk about "*national independence*" is, if looked into, mere noise and nonsense. It is a big-sounding phrase, it is a watch-word, a cry, set up by the crafty to astound the ignorant and inflame their prejudices. The former make the latter believe, that it was a love of "*national independence*" that roused the people of Russia, Germany, and Holland, to drive out the French. We have no authentic accounts of any such *rousing*. The cause of what has happened is to be looked for in the loss of the grand French army in the frosts and snows of Russia, following upon the heels of an event that no human being could have thought possible, the burning of Moscow by the hands of Russians. To this cause, succeeded by the defection of Prussia, Austria, Bavaria, and Württemberg, aided by English subsidies, and by the skill of a *Frenchman* commanding the Swedish and other troops, also aided by an English subsidy; to these causes, purely physical; to numbers and to money, and not to any moral cause; not to any thing proceeding from the *minds* of the people of Europe, we must look for the change in the situation of the sovereigns of the Continent. By *principles* at first, and by *force* afterwards, France extended her influence and her dominion. By *force* alone she has been driven back. Whether she be again to advance is a question not yet quite decided, notwithstanding Mr. Canning so loudly proclaims, "*the humili-*

ation of France and the *restoring* of Eu-
"*rope*" as being completely finished. But, there is another question in a state of much less uncertainty: namely, whether, let the war end when and how it may, we, the people of this kingdom, will not find ourselves losers by it.—Mr. Canning boasts, that, during the *twenty years* that he has been in parliament, he has been an advocate for the war. That is to say, from the first hour of the war to this day. —He, then observes, that, as an avowed advocate for the war, he was chosen by his hearers to represent them. From this, in order to show how wise they were in choosing him, he proceeds to draw a contrast between the situation of affairs *then* and the situation of affairs *now*, and to show how much our affairs have been improved by continuing the war.—This was unfair. He took the wrong periods as subjects of comparison. He, who had been, and who boasted of having been, an advocate for the war from the *beginning* of it to this hour, and who asserted that the principles of the war had always been the same, should have gone back to that *beginning*, in order to make the contrast exhibit a proof of the soundness of his principles and the correctness of his foresight; in order to show, that his conduct was worthy of approbation, and himself worthy of confidence and support.—Instead of doing this, however, he skips over *eighteen years out of the twenty*, and begins his contrast, in 1812, "*when*," to take his own words, "*two-thirds*" of the "*ports of the Continent were shut against you*"; when but one link, as it were, was "*wanting to bind that Continent in a circling chain of iron, which should exclude you from intercourse with the other nations of Europe.*"—If there had been, in this assembly of 400 persons, but one single man, endowed with common spirit, to stop him, and to cry out to him: "*Not so fast! Go back to the outset of your twenty years' war; name to us the port that was THEN closed against us in any part of the world, France herself not excepted, with whom we carried on a commerce more advantageous to England than any she ever knew: and, before you come to your period of 1812, tell us how many thousands of bankruptcies your war produced; how many hundreds of thousands of people it made paupers; how many millions it added to our annual burdens; what riddling it made amongst our account books to get our incomes; how*

'many, and what laws, before unknown,
 'about libel, sedition, and treason, the
 'conflict brought into the Statute Book;
 'how many millions your war added to the
 'national debt; how it banished gold and
 'silver from the land; and how many of
 'our countrymen it caused to perish in
 'battle: tell us a little about all this, and
 'explain to us the *means*, by which we
 'were brought to the situation of 1812,
 'before you proceed to contrast the latter
 'period with the present.'—If there had
 been but one single man, in this assembly
 of 400, to stand up and stop him some-
 what in this way, I am of opinion, that
 the Orator, though not sparingly gifted
 in that quality, which is generally typified
 by one of the most obdurate and imperi-
 trable of metals, would have stood aghast.
 True, the state of the country is better now
 than it was in 1812, or, at least, its war-
 like situation is better; but what is that to
 the question of good or evil as relating to
 the whole of the war, for which Mr. Can-
 ning boasts that he has been an advocate?
 If a foolish, or wicked servant lose or
 squander a *thousand* pounds of mine on
 Monday, am I to applaud his adroitness or
 integrity, and think myself a lucky man,
 because he has restored to me *ten* of them
 on Saturday? Yet this I must in consist-
 ency do, if I were to admit the justice of
 trying Mr. Canning's politics according to
 the principle and mode of reasoning which
 he has resorted to in this part of his speech.
 —But this I cannot do. No: I must go
 back to the state of my affairs on *Monday*;
 and then I shall find, that, though I am *ten*
 pounds better than I was on Friday, I am
nine hundred and ninety worse than I was
 before I was so unfortunate as to trust my
 servant with my bag. —However, I must
 confess, that, after going through all the
 cobweb work of the former part of the
 speech, followed by the last-noticed skip-
 ping contrast and empty boasting, my eye
 darted with eager expectation on the follow-
 ing passage, where, perceiving the words
 "*compensated*" and "*gained*," in *italic*
 characters, "Oh!" said I, to myself,
 "here is something *solid* coming at the
 "close!" we are now going to see what
 "we have *gained* by this war of 20 years
 "duration."—Here, you 400 gaping
 oafs! Take it in again. Swallow it down
 a second time, while my reader and I divert
 ourselves at the sight of your scramble for
 these precious *gains*.—Can we regret
 "that we did not lie down and die under
 "the sufferings of the inclement season?"

"or did we not more wisely to bear up,
 "and wait the change?—Gentlemen, I have
 "said that I should be ashamed, and in
 "truth I should be so, to use the language
 "of exultation, if it were the language of
 "exultation only; but those who have suf-
 "fered great privations have a right to
 "know that they have not suffered them in
 "vain; they have earned a claim not
 "merely to consolation, but to something
 "more. They are justly to be *compensated*
 "for what they have undergone, or lost, or
 "hazarded, by a contemplation of what
 "they have gained. We have gained,
 "then, a rank and authority in Europe
 "which for the life of the longest liver of
 "those who now hear me, must place this
 "country upon an eminence which no pro-
 "bable reverses can shake.—We have
 "gained, or rather we have recovered,
 "a splendour of military glory which
 "places us by the side of the greatest mi-
 "litary nations in the world.—Twenty,
 "nay ten years ago, while there was not a
 "British heart that did not beat with rap-
 "ture at the exploits of our navy, there
 "were few who would not have been con-
 "tent to compromise for that reputation
 "alone; to claim the sea as *exclusively* our
 "province, and to allow France and the
 "other Continental Powers to contend for
 "superiority by land.—Let Portugal;
 "now led to the pursuit of her flying con-
 "querors, let liberated Spain, let France
 "herself, invaded in her turn by those
 "whom she had over-run or menaced with
 "invasion, attest the triumphs of the Bri-
 "tish army, and the equality of her mili-
 "tary with her naval fame.—I do not
 "say that these are considerations with a
 "view to which the contest, if otherwise
 "terminable, ought to have been purposely
 "protracted: but, I say, that upon the
 "retrospect, we have good reason to re-
 "joice that the contest was not closed in-
 "gloriously and insecurely:—when the
 "latter events of it have been such as have
 "established our security by our glory. I
 "say we have reason to rejoice:—that
 "during the period when the continent was
 "prostrate before France, that especially
 "during the period when the continental
 "system was in force, we did not shrink
 "from the struggle; that we did not make
 "peace for present and momentary ease,
 "unmindful of the permanent safety and
 "greatness of this country, that we did
 "not leave unsolved the momentous
 "questions whether this country could
 "maintain itself unaided and alone; or

"with the continent divided, or with the continent combined against it; whether, when the wrath of the tyrant of the European world was kindled against us with seven-fold fury, we could or could not walk unarmed and unfettered through the flames.—These questions, Gentlemen, therefore have been solved by our perseverance under difficulties and discouragements which, when related in history, will appal our posterity more than the actual suffering of them has appalled ourselves."

So then, wholly and exclusively of *military glory*, *military reputation*! And there we stop. This sort of language might have had some sense in it, if addressed to the *army*; if addressed to *military* men; if addressed to those who have no other object than that of the credit and profit of the fighting trade in view. But with what sense could it be addressed to an assembly of merchants, and dealers, and handicrafts men, who could have not the smallest pretensions, personally, to any share of this sort of *gain*?—But, to this acquisition is, it seems, to be added, a knowledge, or, at least, a *confidence* which we have acquired by the war, that we are able to defend our country; that we have, within ourselves, the means and the courage, to ensure us against being conquered by foreign nations.—Was this, then, *doubted* before the war? Was it ever, before the war, a question with us, *whether England was able to defend herself against France*? The gentleman says, that *that question is now decided*. As if the question was ever entertained before this unhappy war began.—Now, says he, our *soldiers* have a reputation equal to our sailors. And when had they it not? When were we disposed to yield, in this respect, to the French, or any other nation? It is notorious, that, *before this war began*, it was an opinion grown into a vulgar maxim, that *one English soldier was equal to three French soldiers*. I grant, that the opinion was erroneous, and the maxim that of the vulgar, imposed upon by crafty men. But, it is undeniable, that the opinion was generally entertained, that the maxim was on every one's lips; and, it is equally undeniable, that, by the events of this war; by our numerous retreats before French armies; by the occurrences at the Helder, at Dunkirk, at Corunna, and in divers other quarters, this flattering opinion of our superior prowess, this maxim so well calculated to excite a feeling of contempt towards our

enemy, have been entirely put out of vogue; and, according to Mr. Canning, they have been replaced by an opinion, founded on proof, that our soldiers are *as good* as those of France; and, that we need not fear their power to invade and conquer our country. A mighty *gain* indeed! A very *great object* to be obtained by twenty years of war!

—The drift of Mr. Canning, in this part of his speech, is, however, in great part, to give *Lord Wellington* the merit of having effected this glorious change, so advantageous to our reputation, and so powerful in its effects as to our future security; for, in another paragraph of the speech, he says, that, after the peace, the meanest Englishman, walking the streets of Paris, will be pointed out as a member of that nation which has *humbled France*; will be pointed out as the "*compatriot of Wellington*."

—Now, in the first place, France is not *yet humbled*. It is not yet, and, of course, it was not, three weeks ago, time to sell the Lion's skin. And, in the next place, if France be finally humbled, will it have been *by England*? Will no other nation have had a hand in the work? If she be humbled, will it not have been by the joint efforts of *all* the other nations of Europe?

—And, suppose that an Englishman were to be looked upon in the light that Mr. Canning says he would. Is it any thing *new* to the world for Englishmen to be thought highly of as soldiers? Just as if Englishmen were nothing in the field *before this war*; as if Englishmen never set a hostile foot in France till led by this Lord Wellington! As if we ought to forget all about the battles of Poitiers, Cressy, Agincourt, and many others. Lord Wellington has barely entered France; he is not *out* of it yet; his campaigns have yet, by their *result*, to show whether it be likely that Frenchmen will, with fear and trembling, look at his compatriots. But, taking his seats, as they now are, what has he done? Why, with two nations of 13 millions of people on his side, and with an army that has cost us about 20 millions a year, he has, at the end of four years, so far got the better of a mere detachment of the forces of France, as to just poke his nose into the French territory. And this is to cover us with *glory*, is it? This is an *acquisition of military glory to England*, with a 20 years' war, and 600 millions of debt, besides six hundred millions more of taxes? Why, Mr. Canning, did we want all this war and expenditure to prove that Englishmen were capable, under such cir-

circumstances, to poke their noses into France, when history told the world before, that Englishmen had *conquered all France*; that they actually held possession of a considerable part of France for centuries; that so late as the reign of Queen Mary, Calais was an English town; that so late as only 140 years ago Dunkirk was an English town. And, did we, after the battles of Marlbrough and Wolfe; did we, indeed, want the war; this long, expensive, and bloody war, to establish the fact, that Englishmen were able to meet Frenchmen in the field.

—But, Mr. Canning; you talk of the *honour and glory* that we have *gained*. You have overlooked a little item of this sort which we have *lost*. Amongst the titles of our king, *before this war*, was that of KING OF FRANCE. He was, before this war, “King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, &c. &c.” France is *now* expunged from his title; a title won by Englishmen fighting in France. It had nothing *real* in it. Our king was not, in fact, king of France. No; nor was, nor is he, *Defender of the Faith* of the Romish Communion, as Henry VIII. was styled by the Pope. But, the former, like the latter, made part of his honorary appellations. He was not in reality King of France in 1801, when that part of his title was given up; but, he was in 1801, and he is now, *as much* King of France as he was before your 20 years’ war; and, why has the title been yielded up *since the war*? I ask you WHY? I have heard it said, that the king gave it up, because it was become a *disgrace to be king of such a people*! Upon this principle, if they should return to allegiance to the Bourbons, the title may be *revived*.—No, no, Mr. Canning, that day is gone by. That title will never be resumed. When I was a child my father had to explain to me *why* our king was called *King of France*; and, in so doing, he had to relate to me the victorious wars of our English ancestors. You and I, Sir, are *saved* that trouble. All the old *guineas* are gone (another happy effect of your war); the old crowns, half crowns, and shillings have followed the same course; our copper coin is new; so that the great, wide-spreading, ever-present record of the gallant achievements of our forefathers are all vanished. Your children and wine have nothing to tempt them to ask us any questions upon that which is now, in spite of all your boasting, a very painful subject. —I could here, entering upon matter better suited to your audience, show how

enormous the *losses* of this nation has been from the war; I could draw a comparison between the state of the country in 1792 and 1814, as to its Debts, its Taxes, its Currency, its Paupers, its Laws, its Liberties, and its Prospects, which, I think, would wring the heart of every real lover of England. But, confining myself to your own topic, to your own view of the matter; taking you upon that ground, which you yourself have selected, and upon which to stand and crow in fancied security, with eyes half shut and plumes expanded; taking you here, I show, I flatter myself, that your promises are false, and that your conclusions are false, even supposing your premises true.—It only remains for me to apologize to the reader for having, as I fear, put his patience to too severe a test. But, the poison was so artfully mixed up and kneaded together, that it required time to analyse it and to furnish, as I hope I have, an appropriate antidote.—I may deceive myself in the utility of this antidote, but, in case others, who have the means, may be desirous of giving it circulation, a few Numbers extraordinary have been printed this week, in order to afford them an opportunity of so doing.

ROWLAND HILL AND THE DEVIL.—

The forner of these, in imitation of Mr. Canning, has, I perceive, been *figuring in a Tavern Speech* upon the subject of politics.—I intend paying my respects to him next week, and to inquire into the justice of his charge against the Prince of Darkness.

THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON AND HIS ARMY.

—So it has come to this at last—Buonaparté—the beaten, the cowardly Buonaparté; the man whose fate was, only the other day, “in the hands of his enemies;” who “bear-like must fight his course;” and whose speedy downfall was pointed at by “the finger of Providence.” This man, who was universally hated, and the terror of all his subjects, has, notwithstanding all this, been able to raise and discipline a numerous army, and to march at their head against the enemies of France. Can it, then, be believed that Napoleon had “fallen to rise no more;” that all Frenchmen were disaffected with his government; or that, from the most consummate general and politician in Europe, he had, all at once, become the weakest and most contemptible of men? Can it be supposed, for a moment, that, after having exhausted

France of men, of money, and of all its resources, he would have been able, and that in a few months only, to collect and equip an army more formidable in point of numbers than all the armies of Europe put together? It is impossible to entertain such an idea, and at the same time to give credit to the tales with which the people of this country are every day fed, by a hired and prostituted press.—I never entertained, nor expressed a doubt, as to Buonaparté being again able to meet his enemies in the field, because I never believed that France was exhausted, nor could I at any time discover the least symptom to justify a suspicion that his subjects were unwilling to support him. Not even a single soldier had deserted his standard, nor did a solitary cockade appear in any part of France, indicative of a disposition on the part of any one to revolt against him. It will be recollected, that at the time Napoleon was in Germany, and heard of the defection of the Bavarians, a conscription of 280,000 additional troops were voted him by the Senate. After his return to Paris, a new levy of 300,000 was called for. It was this last which appalled the Allies, and gave occasion to their declaration to the French people issued from Frankfort. If to these levies are added 100,000 more, which, it is admitted, returned to France with the Emperor, after the battle of Leipzig, this will give an aggregate of 680,000; and when the armies under Soult, Suchet, and the numerous garrisons occupying the different stations in France, are included, it will be seen, that the armed force which Napoleon has at present under his control, cannot be far short of a million of men. This is no vague speculation. It is founded on facts, which even the enemies of Buonaparté know to be true, though they find their account in misleading the public respecting them. But what, more than any thing else, shows the insolent and despotic disposition of those who regulate the press of this country, is the censure which they are ready on all occasions to pronounce on any attempt to put forth the truth—to unveil their political deception, and to lay before the public a fair representation of facts. A most flagrant and barefaced instance of this kind has just occurred in the *Courier* newspaper, which I consider it my duty to expose, because it fully lays open the base and unprincipled views of these political charlatans. I have stated, that the armies of France cannot, upon a fair calculation, be

estimated much below a million of soldiers. The *Morning Chronicle* published a letter the other day received from Paris, as genuine, in which the army of Napoleon is said to amount to 600,000 men, and in which a variety of other circumstances are stated, all tending to shew that his cause is any thing but desperate. The publication of this letter has put the *Courier* man into a terrible rage; it has lacerated his *fine* feelings so much, that nothing will satisfy him but the proscription of all who dare even to receive letters from an enemy's country.—But that my readers may judge for themselves as to the facts of the case, I shall here give the letter as it appeared in the *Morning Chronicle*, and then subjoin to it the remarks of the *Courier*: The letter was ushered in by this paragraph:—"The following letter, from the French capital, reached our hands yesterday. Some of the statements it contains are *probably* overcharged, or exaggerated, or *may be* erroneous; but we give them *as we received them*. We can assure our readers that it is a *genuine letter*."

"Paris, Jan. 25.—I have just now returned from seeing the Emperor depart, and all classes express their good wishes to him with a vehemence which baffles all description. The Empress is appointed Regent, and has undertaken her duties with the solemnity of an oath. Your English Editors conjecture that Napoleon has lost all his time in inactivity, but in this they are grievously mistaken, and in their opinions of the weakness and inefficiency of his armies.—Precisely the contrary is the fact, and the greatest care has been taken to keep secret the situation and extent of his forces. Europe will be astonished that France, under her apparent supineness, should have profited by every expedient to augment her strength, so as to have raised an army of 600,000 men, perfectly equipped, and ready to take the field.—The cavalry is the weakest, and yet it is 25,000 in number, disciplined under Generals Pagol and Bordesalt, to whom the Emperor has condescended to give his thanks, and has otherwise rewarded them for their great exertions.—The artillery is perfectly restored, and is in the highest condition as to every branch of that service.—The recruiting has been especially active in the Emperor's own army.—Your Congreve rockets have put the chemists and artists on the alert, and their ingenuity has produced a singularly destructive compound; and a great quantity of these devil's

shots have been daily prepared to be sent to the army. The chief engineer in this business has been created a nobleman for his discovery, and a large pension has been assigned him by the Emperor.——How terrible an effusion of German blood will this invention occasion!——The Emperor's own army consists of at least 280,000 men, and these are to be marched against Prince Schwartzberg, with whom Napoleon is particularly enraged.——The other armies maintain their communication with that of the Emperor, and will be commanded by Marshals Victor, McDonald, Augereau, Marmont, and Mortier.——The reserve, 200,000 strong, is at Meaux, Châlons, Soissons, Troyes, and Arcy sur Aube.——The towns and villages have shewn the greatest energy, and every one of sufficient age and strength has entered the National Guard. About 50,000 remain here because the Emperor would not allow them to attend him.——You may perhaps already be informed that the Allies could not persuade a single French General into their interest, although large pecuniary rewards, and other advantages, have been offered. Every attempt to corrupt has been unsuccessful. The Duke of Dalmatia and Albufera have communicated to the Emperor the proposals made to them.——The Duke of Vicenza has actually taken his departure, to be present as Plenipotentiary at the expected Congress, but he was stopped in his way, because the Allies refused his passports. This circumstance has given the Emperor great offence, and he has solemnly sworn that he will appoint no other Minister on that duty; and now that the gall has overflowed in such abundance on both sides, we must expect in a short interval dreadful scenes; bloody battles must be fought, to which the armies of the unfortunate Allies will be impelled by the famine that must await them if they avoid the conflict.——Magazines of wonderful extent are every where provided to support the native army, and the diligence is unremitting in this important department.——Paris is very quiet, although the singular resolutions of the Directors of the Bank produced a disagreeable sensation. No evil otherwise has attended them; the wants of the armies were pressing, and the measure was necessary.——The Empress goes every where, in order to animate all classes of the people, and she is assisted in this purpose by the principal families, who are anxious to load the army with presents, to conduce to the comfort of the soldiery during the inclemency of the season."

Here ends the letter; and if I am to be allowed to judge from the last Paris papers, and from the previous facts which I have stated, and which are within the reach of every man who chooses to seek after them, it appears to me that this writer from Paris has neither overcharged nor exaggerated his statements. Now for the viperation of the *Courier*.——"This is a kind of trash," says that immaculate journal, "with which the friends and admirers of Buonaparté console themselves, and these are the statements of which an English news-paper is made the vehicle." "Some of the statements," the *Chronicle* modestly observes, "are probably overcharged or exaggerated, or may be erroneous." But it assures its readers "that the letter is a genuine letter, a real *bona fide* letter, which "reached the *Chronicle* from the French capital yesterday." Look to it, my Lord Sidmouth; if one letter can come, another may, and this letter, *absurd and foolish as it is*, proves that the writer (whoever he be) is either a *drivelling sycophant*, or a *hired tool of Buonaparté's*! How comes such a letter into the hands of the *Morning Chronicle*? We request the public attention to this point, because, though we know that Buonaparté has reduced the French press to a state of the most base instrumentality in his atrocious designs, we see no good reason why our English news-papers should become the vehicles of his manufactures.——With all sincerity and fellow-feeling, we really advise the *Chronicle* to drop, in good time, its intercourse with its genuine Parisian Correspondent."——Now, reader, what do you think of these sentiments, put forth by a writer who is incessantly dinning our ears about British liberty, about the liberty of the press, and who assures us that "he knows Buonaparté has reduced the French press to a state of the most base instrumentality."——This hireling scribe tells us, that the Parisian letter is *trash*, is *absurd and foolish*, and that it is the production of a *drivelling sycophant*.——Take care, Mr. *Courier*, what you say about drivelling sycophants. Either you suppose that Lord Sidmouth will look to it; that he will, without delay, put a stop to this "treasonable correspondence," or you do not. If you do, why do you call the letter *trash*, *absurd* and *foolish*? Do you wish us to infer from this, that it is mere *folly and absurdity* which engages the attention of government, and that *trash* only can alarm them? Or if you do not be-

lieve this, how can you avoid the charge of being the most contemptible sycophant on earth, for endeavouring to attract the notice of ministers, and to excite an interest in the public mind, by raising a cry against a document which you say is the production of a *driveller*, is *absurd*, is *foolish*; in short, is nothing but *trash*? Was there ever such sycophancy practised? Was there ever such drivelling heard of? But how comes such a letter into the hands of the *Morning Chronicle*? In reply, I would ask the *Courier*, how they come to the knowledge of many things which they announce, and with which they are every day cramming the gaping multitude, as *authentic* intelligence of what is passing in Paris; of the state of the public mind in that city; nay, more, of Buonaparté's precise language in his conversations to his ministers and generals? How, I ask, can the *Courier* acquire a knowledge of these pretended facts in any other way than that by which the *Morning Chronicle* received the above letter? The *Courier* must either have a correspondent at Paris to communicate these particulars, or all the stories with which it is filled about the Parisians being in a state of revolt, of all France being ripe for insurrection, and of every Frenchman panting to embrace the Bourbons, are downright falsehoods. But the *public attention* is requested to this point. Very well. The public, it seems, are not to be told the *truth*. This is letting out too much, Mr. *Courier*; for it is telling us, in plain language, that the facts stated in the letter published in the *Chronicle*, which you do not deny to be *true*, ought to have been *suppressed* by the conductor of that paper. If the letter which appeared in the *Morning Chronicle* should turn out to be false, and this will be ascertained beyond all controversy in a few days, it can do no other harm than impeach the veracity of the writer. If its statements prove to be true, and Napoleon succeeds in driving the invaders of France beyond the Rhine, is it not right, is it not proper, that the people of this country, who feel themselves so deeply interested in the matter, should be prepared *before hand* for whatever may be the result?—Or are we to be told,

that it is time enough to prepare the mind for an event, when that event actually happens.

We shall see by-and-by whether my Lord Sidmouth “looks to it” or not; but if he does, and if it is to be held a *crime* to publish *authentic* intelligence here, respecting the disposition of the forces of an enemy, I confess I do not see how any political writer can calculate upon being in safety to take up the pen. I have much to say respecting the *manner* in which the *foreign* intelligence is published in this country; but I must delay this till another opportunity.

OCCURRENCES OF THE WAR.—The departure of Buonaparté from Paris, to take the command of the army destined to repel the invaders of France, is an event which will be attended with consequences of greater magnitude than any thing that has occurred during the war; perhaps of more importance than any thing recorded in the history of nations. Napoleon left Paris on the 25th ult.; but it does not appear from the French papers to what point he meant to direct his attention. He was greeted with the loudest acclamations, and carried with him the fervent wishes of his people for success.

By accounts from Lord Wellington we find that a division of the French army, under General D'Hariespe, has compelled the Spanish General Mina to abandon his position, and “to retire into the valley of “the Aldudes.”—The Gazette, in which his Lordship's dispatch appears, does not inform whether there was any one killed or wounded in the engagement.

Dispatches from the American government announce, that it has been agreed to enter into negotiations of peace with this country, and that Gottenburgh has been named as the place of meeting for settling the terms; but there is to be no suspension for the present of hostilities.

There has been some successful fighting on our part with the Americans. We have taken Fort Niagara by surprise, and, according to the American official details, our troops fell upon the enemy while they were mostly asleep, “and committed a most horrible slaughter.”

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

ROWLAND HILL AND THE DEVIL.—

The attack, and, as it appears to me, wanton and unmanly attack, of the former of these upon the latter, I intended to notice last week; but was prevented by the unexpected length of my Answer to Mr. Canning's Liverpool Speech, which Answer, by the by, is almost wholly out of print, though an extraordinary number of it was printed. — Before I proceed, however, to notice this attack itself, I ought to give some little account of the occasion, which gave rise to the attack. — It appears, from a report in the Times news-paper, that, on the 27th of last month, a meeting was held at the City of London Tavern, for the purpose of affording relief to the "*Sufferers in Germany*." — At this meeting, the speakers were, as it is reported in the Times, Mr. HENRY THORNTON, Mr. ROBERT THORNTON, Mr. WILBERFORCE (*formerly member for Yorkshire*, but *now member for the nice little snug borough of Bamber*, of which a curious account may be seen in Mr. Oldfield's history of Boroughs), Mr. BUTTERWORTH, the bookseller, member for Coventry, two or three GERMAN PRIESTS, Mr. HOWARD, a Quaker, and the "*Rev. ROWLAND HILL*," our assailant of the Devil and Buonaparté. — In the speech of Mr. H. Thornton it was stated, that the distresses of the Germans had already arrived at such a pitch, that, in some parts, *famine* and *epidemic diseases* had made their appearance, a fact well worthy of attention; for, we had been made to believe before, that the Germans were rejoicing in their *deliverance*; but, ~~now~~ we are told, that *famine*, and even *epidemic diseases* have been the fruit of this precious deliverance; so that, if this new representation can be believed, we may also believe, that the poor Germans would have been better if they had not been delivered at all. — Mr. Wilberforce (member for the snug borough of Bamber) is reported to have said, that we were bound to assist those, "who had achieved *our security* at *their own expense*, and for which they

"*had paid so high a price.*" — Now, reader, observe, that Mr. Canning told us, that it was *we* who had *humbled France*; that we had proved to the world, that we were able to *stand alone* in a war, not only against France, but against all Europe combined. But, then, say you, Mr. Canning had a different object in view. *He* wanted to inculcate the notion, that we had *gained* glory and reputation and conscious safety by the war; whereas Mr. Wilberforce wanted to get money for the German sufferers. — Be this as it may, *both* these tavern speech-makers cannot be right. If we are indebted for our *safety* to the Germans and Russians, Mr. Canning's assertions must be false; and, if Mr. Canning's assertions be true, the Member for Bamber must have uttered a falsehood. — I must, however, take the liberty positively to deny the second proposition of Mr. Wilberforce; namely, that the Germans have achieved our security at their *own expense*. They may have suffered severely in the work, which work, by the by, is not yet, I fear, quite effected; but, it has *cost us some few millions in taxes*. We have paid the German *sovereigns* at a very handsome rate, and, we are so paying them at this moment. Taxes make misery and paupers; and, therefore, we have not only paid and are paying, but we have also suffered and are suffering from the same cause. — Whenever *peace* shall come; whenever the *day of reckoning* shall come, and that day is, may be, at no great distance, the Member for Bamber will find, that the people of England will see the consequence of the war, and that they will discover, that the wars in Germany have not been carried on wholly at the expense of the Germans. — Mr. BUTTERWORTH told the meeting, that he had received 2 or 300 letters from the different places where money had already been distributed; and that, in some of these letters, it was said; "Let England sympathize with us; for we have *suffered in her STEAD.*" Whence it would appear, that these Germans look upon themselves as *our deliverers*, and not upon us as *their deliverers*. These modest correspond-

cents of Mr. Butterworth do not seem to think that we have suffered any thing at all. They seem to think, that our subsidies of so many millions have been nothing. They seem, in short, to think, that we ought to look upon ourselves as their debtors to an incalculable amount; and, I should not wonder if they were to threaten us with letting the French loose upon us, if we refused them indemnification.—At any rate, if Mr. Butterworth speaks truth, as to the contents of his continental letters; and, who will suspect so ghostly a man of uttering a deliberate falsehood: yet, if he speaks truth, one thing is very certain, and that is, that the Germans believe what Napoleon has so often told them; namely, that they were fighting the battles of England; that they were incurring misery and shedding their blood merely to advance the power and riches of England. These notions, if Mr. Butterworth speaks truth, have been completely imbibed in Germany; for, as he says, his correspondents tell him, that they have suffered in our *stead*; which has no other meaning than this: that, if they had not fought the French, *we should have been invaded and conquered*, notwithstanding all that Mr. Canning has said about the result (it is not known yet) of the war having proved to the world, that England is able alone to secure her own independence and her own greatness and prosperity.—Before these gentlemen come forth again upon these subjects, it may be as well for them to have a preliminary select meeting, a rehearsal, in order to arrange their several parts, and settle upon the doctrines and arguments that each shall bring forward; for, as they may perceive, this clashing furnishes weapons for those, who are inclined to dispute the points which they appear to have considered as indisputable.—Mr. LUKE HOWARD, the Quaker, is reported to have said, that the Society of Friends, who reject baptism and the Lord's Supper, as being idolatrous, would "join in the object of the Meeting, because its basis was *Christian Compassion*, upon which ground also he had accepted of the office of assistant Secretary. He trusted," he said, "that they would feel and act like the good Samaritan, who said to the host of the wounded traveller; take care of him till I come again."—Mr. Luke Howard's "basis" is wholly different from that of the object of the meeting, which was to give money to the Germans, because they had aided us *by fighting*; and, whatever may be the arguments by which the

Quakers have been persuaded, that this money is not given for *warlike purposes*, those arguments will, at bottom, be found to be fallacious.—The case of the good Samaritan, with all due deference to one who professes to be moved by the unerring Spirit, is not a case in point. The poor man, who had fallen amongst thieves, had not got his wounds in *FIGHTING for the good Samaritan*, as the Germans have in fighting for England. The good Samaritan (who, by the by, was *no Christian*) poured in his oil and wine from a motive of the most pure and *disinterested* benevolence. He did not say: "I see, friend, that thou art wounded in fighting for my safety. I will, therefore, do my best to heal thy wounds," leaving it to be inferred, of course, that, the wounded man, if need was, might, perhaps, be able to fight another round in his service. No: the good Samaritan, who was *no Christian*, and even belonged to a set of people thought to be reprobates, did not stop to ask, in whose *service* the wounds had been received; but, seeing a wounded and suffering fellow-creature, he set about relieving him at once.—If Mr. Luke Howard's motives were those of pure *Christian compassion*, wholly unconnected with all ideas of self-interest and security, why did it never occur to him to make some effort to assist in relieving the *people of France*, who, if we have been told truth, have, for many years past, been suffering miseries of all sorts in the most supreme degree? But, Mr. Howard, have we *no sufferers* at home? The very day on which this meeting was held, the news-papers told us, that there were in the parish of St. Giles's alone, *six thousand* poor creatures actually in a state of *starvation*. Have they been relieved? No: unless the humane man who pleaded their cause with the public has stated falsehoods, which I do not believe. Why need we send money to Germany, upon the pure basis of Christian compassion, while these and hundreds of thousands of others of our own country people are suffering so severely as they are? Here is quite field enough for all our compassion. We want no hunting abroad for miserable objects; unless we connect the feeling of *self-interest* with the act; unless we give the money as a reward for having *fought* in our service and for our security, as Mr. Wilberforce states it; and, if that be the basis of the gift, what becomes of the *religious* principles and of the professed motives of Mr. Luke Howard?—

I am truly sorry to have been compelled to make these remarks upon the speech of Mr. Howard. My recollection of the excellent qualities of the Quakers, in Pennsylvania; my long observation, and, indeed, experience, of their real benevolence, their integrity, and their good sense, always makes me deeply regret to see any meddling and vain persons amongst them making the Society a tool in the hands of designing politicians.—But, I feel myself disposed to exercise much less forbearance towards the personage, whose name stands first in the title to this article, and whose speech, upon this occasion, exhibits, I think, as complete a specimen, in a small compass, of egotism, vanity, folly, falsehood, and impudence, as I have ever met with in the whole course of my life.—To do it justice, I must first insert it, word for word, as I find it reported in the newspaper above-mentioned, thus:—"The Rev. Rowland Hill was of opinion, that the sword had never been taken up in a more necessary cause, than against that wanton cruelty, by which mankind had been harassed for the last 20 years. It might even be termed a righteous cause: but for the battle of Leipsic, instead of 10 per cent. we must have paid 20. He had a worthy nephew, equally distinguished for humanity and courage, who was now fighting for an insulted nation, and against a kidnapping of royalty, which must have been suggested to Buonaparte by the devil himself.—(Loud applause.) Buonaparte might now squeak for mercy as much as he pleased; but he had shewn none himself when he had the power. His nephew had received a sword, worth a hundred guineas, from the City of London, and he trusted they would give another hundred guineas to the present fund. The Quakers, as they were called, gave no money to kill, but were always ready to give money to cure (applause). He thought that in every episcopal diocese, the Dean and Chapter should be called upon to assist the fund; and were he as high in the church as his nephew was in the army, he would set the example. As it was, he hoped they would soon hear something from Surrey chapel: for,

"No woe should reach the ear,
"That did not also touch the heart."

"The Rev. Gentleman concluded by moving, that all the corporate bodies be invited to give their assistance to the

"funds of the meeting." The motion was seconded by Mr. Brunnmark and carried "unanimously."—Reader, you may not, if you live at a distance from London, know who and what this person is.—He is, and has been ever since I was a boy, a preacher at a meeting-house on the Surrey side of the River Thames, at London. He has long been famed for those sort of harangues, called *sermons*, which seldom fail to draw together great crowds of the lowest and most ignorant of the people, with whom a bellowing voice and distortion of attitude do usually more than make up for the absence of reason and sense.—One might, however, have expected from a person, with whose denunciations against pride and vanity the walls of his meeting-house (he calls it a *chapel*) are continually ringing; from a man who, in his "sermons," has no mercy upon the showy gowns and caps of the poor girls who are amongst his hearers: from such a man, from one of the elect, from a vessel set apart unto holiness; one might have expected to hear no *boastings* of any sort, and more especially of that most disgusting of all the sorts; namely, about one's *family blood*. Fielding, in speaking of a man's beating his wife, after reproaching the act, generally, in very strong terms, does, I recollect, observe, that he thinks the medicine of a reasonable switch may be justly and beneficially used in cases where *high blood* breaks out in the wife. I do not recommend a similar remedy in the present case; but, I put it to the reader, whether it was becoming in any man, much less in a man putting in claims to superiority as a teacher of *humility*, to take such an opportunity of dragging out neck and heels, the fact, that he was the *uncle of General Hill*; and, in a speech of only eight sentences, to contrive to bring out this fact *three several times*?—What had this fact to do with the subject before the meeting, which related to the raising of money for the German sufferers? First, he told his hearers, that he had "a worthy Nephew, equally distinguished for humanity and courage, who was now fighting for an insulted nation." Without disputing the facts with him (for I do not know that they are, or are not, disputable) what had they to do with the object of the meeting? The Nephew had nothing to do with the money to be given to the German sufferers; he was not even in Germany; his example, or his authority, was not cited; his name was not wanted for any purpose of illustration. Why, therefore, drag the pos-

General in, unless from a motive of the most consummate vanity?—Next, this *chosen vessel* has to propose that the City of London shall be invited to give something to the fund; and one cannot help admiring the ingenuity with which he here brings the poor Nephew again upon the scene. The City of London, says he, “gave my Nephew a sword worth a hundred guineas, and I trust they will give another hundred guineas to the present fund.” A man with any sense of modesty, if he had wanted an example to refer to, would have cited some instance where the City had given a hundred guineas for charitable purposes; but who, besides this teacher of humility would have thought of thus bringing his Nephew upon the scene a second time, in order to convince his hearers, that the City ought to relieve the sufferers in Germany, *because* they had given a sword to an English general?—But, even this was not enough. The select vessel has to recommend to the *Established Church* to bleed freely upon this occasion. According to his account, the Devil is a very artful personage; but, I think, it would have puzzled the Devil himself to find out a way of hooking in the Nephew here too along with the *Church*. Yet Rowland Hill does it, and thus: the Church, says he, ought to be called upon to assist the fund; “and” (now, watch him!), “if I were as high in the Church as my Nephew is in the army, I would set the example.”—Now, reader, can you form an idea of egotism and vanity more barefaced, more disgusting than this? Can you conceive how a man could find face sufficient to utter these passages, upon such an occasion, and amongst an assembly of persons, who might reasonably be supposed to be tolerable good judges of what they heard spoken? It has often been remarked, that, in point of *front*, men of this description surpass all the rest of the world.—But, though the Reverend Gentleman’s repeated mention of his Nephew was certainly extremely disgusting, it was not altogether thrown away upon me; for, I always thought, from the language and manner of this person, whom I remember to have heard holding forth some years ago, that he had been one of the lowest mechanics, or labourers. Indeed, till told of my error about two years ago, I thought that he was that famous *coal-heaver*, who made such a noise by his preaching; but I then found, that that man’s name was *Huntingdon*, or *Huntington*, or something like it.

So that these expressions about his Nephew have, at any rate, given the world to understand, that this great preacher of *humility* has not sprung from the very dregs of the people; but, that he belongs to a family, who have been able to expend great sums of money, in the work of *election at Shrewsbury*.—We come now to the charge which Rowland prefers against the Devil. He says, that Napoleon, in his conduct towards the king, or, rather, kings, of Spain, *must* have acted “at the suggestion of the Devil himself.”—Now, we might ask Rowland, in the first place, how he could know this fact, unless he had direct or indirect communication with the Devil; for, Napoleon could not give him the information without exposing Rowland to the charge of carrying on correspondence with the enemy. If he does not derive his information from the Devil, his assertion is made at hazard, and, for aught he knows, it may be wholly false.—Then, if it be mere guess work, we may ask him, why he supposes, that the Devil should have had so much power. He must, I think, say, that he believes the Devil to be *more powerful than God*, or that *God approved of what the Devil did, in this instance*; and, if Rowland adopt this latter opinion, with what justice, with what decency, with what face, can he rail against Napoleon for the acts he performed at the Devil’s suggestion?—Leaving Rowland to answer this question at his leisure, let us proceed to put a few other questions to him, first observing, that there can be little reason to suppose, that the Devil, if he were at the elbow of Napoleon at Bayonne, the same personage has not followed him in all his actions, as well before as after that time. Was it, then, the Devil, who suggested to Napoleon the putting down of the *Inquisition*, and the turning out of the Monks and Friars? Will Rowland say, that it was the Devil, who inspired Napoleon with such inflexible and efficient hostility to these two establishments of *Christian Priests*? I have heard Rowland bellowing most loudly against the *Scarlet Whore of Babylon*, whose seat was the seven hills of Rome. I have heard him rave about the cup of her abominations, out of which the world had been made drunk. Well, was it, then, the Devil, who suggested to Napoleon to put down the Pope; to destroy his power; and to root out the Priests and the superstitions, by which the Pope was supported? Was it the Devil, who suggested to him the putting-down of the

idolatry, as it was called, of the Church of Rome? Will Rowland assert the affirmative of this? If he does, what becomes of all his railing against the Romish Church; and, yet, it appears to me, that he must assert this, or he must confess, that the Devil had nothing to do in the prompting of Napoleon; for, to suppose, that he was prompted by him in some of his invasions and not in others, we must make the Devil a very whimsical being.—Rowland should observe, that the putting down of the cruel, the infernal Inquisition, in Spain, was not only the work of Napoleon, but it was a *consequence* of the very art of which Rowland particularly complains. I will not stop here to ask, what *sort* of *kings* those must be whom it was possible to *kidnap*. I will not ask, whether it was very likely, that they should be the fittest persons to be at the head of the government of a great nation. These inquiries, though proper enough to be made, do not come within the scope of my present object. The *Inquisition*, that proverbially cruel and infernal instrument of tyranny over the bodies and consciences of men, was put down in consequence of the invasion of Spain by Napoleon, and of his putting a new sovereign on the throne. Now, could the Devil wish to see this bloody institution destroyed? And, if he could not, why are we to suppose, that it was *he*, who prompted Napoleon to the act which was the cause of it; and, if we were to suppose, that the Devil really was zealous for the destruction of the Inquisition and of the power of the Monks, should we not be led to doubt, whether the Devil be so very detestable a personage as we have been taught to believe him?—It was the Devil, too, I presume, who, in the opinion of Rowland, suggested to Napoleon to establish by law, and on the clearest ground and most firm basis, *religious liberty in France and Italy*; it was the Devil, who prompted him to lay the axe to the root of superstition; to leave all men free to worship God according to their several opinions; to make all religious sects perfectly equal in the eye of the law; to abolish all religious tests; to open all stations and employments and honours to men of all religions, not excepting the Jews; to give, in short, to *fifty millions of people*, a perfect freedom in all matters relating to religion, and, thereby, doing all that it was possible for the greatest potentate of the earth to do for the success of religious truth.—It was *the Devil*, was it, Rowland, who prompted

Napoleon to do all this; who stood at his elbow and urged him on and chuckled at his success? It was the Devil, was it, who was at the bottom of this grand scheme? Come, Rowland, never hesitate, man! Say, at once, that it was the Devil, and then you will at least, be consistent.

—The Bourbon Proclamation (my ANSWER to which has been so much sought for) calls Napoleon an instrument in the hands of God. So, one calls him God's instrument, and the other calls him the Devil's instrument! If I were to venture, if I were to dare, to talk of the Deity in this familiar, this vulgar, this grovelling strain; if I were presumptuous enough thus to trace the events of this earth to the maker of the Universe; if I were thus to pull down the Deity to the level of my own narrow conceptions, and to make him almost a party in the squabbles of men; if I were to do this, leaving out of view all the great scheme of intermediate causes, I should certainly say, that Napoleon, in giving perfect religious liberty, in unbinding the consciences of so many millions of people, before subject to the cruel persecutions of ecclesiastical power, was urged on by *God* and not by the *Devil*.—For many years past, we have heard of schemes for the *abolishing of tithes*, which, by all sorts of people, have been represented as the greatest of nuisances and the heaviest of burdens. From Mr. Coke, the most enterprising and public-spirited agriculturist in the kingdom, and Mr. Arthur Young, the most voluminous and very able writer upon the subject of agriculture, down to the lowest of the farmers, who, in the scale of being, are but one remove above the clods which they till, or, rather, leave untilld, and which are the masters in the struggle. From the Lord to the artisan; all, yea the whole nation, have joined in this cry against *tithes*, as a nuisance, a burden, a grievance, a cause of impediments to the growing of corn, a source of want and of misery.—I, who am called a great Jacobin, have never been able to see them in this light. But, if this be the proper light to view them in, was it *the Devil*; was it *the Devil*, Rowland, who suggested to Napoleon to drive the idea of tithes from his Code? I fancy, if you ask the opinion of farmers upon this subject, you will find that they are disposed to believe, that, in this instance, at least, he was surely inspired by God.—It is true, that I could wish, as, doubtless, many persons in France wish, that more liberty existed

in France; I could wish the form of the government to be somewhat different from what it is, and, above all things, I could wish to see the people who pay taxes fully and fairly represented in a legislative assembly, having the real, not the sham, hold of the purse-strings of the nation. But, even in this respect, I shall be very slow to blame Napoleon. It is rarely that we find wisdom in all things meeting in one man. Napoleon was bred a soldier; he has, from his infancy, been used to military discipline; his ideas must necessarily be too much those of a soldier; and, besides, we are to take into our view the state of France after that revolution, which the attacks upon her from without had rendered so bloody. When the government came into Napoleon's hands, the first wish of the people of France was *safety* for person and property. It was thought dangerous to attempt any new scheme of liberty. And, therefore, we ought not so violently to censure Napoleon even upon this score; and, especially when we know, that those parts of his criminal Code, which are the most favourable to liberty, were chiefly of his own choosing. It is a fact, well known, and recorded in the speech of the person who proposed to the legislature the institution of *trial by jury*, that France owes this in particular to the inflexible adherence of the Emperor himself.—Who, then, has a right to abuse him in the style which the base prints of London daily employ? They call him "*the tyrant*," not only as if he were taken for granted to be one; but as if he was the only one in the whole world. Mr. Canning so called him; but he did not attempt to establish the *justice* of that hateful appellation; he attempted to cite no instances of the tyranny of which he spoke. In short, like Rowland, Mr. Canning was a calumniator of a sovereign, of whose conduct he was ignorant, or whose actions and character he wished to misrepresent.—I shall here take my leave of Rowland, with advising him to confine his attacks upon Napoleon and the Devil to his preachings, and then he will be in no danger of spreading the knowledge of his ignorance and malignity beyond the walls of his Meeting-House.

MR. MANT AND CAPTAIN CAMPBELL.

—Since my last article upon this subject, to which the reader will please to refer, in page 149 of the present volume, I have seen some *authentic documents* on the other side; that is to say, in favour of Captain Camp-

bell and against Mr. Mant.—Before I notice these, I will state Mr. Mant's charge against Capt. Campbell.—It is this, that Captain Campbell, the commander of an English squadron, stationed in the Adriatic, did cause vessels of neutrals as well as of enemies to be stopped; and that, instead of sending them to Malta *for trial*, as prizes, agreeably to the law and his orders, took money from the Captains and Owners, and then let the vessels go their way.—This is the substance of the charge; and a very heavy charge it is. In short, the act here described, is an act of neither more nor less than *piracy* upon a grand scale. Mr. Mant says, that he was the person appointed to stay on shore to negotiate these *ransoms*, and to receive the money, and that thus it was he became acquainted with the facts.—This is a matter in which the interest and honour of the country are deeply concerned, and, I am, therefore, very glad to be able to state, that, from authentic documents, which I have now seen, I am convinced it is *wholly unfounded*. The case is one which would admit of misrepresentation, as, indeed, what case will not; but, after having examined the documents, to which I allude, with great care, I state it as my perfect conviction, that the charge against Captain Campbell is totally destitute of foundation.—I wish I could give the same opinion as to the charge, which Mr. Mant says has been made against him.—It was this; that, having been sent on shore by his Captain to manage the affairs of the prizes, he, Mr. Mant, *took money for himself*, in an unfair way.—I said, in my last, that, as far as I could judge from *hearing one side*, Mr. Mant had exculpated himself from this charge. I have now, not *heard*, but *seen*, the other side. I need not dwell long upon the subject. It is a painful one, especially when I reflect on the respectable connexions of Mr. Mant.—I have seen an original document, regularly attested before legal authorities, showing that Mr. Mant received 200 dollars "*TO CAUSE ME, TO HAVE ON ADVANTAGEOUS TERMS THE GOODS I BOUGHT OF HIM.*" These were *prize-goods*, which Mr. Mant sold for the benefit of the Captain and crew of the ship to which he belonged.—Another document is a passport to permit a vessel to *proceed with a cargo of corn*, signed by Captain Campbell. But, after the signature, and without the Captain's knowledge, Mr. Mant

interlines, or rather adds, in other ink, the words "*and to return with merchandise.*" The master of the vessel, fearing that the interlined words would carry a suspicious appearance, went to Captain Campbell and asked him for a fresh passport, telling him that he had paid Mr. Mant 300 dollars for the part *interlined*. It was wholly unlawful for Captain Campbell to grant any passport "*to return with merchandise,*" and he therefore refused it.—Mr. Mant, when the master returned to him, drew up a paper, which I have seen in his own hand writing, for the master to sign, declaring that he, the master, had *not* paid Mr. Mant any money for the interlineation. This paper was not signed, but was carried unsigned to Capt. Campbell; and, another document, clothed with all legal forms, proves that *a third person was present*, when Mr. Mant offered the master of the vessel *to return him the 300 dollars*, if he would sign the above-mentioned paper, declaring that he had never paid him, and never said that he paid him those very 300 dollars, which were, on such condition, to be returned.—This was quite enough for me, and I dare say, that it will be quite enough for the public, as to the charge of Captain Campbell against Mr. Mant.—The legality or illegality of the disposing of prizes without sending them in for trial, and of making compromises of the kind stated by Mr. Mant, in charge against his Captain, is wholly another question. As I have said before, I am convinced that Captain Campbell did nothing unlawful; or, at least, that he did not depart from the real spirit of his orders and the law. And, I think, that if he had not been conscious of having done nothing unlawful, he never would have proceeded to such extremities against Mr. Mant, who was master of all the proofs against him. It is not usual for a man to excite the rage of one who has him so much in his power.—Besides, if there had been any deviation from the law in these prize transactions, Mr. Mant, as the voluntary agent, must have taken his full share of the guilt; and, the most awkward circumstance of all, for him, is, that we do not hear of any complaint of his upon this score, until *after* the Captain has caused him to be displaced, and has represented his conduct to the Transport Board; which, I repeat it, the Captain never would have done, if he had been at all apprehensive that Mr. Mant could give information of any great account against him.

—I have only to add, that, if Mr. Mant finds his situation worse on account of this article, the misfortune is wholly to be attributed to himself.

PUBLIC FEELING.—I have inserted a letter below upon this subject, which I think not undeserving the notice of my readers.—I am glad to find that there are some individuals who entertain hopes, that the public mind may yet be roused from the lethargy with which all classes of society seem to be seized; but I never was very sanguine that any exertions of mine could overcome this sottish disposition. The writer of the letter to which I allude thinks he discovers symptoms of "returning reason" among the multitude, in the fluctuation of the stock exchange; in the boldness of the public press; and in the present state of the contest in the field. It is true, that the *fluctuation* of the stock exchange has been regarded as the *barometer* of public feeling; but I question much whether this feeling ever went deeper than the bottom of a man's *pocket*. At present, it evidently has no other effect upon the holders of stock, than to set them about contriving schemes to *raise* the funds when they are *low*, or to keep them from falling when they have reached a desirable pitch. I never yet was able to find a single stock-jobber, who was led from contemplating the rise or the fall of stock, to view with attention the *ruinous* state of the country; to turn his mind *seriously* to what the much talked of deliverance of Europe is likely to lead to; or to inquire what was the amount of the national debt, at what rate it was accumulating, or how it would bear upon the country, should peace with France be the result of the present negotiations. As to the *present state of the contest in the field*, I have as little hope from this source. The Allies appear to my correspondent to have acted *foolishly* in not pushing forward, and improving the advantages which victory had given them over the enemy. But I suspect, notwithstanding all that our wise conductors of the press say about the ignorance, the stupidity, and the cowardice of the Emperor Napoleon, that the Allies *know him much better than we do*. He is not a soldier of yesterday, nor need they be told that they have all been compelled, in their turn, to bow beneath his victorious arm. The people here, however, have been so effectually worked upon by base and hireling writers, and the same vile and unfounded calumnies so often repeated against

the French Emperor, that were he again to force the invading armies to recross the Rhine; nay, were he even to drive them back to the Elbe; such is the *besotted* state of mind to which the multitude are reduced, such their *willingness* to be deceived, that I am persuaded they would not allow this to be the effect of victory on the part of the enemy. During the whole of Napoleon's progress to Moscow, a distance of about 1,500 miles from Paris, we heard of nothing but defeats and disasters which attended him. Every advantage which he obtained, was converted into a victory gained by the Allies; and even when the battle was fought which removed the last obstacle to Buonaparté's entering the ancient capital of Russia, we were gravely told, that the French army had sustained so signal a defeat, had been so completely dispersed, that scarcely a man of them was to be found; and that Buonaparté himself, who, it was said, had fled with the utmost precipitation from the field of battle, was *certain* of being taken prisoner. All this was not only put forth in foreign journals, and *Te Deum* chanted by our pious Allies for the glorious success; but *here*, aye, in this *enlightened* country, *every letter* of it was believed, and the highest expectation prevailed at the time, that the "Corsican" would soon be exhibited to the gaping rabble, as some "fell monster" who had hitherto desolated the earth, and "gorged in human blood." Every victory, in fact, which Buonaparté has gained, has been treated by his enemies as of no account, and steadily viewed in the same light by the mass of the people, who, I do not find, are *less* credulous *at present* than when the arms of France were almost every where victorious. But if I calculate upon little towards the enlargement of the public mind, resulting from the state of the contest in the field, I expect still less from the *public press*. It is long since the *liberty of the press* could, with any propriety, be regarded as the palladium of British freedom. It is even a matter of doubt, whether the art of *printing* has not become a greater *curse* than it ever was a *blessing*. The notorious profligacy and total disregard of principle so prevailing in the world, has directed the powerful means, originally intended for the benefit of society, towards checking free discussion, arresting the progress of inquiry into public abuses, protecting notorious delinquents, and exercising a novel and unwarrantable rigour against every press possessing the least semblance of freedom, that no

man even dares avow his *honest* sentiments as to public measures, without running the risk of being utterly ruined by what are termed *legal* proceedings. But this is not all:—Though the corrupt and ignorant dread the existence of a free press, they feel no hesitation in converting it into an engine to serve their own purposes. Aware that it may be employed with equal success in *deceiving* as in undeceiving mankind, they have availed themselves of its powerful influence, which they have rendered more extensive in the propagation of *error*, than it ever was in the promulgation of truth. At this moment there is scarcely a single news-paper that is not indebted, in one shape or another, to the fostering hand of corruption; and even where symptoms of patriotism do sometimes appear, the cause of *truth* is advocated in so feeble a manner, and the writers who pretend to support it, are under so much restraint, that they seem rather to make advances towards a total surrender of the limited portion of independence which they enjoy, than to be the champions of the people's rights. The effect which this *degraded* state of the press has had on the public mind, is what it will always be among a people who *court* deception, and who seem to cherish it the more that they are deceived. Truth with them becomes fiction; vice, virtue; defeat, victory; and victory, defeat: what common sense pronounces ruin and wretchedness, is thence deemed prosperity and comfort; and the destruction of commerce more desirable than the employment of our starving manufacturers. Those measures which every enlightened politician condemns as fatal to happiness and independence, are applauded as the result of a wise and profound policy; and the confidence which powerful men have *thereby* acquired, not only encourages them to persevere in their pernicious schemes, but to conspire more effectually against public liberty. My correspondent "Hortator" has flattered me by supposing, that I am "*alone* sufficient to unteach the English world the *follies*, which its own ductility, practised upon by interested craft, has rendered it so easy to adopt." I am of opinion, however, with Solomon, that "it is more difficult to convince a *fool* of his folly than for seven wise men to render a reason." If the task then is so difficult with *one* fool, what must it be with the *many*? I have not the vanity to think that my feeble exertions are *sufficient* to avert the impending storm: nothing, I am

afraid, short of a miracle, can save the country. But as I hold it to be the duty of every one who has the means in his power, to detect and expose the moral and political *deception* universally practised through the medium of the press, particularly by means of the public journals, I shall never be sparing in my strictures on any writer, be his *pretensions* to patriotism what they may, if he forgets the duty which the press owes to the *people*; and if, in the course of my labours, I succeed in unmasking the vile policy, by which the partisans of an equally vile and pernicious system have obtained so extensive an empire over the credulous, I shall have the satisfaction of having at least *endeavoured* to stem the torrent of general corruption, and of having entered upon record my solemn protest against all who may have promoted the views of those, if any such exist, who aim at subjecting the throne and the people to an unprincipled oligarchy.

PUBLIC FEELING.

Mr. Cobbett,—To your opinion of the lamentable corruption of the public feeling, and of the nefarious practices employed, by means of the press, to produce that corruption of it, I heartily subscribe. It is some consolation that a man, of your powerful intellect and spirit, is aroused to stem the torrent which threatens destruction in its progress, to “man and man’s weal.” You seem, however, to enter on the grand enterprise with a portion of despair of success. And it is the design of this communication, by pointing out dawning prospects of encouragement, to reassure you, and to strengthen your vigour, that, in the hope of conquering, you may assume the energy necessary to wrest victory, in so holy a cause, from the hands of the amphibious crew, the mixed Sybarites and Goths, who prowl, like Cossacks, for plunder, and extract their spoils from the blood of mankind.—There are evident symptoms of returning reason, scattered over the face of this country. Fluctuation is felt on the *Stock Exchange*, that *barometer*, as it has been called, of the public feeling. The height, at which that species of public property has stood, may be easily accounted for. That place is an arena where the keen and the cunning encounter the dolt and the dupe. That scene indicates the opinion of the last only, and not of the first who, snugly wrapped up in a cloud of unmixed love of gain, and shielded by the genius of

speculation, “ride in the whirl-wind and direct the storm.” However, the public feeling, of a certain description of the good people of this country, is to be discovered on the Stock Exchange. Its wavering and hesitation, at this moment, are a proof that it is not fixed but distrustful. This is the first phenomenon that the public mind is *practicable*, if I may so say, which I notice for your encouragement to proceed in giving it a right tone and direction.—The *public press* may furnish similar indications that Englishmen are, at this moment, of corruption and delusion, *penetrable*. Some of the news-papers have assumed, lately, a degree of courage, and ventured to speak unwelcome truth. Their venal opponents are alarmed, and suggest that it becomes the Secretary of State to take cognizance of the *sources* of their information. This is hopeful. It is thus avowed, in effect, that to give the *rights of things* is a political crime, and that the system which deserves patronage, is that of deluding, not of informing, of falsehood, and not truth. These things bring a ray of hope, and impart a portion of consolation. A feeble paper, conducted by a man of a feeble mind, is just now before me. This poor thing has, as one might expect, been enticed by the bauble of the day, and snivels something about the cause of *independence*, and that kind of *cant* which the dwarfs of the hour have learnt from the giants of corruption. “Were the invaders freemen themselves, there would be little chance for him; as it is, &c.” This is sufficient. The invaders, then, it is acknowledged, are *not freemen*. And to this is reduced the cause of *independence*! Of this point, however, there is little hope, for there is an obstinacy in diminutive men which it is vain to combat: but they are not cunning enough to see the consequences of concession. From their concessions, from the more courageous daring of *greater intellects*, and from the rage of their *professed opponents*, prognostics may be gathered of good effects on the general mind, on which light cannot be poured without producing illumination.—*In the present state of the contest in the field*, we may discover a pretty clear source of the removal of the present illusion, and of the return of sober sense among our countrymen. An instance of greater impolicy and rashness never has occurred in the history of nations than that which the Allies have lately supplied. At Frankfurt they might, with swords in their hands, have obtained a *peace on satisfac-*

tory conditions. *But they have set all on the cast of a die.* From that station, they could not have provoked France to rouse its energies. But they have left her without alternative, and shifted the cause of *independence* from themselves. To the lasting grief of every friend of liberty, they have delivered over, to such a man as the French Emperor, the honour of defending his country, and every thing valuable which it contains. However, the general delusion is likely to be more effectually removed, under these circumstances, than if the Allies had suppressed their *genuine designs*, at the suggestion of policy and prudence. Had they *then* stopped short, as they ought to have done, the world would still have been goaded by the assassinating rage of the papers, and tauntingly told that the peace of Europe was the effect of drivelling pusillanimity. This cannot now be the case for any length of time. Should France be subdued, which is next to impossible, and of which there are not the slightest appearances, the stupor will be removed, and the certain state of the world will, cruelly, because too late, *open its eyes*: and, surely, it is better that a patient, suffering from a fatal disease, should know something of his condition, in order to apply remedies, than that he should, through unconsciousness, riot in luxurious fare which must render him beyond the power of medicine. On the contrary, if France should repel the invaders, which is the more probable case, as it is supposed by all present appearances, and by all past history, the delusion will be at once removed. The consequences of such an event need not be detailed; besides presenting, in a clear light, *the views* of the parties engaged, it will prove, to demonstration, the impolicy of not following up the declaration of Frankfort by sincere, practical, proofs of the truth with which the objects of it were entertained. It will have a still more beneficial effect, for it will undeceive this country, than which nothing can be more desirable. The time is fast approaching. The scales will fall off from the eyes of the blind, in one way or other, and the blessing of restored sight will be recovered and appreciated. On this you may securely calculate, and your efforts may be pursued without despondency, for the day of their effect and ascendancy is at hand.—In the south of France, there are almost clear proofs that deception will not long prevail. The genius of

But I will only ask, if the two contending

generals had changed sides; if Soult had been at the head of one hundred thousand of the finest soldiers in existence, and his antagonist at the head of a moiety of that number, of motley men of all nations, half without discipline or experience, what would be the case in the south of France? Let any man put this question to himself. When events shall no longer cloud the imagination, delusion will vanish. It appears that the only hope which remained has there perished. Soult cannot be *bribed*, and the tale of the Newspapers will serve only to point out to the English nation the *honour* of the attempt upon a man who was not otherwise to be *subdued*. Although such transactions cannot fail to draw blood of affliction from every noble British heart, they bring their consolation with them. The nation will not be deceived by the false medium through which objects are now presented to its view.—Lastly, you may allow indulgence to your hopes on account of *the success with which you have hitherto tried your efforts on the public*. You may know the fact, but I will still state it for the benefit of the world: your late Numbers have been bought up with uncommon avidity and read with uncommon zeal. The public is impressed; a sensation has been produced. On Sunday morning, I could not procure your paper, though I had sent an order for it, to the newsseller in my neighbourhood, early on Saturday evening. I was disappointed, notwithstanding his promise to supply me: it could not be obtained. This has been the case with two or three more of your papers. And let me advise you to have a larger number printed, for the demand “has increased, is increasing, and will not be diminished.” Who can contemplate this case, and entertain for the public, either fear or despair? You are, *alone*, sufficient to unteach the English world the follies, which its own ductility, practised upon by interested craft, has rendered it so easy to adopt. Others will follow your successful example; and there is reason to believe, that the British press will yet save the country. It will administer the medicine to madness, and rage will give place to returning reason. The career of self-destruction will be obstructed, and health will be brought to revisit the unhappy patient, led by the hand to him by the pure and placid Divinity—PEACE.

HORTATOR.

THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON AND HIS ARMY.
—It is curious to observe the change of

tone which the news-paper press has assumed since Buonaparté left Paris at the head of his army. Like cowards, the contemptible conductors of these vehicles of falsehood "swagger and bully" when the enemy keeps close in his quarters:—like cowards, they "squeak and tremble" when he threatens to take the field against them. In the one case, nothing is too gross for these reptiles to swallow; nothing too ridiculous and absurd for them to propagate. In the other, they would fain retract their calumnies and lies; but the rancour and malice excited by disappointment, gives to their concessions so bad a grace, that their duplicity appears more *notorious* than it would otherwise have been. That the reader may judge how far these suggestions are correct, I shall direct his attention to the leading article of the *Courier* of the 8th instant, and then bring under his view some of the *former*, though very recent, statements of this prostituted journal, and its coadjutor in iniquity, the *Times*.—

"Buonaparté, as our readers know (says the *Courier*), proceeded straight from Paris to Châlons, Vitry, and St. Dizier, which he entered after an action, and slept there on the 27th, pushing on his advanced guard to Vassy. In the last Paris Papers, which were to the 1st, we were informed that, "the Emperor continues his movements upon the rear of the enemy!" In the papers just arrived we are told, that after the taking of St. Dizier, "the Emperor advanced upon the rear of the enemy at Brienne." Hence it is obvious, if these papers be correct, that the army under the immediate command of Prince Schwartzberg had advanced from Langres by Chaumont, and spreading from thence to the Aube and the Seine, to the two towns of Bar, had sent forward their light troops, the Cossacks, to Arcis and Sens, the gates of which, we have the authority even of these Paris Papers for saying, they had reached on the very day (27th ult.) Buonaparté made his attack upon St. Dizier. Thus, the army of Schwartzberg was at that time, and indeed since, nearer Paris than Buonaparté. Buonaparté operating upon the Marne to St. Dizier, turned short, when he reached that place, and making a lateral movement on Vassy, proceeded to the banks of the Aube to Brienne, where he had this smart action with the rear-guard, which is mentioned in the *Moniteur*. He is now following Prince Schwartzberg,

and down to the latest accounts had not gained any advantage of a decisive nature over him. He has thrown himself in the Prince's rear, a movement the prudence or imprudence of which is yet to be ascertained. If he be strong enough to risk a battle with the Prince, and if he gain a great victory, the Austrians, placed between him and the capital, may be exposed to great difficulties and dangers. He evidently wishes by manœuvres to separate Schwartzberg from Blücher, and make an impression upon the former, the Austrians being his first object, for reasons which we mentioned two or three days ago. If Blücher moved from Metz towards Verdun, or from Pont-a-Mousson to Bar-le-Duc, Buonaparté by his movement first to St. Dizier, and afterwards to Vassy and Brienne, is between him and Schwartzberg, and so far may be said to have separated them from each other. But both Blücher and Schwartzberg, by the preparations made at Châlons, and the march of French troops to that point and to the line of the Marne, must, we apprehend, have been aware of Buonaparté's plan. If the Austrian General directed his route, as we infer from these papers he has directed it, to the Aube and the Seine; if he has taken the road that leads direct to Paris, he must have been aware, we repeat, that Buonaparté could throw himself in the rear of his line of march. He would hardly, therefore, have pushed on, if he had been convinced that his force was insufficient to cope with that which Buonaparté could bring against him, because in the event of a decisive defeat, he would know that his retreat would be cut off, or at least exposed to the greatest difficulty. But there is another point in which this movement is to be considered. Buonaparté is in the rear of Schwartzberg; true: but Blücher may be in the rear of Buonaparté. If on the 17th or 18th he was at Nancy and Pont-a-Mousson, he might easily, by the end of the month, be near the banks of the Marne, and close after Buonaparté, supposing him not to have joined Schwartzberg. If, therefore, the latter was between Paris and Buonaparté, Buonaparté might be between Schwartzberg and Blücher, a position quite as perilous at least, if not more so, than the Austrian General's. But we have as yet only the enemy's account, and not a word is mentioned of the movements and operations of Bla-

"cher."—From this extract it is put beyond all question, that the Emperor Napoleon has been able to bring into the field an army of sufficient magnitude to occasion *serious alarm* to the writer of the *Courier*, who is forced to confess that the Austrians may be exposed to *great difficulties and dangers*, that the Austrian General, Prince Schwartzberg, may have *his retreat cut off*. But the statement of the *Courier* proves more: it proves that Buonaparté had actually commenced *offensive operations* against the Allies, had obtained an *advantage* over them, and was *pushing on* his advanced guard. It proves that Napoleon had succeeded in *separating* the armies of Blucher and Schwartzberg, and that he had actually placed his own army in the *rear* of the latter. "He has thrown himself (says the *Courier*) in the Prince's rear."—In fine, it proves, that Buonaparté had forced the Austrian General to *retreat*, for in no other sense can the words be understood, that "he (Napoleon) is now *following* Prince Schwartzberg."—All this, and much more, may be learned from the Paris Papers; but it was scarcely to be expected that the *Courier* writer, who pronounces every thing "a lie" that comes from France, would have admitted even the *probability*, far less the *truth* of statements so clearly subversive of all his previous assertions. Only a few days ago it was exultingly demanded by this *sagacious* politician, "Where is the army; where are the mighty means that Buonaparté boasted of? They *talk* (said he, sneeringly) of immense armies, of levies raised with great facility, and of the confidence and enthusiasm of the people; but *we see no proofs of it*."—This writer, who is blind to every thing but the "restoration of the Bourbons," a theme which he "croaks and cons over" to satiety, and the annoyance even of his most stupid admirers, could discover nothing in the "note of preparation" lately sounded in France, but the marshalling of a few "tall boys and old women."—All at once he changes his tone. No sooner does he find that Buonaparté had in truth left Paris, than he begins to *fear* that he "may probably attempt to cut his way through the line of the allied forces, and *separate* one army from the other." What! the timid, the cowardly Buonaparté, attempt to cut his way with only "30,000 tall boys and old women" through an army of 200,000 veterans? "The grand army (said the *Courier* of the 28th

ult.) under Prince Schwartzberg, is estimated at 100,000 men. We are happy to know, that it is *more than double* that number." If the *Courier* man spoke truth as to the amount of the Austrian army, which I am not disposed to question, then he must be the most contemptible of all poltrons, to be *afraid* of Buonaparté succeeding in any attempt he can make against so formidable a foe with a handful of "tall boys and old women." But supposing Mr. *Courier* to have known a little more than he was willing to admit, as to the *actual strength* of the French army, which it is clear he must have done, what a vile and infamous wretch must he now appear in the eyes of every man who has any regard for truth and honesty. He must either be held a *coward* for attempting to excite groundless fears as to the probable fate of the allied forces, or he must be held a *notorious impostor* for deceiving the public so long as to the chance at least of Buonaparté being again able to bring an army into the field. Whether the French Emperor will succeed or not, may yet be regarded by some as a matter of speculation. If a judgment is formed upon the admissions of the *Courier*, and if the "anxiety," the "fear," and the "doubts," which are every day expressed in the columns of that paper as to the *success* of the Allies, are to be taken as the criterion of opinion, there can be little doubt as to what will be the result of the contest. My own sentiments are, and I have frequently avowed them, that so long as the French people continue faithful in their adherence to Buonaparté, his throne cannot be overturned though all the armies of Europe were combined against him. In this view of the subject I am completely borne out by the conduct of the Allies themselves, who, despairing of ever being able to overcome Napoleon in battle, so long as he can bring any thing like an equal force into the field, endeavoured, by their Declaration at Frankfurt, to detach the French people from his cause, and to persuade them to withdraw the means, with which, as was asserted, he had hitherto been able to gratify his ambition. It is from this *dread* also of the superior military skill of Napoleon that all our news-paper *abuse* has arisen, and which has led these hirelings, contrary to the experience of all history, to give a preference to the sway of the Bourbons, and to vociferate the necessity of assassinating Buonaparté, in order to make way for the restoration of that family. No matter what

principles are sacrificed; no matter what feelings are outraged, if they can get rid of the terror which Napoleon's name carries with it into the field of battle.—Let us now turn to the declamatory columns of the *Times*, and see whether they are more consistent than those of the *Courier*.—Contradictory as we have found the statements of the latter, those of the former are, if possible, more so. The *Times* is, indeed, the more dangerous of the two, inasmuch as it appeals to public feeling, in a style of jesuitical jargon, which would do honour to the most consummate theologian, and which is always certain of finding admirers among the rabble, who, in all ages, and in every country, were celebrated for listening with the greatest attention to the man who tickled their fancy the most; who had the knack of making the multitude stare; who could best “excite the wonderment of the “people.”—Combining this view of the talents of the *Times* writer with an insatiable thirst for the blood of Napoleon; with every quality of the mind requisite to complete the character of a “finished assassin,” we shall be at no loss to form a correct idea of the general sentiments which pervade that infamous paper.—As to the probable result of the present campaign, and the means possessed by Buonaparté, more caution is displayed here than in the *Courier*; but enough is admitted to satisfy every thinking and rational person, that the charge of notorious imposition is not the less applicable to the one than it is to the other. Adverting to Buonaparté's recent success at Brienne, the *Times* says “it is “probable that accounts have been received “at Paris of some successes; it is not improbable that he might have succeeded “in cutting off some of the cannon.”—In another paper, he says, “The truth we “take to be, that the advanced detachments of the Allies, which were spread “over a great extent of country, had been “necessarily called in as soon as Buonaparté advanced in force, and, in drawing “them together, it is very probable that “some of them may have come in contact “with the enemy.”—Who does not discover in all this the shuffling, the shifting, and the chicanery of one who wishes to disguise the truth? who wishes, most ungenerously, to detract from another, merely because he is an enemy. Talk of “gentlemen and men “of honour,” forsooth—Rather talk of a whipping-post and of a halter. Here I must do justice to the *Courier*, by acknowledging that, in this particular, it is entitled

to more credit for fidelity than its hopeful associate. It was admitted, without reservation by the former, that Buonaparté had obtained a certain success; that he had thrown his army into the rear of the Austrians, by which he had separated them from the Russians; and that he was now following Prince Schwartzberg instead of that Prince following him. But the *Times*, no doubt, indignant at the “caitiff “Corsican” presuming to thwart all their favourite schemes as to the Bourbons, treats these positive advantages as fables, and asserts it to be but barely probable, that some of the soldiers of Buonaparté may, as if by accident, “have come in contact “with the enemy; that he may have succeeded in cutting off some of the cannon; “and that it was only probable, accounts “had been received at Paris of some successes.” And this is what the *Times* newspaper tells us, in the face of the French official bulletin, and, I must say, in this instance, in opposition to the apparent candour of the *Courier*, which has no pretensions to any superior sources of intelligence. I leave it to those who give implicit credit to these oracles of wisdom, these faithful records of passing events, to divine the cause, if they can, of these palpable contradictions. But, in doing this, it is not my intention to let the *Times* writer slip from my fingers. His jesuitical jargon, may make partisans on the Stock Exchange; but it is not proper that it should have that effect every where, without an attempt, at least, to expose and counteract his tergiversation. Whether this writer admits or denies the late successes of the French arms, it is clear that he is not without his alarms any more than the *Courier*, and that he has been forced, though very reluctantly, to eat in his words, and to treat the enemy with more respect than he did within these few weeks. Had full credit been given to his representations down to the departure of Napoleon from Paris, it would have been the height of absurdity in any man to suppose, even for a moment, that he would ever be able to recruit his armies. The universal opinion, said to prevail in France, was, that Buonaparté ought to be dethroned, and Louis called upon to fill his place. The terror which these sentiments had excited in the mind of the “despot,” was thus faithfully described in the *Times*: “The tyrant has “drawn his guards from the frontiers to “Paris! He has there hedged himself “round with a triple row of defenders: first

“and nearest to himself, his Mamelukes and
 “Poles; then his regular French troops,
 “and, in his outer circle, come the national
 “guards of Paris, over whom, by a recent
 “decree, he has placed officers of his own
 “choosing.” “At present he clings to
 “Paris, as he did a few months ago to
 “Dresden. He sees whole departments
 “occupied by the Allies, without daring
 “to move to their defence.” I must confess, if this description of the situation of the “tyrant” was *true*, the poor devil must have been in a sad mess, especially when, what this writer stated as a matter of unquestionable notoriety, is farther considered, “that ere many weeks have
 “elapsed, the white flag will be flying in
 “several different parts of France.” If, I say, these statements had been *true*, that man ought to have been held the most egregious fool alive, even to *imagine* that Buonaparté would, at any future period, be able to overcome his difficulties, or venture to show his face at Paris. But, reader, I am now about to prove to you, and that from the mouth of this writer himself, that his statements were *not true*, and that he must have known them to be *false* at the very instant he was attempting to palm them upon the public. We all know that the French Emperor, contrary to the lying predictions of the news-papers, did leave Paris, without any attempt on the part of his subjects, “to call him to
 “account for his misdeeds.” Nay, more, we know, that as he set out to *fight* the Allies, who are represented in the *Courier* to have invaded France with 400,000 chosen troops, that he must have taken an army with him equal, if not superior, to the invaders, otherwise it would have been madness in him to think of leaving his capital. Now what did the *Times* writer say, on these facts becoming notorious?—Did he come forward, like an *honest* man, and acknowledge his error? Did he shew that a regard for *truth* was *paramount* with him to all other considerations? No; he had not the *integrity* to act a part so noble and disinterested. Finding he could no longer *deny* facts, he descended to the mean and pitiful shift of endeavouring to bring them into discredit by *ridicule*, which, however, he intermixed with so large a portion of the *gall*, that he disgusted even his most credulous readers. It was in the following insolent manner that he spoke of the affairs of France, when he found he could not conceal what was known to all the world:—“If we turn our eyes toward the pro-

“spect which Buonaparté’s *departure* for
 “the *armies*, under the present circumstances of France, offers to our view, we cannot but consider it as most animating. The day of trial is at hand. The Tyrant, like a condemned gladiator, sullenly enters his last arena. No look of comfort greets him. No one cries, God save him. His enemies are numerous and formidable. His subjects are *cold*, gloomy, and *dispirited*. How does he leave his capital? What are the parting tokens of his love for his good city of Paris? Bankruptcy and swindling. Like a fraudulent tenant, the last acts of whose occupancy are waste and spoliation, he plunders the Bank, and robs the merchants, that the lawful master of the throne may find it on his accession destitute of wealth and weakened in resources.”—Here, reader, you find not only an *explicit admission*, that Buonaparté, the man who, only a few weeks before, found it necessary to *shelter* himself in Paris from the rage of his oppressed subjects, by collecting round him *all* the military force in France; the man “against whom every man’s hand was turned,” and who “trembled every inch” for the safety of his throne; *this humbled*, this “proscribed individual,” not only *braving* all these dangers by leaving Paris, but actually leading forth an army of those very Frenchmen, who, the day before, were eager to merit the “proud title of being his assassins.”—This writer thought he saw something “animating” in all this. It is probable he did, if we suppose, as we have every reason to do, that he entertained a *fellow feeling* with those who cry up interminable war, merely because they *profit* by it.—Only a few days after putting forth the above philippic, we find this writer reasoning thus;—“We deny not, that the power of evil may predominate. The *short-sightedness* of our Allies; the *apathy* of a great part of France; the *wicked* activity of the advocates and accomplices of murder and treason; all these may *raise up* the down-trodden hopes of the detested Tyrant. *He will, doubtless, make an imposing display of his forces*. He has drawn *all his armies*, except those of Soult and Suchet, to a point. Their composition must be bad; but their *numbers may be great*.”—Indeed, it has come to this, has it? Buonaparté *will doubtless make an imposing display of his forces*; he has drawn them together, and their *numbers may be great*. What! all in a mo-

ment? Was it really "all lies" you were lately telling the public, about the *desperate* situation of Napoleon? or was you *serious* when showing off your learning to the city politicians, in the comparison you drew between the French Emperor and CADMUS, who, you told them, "sowed dragons' teeth, and they started up armed men?" But the best of the joke is, this writer tells us, that we have nobody to blame for the *imposing* attitude which Buonaparté has assumed, but the *Allies* and the *people* of France. "The short-sightedness (says he) of our Allies—the apathy of a great part of France!" These complaints against the *people* of France might have been tolerated. Considering how much they are attached to their sovereign; how ready they are to sacrifice their lives in his cause; and that he has only to raise his finger, or to give a nod, and 300,000 Frenchmen, in reality, "start up armed men." I am no way surprised that the *Times*, and all the tribe of scribbling pensioners in this country, should vomit out raucous and abuse against that gallant people. But why blame the *Allies* for this? What could they have done more than they have accomplished? Have they not *most willingly* accepted every shilling which our *liberality* and earnest desire for the "deliverance of Europe," forced upon them? Have they not, by these means, raised, disciplined, and united innumerable armies? Have they not succeeded in detaching from Buonaparté the *whole* of his former Allies, not even excepting the Crown Prince of Sweden, who owes his elevation to the "intrigues of the Corsican?" Have they not *compelled* him to abandon all his influence in Germany? Have they not *rescued* Holland from his grasp? Have they not *driven* him across the Rhine? In short, have they not *invaded* his territory, levied contributions upon his subjects, in order to give them a *taste* of the miseries of war, and actually marched the Cossacks, the "unimitated, inimitable" Cossacks, as the *Courier* calls them, to within 60 miles of Paris, that they may have it in their power, *when* they reach that city, to gratify the *Christian* and *pious* wish of the writer in the *Times*, "that Paris, like Moscow, should be laid in ashes?" Have the Allies, I say, not done all this? and ought not such *mighty* doings to have sheltered them from the imputation of *short-sightedness* which has been so wantonly brought against them? It is very true, the French *people*, whom I have

already cleared, and I think upon good grounds, from the charge of disloyalty, seem *rather disposed* to put a stop to the career of these invaders, and inclined to carry the horrors of war back into the bosom of the German states. But if the allies could not *foresee* this. If, *believing* all that the *Times* newspaper told them about the *disaffection* of the French, and their *readiness* to hoist the white flag and declare for the Bourbons; if, I say, the Allies were so *simple*, so *credulous*, and so *blind* as to take this upon the bare statement of the *Times*, how can *that paper* now censure them for the credit which they gave to their lies? how blame them for being *short-sighted* as to an event which they themselves did *not foresee*, or, if foreseeing it, which they intentionally and carefully concealed from all the great powers in Europe who were so deeply interested in knowing it? I am clear, however, that the Allies ought not to have trusted to any newspaper report whatever in a matter of such consequence; no not even to the representations of spies who every where affect to know more of other people's matters than they do themselves, and who never scruple at deceiving even their *employers*, if they find their *interest* in it. The Allies ought to have *looked* into the affair themselves; they ought to have *reasoned*, they ought to have *calculated* upon the *probability* of succeeding in their designs against France, instead of viewing the matter through the medium of other people's eyes. In short, the Allies ought to have studied human nature well, before they determined on invading a people so attached to their sovereign as the French appear to be, and who, rather than submit to the former tyranny of the Bourbons, are willing, it is now seen, that war, with all its calamities, should be perpetuated; are disposed to subject themselves to every privation, to the loss of life itself, rather than allow any foreign power to dictate the law, or, in any shape, interfere with their form of government. If the Allies have not duly *considered* these matters; if they have rushed heedlessly into the contest; if they have taken it *for granted* that every thing which the *lying* press of this country told them was *true*; and if the consequence of their *credulity* should be an entire reverse of fortune; then, indeed, they will have cause to regret their folly, to lament their *short-sightedness*, and even to *curse* those who urged them on by lies and deceit; but to hear the conductors of the

Courier and the *Times* men, who have not relaxed one moment in their base attempts "to spread darkness and delusion" over Europe, and to subject mankind to a worse than Gothic barbarism, who have been *unceasing* in their endeavours to promote the invasion of France, and to persuade the Allies that *nothing* stood in the way which could prevent their march to Paris. To hear, I say, these creatures *daring* to censure the Allies for their *short-sightedness*; for *besom*ing, what is not improbable, the unwary *dupes* of their own *knavery*; indicates a degree of presumption, of arrogance, and of effrontery, that has no parallel; except, indeed, we look for it in the *passive, tame, and stupid* manner in which mankind permit themselves to be led by these prostituted and hireling journals.

OCURRENCES OF THE WAR. The *official* intelligence which I have to notice as to the war in France, is what is contained in the following article from the *Moniteur*. "After the taking of St. Dizier, the Emperor advanced on the rear of the enemy, at Brienne, beat him on the 29th, and took possession of the town and castle, after a pretty smart action with the rear-guard." Subsequent accounts state, that Buonaparté proceeded afterwards to Troyes. — Dispatches have been received from our minister Lord Burghersh, detailing the operations of the Allies up to the 18th of last month, which, of course, could not be expected to bring any thing new. But the *Courier*, with its usual *penetration*, has discovered, that a passage in his Lordship's letter of the 14th ult. places it "beyond all doubt that the people will not rise in support of Buonaparté's authority." Had this letter been written after the date of Buonaparté's departure from Paris (the 25th ult.); and had, the recent advantage, which he obtained over the Allies, not been before the public, from which it clearly appears that the *people of France must have risen*, otherwise Napoleon could not have had an army; the *Courier* might have calculated upon being able to lull its readers more effectually in their *fancied* security, by Lord Burghersh's dispatch. But when it is plain that his Lordship speaks of the state of things, as he understood it to be, *eleven days prior* to the march of Napoleon from his capital, and fifteen days before his

entry into Brienne, all comment upon that dispatch was puerile, and only shows the desperate nature of the game which is playing off upon the deluded people of this country.

Negotiations are going on with Buonaparté and the Allies. The *Moniteur* of the 6th instant states that Lord Castlereagh and Caulincourt were at Chatillon along with the other ministers of the confederates, and that our Ambassador had exchanged notes with the French plenipotentiary on the 4th, and were to have a meeting in the evening. In a late report by Baron St. Aignan, one of the French diplomatists, which appeared in the *Moniteur*, he gives the following as the substance of a conversation which he had with the Austrian Minister:—"He told me that the Allies, long before the declaration of Austria, had saluted the Emperor Francis with the title of Emperor of Germany; that he did not accept this unmeaning title; and that Germany was more to him in this manner than before; that he desired that the Emperor Napoleon should be persuaded that the greatest calmness and the spirit of moderation presided in the councils of the Allies; that nothing was intended by any body against the dynasty of the Emperor Napoleon; that *England was much more moderate than was thought; that there had never been a more favourable moment for treating with her*; that if the Emperor Napoleon really desired to make a solid peace, he would spare humanity many misfortunes, and France many dangers, by not delaying the negotiations for peace; that they were near coming to an understanding; that the ideas conceived of peace ought to give *just limits to the power of England, and to France all the maritime liberty which she had a right to claim, as well as the other powers of Europe*.—That England was ready to restore to Holland as an independent State, what she would not restore to her as a French province."

Dispatches have been received from Lord Wellington, in which it is stated, that Soult had called in all his out-posts, and had received considerable reinforcements from the interior of France. How does this fact accord with what the *Courier* tells us about the French people, *refusing to support the authority of Buonaparté*?

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

MR. MANT AND CAPTAIN CAMPBELL.—

In the last Number of the Register, at page 203, I inserted an article upon the subject of the dispute between these two gentlemen, relative to the selling of prize goods and the granting of passports to foreign vessels in the Mediterranean.—I had observed, in a former article, that the matter divided itself into two parts, very distinct from each other. One part related to the conduct of Captain Campbell towards the parties whose goods and vessels were seized, or laid under contribution, and towards the nation whose ship he commanded, whose sailors were employed in the service, whose purses bore the expense of his enterprises, and whose credit and honour it was his bounden duty to maintain; or, at least, not wilfully to tarnish.

—The other part was of a nature comparatively insignificant, though not divested of sufficient importance to merit the serious attention of the public, as it involved a question of good or bad character of Mr. Mant, a gentleman of very respectable connexions, and, until lately, a surgeon in the navy.—It is always disagreeable to me, and particularly at a time like the present, when subjects of such astonishing moment are presenting themselves every hour for the consideration of my country, whose future fate depends, perhaps, upon the events of the present month; at such a time, it is peculiarly disagreeable to me to enter upon matters originating in the disputes of individuals. But, seeing that I have entered upon the subject, and that if I leave it in its present state, I may be the means of doing injustice, I think it necessary to resume it here, and, with the aid of all the information which I now possess, to place the whole of the case as clearly before the reader as I can; and, however deficient I may be found, in other respects, in the performance of this task, I trust that neither of the parties concerned will have any just grounds for charging me with partiality.—To the first branch of the subject, as being by far the most important of

the two, I shall first request the attention of the reader.—Mr. Mant, as was before observed, has published a pamphlet, which, he states in that pamphlet, to have been rendered necessary by the conduct of Captain Campbell, who had, it appears, shown to several persons at Southampton, certain papers injurious to Mr. Mant's character; and, who, it also appears, had refused to furnish Mr. Mant with any copy of those papers, though, it must be observed, that Captain Campbell did offer, in answer to Mr. Mant's request, to suffer the papers to be seen by any friend of Mr. Mant's; an offer which Mr. Mant refused, upon the ground, that, the showing of the papers to one person would not satisfy him after they had been shown to so many, calling upon Captain Campbell to cause the papers to be printed, and offering himself to bear the expense. To this proposition, Captain Campbell's relation, Capt. D. Campbell, who was now, it appears, the keeper of the papers, declined to make any reply; whereupon Mr. Mant published that pamphlet, to which I am now about to refer.—In his pamphlet, at pages 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11, Mr. Mant makes the following statement.

—"Captain Patrick Campbell has accused me of Peculation, &c. in my arrangement of the Prize Concerns, &c. of His Majesty's Ship Unité and others; and at the period which embraces the events in question, under the immediate command of Captain Patrick Campbell, of the said ship, then senior officer, commanding a squadron stationed in the Adriatic, intended for the blockade of the ports of Venice, &c. &c.—In the execution of this duty, numerous vessels of the enemy, as well as neutrals, were detained by Captain Campbell; and, being acquainted with the Italian language, I was directed by him, my commanding officer, to go on shore to the city of Trieste, for the express purpose of disposing or compromising for such vessels and cargoes as were then, or might thereafter be captured or detained by him, or by any of the squadron under his command, without having been pre-

“vously sent to an admiralty court for adjudication.—Not having been an accredited, but a voluntary and friendly agent to Captain Campbell in this business, and this was the prevailing idea of the squadron, from the knowledge I had of the Italian language, yet unacquainted with its routine, that it did not then occur to me that I was lending my assistance to the committal of an illegal transaction, a circumstance of which he himself could not be ignorant at the time he gave me the instructions.—In obedience to his orders, a negotiation took place with a Deputation of merchants mutually selected for this special purpose from the commercial chambers (i. e. *Borsa*, or *Royal Exchange*) of the city of Trieste, gentlemen of opulence and known respectability, and ultimately denominated as “The Deputation for the prize affairs of Corfu and Malta,” &c. &c. —Towards both these ports I was directed to hold out a menace, that detained vessels would be sent, if a pecuniary arrangement on their part was not made; which had the desired effect, by the speedy adjustment of the matter; the Deputation being well aware of the subsequent and great expense of litigations, &c. in a court of Admiralty: and as a further inducement for the Deputation to cause a liberal compromise, passports were generally given by Captain Campbell to each vessel; and, in several instances, a convoy was granted, to prevent their being again seized or detained.—Captain Campbell, conscious of his improper and illegal conduct in this affair, delivered to me a Bond, drawn up in his own diction and writing, with instructions for me, to use as a Form for those merchants to sign who agreed to a compromise, as a prevention to their instituting any process against him in any court of law:—but, unluckily for the Captain, he is not aware of the nullity of the Bond even at this moment; as, very probably, he may hereafter feel the ill effects of this designing caution.—In order to afford some proof to the public, that Captain Campbell’s orders were enforced, for the compromise of the several vessels and cargoes, I declare the same to have taken place with vessels under the following flags; viz. Turkish, Grecian, Danish, Papal, Imperial, French, and Venetian; and, were I to state the names, the list would nearly reach the length of a certain Procter’s bill:—but

“this must be added, they were of the construction of ships, brigs, trabacolos, &c. &c. Documents of which are in my possession.—In the several compromises, &c. I have been acknowledged by the *Borsa* (i. e. Commercial Chambers, or *Royal Exchange*) to have made them on the most honourable and advantageous terms for the interest of my employer; and to exculpate myself completely from any charge of misconduct, or of appropriating any sum or sums to my own use and benefit, that I now declare, the specific sums stipulated in the several pecuniary payments were always (excepting in some very trifling cases, and this at the moment of emergency), in the first instance, submitted to the consideration, and, lastly, rendered valid with the concurrence of Captain Campbell, my commanding officer, or some other Captain, who were all in agreement of sharing monies obtained by this unwarrantable and illegal proceeding.—The various sums received on account of this practice were never collected by me; the Deputation sent the money to the office of the Vice-Consul at Trieste, which was delivered over to me in bags, sealed, and with a tally, specifying the amount, in order to deliver it to Captain Campbell, my commanding officer, on my returning on board; and which I was in the constant habit of doing, seeing at the time of delivery the amount counted and reckoned by Captain Campbell; and the distribution of this money was at no period intrusted to me.”—There is something so bold in these transactions; they display so grand a scale of action, that one can hardly believe it possible that they were illegal; and yet, I have examined the acts of Parliament in vain in order to find out something to warrant them. It is impossible for me to know what were the instructions given to Captain Campbell by the Admiralty; and, I do not pretend to say, because I really do not know, what is the law upon the subject. These transactions may, therefore, have been fully justifiable, in consequence of some instructions on the part of the Admiralty, or of some enactment by the Parliament; but, this, I say, that, if they had not one of these grounds to rest upon, they were neither more nor less than acts of *Piracy*. When I wrote the last article upon this subject, I had seen a paper, purporting to be a letter to the Lords of the Admiralty, the object of which was, to explain the nature of these

transactions, and from the reading of that paper, I was convinced that the charge against Captain Campbell was wholly unfounded, my judgment, too, being in some degree biassed by the papers shown me with regard to the conduct of Mr. Mant, who had preferred these charges; but, I have now seen lists of vessels and divers other papers, to which, as it appears to me, that letter to the Admiralty does not give an answer; does not, sufficiently, explain.

—This statement of Mr. Mant's, in which, I repeat, is contained matter, affecting, and deeply affecting, the vital interests, and still more the honour of the navy and the nation, is in *print*, let it be remembered. It is in print, and its author pledges his character for the truth of it. He also puts in jeopardy his property and his personal liberty, if it be not true. Therefore, it is very desirable, that this statement should receive a flat and plain contradiction; or, that it should be shown, that the statement, if true, brings to light nothing unlawful. —There can, I imagine, be no difficulty at all in proving, by many witnesses, the falsehood of such a statement as this, if it be false; and as to the legality or illegality of the acts, that question might be settled at once by an appeal to the instructions, or to the act of Parliament, under which these sales of prize-goods and these compromises, as they are called, took place. I really should be very happy to be the means of promulgating a refutation of this statement altogether; for, there does, upon the whole, appear to be something so terrible in the acts alleged, that one cannot think of them without feeling some degree of shame for one's country.

—Captain Campbell is an officer of great merit in his profession; he long ago distinguished himself by his bravery; he was, I observed, highly praised in a public dispatch of Lord Collingwood, for his conduct in the Mediterranean; and, as I am informed, he is still very well thought of at the Admiralty. But, though these circumstances have, and ought to have, great weight, they could not, if they were fifty times as numerous and fifty times as strong, do away any one undeniable fact. —The same of Lord Nelson: all his vigilance, all his skill, all his wonderful activity, all his bravery, all his honours, all his titles, of Baron, Earl, and Duke; yes, the loss of his life in the arms of the most glorious naval victory that ever was won; all these put together, do not, in the mind of any just, any generous, any merciful man, weigh as one

single feather against any one single fact, alleged by Captain, now Admiral, Foote, relative to the transactions, the ever-memorable, the indelible, transactions of the Bay of Naples; therefore, as a friend to the British navy, and, of course, in that view of the matter, a friend to Captain Campbell, I take the liberty to recommend to him a plain and full answer to this statement of Mr. Mant. —It may be said, that Captain Campbell is not bound by any rule of moral action to enter the lists in print with every person who may chuse to write and print respecting his conduct. This is very true; but, it appears from Mr. Mant's pamphlet, that it was not Mr. Mant who began the work of publication; for, Mr. Mant inserts the copy of a letter from Captain Campbell to him; in which letter Captain Campbell seems clearly to admit that he had shown papers, relative to these transactions, to several persons at Southampton, which was a sort of publication, not so general, indeed, as that of Mr. Mant, but still, it was a publication; And, it was a sort of publication, too, which was calculated better than any other to produce all the consequences that have followed. Captain Campbell, therefore, must, I think, be regarded as having given the challenge. He, in some sort, compelled Mr. Mant to publish; and if Mr. Mant did publish, it was absolutely necessary for him to state the transactions, or at least, some part of the transactions, the existence of which gave rise to Captain Campbell's charges against him. It appears, therefore, very clearly that Captain Campbell cannot refuse to meet Mr. Mant in print, upon the grounds above stated, and that his silence cannot fairly be attributed to a contempt of his assailant, with respect to whom he thought it necessary to promulgate charges. —Thus far we have viewed the transactions above mentioned solely as they relate to the commander; but, upon a supposition, that the statement of Mr. Mant with respect to those transactions, be true; upon the supposition that they were what he states them to have been, and that they were, as he says they were, "unwarrantable" and "illegal," we must not omit to observe, and to bear in mind, that Mr. Mant, according to his own account, had a pretty considerable share in them. He was the person who negotiated the compromises spoken of; he was the person who sold the prize-goods; he was the person who received the money, and who caused it, as he says, to be trans-

mitted to his Captain. He lays great stress upon the circumstances of Captain Campbell being his "commanding officer," and of his acting in "obedience to his orders;" but Mr. Mant was not a person likely to be uninformed of the fact, that he was not bound to obey any *unlawful* command of his commanding officer. Mr. Mant was a surgeon in the navy. The health of the crew depended, in some measure, upon him. The necessity, therefore, must have been very urgent which could have justified his being so long absent from his ship, upon any account; and, I should have thought that a person in his situation would have been likely to hesitate, and even to remonstrate, before he consented to leave the ship, to go and reside on shore, and that, too, in the not very respectable capacity of an agent in compromises and a vender of prize goods. He certainly was not, in duty, bound to take upon him this office; and, it is impossible that even his warmest friends can attempt to justify the act, even upon the supposition of his having been wholly ignorant of the illegality of the transactions in which he was concerned. Of this circumstance, he says in his statement, that he was ignorant at the time when he first accepted of the office. He does not say when it was that he discovered his error; but his friends must sincerely lament, that he did not, the moment he discovered it, make a communication, either to the Admiralty or to the commander in chief in the Mediterranean, of those transactions, which he had then discovered to be so unwarrantable and illegal, and in which, he had, through ignorance, taken so prominent a part. Yes, the friends of Mr. Mant must all sorely regret, that he reserved all communications of this sort, through a space of two or three years, and, until after Captain Campbell, as appears from Mr. Mant's own publication, had thwarted him in his wish'd-for appointment to another ship, and until, as is manifest, his resentment urged him to do that which his friends must wish to have proceeded from a sense of duty to that country in whose service he was engaged.—It is very certain, that, if the blame of these transactions were divided into a thousand parts, nine hundred and ninety-nine would fall to the lot of Captain Campbell, to whom the ship, her crew, and the interest and credit of the nation, as far as this ship was concerned, were confided; but, still, it is impossible, upon the supposition that the transactions were criminal, and so

grossly and scandalously criminal, as the statement of Mr. Mant gives us to understand, to excuse Mr. Mant himself from all share of the criminality.—Thus far with respect to the first branch of this subject, into which, I continue to think, that some serious inquiry is now become inevitable. The example is of so dangerous a tendency; the evil of such an example may be so great; the mischief that it may produce may affect the nation in so many ways, that, at any rate, it should be made apparent to all the world, that it has not the countenance of the government.—We now come to speak of the second part of the subject; namely, of the charges preferred against Mr. Mant by Captain Campbell, the substance of which is this: that the former, while he was employed as the manager of prizes and of compromises, received secretly sums for his own private benefit, no part of which, of course, he paid over to the Captain or crew.—In my first article upon this subject, I said, that I thought, that Mr. Mant had successfully defended himself against this charge. In my last Number, having, in the meanwhile, been shown two documents on which this charge rested, I stated the substance of them, the effect of which has been necessarily a strong suspicion, at least, that the charge was well founded.—This has very naturally brought from Mr. Mant an explanation of the circumstances connected with these unfavourable documents, and also an affidavit, which will be inserted at the foot of this article.—The documents here mentioned, relate to two separate transactions, in the first of which Mr. Mant is asserted to have taken the sum of 200 dollars from a person, to whom he sold prize goods, as a bribe to let that person have the said goods on advantageous terms; as a factor, or salesman, or commission merchant, might, if a rogue, take money of a purchaser as a compensation for defrauding his employer. This charge, if well-founded, is quite decisive of a man's character; and, I confess, that, with a view of only one side of the matter, I looked upon the proof as complete. But, upon hearing the explanation of Mr. Mant, my opinion is a good deal changed, and I must see further proof in support of the document before I regard him as guilty. I will now, however, submit Mr. Mant's explanation to the reader, together with such remarks as it naturally suggests, and then leave him to form his own judgment.—The document, upon which this most foul

charge rests, is a *Declaration*, upon stamped paper, and made, apparently, before some magistrate or notary in Italy, and it shows, that Mr. Mant received 200 dollars "to cause ME," says the Declarant, "to have on advantageous terms the goods I bought of him."—Mr. Mant first observes, upon this document, that it is one of those very papers which Captain Campbell showed about Southampton, and of which he was refused a copy; and, that, though Captain Campbell had the paper in his possession for years, while Mr. Mant was in the ship with him, he, Mr. Mant, has never been allowed to see the paper from the day it was written to the present hour. He further observes, before entering on an inquiry into the nature of the evidence thus furnished, that he often pressed for a formal investigation of his conduct; that he asked to know and to be confronted with his accusers; and, that it is very strange that Captain Campbell should now think it proper to be his accuser and produce documents to criminate him, when he never thought proper to be his accuser with the government, never would bring the matter to a legal investigation, never would consent to confront the accuser with the accused, and would never even show Mr. Mant the document, on which the principal charge was founded.—The document, upon which the charge is founded, is signed, I think, by *Joseph Jursovich*; but of this I will not be certain. Mr. Mant states, that this was the name of the man, who, as he was informed afterwards, was his accuser.—The affidavit of Mr. Mant positively denies the fact; and to that affidavit the impartial reader will give, of course, all the credit that is due to it, bearing in mind, too, that it has been made in the place where Mr. Mant resides, and under the very eye of his circle of friends and acquaintances.—But, yet, this will not be sufficient in the way of exculpation; for, if it were, we must adopt the principle, that the evidence of the accused is to be admitted in his own defence, a principle contrary to all the practice of the world and to the dictates of reason and of nature.—Something, therefore, is wanted to show the want of credibility in the evidence, and this, I think, Mr. Mant does furnish, and especially if we take into view the circumstance of the informer having been a party concerned in the foul transaction, of which he gives evidence.—Mr. Mant states, that this Jursovich was a very low man, the master of a coast-

ing vessel of about 8 or 10 tons; that, secondly, he was under the influence of one *Haire*, a person employed by Captain Campbell as a pilot, in Italy, and that this *Haire*, having been reproved by Mr. Mant some time before for most indecent conduct on board the ship, swore, in the hearing of an officer, that he would do Mr. Mant all the injury he possibly could, of the truth of which fact Mr. Mant produces a proof in a *Declaration* (legally taken in London) attested by the said officer, whose name it is not necessary to mention; that *Haire* was, at the time alluded to, become the agent in the prize and compromise transactions, and that Jursovich was his assistant in the business; that Captain Campbell never even mentioned to Mr. Mant any thing of Jursovich's *Declaration*, until about a year and a half after it was made, and after it was in the Captain's possession; that, at the time when the *Declaration* of Jursovich was made, the ship was in the *Adriatic*, and that the whole of the parties were then within reach of the other, and might have been confronted, but that, at the time, when Captain Campbell first talked of the *Declaration* to Mr. Mant, the ship was near *Malta*, and, of course, out of the reach of the party who made it, as has been before stated by him in his pamphlet at pages 42 and 43, where, together with pages 44 and 45, the whole of this matter will, he says, be found to be fully explained; that, Captain Campbell never showed the *Declaration* to Mr. Mant; that Mr. Mant earnestly requested the Captain to cause a formal investigation of all these matters to take place, but that this Captain Campbell never did, saying, that he was convinced that the fellow was not to be believed, and that he, Captain Campbell, should destroy the *Declaration*. Such is Mr. Mant's statement in answer to the charge laid against him by Jursovich, and such, in substance, is his affidavit. The public, like me, will, of course, in estimating the value of a declaration of this, or of any sort, pay attention to the circumstances under which it was made; and, it must be confessed, that the circumstances here are very material. The character of the person declaring, the situation in which he was, his not declaring upon oath, his very close connexion with *Haire*, his interest conjointly with that of *Haire*, are all circumstances, which, unless they can be proved not to have existed, must necessarily make greatly in favour of Mr. Mant;

but, then, it must, on the other hand, be observed, that this is the statement of Mr. Mant himself; it is the evidence of the accused in his own defence; and, it, supposing it all to be true, rests upon the fact (for which my memory does not warrant me in vouching), that the name of the Declarant was *Joseph Jursovich*.—But, we now come to the *internal evidence*, not depending upon the word of any man; evidence against the credibility of the Declarant, furnished by the Declaration itself. —I confess, that my last article, above referred to, was sent to the press without sufficient reflection. The documents shown to me produced a feeling in my mind not favourable to the right operation of reason. If this had not been the case, it would have occurred to me, as, I hope, it must have occurred to my readers, who had more time for reflection; that, supposing the document to state truth, the Declarant himself must have been a dishonest man; for, if it was dishonest or dishonourable in Mr. Mant to take the two hundred dollars, it was not less so in Jursovich to give the two hundred dollars. The sum was in the nature of a bribe, and in all cases of bribery, the briber is looked upon as the most criminal of the two. One would, indeed, more readily excuse, or rather, be less disposed to wonder at, such conduct in a man like Jursovich, than in a man in Mr. Mant's situation in life; but, in whatever degree we are inclined to excuse him on account of the groveling nature of his mind and habits, in that same degree we must, in justice to Mr. Mant, deduct from the credit due to the declaration. We know, that the evidence of accomplices is, sometimes, regarded as sufficient, but, then, there must be strong circumstances to back it, and the probabilities of the case must be decidedly in favour of the truth of such evidence, which they certainly are not in the present instance. —It is very natural to ask, why the Declarant, who had got, as he says, the benefit of the sale of goods to him, in consequence of a bribe, should go to Captain Campbell and give information of his own rascality; why, he should go and declare himself to have been a villain? It is impossible to suppose that he would have done this, without some very powerful motive, and some motive of self-interest, too; and, is it very likely, that a man, who was not ashamed to declare, and put his name to it, that he had been a villain, should scruple to declare what was ~~his~~ ^{the} question is simply this;

is a man, who acknowledges himself to have committed, for selfish and base purposes, a most roguish act, to be believed against another, upon his simple declaration, unsupported by any other witness, or by any fact in corroboration of the charge? The decision of this question I leave to the impartial mind of the reader, who will, however, not fail to take into view the very important circumstance, that Captain Campbell kept the knowledge of the Declaration from Mr. Mant for a long time, and until the parties were at so great a distance from each other as to make it impossible to confront them; and, further, that he, as appears from the pamphlet, declined letting Mr. Mant have a copy of the Declaration even after it had been shown about Southampton. From these facts, which appear, even from his own letter, if a correct copy of it be given by Mr. Mant, to be undeniable, it would seem to follow, that Captain Campbell himself did not think, for a long while, at least, very highly of the credit due to this document, which aims such a deadly thrust at the character, at the common honesty, of Mr. Mant; and, I submit to every candid man, whether, if it was not thought necessary to confront Mr. Mant with his accuser, if it was not thought necessary to bring him to trial, if it was not thought necessary, afterwards, even to let him see and have a copy of his accusation, it was, or could be, necessary or right, to promulgate that accusation through the circle of his friends and acquaintances. —Therefore, after a cool and impartial review of all these circumstances, I must say, that the evidence of this Declarant appears to me to be worth little or nothing at all; and that, as far as relates to this principal and most odious charge, the accusation against Mr. Mant must be regarded as unsupported by proof, and, of course, as without foundation. —The other charge against Mr. Mant, as stated in my last article was this: that, by means of an interlineation in a passport, granted by Captain Campbell, the former extended the license of a trading vessel, and that he received three hundred dollars for so doing, which he kept to himself. —The extending of the license we must set down amongst the other illegal transactions, if they were illegal; and, really, amongst the mass, this appears, in itself, a trifling, unworthy of any particular mark of disapprobation. Mr. Mant, in his affidavit, says that he made the interlineation with the Captain's consent; but, if the great

mass of the transactions, described by Mr. Mant, were such as he describes them to have been, the mere alteration, or even the fabrication, of a passport, or a license, can only be looked upon as part of a wide-sweeping system, in the carrying on of which he was concerned, but of the illegality of which he solemnly asserts his ignorance. It is the taking of the three hundred dollars for the interlineation; or, more properly speaking, the keeping of them to himself, that forms the sting of the charge, and, especially with those, who are disposed to excuse the transactions in general.—But, even in this light, the charge falls greatly short, in point of dishonesty, of the foregoing one. There he was accused of taking into his own pocket, in the shape of a bribe, money due to his Captain and shipmates. Here he is accused of taking money to himself indeed, but money, which, or the worth of which, his shipmates had never possessed, and would never have possessed, if he had not taken it.—This was, as it appears from the representation on the other side, one of those transactions which but too often occur between those who have power and those who have money, and who have a mutual desire to soften the rigour of instructions, regulations, or law.—But, still, we must hear the explanation of Mr. Mant; and see on what sort of *evidence* this second charge is founded.—There were, as relating to this transaction, two documents mentioned by me, one in Mr. Mant's hand-writing, but not signed. It was a declaration drawn by him to be signed by Pazzi, the person who had received the interlined license, certifying that Mr. Mant had not received three hundred dollars from him. This paper, of itself, made nothing at all in support of the charge, and Mr. Mant very naturally accounts for its having been drawn up, and having been put into the hands of Captain Campbell by Haire, or his associates, without ever having been even tendered to Pazzi, who was on shore, and to whom Mr. Mant was not permitted to go.—The other document, and the only one in support of this charge is, the Declaration, shown to me, and mentioned in my last Number, of a *third party*, who declares, that he was present, when Mr. Mant offered Pazzi to return him the 300 dollars, if he would sign the above-mentioned certificate of not having paid them.—As to this document, Mr. Mant states, that it ought to have been shown to him at the

time when his accuser might have been confronted with him; that, as the act charged was very criminal, Captain Campbell ought to have caused inquiry to be made *in situ* on the spot, where the parties all were. He asks, *who this third person was?* and I do not recollect; he asks, why Pazzi's evidence was not taken? he asks, if Pazzi refused to sign the certificate, and rejected the offer of the 300 dollars, made by Mr. Mant in person? how could it happen that Mr. Mant should leave the certificate with him, and should not take it away? he asks, if Pazzi carried the certificate back to the ship, why a declaration was not taken from him, and why he was not immediately confronted with Mr. Mant? he asks, if Pazzi did not carry it back, who told the Captain that it ever had been presented to Pazzi? he asks, whether it be likely that such an offer should be made in the presence of a third party, especially when the intention must have been to smother a disgraceful transaction? he asks, whether a man, who, for the sake of lucre, could give 300 dollars in the shape of a *douceur*, was likely to refuse to take them back again in the shape of hush-money? and, above all things, he asks, how Captain Campbell, if he deemed the Declaration of this third party to be good evidence, could reconcile it to any sense of his duty as a Commander, or to any principle of justice as a man, not to bring him, Mr. Mant, to trial, not to confront him with his accuser, and never, even to this hour, to show him the Declaration, or make him acquainted with the name of the Declarant?—To these questions I can, I confess, see no answer; and, from the very nature of the thing, I think, that it appears that Mr. Mant has given the true history of this paper; namely, that he sent the paper open from the quarter-deck, that it was never presented to Pazzi, and that Haire, or some of his associates, brought the paper on board to Captain Campbell.—I am sorry that I cannot recollect the *name of the third party*; but, the credibility of his testimony is furiously shaken by the circumstances of the case; for, if it be true, Mr. Mant must not only have made the offer in the presence of a third party, a fact hardly to be believed; but, he must also have voluntarily been guilty of that supreme act of folly, the *leaving of the certificate* in the hands of a person, whom he must then necessarily have regarded as one resolved to give information against him.—This is too much to be believed by

any one; and, therefore, I am pretty certain, that the public will agree with me, that the allegation is unsupported by any thing like proof, and, of course, that Mr. Mant stands acquitted of the charge.—I have now only to add, that I was in error, when, in my last, I supposed, that Mr. Mant had been *displaced*, or *dismissed*, from the Navy, on account of these transactions. I have now seen a letter from the Transport Board, showing that his discontinuance upon the half-pay list as a surgeon of the navy, was owing to his having become a lieutenant in the militia service.—The affidavit of Mr. Mant should be read with attention. The reader will take into his consideration the circumstances under which this affidavit has been made; he will bear in mind, that it has been made under the eye of Mr. Mant's friends, and in the place where he resides; that it is a solemn proceeding, which, in case of the refutation of any part of the facts, must consign the person swearing, to everlasting infamy; and, that, when Mr. Mant made the affidavit, he must have been sensible, that, if refutation was possible, it would not fail, first or last, to take place.—I have now endeavoured to place the whole of this subject fairly before my readers. I have not wilfully misstated or discoloured any fact; I have made no attempt to strain any argument; I have acted under no feelings of partiality; and, if I have omitted many things, which would have struck the mind of an advocate on either side, I shall rely on the penetration and judgment of every candid reader to supply the deficiency.

MR. MANT'S AFFIDAVIT.

"THOMAS MANT, late Surgeon of His Britannic Majesty's frigate, *Unité*, now residing at the Town and County of the Town of Southampton, maketh Oath, and saith as follows: That it is only since this Deponent's pamphlet was offered to the consideration of the public, as a refutation of certain calumnious reports tending to injure this Deponent's character, that he has been made acquainted with the whole tenor and extent of such reports, Captain Campbell, late commanding the said frigate *Unité*, having previous to such publication only *privately* exhibited papers of that tendency: That as the charges now appear in a weekly publication, and as it seems that this Deponent's pamphlet has not so satisfactorily rebutted the said reports, in consequence of the clandestine manner of their circulation, as otherwise might have been effected from the truth of its contents; and this Deponent having promised an immediate and honorable refutation to any charges which the said Captain Campbell should ~~advance~~ *put forward* with: Therefore this Deponent ~~doth~~ *now*, in regard to the first and second charges contained in the said weekly publication; viz. of his, this Deponent's, having

'taken money for himself in an *unfair* way for 'passports,' voluntarily make oath, That he never in any one instance received any sum or sums of money on these accounts, or for any other whatsoever, appertaining to the prize affairs of the Adriatic squadron, nor did he ever issue a passport to any person whatever, but such as had always the said Captain Campbell's approbation and signature: and this Deponent further maketh oath, That in regard to the third charge contained in the said weekly publication, of the interlineation of a passport, with the words 'to return with merchandise,' the said Captain Campbell permitted such words to form a part of the passport, and which interlineation was made, and passport given, as a compliment to a gentleman at Trieste, for the trouble and attention he had in arranging some part of the prize affairs of the aforementioned squadron: and this Deponent further saith, That he now holds two original letters to that effect, one addressed to the said Captain Campbell, and the other to him, this Deponent; and this Deponent further saith, That the said Captain Campbell granted passports containing the same permission, as was interlined in the before-mentioned passport, to four other gentlemen, who had also been instrumental in arranging some of the prize affairs of the said squadron at Trieste, to each, one passport or more, chiefly to load with oil and merchandise from Paglia, in the Adriatic, and other ports where British ships were not permitted to enter, and to return with their cargoes to Trieste: and this Deponent also, in regard to the last charge contained in the said weekly publication, viz. That 'when the Master of the vessel returned 'to Mr. Mant, he drew up a paper,' further maketh oath, That he, this Deponent, hath not at any period or place whatever ever seen or conversed with the Master of the said vessel (Padron Pazzi) since the passport first herein-mentioned was delivered to him at Trieste, and which was prior to the said Master's application to the said Captain Campbell for fresh passports: and this Deponent further saith, That with respect to the paper which appears in this Deponent's own hand-writing; it was written in consequence of his having heard it reported (but not then from the said Captain Campbell) that the said Master of the said vessel had paid this Deponent three hundred dollars for the interlineation of the passport: That on hearing such report, this Deponent not being permitted by the said Captain Campbell to go on shore, desired a person to call on the said Master and request his attendance on board the said frigate *Unité*, to know if he had circulated such report: in answer to which message, the said messenger brought word to this Deponent, that the said Master said, he could not come on board, but desired having said any thing of the sort; and said, he was willing to subscribe his name to any paper this Deponent would draw up which would refute such a charge, when the Deponent wrote the said paper before-mentioned, and gave the same open to the said messenger publicly on the quarter-deck of the said frigate, with directions to carry the same to the said Master of the said vessel for his signature: and this Deponent further saith, That the said paper so sent as above-said was, as this Deponent verily believes, intercepted by one *Jamuel Haire* (styled in this Deponent's before-mentioned pamphlet as the incapacitated Pilot) who carried the same, unsigned, to the said Captain Campbell: and this Deponent

further saith, That the said Samuel Haire had sworn, that 'he would do this Deponent all the injury he possibly could; and, if money could buy it, he would buy every one at Trieste to prove this Deponent dishonorable in arranging the Unité's prize concerns,' or words to that effect: and that the said Samuel Haire was heard by these officers to use the above expressions; and that such expressions were so used by the said Samuel Haire, in consequence of this Deponent's having reproved the said Samuel Haire for his conduct in the mess-room on board the said frigate Unité; and which conduct of the said Samuel Haire, one of the said three officers, in an attested declaration in this Deponent's possession, is represented as being *too indecent for public detail*: and this Deponent further saith, That it was eighteen months or more after this Deponent heard the said reports of the said charges against him, that the said Captain Campbell, on being ordered to join Lord Collingwood, then the Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean, to explain reports of this nature, which his Lordship had heard, first spoke to this Deponent concerning them; and this Deponent having explained to the said Captain Campbell the circumstances of the before-mentioned several charges, he appeared perfectly satisfied, and desired the officers on board his said frigate to suspend their opinions thereon: and this Deponent further saith, That the said Captain Campbell, talking of Jos. Jursovich, the person by whom the said first mentioned charge was made, said, that he was a blackguard, and that he, Captain Campbell, could not take his word, and would therefore destroy the declaration he had made, which declaration this Deponent never saw; and that the said Captain Campbell also said, that he had no better opinion of the business of the said Master of the vessel (Padron Pazzi) than he had of the said Jos. Jursovich's; and should treat it in like manner, although the said Captain Campbell shewed this Deponent the said passport, in which the said interlineation was inserted, and permitted this Deponent to take a copy thereof: and this Deponent further saith, that the said Captain Campbell read to him, this Deponent, an extract of a letter from the said Captain Campbell to the said Lord Collingwood on the subject, wherein the said Captain Campbell expressed himself in words to the following effect: 'And after a strict and diligent search into the business for nearly eighteen months, I have not been able to find any thing to criminate him,' meaning this Deponent: and this Deponent further saith, That he quoted the above extract in a letter which he wrote to the said Lord Collingwood on this Deponent's soliciting his Lordship's attention to, and adjudication of the charges in question, and that no investigation was ever ordered by his Lordship. And this Deponent further saith, That the said Padron Pazzi, and the said Jos. Jursovich, were both under the influence of the said Samuel Haire, who conducted the Prize Affairs for the said Captain Campbell about eighteen months after this Deponent had found out the illegality of these transactions, and refused to act further therein.

THOMAS MANT.

Sworn at the Town and County of Southampton, the 15th day of February, 1814, before me, THOMAS RYDING, a Master extraordinary in Chancery.

THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON AND HIS ARMY.

BATTLE OF BRIENNE.—It seems that Buonaparte has met with another terrible defeat, which, if we believe the *Courier* and the *Times*, must be attended with consequences more fatal to his dynasty than any of his former disasters, because it has taken place in the heart of France, by which a direct communication has been opened to his capital. I was much surprised, however, to find that neither the Park nor the Tower guns were ordered to be fired, in celebration of an event so gratifying, so joyful to the good people of England. Lord Burghersh tells us, in his dispatches, that it was a *most glorious victory*. Sir Charles Stewart says, that "if Marshal Blucher was not long ago *immortalized*, "this day would have crowned him in the "annals of fame;" and the whole tribe of hireling journalists were so *intoxicated* with the news, that language was incapable of describing their ecstatic feelings. The money gamblers, and other "gentlemen and "men of honour," who frequent the Exchange, were particularly rapturous on this occasion. They *thought* of nothing but the "most glorious victory;" it was the predominant *theme* of their conversation; and I have no doubt it was the object of their nightly *visions*. Their favourite journals kept ringing the changes upon the *immortalizing* intelligence; and if any one ventured, even by a *look*, to indicate a doubt upon the subject, he ran the risk of being horse-whipped, at least, by these "gentlemen and men of honour." Yet in the midst of all this exultation; with the *official* details in their hands of this "most glorious victory," and that, too, "on the "territory of France," not a single gun was fired, not a chime rung, nor a solitary candle lighted up, to commemorate the event. The other day the citizens of London were *gratified* with the roaring of the Park and Tower guns, in return for the *high honour* conferred upon the country by the Danes, who had graciously *condescended* to accept of £200,000 of our money. It is true, the Crown Prince, who had armed against his *native country*, and helped us to get rid of this troublesome article, compelled the Danes to give up to Sweden a part of their territory; but for this we had previously given his Royal Highness an entire island. It was not said that either we or the Allies gained a "glorious victory," or even any victory at all, by the Danish arrangement. We, good souls, *rejoiced*,

merely because another opportunity was given us of *parting* with our money. If when we entered into treaty with the *vuliant* Prince of Sweden, our views were *then* directed to something beyond a settlement with Denmark; if we *then* calculated upon the Crown Prince marching with his army to assist the *Allies* in the invasion of France, or to co-operate with our *own* troops in completing the deliverance of Holland, it *now* appears that these calculations were not well founded; for, whether he disapproves of the proceedings of the other Powers, or whether, having *obtained* the object he had in view he is now solely occupied with *securing* it, it is clear that Bernadotte has not performed any achievement worthy of notice, or shewn any anxious disposition to bring forward his army, since the signing of the treaty with Denmark. But so it is, that we did rejoice, that we did fire the Park and the Tower guns on that event being announced. How is it, then, that nothing of this nature occurred when we heard of the late "most glorious victory" which had been obtained over the enemy "on the territory of France?" How is it that those who have the management of these matters should have thrown such a *damp* upon public feeling? Did they *believe* the dispatches of Lord Burghersh, or did they regard it a matter of *greater* importance that Denmark should accept £200,000 of our money, than that Buonaparté should be completely defeated in the very heart of France?—To me it seems that this alleged *victory* has not received that *implicit credit* in every quarter which it has done on the Stock Exchange, and which our prostituted press has endeavoured to obtain for it among the credulous multitude. It is only in this way that I can account for restraining the public rejoicings usual on such occasions; and when I look into the official details now before me, in which I find both parties, Buonaparté on the one hand, and Lord Burghersh on the other, telling their own story, I confess there appear to me strong reasons for believing, that the engagement at Brienne was *not* a "general affair;" that Napoleon himself was *not* in the action; and, consequently, that he could not be defeated. My view is, that it was the *rear* guard of the French army only that was engaged; that even this part of it *stood its ground* against the united and reiterated attacks of the *main body* of the Allies; and that the movement which followed, of *withdrawing* it from its original position, was

the result of a *previous* determination on the part of Buonaparté, and not the consequence of its having been defeated. But before I proceed to notice the circumstances which, I think, warrant these conclusions, I request the reader to attend to the marked *discrepancy* which appears on comparing the French official accounts of the Brienne affair with those published in our Gazette. In the former we have a most interesting and particular detail of a battle fought on the 29th January, which was contested a whole day, and which terminated, after a great deal of hard fighting, in *favour* of the French, who thereby obtained possession of "the height of Partha," of "the castle of Brienne," and pursued the enemy "beyond the village de la Rothiere, where they took their position."—In Lord Burghersh's and Sir Charles Stewart's dispatches, *not a single word* is said as to these important and *decisive* occurrences! It cannot be pretended that the enemy's accounts are mere gasconade, because we find it admitted in *our* official details, that they actually had possession of the places mentioned. Why, then, should Lord Burghersh and Sir Charles Stewart *suppress* the facts? Why should it be concealed, that the Allies had been *compelled* to give way before the enemy, and to *abandon* so many places of strength? Or, if they did transmit the particulars, why have they been kept back from the public, while every circumstance *prejudicial* to the enemy has been *anxiously* obtruded upon our notice?—Is not this *concealment* sufficient of itself to warrant the charge of deception practised by the public press, and to satisfy every rational person, that there is something wrong in the manner of giving out foreign intelligence?—How far it may influence the mind of the reader in judging of the credit due to what has been published here as *authentic*, it is for him to determine.—I shall now offer such observations as occur to me on a comparison of both statements, in so far as they relate to subsequent events.—I have said, that the engagement at Brienne was *not* a "general affair;" by which I mean, that the *whole* of Buonaparté's army did not take part in that action. It is stated, in the French bulletin, to have been only the *rear* guard that was engaged. "This day, in which our rear guard maintained itself in a vast plain against the *whole* of the enemy's army, and quintuple forces."—But I shall be told, that the *French* bulletin ought not to determine the fact. Very

well; be it so; let us see what Lord Burghersh says respecting it. "It appears," says his Lordship, "that Marshals Marmont, Mortier, and Victor were present in the action of this day. Generals Colbert and Grouchy were also present."

—Now, on turning to the French account, it will be seen, that the officers named by his Lordship were those attached to the rear guard of Buonaparté's army. It is true, he does not tell us explicitly what precise part of the enemy's army was in the battle; whether it was the right or the left, the centre or the rear; he speaks vaguely of a "general affair;" but when we see that the officers he names, were those who at the time actually did command the rear of the French army, and no other part of it, we cannot doubt the truth of Buonaparté's statement.—Had the entire force under the immediate command of Napoleon been in the action, Lord Burghersh would not only have mentioned this, but he would have dwelt upon it with exultation, as a circumstance demonstrative of the importance of the success, and of the little chance there was that Buonaparté would be again able to take the field. He prudently avoided this, which clearly shews that it was only a part, and not the whole of the French army that was engaged. In Colonel Lowe's letter to Sir Charles Stewart it is said, that "Buonaparté is supposed to have had the great body of his army collected." It is also said by Sir Charles himself, that "the enemy are supposed to have had about the same strength as the Allies." But mere supposition goes for nothing, when the object in view is to obtain an accurate knowledge of facts. I have further stated, that it was the main body of the Allies with which the rear guard of the enemy fought; and that, notwithstanding this, they stood their ground. The French bulletin distinctly says, that "the whole of the enemy's army and quintuple forces" were engaged. This statement may be somewhat exaggerated; but if Lord Burghersh's account be impartially considered, it will not be found to go far beyond the truth. His Lordship informs, that "General Blücher began his attack about 12 o'clock; the Prince of Württemberg advanced about the same time; General Wrede arrived upon the right of the Prince Royal; General de Tolli formed the support of the different corps; and the Ulians of Prince Schwartzburgh made a most successful charge."—Here we have an actual combination of the forces

of Russia, of Austria, of Prussia, and of Württemberg; an attack upon the enemy by a large portion at least of the united armies of the Allies. This is estimated by Sir Charles Stewart at 70 or 80,000 men, and fully warrants my statement that the main body of the Allies were engaged. It was probably this circumstance which induced Lord Burghersh to denominate the affair a general one, for surely he could not mean that it was general as to Buonaparté's army, whose rear only was in the action. Now, let us see what the Allies accomplished by the overwhelming numbers which they brought into the field? Let us inquire whether they were really successful? whether they defeated the enemy? or rather whether they were not obliged to yield the palm of victory to the French? There are two dispatches from Lord Burghersh, the one dated the 1st and the other the 2d instant. In the former, his Lordship sets out with giving a view of the positions of the French army, prior to the attack of the Allies on the morning of the 1st. "It extended," says he, "across the plain from the front of Dienville on the right; by the village of La Rothière towards Tremilly on the left. In the front of the left, he occupied the village of La Gibrée, and the woods by which it was surrounded. In reserve, General Marmont was placed in the village of Morbillières. The heights also about the town of Brienne were occupied." Thus then it was, on the morning of the 1st instant: the French occupied the ground by, or near, the village of La Rothière, the village of La Gibrée, and the heights about the town of Brienne. This, it will be kept in mind, is not the French account of the matter; it is the account given by Lord Burghersh, a Lieutenant Colonel in our army, who writes from the spot, and who was himself a witness of the whole affair. It is besides corroborated by the letter of Colonel Lowe, who also was in the field of battle during the whole of the engagement. Having told us how the enemy was posted before the action, and I dare say they have been perfectly accurate as to this; let us now attend to the account given of their position after the action; let us see whether they were compelled materially to change that position, in consequence of the very formidable numbers brought against them, and these numbers led on by the redoubted General Blücher, supported by the combined military skill and talents of those celebrated officers Ge-

neral Barclay de Tolly, General Wrede, and the Prince Royal of Wertemburgh; and encouraged by the presence of the sovereigns of Russia and of Prussia. "Immediately after the battle commenced" (says Colonel Lowe) the Emperor of Russia, the King of Prussia, and Field Marshal Prince Schwartzburgh, came "on the ground." Neither Sir Charles Stewart, nor Colonel Lowe, mention any thing about the ground occupied by the enemy after the battle of the 1st. If indeed we are to believe the latter, who says he saw the whole affair, the victory of the Allies "was complete in every quarter;" which is as much as to say, that the French were *totally routed*, and driven from all their positions. Lord Burghersh, however, tells us a very different story. He says, "so ended the affair of this day; the enemy still held the ground beyond La Rothiere, and was still in possession, at the dark, of the heights of Brienne!" I suppose the reader begins to think, that he has enough of my Lord Burghersh's "most glorious victory." He has seen the French rear guard, at the beginning of the action, in possession of three strong positions; he has beheld an attempt made by the main body of the Allies to drive them from these positions; he has found their most famous generals employed in this attempt, and nearly a whole day spent in endeavouring to make an impression upon them: yet he has seen that same enemy, that enemy so very inferior in number to their opponents, at the close of the day, occupying two of these positions. Even La Gibrée, the other position, was not, according to the French accounts, abandoned till the battle had ceased. "The Duke of Belluno (says the bulletin) maintained himself the whole day at the hamlet of La Gibrée, notwithstanding the enormous disproportion of his corps to the forces that attacked it." What then was there in all this to justify my Lord Burghersh's statement, that the Allies had gained a most glorious victory, or how could this affair have "crowned Marshal Blücher in the annals of fame?" Laying numbers altogether out of view; supposing, for a moment, that the enemy had as many men engaged as the Allies, I do not understand how the relinquishing by the former of a small hamlet at the end of the battle, can be held glorious to the latter, because we all know that the troops of the Allies are well-disciplined veterans, flushed with victory, while those of the enemy

are raw conscripts, who never before were in battle, and who, as all the world knows, are so far from being hearty in the cause of the leader under whom they are fighting, that they detest and abhor him. It is thus that the public press speaks of Buonaparte and his army:—"The French army is completely disorganized; the old soldiers have been victims of the epidemic, or are in the hospitals; the conscripts are without arms; dejection and discontent are at their height. From the Marshal to the meanest soldier, all attribute the misfortunes of the two last campaigns, and the invasion of France, to the unmeasured ambition of their chief, and regard the passing events as a punishment from Heaven."—In these circumstances, the Allies ought not only to have completely routed the foe; to have recovered the positions whence they had themselves been driven; but to have captured their whole army. This was nothing more than what was to be looked for, considering the condition of the soldiers they had to encounter. But when it is seen that, with all these disadvantages on the part of the enemy, they were not only not driven from the field, but at the termination of the affair, "still held the ground beyond La Rothiere," were "still in possession at dark of the heights of Brienne;" what are we to think of those who could boast of this being, "a most glorious victory?" what are we to say of those who could discover nothing in all this but a signal defeat of Buonaparte? But, say these men, the Allies have taken 73 pieces of cannon, and about 4,000 prisoners from the enemy." What of that? Why did they not take all their cannon and all their men? Why did they not totally annihilate these raw conscripts; these "tall boys and old women?" Unless they can show that they did that, I say, they have done nothing to entitle them to thanks, and far less to claim the victory. But is it so very clear that the Allies took 4,000 prisoners? Is it plain that the cannon of which they possessed themselves, were legitimate trophies, fairly won in the moment of battle? Buonaparte tells us, that at the close of the engagement which was fought on the 1st, "few prisoners have been made on either side; we have taken 200." Lord Burghersh says, in his account of the same affair, that "3,000 prisoners are already in the hands of the Allies." I shall not pretend to say which of these statements ought to be believed.

But I cannot help thinking it strange that all these prisoners, and all these cannon, should have been taken from the French, without the Allies *admitting* that they had a single man killed, or wounded, or a single prisoner taken. Lord Burghersh states, that there was much *hard fighting*; that the Allies were "strongly opposed," that the French made *repeated* attacks upon them, and were repulsed with *difficulty*. Was there nobody but Frenchmen that fell on this occasion? were the skins of the Cossacks impenetrable to shot? or had the *holy charm*, which every Russian carries with him to battle, so miraculous an effect on this occasion, that they neither lost leg nor arm? But, reader, let me not deceive you; for I find, on again casting my eyes over the very "satisfactory and accurate" letter of Colonel Lowe, that I was mistaken in supposing the Allies had neither killed nor wounded. I say, I find I was *mistaken* in this, because I have now discovered, what had formerly escaped my notice, that "A Cossack orderly of General Cuissenaue, was *shot* by his (Blücher's) "side." I suppose this unfortunate Cossack had either lost his *holy amulet*, or had neglected, in the morning, to offer up his prayers to St. Nicholas. He had certainly been guilty of some very great crime, that he, of all the thousands who had been exposed to the fire of the enemy, should be the only one that was slain. But, perhaps, Heaven intended by this to show how highly it favoured General Blücher, by directing the shot, which was probably pointed at the "hoary veteran," to the head or heart of the Cossack, whom it levelled with the dust. "If Europe be saved," says the Courier, "Blücher will be placed in the first rank of her savours!"—But let us now return to my Lord Burghersh. If we are to consider his Lordship's statement a *faithful* detail of what passed on the 1st instant, we shall be compelled to admit the power of the *holy charms* of the Russians. But if we do not; if we are to regard it as a mere *partial* account of the proceedings of that day, and that many things passed before him, things which others, who saw them, viewed as matters of importance, and which were really so; if, I say, his Lordship has told us only *half* the truth in one instance, how are we sure that he has told us the *whole* truth in every other? Or rather, believing that he did transmit a *full* detail of these occurrences, how are we sure, when we find that detail, as I have found it in

the *Times* and *Courier*, disfigured and mutilated, that any part of it is correct? Buonaparté has been accused of "mean spiritedness," of "whining," and of "cowardice," because he tells his subjects the *extent* of his losses, and does not *conceal* from them the dangers to which the country is exposed. But I would rather trust a man who tells me *all* the truth, however disagreeable that truth may be, than he who keeps back a part of it. The former, I am certain, knows how to practise *deceit*: the latter values himself upon being an *honest* man. It is from this view of matters, that I am inclined to believe the following account which Napoleon gives of the cause of the loss of his cannon, to be the *true* one:—"In the midst of the obscurity of the night, a battery of the artillery of the guard, following the movements of a column of cavalry, which was advancing to repulse a charge of the enemy, lost its way, and was taken. When the cannoniers perceived the ambush into which they had fallen, and saw that they had not time to form their battery, formed themselves in a squadron, attacked the enemy, and saved the horses and harness. They lost fifteen men killed or taken prisoners."—The reader will observe, that I have hitherto been speaking merely of the battle of the 1st. I shall notice what is said about the loss of both sides on the 2d, after I have stated my reasons for believing that Buonaparté was not *personally* engaged in the battle of Brienne, and that he afterwards drew off his troops from that quarter, not because they were routed, but because he had *previously* intended to do so. Lord Burghersh does not say, in as many words, that the French Emperor took a part in the action. He merely states, that Buonaparté placed his army so and so, that Buonaparté continued the action with considerable obstinacy, &c. All this we know he could have directed to be done, without leaving his head-quarters. Of the Russian general, Lord Burghersh speaks thus: "General Blücher was present at the defence of this village, and contributed materially by his exertions in the repulse of the enemy." Here the person of Blücher is *completely identified* with the occurrences of the day, that it is impossible to mistake his being present. But there is no such identity of Buonaparté; it is not said that he was present in any part of the action. If he had been on the spot, it cannot be believed that Lord Burghersh would have omitted noticing, and

that in the most pointed manner, a circumstance so well calculated, as the defeat of Napoleon in person, to enhance the value of the victory. Besides, it appears from the French bulletin that he actually was not there. "On the 28th the Emperor went to Montierender. On the 29th, at 8 in the morning, General Crouchy, who commands the cavalry, sent word that General Milhaud, &c."

—Here we find him at a distance from the scene of action, and one of his Generals sending him word as to the movements of the Allies, a step which would not have been necessary had he been there in person to observe them. It is no where said that Buonaparté left Montierender until the 3d instant, on the noon of which day we find he "entered Troyes."—But I shall be told that the fact of Buonaparté's personal presence is put beyond all doubt by the letter of Colonel Lowe, who appears to have been a witness of the whole transaction, and, therefore, it was but natural to expect that he would be able to tell us something positive, something certain as to Buonaparté.—"Colonel Lowe's detail" (says Sir C. Stewart) is so satisfactory, and so accurate, from his having had the advantage of being with Marshal Blücher in "the advance during the whole of the day."

—Let us see then what this very accurate Colonel, who saw every thing, says about the presence of Napoleon. He states, that "Buonaparté, in person, it is reported by the prisoners, led on the attack himself, at the head of the young guard, and had a horse shot under him."—So this is what Sir Charles Stewart calls satisfactory and accurate information. It is reported by the prisoners. Why not asserted by Colonel Lowe who was "in the advance during the whole day," and could not fail to see Buonaparté if he "led on the attack himself?"—It is either true that Buonaparté led on the attack himself, or it is unlikely that Colonel Lowe was in the advance during the whole day.—For the former of these statements, we have only the report of the Colonel to whom it was reported by some prisoners; neither he nor Sir Charles Wilson say they believe the fact. But for the latter we have the positive assertion of both these officers. The fair and rational conclusion, therefore, is, that Buonaparté neither led on the attack himself, nor was present during any part of the action. The Times and the Courier, however, will have it that Buonaparté was "actively

"engaged," and the votaries of these lying idols, who would hold it criminal were they to entertain a doubt as to the veracity, are ready to exterminate every man who ventures to differ from them in opinion on this subject. With them the French bulletins contain nothing but "impudent falsehoods." Even our own official accounts are rejected, or thrown aside, if they come in contact with their favourite journals. But leaving these groveling insects to enjoy their fancied triumph, let us proceed, in the development of the motives which induced Buonaparté to withdraw his rear guard from before Brienne. We have already seen that this was not because of a defeat, for at the close of the battle, as admitted by Lord Burghersh, "the enemy still held the ground beyond La Rothière, and was still in possession, at the dark, of the heights of Brienne." Even "next morning" (i. e. the morning of the 2d instant) says his lordship, "his rear guard was in occupation of the position of Brienne." Those who have been in the practice of observing the military progress of Buonaparté, must have remarked, that he has been indebted for the greater part of his victories, to his manœuvring, and the promptness with which he executes all his designs. In fact, he calculates more upon the rapidity and variety of his movements, than upon any other circumstance.—These he knows tend to embarrass his opponents, to deceive them as to his ulterior views; and when he finds, as he commonly does, that he has bewildered them, that he has drawn their attention from the real object he has in view, he never fails to turn this to good account. The advantages which Napoleon had gained on the side of Brienne, prior to the 30th of January, though very decisive in their nature, seem to have been more the result of the impetuosity and enthusiastic courage of his troops, than of any regular plan of his nature. They had driven the Allies from several strong positions; but there were still others which the vast accumulation of force that every day brought to the Allied army, rendered much more formidable, and which Buonaparté, with his usual penetration, appears to have very soon discovered required something more than the native enthusiasm of his raw undisciplined soldiers to overcome. He, therefore, determined on concentrating his army, and effecting a junction of his different corps, which at that moment occupied separate positions, for the purpose of enabling him

to carry on operations in a quarter, where he had calculated upon acting with greater effect. That Buonaparté had formed this resolution prior to the battle of the 1st, appears to me clear from what is said in the official bulletin, which the reader will probably think with me, deserves as much credit as the very "satisfactory and accurate" letter of Colonel Lowe, of which we have already had so notable a specimen. "The 31st," says the bulletin, "was employed by us in repairing the bridge of Lesmont, on the Aube, the Emperor intending to advance towards Troyes, to operate upon the columns which directed their march by Bar-sur-Aube, and the road of Auxerre upon Sens. The bridge of Lesmont could not be repaired before the 1st of February in the morning; a part of the troops were immediately made to file off." Here, then, it is distinctly stated, that Buonaparté had resolved on the 31st ult., if not before, to remove his headquarters to Troyes; to advance, not to retreat, as the *Courier* most impudently asserted. Not only had Napoleon adopted this resolution on that day, but he actually caused a part of his troops "immediately to file off."—These were the troops who had, only two days before, defeated the Allies, after a whole day's fighting, and driven them beyond Brienne. Instead of filing off in consequence of having been themselves beaten by the Allies; instead of retreating before a victorious army, they were retiring of their own accord, in compliance with the orders of their Generals who had cut out work for them in another quarter. The circumstance of the other divisions of Buonaparté's army having been previously in advance towards Troyes, at once accounts for this one being called the rear guard. It is true, neither Lord Burghersh, Sir Charles Stewart, nor Colonel Lowe tell us any thing of the intention of the French Emperor, nor of the actual movement of his troops on the 31st January. But I have already shown, that the dispatches of these officers, as they appear in the *Gazette*, are entirely silent as to every thing that occurred before the 1st instant. The "most glorious victory" obtained on that day by the Allies was enough for them to think of. It gave them no leisure, even had they felt the inclination, to notice events which had proved glorious only to the enemy, and which they were not disposed to be the willing instruments of handing down to posterity. No, no; they knew the taste of "John Bull" better than

"he after such naughty tricks." But they could not conceal from the public, at least for any length of time, the fact as recorded by Buonaparté; neither could the attentive observer long remain ignorant, that the French rear guard had actually begun its march towards Troyes, before the allied army ventured, even with all its accumulation of force, to attack it. Napoleon foresaw that it was probable something might be attempted against this part of his army, and therefore he provided against it. We have seen what was the result. Not the defeat and dispersion of the enemy; no compelling them to abandon their positions; but, on the contrary, a complete repulsion of the main body of the united army of Russia, of Austria, of Prussia, and of Württemberg, acting under the immediate command of their most celebrated Generals, and encouraged by the presence of the Emperor of Russia, the King of Prussia, the Prince Royal of Württemberg, and the never to be forgotten Prince Schwartzburg, who, in person, received, on this occasion, a sword from the Emperor Alexander, for the skill and talent he had "displayed in bringing the troops under his orders to the brilliant situation" which they then occupied.—Mark, reader, the brilliant situation of troops, who had endeavoured for nearly a whole day, but in vain, to compel the rear guard of Buonaparté's army to abandon its positions.—But, then, though the Allies could not, with 80,000 men, force this incorrigible rear guard to move an inch, they took "75 pieces of cannon and about 4,000 prisoners" from them. We have already seen, that it was not by fighting, but by accident, that the Allies got possession of a great proportion, at least, of these cannon. We have also seen it positively asserted by Buonaparté, that, at the termination of the battle of the 1st, "few prisoners were made on either side."—The affair of the 1st had created a pause in the movement of the enemy's rear. But after the action was over; early in the morning of the 2d, it again began to file off. "His columns," says Lord Burghersh, "appear to have begun their movement to the rear, about one in the morning." "It successively took positions" (says the French bulletin) to finish passing the bridge of Lesmont and rejoining the rest of the army." It was at this critical moment that the Allies again resolved to renew the attack. They saw the rear guard separated from the main body

of Napoleon's army; they observed its exposed situation, occasioned by the necessity there was of changing its front, and of contracting its files, in order to effect the passage of a narrow bridge. Taking advantage of these circumstances, and while part of the French division were actually "in position upon the bridge of Rosnay," it was "attacked by an Austrian corps which had passed behind the woods." It cannot be surprising, then, if a part of the French division, which must have remained on the Brienne side of the bridge of Rosnay; which must have been isolated from the mass of the rear guard that had either crossed or was "in position upon the bridge." It will not, I say, appear extraordinary if some of those troops which were surprised by the Austrian corps that had been concealed from view by the woods, were taken prisoners, and that a considerable number of them were killed and wounded. The French bulletin states their loss in the two days at from 2 to 3,000 killed or wounded; and adds, "that of the enemy has at least been double." Our dispatches, on the other hand, do not acknowledge the loss of a single man on the part of the Allies; except, indeed, we admit, that the "orderly Cossack," who fell by the side of Blucher, ought to be considered a person slain in battle, and not by the hand of St. Nicholas, as a punishment for losing his holy amulet, or for having impiously neglected to offer up prayers to that Saint. Which of the statements are to be adopted as the most correct, the reader will be at no loss to determine, from what I have already said. For my part, I cannot refuse my assent to the leading facts stated in the French bulletin, because that statement appears perfectly open, natural, and consistent; whereas, on the other side, there is an obvious concealment of some of the most important results, which is sufficient, in my apprehension, to create a doubt as to the truth of the whole.

Occurrences of the War.—Dispatches have been received from Lord Burghersh, dated Troyes, the 8th instant, from

which it appears, that the Allies entered that place on the 7th, in consequence of Buonaparté having left it the night before, and proceeded to Nogent. Troyes is about 95 miles from Paris, and Nogent 70. The following French official bulletin, which has been confirmed by the arrival of Paris papers to the 15th instant, shows that Napoleon has again commenced offensive operations, and that these have been attended with very considerable success. The engagement took place near Chateau Thierry.

—*Paris, Feb. 12. (Telegraphic Dispatch.)* The day before yesterday, Feb. 10, the Emperor completely defeated a Russian corps near Sezanne. The General was taken, and his Staff, forty cannon, 6,000 men, all the caissons, the baggage and matériel. Yesterday, the 11th, the Emperor completely defeated and put to rout the corps of General Sacken, of whom he has taken 50 pieces of cannon, and 10,000 men."

The negotiations are still going on at Chatillon, whence dispatches were received from Lord Castlereagh, dated the 10th. The *Morning Post* says, "that Lord Castlereagh has recommended to his colleagues the measure of peace with Buonaparté, whose authority is most unfortunately ascertained to be *unshaken*, and his means of carrying on the war *ample enough to discourage the hope of breaking down or overthrowing his power*;" "that the allied powers have found the enemy *much stronger* than they expected; and that unless we become parties, not only in the negotiations, but to the treaty which they are concluding, we expose ourselves to the charge of being considered as the sole obstacles to peace, and being left alone to bear the burdens of an exhausting war, which we might have closed with safety and honour." It is said by the *Morning Chronicle*, that the *Morning Post* is the government demi-official journal, as the *Courier*, which depreciates all intercourse with the "Assassin of one of the Bourbon Princes," is that which belongs to Carlton House.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

"THE SCOURGE OF GOD."—A Correspondent, whose letter will be found in another part of this Number, has "taken me to task," as it is called, upon the subject of my notions, relative to the charge against Buonaparté, that he is the "*scourge of God*." A charge, indeed, it is not, in my view of the matter; but, rather, an exculpation.—This gentleman, who calls himself a constant reader, sets out with observing, though, I must confess, in a very moderate strain, that I do not understand matters of polemic divinity. He is very right; but, then, he should bear in mind, that I never pretended to understand them; and, he must permit me to observe, in my turn, that to say that I am ignorant of what I am writing about, or have been writing about, is but an indifferent opening to an answer to my positions or my arguments.—This subject, I am told by my correspondent, is not my *fort*; but, be it remembered, that I have never attempted to enter into it, except in cases, where our adversaries have mixed up religion with politics, and in such a way as made it impossible to separate them, in any commentary upon their writings. If divine right; or divine power; or divine authority, be introduced into a political discussion, it must make part of the subject on one side as well as on the other side. If the adversaries of our liberties will, in future, forbear to enrol Divine Providence on their side; if they will forbear thus to degrade, or endeavour to degrade the Deity, for the purpose of giving a sanction to the acts of tyrants, they will never find me introducing religion, or religious subjects, into the Register. But, so long as Napoleon, or any other despot, though more hypocritical than he, shall put forth his claims to obedience, upon the ground of his being upheld by God, so long shall I, as often as the case requires, endeavour to show the folly of all such claims. So long as there are men or nations, who make war, to plunder and to oppress, and to waste the blood and treasure of millions of men, and to destroy hundreds of thousands of lives,

in the name of *Divine Providence*, it will be right and necessary to inquire into the probable share which Divine Providence has in the matter.—So much for the general objection to the mixing of religion with politics. It is not I who cause this unnatural mixture; but those vile men, who are continually dragging Divine Providence into the discussion.—My reasoning is, too, always, upon these points, *hypothetical*. I pretend to know nothing at all about the will of God in these political matters. I merely take the positions of the adversary, and show, or endeavour to show, that they are false; or, that, if true, they make against, instead of for, the hateful and bloody cause of the tyrants of the earth, the enemies of human liberty and happiness. If, in doing this, I wound the prejudices of men, who have never thought for themselves; if I offend men, who will have it, that the Bible was dictated by God to be a rule to men, and yet, that men ought to be execrated for imitating the examples there given; men, who will have it, that Napoleon may have been an instrument in the hands of God to do certain things, and yet, that those who adore God, ought to execrate Napoleon for doing those things; men, who think, or pretend to think, that God sent Napoleon to Moscow, and that now, to punish him for going to Moscow, he is sending the Cossacks to burn Paris. If I offend men of this sort, I am not sorry for it; for, I am very sure, that such men are utterly incapable of thinking right upon any of the matters, with regard to which it is my wish to produce an impression on their minds. Such men, though they may talk about liberty, do not, and cannot understand what it means. They are the creatures of habit, of error, of passion; fit to make part of a rabble, but quite unfit for any thing beyond it.—I now come to the particular points of my correspondent's letter.—Certain writers having denominated Napoleon, the "*Scourge of God*," and then imputed to himself the guilt, the infamy, of the acts committed in that capacity, I showed the inconsistency, the folly, the absurdity, of such notions. My corres-

pendent, however, appears to think, that there was no inconsistency in them. He says, that there is a great difference between positively *authorizing* an act, and only *permitting* it; between *causing* an evil, and subsequently *converting* it to good. And then he asks me, whether Nebuchodonosor was not employed by God to chastise his chosen people, and whether he was, for that reason, guiltless of the *excesses* he committed against that ill-fated, but ungrateful nation.——Now, in the first place, it sounds a little oddly, to call a nation *ill-fated*, who were God's chosen people, and who, as we are afterwards told by this same correspondent, were under the *immediate government of God*, who was their lawgiver, and who gave them his particular commands, as the Scripture tells us, even as to the mode in which they ought to go to the privy. It sounds odd, I say, to call such a nation an *ill-fated* nation.——As to what Nebuchodonosor did, I do not pretend to be a judge of that; but, if he was “*employed*” by God to chastise the Jews, he must have been *guiltless* in the case, because God was *almighty*, and *compelled* him as well as employed him. But, then, my correspondent has his salvo here; for, he talks about “*excesses*.” If, indeed, the grass-eating king went *beyond his tether*, that is another matter. It is not, indeed, easy to conceive how his almighty, and all-seeing, and ever-present employer should suffer him to do more against his chosen people than he wished him to do. I tether my cows, for instance, and it now and then happens, that, tempted by the ungrazed pasture, they pull the pin out of the ground and rove, for a time, at large. But, I am not all-powerful, all-seeing, and ever-present. If I were, the length of the tether would describe the radius of their ramblings.——Be this as it may, however, my correspondent, in *lugging in the excesses of the grass-eating king*, deviates from the point. For, be it borne in mind, that the notion of our adversaries was, that Napoleon was an *instrument* in the hands of God. They talked of no *excesses*; and, indeed, they did well to avoid this shocking absurdity, of a man *partly* an instrument and *partly* a free agent.——But, more of this when we have seen a case stated by my correspondent in illustration of his doctrine.——Suppose, says he, A possessed an unlimited power over his two slaves B and C. If C, for some offence, has justly forfeited his life, and A commands B to punish him with death, it is

evident that B is a mere passive instrument in the hands of A, and is in no way chargeable for what he has done. But, if A, resolving to punish C, finds B predisposed to murder him, but without commanding or even interfering further, than by refusing to prevent what will answer his purposes of justice, suffers B to put his design into execution, it is clear, that though B *may be called the instrument of A's vengeance*, he is still chargeable with the guilt of the deed, suggested by his own malice.——So that, if a jailer were to murder a condemned felon, he might be *called*, might he, the *instrument of the government*, and yet be hanged himself for the offence? And the government might, might it, if informed of the intended murder, very innocently *permit* this execution of the design and end of the law, and then cause the jailer to be tucked decently up for the deed, though the government had the power of prevention, and must be considered as accessories before the fact?——Was there ever any thing so monstrous as this?——But, into what absurdities do not men fall when once they begin to make the Deity a direct and immediate actor in the affairs of men!——To apply this illustration to the case of Napoleon, my correspondent first supposes, that Napoleon, as well as the scourged nations, were both under the absolute and *immediate* power of God. He next supposes, that the scourged nations *richly deserved all the scourging that they got*. This is supposing a great deal, and is quite sufficient to stop the mouths of all those hypocrites, who affect to pity them, while, in fact, they are only indulging their malice against Buonaparté, and endeavouring to perpetuate, for their own emolument, war against him. But, the salvo is, that, though these nations so richly deserved the scourge, like the slave C, the slave B, who represents very aptly Buonaparté, was *predisposed* to scourge them, whether they deserved scourging or not.——Now, before we go any further, how does my correspondent happen to know, that Napoleon was *predisposed* to the acts complained of? from what source does he draw his knowledge upon this subject? has he received his information from Napoleon, or from God himself? If he will have it that God immediately intervenes in the affairs of men, how does he know, and what reason has he to show, that Napoleon was *not* urged on and impelled by God in doing all that he has done? Besides, what does it signify by *predisposing*? He ought to *hate* in mind,

that he is speaking of a Being, who is all-powerful, all-seeing, and ever-present. What such a Being *permits*, he must *will*. And, therefore, to say that he permitted Buonaparté to scourge the guilty nations of Europe, is, in fact, the very same thing as to say, that he compelled him to scourge them, and that he was neither more nor less than an *instrument* in the hands of God. So that, this illustration of my correspondent, and all these qualifications of his, leave the matter just where it was before, except, indeed, that he acknowledges that which the anti-jacobins never have acknowledged; namely, that the scourged nations richly merited their scourging.—I return, therefore, to my former argument; to wit, either Napoleon has been an instrument in the hands of Divine Providence, or he has not. If not, why do you call him the scourge of God? If he has been an instrument in the hands of God, why do you blame him for executing his divine commission?—My correspondent asks me, “were the Jews, “think ye, less criminal in having sacrificed “the Son of God, because he had been *delivered up by the determinate counsel and “fore-knowledge of God?”* That is a question which I do not choose to answer. I am not going to say that a set of scoundrels who put Jesus Christ to death for promulgating opinions hostile to the interests of knavish priests, were not guilty of a most foul and abominable crime. I am not going to say any thing in justification of these persecutors of opinions; these legal murderers. But I will not meddle with the question at all, because I will not, in spite of the temptation, enter into a religious controversy, and because my correspondent cannot make the case which he has cited in point, until he finds it recorded in the scriptures that the scourged nations of Europe were delivered up by the determinate counsel and fore-knowledge of God.—Another topic on which my correspondent has chosen to observe, is that of *plunder in war*.—In writing upon the case of Moreau, I had occasion to notice the immense sums which he had amassed together during his campaigns; and I had occasion to observe, that plunder was the soldier’s legitimate harvest, in proof of which I cited from the holy scriptures an instance, wherein God himself, through his instrument, Moses, had warranted such plunder, particularly in the case of the unfortunate Midianites, who were first stripped, by God’s chosen people, of all their goods and chattels, and were then,

by the command of Moses, the servant of the Lord, all slaughtered, men, women, and children.—Here, my correspondent chooses to stop in his quotation, and he falsifies, too, for I never said that they were all slaughtered, the fact being, and as I fully stated it, that all the girls, who had not known man, were kept, by the command of Moses, and divided amongst the soldiers, or men of war. And this was a very material point; because these girls formed a very considerable part of the plunder; and I introduced them with great care, in order to show to what extent plunder in war was authorized by the holy scriptures; ave, by that book, that very book, in the reading of which, or the hearing of which we are told to look for eternal life, and in promoting the circulation of which, such immense sums are now employed, and so many persons of great authority and of great wealth are engaged.—My correspondent does not deny, however, that plunder is the soldier’s legitimate harvest, and, therefore, he can see no just cause, probably, for that outcry against Napoleon which has been set up on account of his having enriched himself, or, rather, enriched France, with the spoils of Italy; nor would he, perhaps, be very much inclined to censure the Cossacks, who seem to be the favourites in England, for any plunder that they might make in France, after the Israelitish fashion. But, says he, though I do not deny that plunder is the soldier’s legitimate harvest, I deny that you can justify French plunder from any example of plunder raised by the Jewish soldiers; and this is the curious ground upon which he founds his denial.—He says, that “the form of the Jewish government, was that of a real “Theocracy, that is, a government under “the immediate superintendence of God “himself, who was the ruler of the Jews, “not under the simple title of governor of “the universe, but was, strictly speaking, “the temporal sovereign, who gave them “a code of laws, which was the sole direction of their political conduct, and “every authority, whether ordinary, or “extraordinary, received its delegation “immediately from him.” Therefore, says he, there can be no similarity in the cases on which to ground a parity of reasoning.—If this be the case, away goes at once all the Old Testament, at any rate; and all these copies of the Bible that are circulated about, and all the sermons, and all the prayers, which poor boys and girls are desired to be incessantly making, must end

to the producing of great and general mischief. The people constantly hear sermons, founded on texts of this book. They are constantly exhorted to look on it as their guide; to resort to it, in short, as the means of procuring to themselves everlasting salvation; they are told that it is the word of God; they are told, that if they diligently read it, they can scarcely fail to do well in every act of life. What incredible pains have been taken to inculcate these notions; to fasten them in the minds of the people; to make them the notions prevalent over all others. How many hundreds of meetings of the nobility, of the gentlemen, of the clergy, of all ranks and descriptions of people, who have a shilling in their pockets, have there been and are there yet daily held for the sole purpose of ingrafting these notions upon the very first buddings of the mind, not excepting the children in the navy and the army, with respect to the latter of whom, the Duke of York, as Commander in Chief, has piously lent the aid of his great authority in the furtherance of the holy work. Nay, it is come to that at last, that in London, which takes the lead in every thing, good as well as bad, and whose example in this respect, we may expect to see followed, subscriptions are opened, for the purpose of causing Bibles to be printed and circulated, where people may subscribe any sum, even so low as *one penny*.—And, yet, in the midst of all this, directly in the teeth of all this, after all the soldiers have had Bibles put into their hands, and have, doubtless, in obedience to the wishes of their commanders, carried them in their knapsacks on foraging as well as other expeditions, up starts my correspondent, and with front of ten-fold brass, tells me, and tells the public through me, that we are not, as to cases of plunder, to take the Bible for our guide, because, forsooth, the government of the Jews was a government by God himself! If this be the case, if we are not to look upon the Bible as a sure guide in this respect, why are we to look upon it as a sure guide in any respect; why are we to consider it as any guide at all?—My correspondent very slyly observes, that he *believes* me to *assent* to the *inspiration* of the scriptures; and that he *hopes* that I am acquainted with the history of the Jewish people. To be sure I assent to the inspiration of the scriptures; and to the inspiration of the *whole* of them too, and not to that of bits and pieces of them. I take them all together, and I take them, too, in

the fair meaning of the words that are made use of. And, now, that I have made this avowal, let me ask my correspondent, why I am to look upon the ten commandments as any rule of conduct for me, unless the soldier is to be guided by the example of plunder in the case of the Midianites? I may, indeed, find that the Commandments are more consonant to the present practice of the world; but, as far as they have any *authority* from the book I find them in, they are exactly upon a level with the rest of that book, and, of course, when the book tells me, that God commanded his chosen people to do *this* or *that*, I look upon it that I ought to pay strict attention to the example.—If this be not the case, how dangerous must it be so widely to promulgate the Bible, and, indeed, how wicked must it be, to put it into the hands of ignorant people and of children, and that, too, observe, without any commentary; without any explanation; without any thing to guide them in selection. It is well known, that one of the heaviest charges, brought against the Romish church, was that of keeping the Bible out of the hands of the people, and of performing divine service in a language which the people could not understand. That church was accused of a desire to keep the mass of the people in ignorance; but, if the doctrine of my correspondent be sound, that church acted not only wisely, but charitably; for, how are the common people; how are the sailors and soldiers; how are the little girls and boys to distinguish between those parts of the Bible which they are to look upon as rules of conduct, and which parts they are to look upon in a different light? If it be true, that these exceptions and distinctions of my correspondent, ought to be made, selections from the Bible ought to be published, and not the whole of the book. Some Synod, some Chapter, some Council, ought to be held, in order to determine what parts of the Bible should be selected for general circulation. To put the whole into the hands of the people, and then to tell them that only a *part* is to be attended to by them, is certainly the most ridiculous, or at least, one of the most ridiculous, proceedings that ever was heard of.—I have now, I think, answered the letter of my correspondent, whose talents I am by no means inclined to underrate, but which talents I should like to see exerted in a very different way. I will engage for him, that he has never given subjects of this sort that consideration

of which his mind is capable. He has taken things upon trust; he has adopted notions, in early life, which he has never had the leisure or the resolution critically to canvass. Prejudice has had too much power in his mind to suffer him to give to truth a fair chance of success. If this were not the case, it is impossible, that he should not perceive, that if Napoleon has been an instrument in the hands of God, and that, too, to punish a guilty people, Napoleon himself must be innocent of all the sufferings of those people.—The misfortune is, that men cannot find means sufficient to answer their wishes in reviling each other, without resorting to supernatural support. They must bring God or the devil everlastingly into their quarrels. The complainant has always God on his side, and his adversary the devil on his side. This, it is, which involves them in intricacies and inconsistencies without end. If they would be content to judge of men's actions upon principles immovable in nature, and upon those rules of morality which are universally recognised, they would expose themselves to no danger of being ridiculed, or of being defeated in argument, unless their premises or their conclusions were false. If the petulant scribes, to whom my correspondent refers, had been content with censuring Buonaparté merely as an invader and a conqueror, they would have had much stronger ground against him, than they could possibly have after they dragged the Almighty into the quarrel. When once they did that, they drew round the person they attacked, a wall of brass, and, accordingly, they have retired defeated from the fortress.—One more observation I will add, and that is, that it always appears very surprising to me, that those, who have been, and who must, if they be not sheer hypocrites, be such decided enemies to the Church of Rome, and such friends to *religious liberty*, should be so bitterly bent against Napoleon, who has done more for religious freedom than was ever done before in the world. He has, in a great part of Europe, in the fairest and most populous part of it, given men liberty to be of what religion they please. He has put down persecution; he has, in short, as to religion, emancipated half Europe, if we estimate Europe by the worth of the climate and the products of the earth.—And yet, the most zealous protestants, who so loudly complained of the Catholics, would murder him if they could.

Sir,

The extensive circulation which your Register possesses, and the weight and importance which your opinions, as an author, are known to bear, make me anxious to see corrected a most fallacious argument which you have more than once adduced within the last six months, but which has been particularly obtrusive in your latter Numbers. I confess, Sir, that for many years I have read your publications with pleasure; and however I may have been inclined to differ with you on certain points, I have uniformly admired you, on political subjects at least, for originality of thought, strength of expression, clearness, accuracy, depth, and solidity of argument, that I do not often find in the productions of the day. But pardon me if I presume to tell you, that on subjects unconnected with politics you do not always write with equal success; and that in the opinion of many of your sensible readers, you rather mistook your own powers when you turned aside to discuss controversy with your late sceptical correspondents. But it is neither my business nor inclination to quarrel with you about your *choice* of subjects; I adverted to a fallacy in your *mode* of arguing, and to that let me confine myself. Commenting upon certain news-paper writers, who had probably, in the exuberance of a rhetorical pecty, first designated Buonaparté *the scourge of Providence*, and then imputed to him the guilt of every act committed in such official capacity. You cannot, it seems, reconcile the apparent contradiction: for, either you argue he is commissioned by Providence, or he is not. If he is not, why call him the scourge of God?—(truly)—if he is, why oppose him, why even blame him for executing his divine commission?—Really, Mr. Cobbett, do you see no difference between positively *authorizing* an action, and only negatively *permitting* it: between *causing* an evil, and subsequently *converting* that evil into an instrument of good? Was not Nebuchodonosor employed by God to chastise his chosen people? but, was he for that reason guiltless of the excesses committed against that ill-fated, but ungrateful nation? Or were the Jews, think ye, less criminal in having crucified the Son of God, because he had been *delivered up by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God*?—(Acts xi. 23.)—Let me illustrate this position by an example. Suppose A possesses, no matter by what means, an unlimited power over his two slaves B and C. If C, for some of-

fence, has justly forfeited his life, and A commands B to punish him with death, it is evident that B is a mere passive instrument in the hands of A, and is no way chargeable for what he has done. But if A, resolving to punish C, finds B predisposed to murder him; but without commanding, or even interfering further, than by refusing to prevent what will answer his purposes of justice, suffers B to put his design into execution, it is again clear, that although B may be called the instrument of A's vengeance, he is still chargeable with the guilt of the deed which his own malice had suggested. In the first instance, A would *authorize*; in the second, only *permit* the deed:—and thus your seeming paradox becomes perfectly reconcilable; and it proves to be not only figuratively but strictly true, that Buonaparté may be the *scourge of God*, and still responsible for the miseries he entails upon mankind:—and, further, that mankind are perfectly justified in resisting his corrections whenever he comes to work the godly work among them.—Again, speaking of the fortune which Moreau had acquired during the Revolution—“I am not, you observe, insinuating any blame in him (Moreau) for having amassed a great deal of property in this way. Plunder is the soldier's legitimate harvest; and we know what abundant harvests of this sort we read of in Holy Writ, as having been expressly commanded by God himself, a memorable instance of which we have in the case of the Midianites, who were first stript, by God's chosen people, of all their goods and chattels, to an immense amount, and were then, by the command of Moses, the servant of the Lord, all slaughtered, men, women, and children.”—(Pol. Reg. Vol. XXV. p. 145.) Now, observe, I am not going to question Moreau's right to the property thus acquired, nor to discuss the truth or falsehood of the abstract proposition, that *plunder is a soldier's legitimate harvest*; but, as far as such right or such legitimacy is attempted to be grounded upon the precedent referred to, I own I am at a loss to account for the paltry sophism. I cannot, consistently with the opinion I have already passed upon your merits as a logician, suppose you so ignorant of the first principles of the art of reasoning, as to argue from a particular to an universal proposition; and I am unwilling, from the general candour of your statements, to impute it to wilful misrepresentation. Relative to the cause then I am content to suspend my judgment. But, seriously, Mr. Cobbett, assenting as I believe you do to the inspiration of the Scrip-

tures, and acquainted, as I hope you are, with the history of the Jewish people, can you find any analogy in the two cases, on which to ground a parity of reasoning? The government of that people, every one knows, differed essentially from every government that had existed before, or has existed since.—It was not, in the times we speak of, a monarchy, nor an aristocracy, nor a democracy, but a real theocracy; that is, a government under the immediate superintendence of God himself. He was their ruler, not on the simple title of governor of the universe, in which sense he may be called the ruler of every nation; but, strictly speaking, he was their *temporal* sovereign. He gave them a code of laws, which for nearly 1,500 years was the sole direction of their political conduct; and every authority, whether ordinary or extraordinary, received its delegation immediately from him. If this were the form of the Jewish government, and its enemies were the enemies of the Author of nature, how can the Israelites be chargeable, even by implication, either with robbery or cruelty, when, in obedience to the express command of God, they first despoiled, and then exterminated the Midianites, whose crimes had merited so severe a punishment. And, provided the ends of divine justice were accomplished, what signified it, whether God employed for this purpose the fires of heaven, or the waters of the deluge; or, whether he availed himself of the instrumentality of man, which, while it effectually punished one guilty nation, read an awful lesson to a stiff-necked and rebellious people against falling into crimes, towards which they were so prone, and taught them the power and majesty of that God whom they themselves were not to insult with impunity. And what room is there to institute a comparison between a nation governed immediately by God, and at his suggestion, which they could not possibly mistake, acting so terrible but so extraordinary a part, with the lawless self-authorized depredations of a banditti, who, so far from pleading a divine commission for what they did, seemed to have declared against God himself, and were openly at war with every vestige of piety and religion? No, Sir, you could not have been serious when you imagined the resemblance; but if you were, and if you will state the grounds of your opinion, I shall receive your corrections with as much pleasure as I am sure your candour will admit the remarks of,

A CONSTANT READER.

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.

MR. EDITOR,—It is now some time since an intended publication was announced, under the title of “*Observations on the CHARTERS and STATUTES of the UNIVERSITY of OXFORD*, so far as they relate to the PROCURATORIAL POWER over the non-matriculated inhabitants of that place, and on the VICE-CHANCELLOR’S COURT.” This work has not yet appeared, and report says, that it never will. From a conviction that recent circumstances require something to be said on the subject, and to be said without any further delay, the person who now addresses you is induced to come forward, though his plan is more confined than that announced as the title of the intended publication must necessarily have been.—The writer of these observations never had an opportunity of inspecting the Charters of the University, but has been informed that some were granted previously to the time of Henry III. and others by that prince and his more immediate successors, and that they were all confirmed by parliaments in subsequent reigns.—The Statutes of the University are printed and published, and consequently are accessible to every one. Previously to the time of Charles I. (in whose reign, through the exertions of Archbishop Laud, who was the Chancellor of the University, and a Committee for the purpose in Oxford, they were drawn up in their present form) they are said to have been a confused chaos. This code remains still in force, “except upon points where the exigencies of modern times have pointed out the wisdom of amendment or abrogation.”—The writer feels less regret from the circumstance of his never having seen the Charters, as it is the commonly received opinion in the University, that in the Statutes, under their present form, every thing that was thought necessary or conducive to discipline, was carefully selected from the Charters and former Statutes, with some additions; and, at the same time, many things were omitted which had either become obsolete, or were considered as unnecessary and useless.—It is the writer’s design to confine himself to the Statutes, in the form in which they are now extant; and more particularly to those parts of them which relate to the Vice-Chancellor’s Court, and the power of searching houses, with some cursory remarks on the Procuratorial office.—He has selected these parts of the Statutes, because they are more odious, and more repugnant to the spirit of the English Constitution,

and in their execution more liable to abuse than any other; because, by the latter, the University officers, if unhappily they should be so inclined, have many opportunities of exceeding their legal power; and because, by the former, they might be less liable to punishment (from circumstances to be mentioned hereafter) than in His Majesty’s courts of common law.—In the Vice-Chancellor’s court, that officer himself, or his assessor (who is appointed by him) sits as judge, assisted by the two University Proctors, whenever they may think fit to attend. The process is carried on “in a course much conformed to the civil law;” that is, the evidence is all in writing, and there is no jury. “In this court, the University has the liberty of claiming cognizance, in exclusion of the King’s courts, over all civil actions and suits whatsoever, when a scholar or privileged person is one of the parties, excepting in such cases where the right of freehold is concerned.”*—Now, as the Vice-Chancellor and Proctors are the officers upon whom the duty principally falls, of carrying the Statutes into execution, and to whom almost the whole of the executive government belongs, it may happen, as, with all their dignities, they are but men, that they may err in the performance of their duty, or exceed their legal authority, and that an action may be brought against them in this very court (for, according to the present system, it can be brought in no other) for false imprisonment, or some other offence, to which the best and wisest of magistrates are sometimes liable. The consequence would be, and, no doubt, to the great satisfaction of the plaintiff, that they would be judges in their own cause; or if, on the other hand, they are plaintiffs, and institute an action against any person by whom they might think themselves aggrieved, they would be equally judges in their own cause, to the no less satisfaction of the defendant.—The thing is so ridiculously absurd, and, at the same time, so enormously unjust, as to be scarcely credible.—BLACKSTONE, who was himself a fellow of one of the most respectable colleges in Oxford, and, as Professor of Canon Law, read his Commentaries in the form of Vinerian Lectures, and who from his frequent residence, and his connexions with the place, and his habits of legal research, must have fully understood the spirit of the Statute, “*De Curia Commissarii sive Vice-Cancellarii Universitatis*,” has placed the

* Blackstone’s Commentaries, B. iii. ch. 6. § x.

matter in a clear light, when he says, that "THESE PRIVILEGES (of the Vice-Chancellor's Court) WERE GRANTED THAT THE STUDENTS MIGHT NOT BE DISTRACTED FROM THEIR STUDIES BY LEGAL PROCESS FROM DISTANT COURTS, AND OTHER FORENSIC AVOCATIONS." We can hardly suppose it possible that it could have been in the contemplation of those who framed the Statute, that the officers of the University, and those very officers, too, who have the right of sitting as Judges in the court, should protect themselves by such a monstrous privilege, in actions brought against themselves. It is, however, well known, that on the authority of this statute, claims of cognizance have been made in actions brought against the Proctors for false imprisonment, within a few years past. It is almost needless to add, that these actions, on cognizance being granted, were abandoned, except in one instance, in which the plaintiff, as well as the defendant, was a matriculated man, and in that instance the cause was tried in the above-mentioned court, and judgment given for one of the Proctors, who was defendant. The other actions were no more heard of, for the plaintiffs, however high their opinions might have been of academical justice and integrity, felt no particular desire to put themselves to the expense and trouble of having their causes tried in a court where there is no jury, and before men appearing in the double capacity of judges and defendants.—As the matter stands at present, to put an hypothetical, though not an exaggerated, case; let an act of the most gross injustice be committed in Oxford by the proctors against any individual, though he may be a perfect stranger to the place, and quite unconnected with the University, his only possible mode of seeking redress is through the medium of this court;—a court, in which there is no jury, in which the expenses are great, and the process tedious; and in which (for that material circumstance should not be omitted) the defendants, if they think proper, may sit as judges.—Under these circumstances, the situation of the inhabitants of Oxford is peculiarly hard. They are put out of the protection of the common law of the land, in every case (short of felony) in which they may be aggrieved by the proctors, or any matriculated man. They are subject to the most odious kind of interference from the University officers. By a particular statute* they are liable to have

* Titulus XV. § 4. *De Donibus Oppidanorum non frequentandis.*

their houses searched both by day and night, at any time that the proctors (who are frequently young men without much experience or knowledge of the world, and often elated by the power intrusted to them by virtue of their annual office) may think fit; and no redress is to be obtained, for any excess or abuse of power, however enormous it may be, but from a court, in which there is no jury, in which the expenses are so great as to operate to the total exclusion of the poorer clients, and in which the very persons who may have committed the injury complained of, are entitled to sit as judges.—The statute which authorizes the search of houses, authorizes a measure utterly repugnant to the spirit of our constitution, and to the feelings of Englishmen. This statute conveys the power of a general search-warrant—a most unconstitutional measure, and liable to great abuse, as the necessity may be insisted upon by the officers, when it does not exist in reality. If there be any alleged necessity of searching houses, a special warrant should be granted for the particular purpose by the Vice-Chancellor, who is always a magistrate, and the parties should be responsible to the common law of the land. At all events, if the exercise of this enormous power be necessary, there should be some check on its abuse, and the proctors should not be allowed to carry it into execution on their own individual and sole authority; and the courts of common law should be open, as in other places, to those who may be aggrieved.—The writer is aware, that it may be said, although the right exists of searching the house of every inhabitant, without any distinction or limitation, that the practice of searching has, of late years, been confined to houses inhabited by prostitutes and women of bad character. But this reply is unsatisfactory and vague, as the power still remains of carrying it into execution to its full extent; and as it gives the proctors the liberty of deciding on the characters of all the female inhabitants of the place, and of condemning them, from partial representations, or individual caprice.—However desirous we may be to suppress prostitution, we should recollect, that we are not justified in punishing offenders beyond the limits marked out by the law. The method which has been lately used in Oxford of apprehending women of this description for merely appearing in the streets, though walking orderly and quietly in the daytime, and sometimes when they have left their homes to purchase things in the shops.

is surely a rigour beyond the law. By what statute of the University, or law of the land, the conviction, and consequent commitment to prison, by the Vice-Chancellor, is justified, the writer (though he has taken the greatest pains in examining the statutes) is not able to discover. — The mode of conduct lately pursued towards these unfortunate females seems to be both cruel and inefficacious. — All severity of punishment, and particularly in these cases, is unjustifiable, unless preceded by some attempt to *reform* the objects who are amenable to it. Without such an attempt being made, what can be more cruel than to commit to a cold and damp cell of a prison, and, perhaps, in an inclement season of the year, a female, whose constitution may have been weakened by disease. The lamentable consequence of such a proceeding is sometimes a rheumatism so severe and inveterate, as to cripple the patient for life: and an instance is well known to have occurred in Oxford of an unfortunate prisoner being driven into a state of insanity, from which she never recovered. — Its inefficacy is apparent from the circumstance of the delinquents being obliged, from necessity, as soon as they are enlarged, to return to their former course of life. Whatever remaining sense of decency they might have, when first committed to prison, soon leaves them. They become desperate from their wretched state of suffering, and renounce all propriety of conduct. By the disgrace brought upon them by the notoriety of this ignominious punishment, they are deprived of all means and opportunity of retrieving themselves. — This cruel severity has been the ruin of many who otherwise would have had an opportunity of recovering their characters. Considering the peculiar situation, in which young females are placed in Oxford, from the many temptations that surround them, and the difficulty of obtaining employment, the motives of christian charity, independently of those of common humanity, loudly call upon the officers of the University to temper justice with mercy. Instead of their offence, on its first detection, being made public by their commitment to prison, an opportunity should be given them of recovering themselves from their unfortunate state, of which they are frequently more sensible than the merciless persecutors imagine. — If in the foregoing remarks the writer has ever expressed himself strongly, it must be attributed to the abhorrence he feels of every kind of cruelty, and particu-

larly of that which assumes the semblance of justice, or is clothed in the garb of authority. For publishing these observations, he exposes himself to the censure of the rigid disciplinarians of the University. They will exclaim, that he has endangered the discipline of the University, and espoused the cause of the profligate and undeserving. — With respect to the discipline of the University, the writer is convinced that it derives its best and most lasting support, from an open and manly conduct in the public officers; from firmness, united with conciliating manners; not to mention that it is possible, that the methods put in practice to suppress vice, may, themselves, have a most dangerous tendency, and even exceed in turpitude the particular vices they are designed to correct. To encourage spies and informers, and to listen at doors, and to peep through windows, are means so base and disingenuous, that if they did not fortunately create disgust, they might by their example have a most pernicious effect, and weaken every moral principle. — In anticipating the other charge, the writer can only say, that it is the boasted privilege of this country to have justice administered with an even hand; that the profligate should be punished, but punished according to the known and equal law of the land, and not with greater severity than that allows; and that by good magistrates, reformation will always be preferred to severity of punishment.* To which may be

* It would be desirable that a commission should be appointed, under the sanction of parliament, for every two or three adjacent counties, (according to their size) consisting of a certain number of persons who should visit every prison and house of correction, (and perhaps workhouses might be added) in such counties, at least every two or three months, but not at stated periods, and as much oftener as they might think proper. The commissioners should be elected, and well paid, both as to salary and travelling expenses, by the counties in which their visitations might be held. A new election should take place at the end of every two or three years. Their commission should enable them to inquire into the management of such prisons, houses of correction, and workhouses; to investigate the chief circumstances attending the commitment of every prisoner, and to have the power, wherever a case seemed to be marked with any peculiar severity, or whenever the prisoner's good behaviour appeared deserving of favour, to mitigate the summary convictions of magistrates, and sentences of quarter sessions. They should make a report of their proceedings every six months, to be laid before the Privy Council, and both Houses of Parliament; of which report copies should be transmitted to the Mayor or Chief Magistrate of every city, town, and borough, in the respective counties.

added the writer's conviction, from circumstances which he does not wish to particularize, that the method lately pursued has had a very different effect from that of increasing the morality of the place!—It is hoped that the University will no longer persist in the support of the above-mentioned abuses, but that they will amend and explain the Statutes in question, so that the inhabitants of Oxford may be placed within the protection of the canon law of England.—What objection the University can have to this measure, the writer cannot readily conceive; for he cannot suppose that they would wish to protect their officers in the exercise of any illegal power, or in the commission of any thing that is unjust. This measure, too, would have the desirable effect of putting an end to those jealousies and disputes, which are now apt, on every opportunity, to break out, and to shew themselves in open acts of violence. It would, in short, tend to civilize the manners of the place, to extinguish inveterate feuds, and prevent the frequent recurrence of disgraceful scenes of riot.—The writer repeats that he has brought forward the preceding facts and observations, from a conviction that both the morality and discipline of the University, so far from being improved, are injured by the method now pursued. He is bound in duty, as well as inclination, to support the privileges of the University, but not their abuse; and he conceives that the best way of supporting them is to clear them from the abuses with which they are now polluted, and not to lay upon them a greater stress, or load them with a greater weight of authority, than they were ever intended to bear.—It was never the intention of the framers of that Statute, which is the most odious and obnoxious of any—of that which allows the entering and searching of houses—that it should ever be put into execution, unless the persons in whom the authority was vested, were certain that gownsmen were in them at the time. If they did it under other circumstances, it should be at their own peril. It was designed that the Vice-Chancellor's Court should protect the Students from “being distracted from their studies by legal process from distant courts,” and not that it should protect the University officers from any action or suit arising from the alleged abuse of their power.—The writer's observations respecting the extreme severity of the University officers against certain unfortunate females, were intended

to shew that the methods now pursued are cruel, in proportion as they are ineffectual; that some means should be adopted, which would at least have a probable chance of effecting a reform in their conduct; and at the same time, it was the writer's design, to suggest to those persons, who are not divested of every feeling of humanity, that the sorrows, and misery, and disease, almost necessarily attendant on prostitution, are, in the way of punishment, sufficiently severe and acute, without the superadded horrors of a prison; and the distress arising from cold, starvation, and confinement.—The writer will only add, that it is the duty of the inhabitants of every place to observe the conduct of the magistrates; for great power is naturally attended with perversion and abuse. When the blessings of peace are restored to our country, it is most earnestly to be hoped that the legislature will have leisure, as well as inclination, to inquire into abuses, and more particularly into those which partake of cruelty and oppression, and to diffuse throughout the land the benefits arising from the impartial administration of equal laws.—After all, however, in cases of this nature, much will always depend on accidental circumstances, and on public opinion; on the good sense and feeling of those in power, and on the temper and spirit of the people.

Oxford, February, 1814.

THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON AND HIS ARMY.

The details of Buonaparté's recent victories over the Allies, which are now generally known, speak a language more decisive in favour of his superior skill and splendid military talents, and are better calculated to abash incredulity, and to silence his calumniators, than any thing I can write. That the allied army, at least that part of it under the command of Blücher, had advanced to within 60 miles of Paris, is a fact which no one can dispute. But that the Allies had reached this point in consequence of having defeated Napoleon, is what I, for one, am not so ready to admit. Since the battle of Brienne, we have learned from a dispatch of Lord Burghersh, dated Troyes the 8th instant, that Buonaparté left that place on the 6th, and proceeded to Nogent. This movement his Lordship attributed to the inability of the French Emperor to fight his opponents. In my last, I ventured to give a different view of the

matter: I stated, that Buonaparté appeared to me to have drawn his troops from Brienne to Troyes, not because he had been defeated, but because he had previously intended to operate with them in another quarter. He determined, I said, "on concentrating his army, and effecting a junction of his different corps which at that moment occupied separate positions, for the purpose of enabling him to carry on operations in a quarter, where he had calculated upon *acting with greater effect.*" This opinion of Buonaparté's plan, was formed by me in consequence of an impartial consideration of the details of the battles of the 1st and 2nd, as given in the French bulletin, and in our own Gazette. I was aware that the point upon which Lord Burghersh and I differed, could only be settled by the *result*; because, if Buonaparté had been greatly defeated; if the Allies, as his lordship asserted, had gained "a most glorious victory," it was very clear that Napoleon could not recover from this for several months, and that the Allied army might proceed to Paris without any interruption. But if, as I contended, he was *not* defeated at Brienne, but had repulsed his assailants, he would then be able, in a few days, according to my opinion, to meet the Allies and give them battle.—What then has been the result? Has Buonaparté given way before the immense and powerful armies which threatened to close him in on all sides? Has he been unable to protect the city of Paris from being plundered and burnt by the "northern hordes?" Did the alarm, which such a prospect was calculated to excite, occasion the removal of the seat of government from the capital? Did the Empress, yielding to the natural timidity of her sex, fly for protection, with her infant son, to a spot where she would have been in greater safety? Did symptoms like these, which would at once have indicated the discomfited and feeble state of Buonaparté's army, appear at any period among his subjects? Or rather, was not every Frenchman devoted to his cause? Did they not, with enthusiasm, join his standard, and march to expel the invaders, the moment he signified this to be his wish? Were not the constituted authorities at Paris, knowing that the sovereign had under his command a numerous and well provided army, perfectly confident that he would overcome all difficulties, and that however near, and however great the danger, the experience of the past was suffi-

cient to satisfy them, that they had nothing to fear while the destinies of France were in the hands of Napoleon? To the *result* then let us look for a solution of these queries. We have in this case no dispatches from a Burghersh, a Stewart, nor a Lowe, to guide us in our inquiry. We must therefore rely on the accounts given by the enemy, till these gentlemen are again pleased to favour us with more "intelligent and accurate details."——From the French official accounts then it is clear, that Buonaparté, only a few days after he retired from Brienne, attacked the Allies at various points, and obtained over them a series of splendid victories. The "army of Silesia, concludes the bulletin, "composed of the Russian corps of Sacken and Langeron, the Prussian corps of D'Yorck and Kleist, and about 80,000 strong, has been, in four days, beaten, dispersed, annihilated, without a general action, and without occasioning any loss proportioned to such great results."——We also learn from the same source, that the wreck of this formidable corps, which had been within "three marches" of Paris, was in full retreat towards Rheims, a distance of nearly ninety miles from the French capital. The *Times* newspaper, which at last is forced to acknowledge these misfortunes, endeavours to conceal its chagrin, and to console its readers by *hoping* that Blücher may get over them. "Notwithstanding the *disasters,*" says that journal, "*(for such they must be confessed to have been)* which Marshal Blücher has experienced, we may *hope* to see him in a very few days at the head of a formidable army, and *perhaps* resuming the menacing attitude which he lately maintained."——But this is plainly the language of despair, *not* of hope; for if Marshal Blücher could not force his way to Paris when at the head of the flower of his army, and having only raw undisciplined troops to oppose him, how is it to be supposed that he can effect this by the straggling remains of a defeated army (though he were again to succeed in bringing them into action) against an enemy flushed with victory, and commanded by a General like Buonaparté? The idea is absurd. I am, indeed, of opinion with the Parisians, that "the most violent enemies of France are defeated; the others are not more terrible." By the "others" is clearly meant the army under Schwarzenburgh. To this army, say the war faction, "we have a right to look with still

"higher expectations." But who, I ask, gave them that right? Upon what are these expectations founded? Not, surely, on the accounts which have already arrived of successes obtained by the Austrians, but the contrary. It appears, while Buonaparté was engaged with the army of Blucher, Schwarzenburgh pushed on to Nangis, only 40 miles distant from Paris. Here, however, the Austrians were attacked by Napoleon in person, who, according to the latest official accounts, defeated them, took "6,000 prisoners, among whom were several Generals, and a great number of officers, and 14 pieces of cannon." These accounts add, that "his Majesty was following up his successes." Is it this new disaster, then, which excites the "high expectations" of the enemies of France? Do they see nothing but victory and prosperity in what common sense tells us is misfortune and defeat? Are they determined to shut their eyes, even against conviction, till they are compelled to open them by some terrible and overwhelming event?

—But, say the *Times*, "new adversaries press daily towards the scene of contest; and if Blucher has been forced to retire towards Soissons and Rheims, this is the very ground which the Crown Prince's army is destined to take up. A bulletin of his Royal Highness's army, dated at Cologne on the 12th instant, announces his having crossed the Rhine in person on the 10th, and having resolved to unite his whole army upon a line between the cities above mentioned, there to act as circumstances shall require."—Yes, Bernadotte is very right to keep at a respectable distance from Buonaparté; to be a looker on, while his former master cuts up the Russians, the Prussians, and the Austrians in detail. I have no doubt his Royal Highness has sufficient penetration to discover what is likely to be the issue of the contest, and that he is prepared to "act as circumstances shall require."—He is a Frenchman by birth; he fought in the ranks with Frenchmen for the liberties of his country; and though his elevation may have a little changed his former views as to patriotism, and led him to take up arms against the land which gave him birth. Though, I say, the recognition of his claim to the Crown of Sweden by this country and the other allied powers, may have somewhat altered his notions as to the vulgar meaning of the words "to love one's country;" yet he cannot have forgot what Frenchmen, at one period, actually

accomplished when stimulated by that old-fashioned phrase. It cannot have escaped his memory, that it was this same love of country—the possession of the comforts and advantages they enjoyed under a government chosen by themselves, which enabled the French people to resist every attempt made by combined Europe to interfere in their internal affairs. He knows well that the same causes usually produce similar effects; hence his caution; hence his tardiness in approaching the "scene of contest." He must, long ere this, have ascertained the fate of Blucher's army, and the extent of the Austrian reverses. If, in possession of these facts, he advances from Cologne, he must be aware that he endangers the safety of his whole army; because, in the event of Buonaparté routing the Austrians, he may then turn his attention towards the Crown Prince, who, in that case, would run the risk of being defeated in the field, or of having his retreat cut off by the French garrisons occupying the fortresses on the Lower Rhine, who only want the signal of the Emperor to pour out their numerous legions, and intercept the retreating foe. Besides, Cologne, where Bernadotte was on the 12th instant, is at least 170 miles north of Rheims, the place to which he intends marching his troops. In the present state of the roads, he could hardly be expected to move an army of 70,000 men with all its artillery, its baggage, and its waggons, to so great a distance, in less than 10 or 12 days. This would make it the 22d or 24th of this month before they reached their place of destination. Even then, Bernadotte would be four days' march from the head-quarters of the Allies, supposing them to remain at Nangis when he arrived at Rheims. But the fact is, the Allies were driven from that place, as we have already seen, on the 17th instant; and it is more than probable, that the next accounts will inform us, that they had been compelled to fall back on Troyes, or, perhaps, on Besancon. In any view, therefore, that can be taken at present of the advance of the Crown Prince of Sweden, I do not see how it can afford a rational ground of hope favourable to the cause of the Allies. In my opinion, there is nothing to which they can look for safety, but in peace with Buonaparté. The chance of dictating this at Paris, if ever any existed, is gone for ever. The French people, who never betrayed any want of confidence in their Emperor, view him now

with greater affection than at any former period. When he returned to Paris from Leipsic as a supplicant who had lost two-thirds of his army, they received him with cordiality; they consented to enable him to recover his fallen fortunes. Now that he has in part succeeded in this; now that he has given additional proofs of his extraordinary talents, and has again been forward in exposing his person in battle; now that victory has once more crowned his efforts; it appears to me that no power on earth can separate him from the affections of his people. What, then, has France to fear from 200,000 Austrians? Were they ten times the number; were even Paris itself environed with this host of foes, Buonaparté, possessing the same regard, the same attachment which all Frenchmen bear towards him at this moment, would, in my opinion, ultimately prevail, and compel the enemies of his country to respect her. If, indeed, the Powers of Europe, who are at present leagued against France, do not soon embrace the opportunity so favourable which now offers of making peace with Napoleon, it may, perhaps, not be long till he again dictates his own terms in one of their capitals. The affairs of France were at as low an ebb, if not lower, about 20 years ago, than they were lately; yet the French people rose above all their difficulties, gave the law to their invaders, and annexed a larger portion of territory to their dominions than was enjoyed by any of their ancient kings. It was only through the *treason of her allies*, that she fell from this pre-emiuent station. She is now, however, fast recovering from the blow. France, in reality, is herself again. Who, then, will take upon him to say, if she is goaded on by the present as she was by the former coalitions, that the reaction which this must create, will not prove more fatal in its consequences to Sovereigns than what it has done at any prior period?

The following article from Paris, will show pretty clearly the nature of the feeling which pervades France as to its present government:—"Paris, Feb. 17.—To-day, at one o'clock, the Russian General Alsuffieu, and two other Generals taken prisoners in the late battles, entered Paris on horseback by the barrier of Gate Saint Martin, escorted by some gens d'armes. They were all in uniform; one of them is decorated with several orders.—From the entrance of the suburb to Place Vendome, they alighted, they were followed by an immense crowd,

"which continually made the air resound with cries of '*vive l'Empereur!*' The tops of the houses, situated upon the Boulevards, and in Castiglione-street, were filled with people.—The public joy was manifested in the most expressive manner, but it had nothing uncivil in it towards the prisoners. Frenchmen triumph over their enemies, and know how to respect the conquered.—After having passed some moments with the Etat-Major-General of the place, the enemy's Generals went into a carriage, and set out for their destination.—The principal places of the different Mayoralties, at this moment, present a spectacle well calculated to interest the friends of humanity. There are seen arrive from morning till night carriages or porters laden with voluntary gifts, offered by citizens of all classes. Some send beds complete, others shirts, handkerchiefs, stockings, caps, in short every article which can be useful to the sick or to the wounded. In many houses the women and young girls abandon their usual employment to make bandages and lint. The sums of money that have been deposited for the same purpose are already very considerable.—Every one has hastened to bring his offering. Persons who live by the labour of their hands, and who are scarcely above want, have deprived themselves of many necessary things to dedicate them to the service of suffering humanity. They expect no other recompense than that heartfelt satisfaction which accompanies virtuous actions. They know that their brethren, their defenders, are in want, and they fly to their assistance.—If benevolence is a duty, it is especially so when it is exercised towards those brave warriors who shed their blood in a cause so just as that which we maintain.—We are threatened by enemies who wish to deprive us of all that is dear to us. The cannon no longer thunders on a foreign land—blood flows in our towns and in our fields. It is not to deliver some of our provinces only; it is to save the country itself, the bosom of which is torn by cruel enemies; it is to defend our hearths, our wives, our children; it is to prevent a stranger from treating us as an enslaved and conquered people, that the Sovereign calls us to the field of honour.—What gratitude do we not owe those brave men who repel with such magnanimous courage all the at-

“tacks of the enemy. Our armies have shewn him, that the French are especially invincible when they fight to deliver their territory under the eyes of their Sovereign. The successes which we have just gained have animated our army with new courage, and ought to be a presage to the other armies of the coalition, of the fate that awaits them. Let us preserve then the attitude which becomes the French. Each of us has duties to fulfil, and it is by fulfilling them that we shall prove to all Europe that the French nation is worthy of the high rank which it occupies among civilized nations. What sacrifice can be too great when it is made to second the views of Government—assist our brave defenders and save the country?”

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IN NORWAY.—These sort of things called Declarations of Independence are become quite the fashion now-a-days.—We had lately something of that sort from Holland, which created a great noise and bustle for a little time; which excited an ephemeral joy among all ranks, who hailed the event as the harbinger of the downfall of Napoleon. But how is it, that the Norwegian affair has not produced similar effects? how is it that the Park and Tower guns have not been fired to celebrate the era of the national independence of the people of Norway? Do the regular governments begin to think, that they have avowed too much in behalf of the rights of humanity; that they have been too forward in recognizing the general principles of liberty? Or do they wish to discountenance the act of the Norwegians; to set their face against the emancipation of nations which they have not been active in promoting, or which may run counter to what they consider the balance of power, and the territorial arrangements which they have determined on, as necessary to the repose of Europe? Whichever of these views have been taken of the subject, it is certain that the Declaration of Norway, has not met with that cordial reception here which was lately given to that of the Dutch. To me it appears that neither of these events are calculated in any way to benefit the people. It is only a change of sovereigns that we hear of in both cases. The claims of the inhabitants to a restoration of their just and natural rights, have not once been mentioned in either of the countries. In Holland, indeed, all their former pretensions to a

free representation, are now absorbed by the establishment of unlimited monarchy. There is one individual, however, whose views must have been sadly balked by the change in Norway, and that is, the Crown Prince of Sweden. We all know that this magnanimous prince, besides receiving £60,000 a month, of our money, was promised the sovereignty of Norway, as a reward for joining the coalition against his former sovereign and native country. One of the articles of the treaty which he concluded with us, did, in fact, stipulate that we were not only not to oppose any obstacle to the annexation and union in *perpetuity* of the kingdom of Norway as an *integral part* to the kingdom of Sweden, but also to assist the views of his Majesty the King of Sweden to that effect, either by our good offices, or by employing, if it should be necessary, our *naval co-operation* in concert with the Swedish or Russian forces.”—The Danes no doubt *ceded* Norway to Sweden by *treaty*, for which Denmark, in return, received Pomerania, and of which, there is as little doubt, she has by this time obtained full possession. But after the court of Copenhagen had thus succeeded in her views, and very likely got possession of the £200,000. agreed to be paid her by England, it comes out that the cessation of Norway was all a fudge; that the Norwegians had previously declared for independence; had separated themselves from Denmark, and, consequently, that the Danes had no right to dispose of their territory, or to interfere in any shape with their internal government. It also appears, that the Prince whom the Norwegians have chosen for their King, is a member of the royal family of Denmark—a circumstance which clearly shews that the Danes, if they did not interfere directly in the affair, were at least acquainted with what was going on; and, of course, that it was a mere humbug on their part to put their name to a treaty, which conveyed and guaranteed to Sweden the possession of a country over which Denmark had lost all right of control. Here then is a pretty piece of business to exercise the ingenuity of our political jugglers. We have *pledged* ourselves to employ force; to give “our naval co-operation towards rendering Norway an *integral part* of Sweden.” Shall we, or shall we not, fulfil that pledge?—The *Morning Post* says, that, to pacify Bernadotte, we can give him another island. But why not *two* islands when our hand is in the business? We have plenty of them to spare which, in one

view, cost us very little; nor could any one presume to say, on the conclusion of a peace, that we were as bad as the Danes for giving away other people's property, because, if *conquest* is to be held a ground of right, then we are the legitimate proprietors of all the islands we have conquered, whether from our Allies the Dutch, the Swedes, or the Danes; for these last also have become the Allies of Great Britain, notwithstanding all the abuse they loaded her with for the burning of Copenhagen. But, says the *Courier*, in opposition to the *Post*, we have now nothing to do with the affair: "the Court of Denmark, by its treaty with Sweden, ceding Norway to her, and receiving Pomerania in exchange, has rendered our naval co-operation unnecessary." I suspect, however, that this jesuitical answer has not proved so satisfactory to Bernadotte as the *Courier* Man would wish. The Crown Prince is not so great a booby as to believe that the mere signing of a treaty is all that is required of the contracting parties; or that, if *deception* has been played off on either side, it is not the bounden duty of every one concerned to assist in counteracting the evil tendency of the deceit. I do not say that Bernadotte should not accept of the additional island offered by the *Post*, rather than quarrel with Denmark; but I am clear, as we have put our names to a solemn treaty, by which we are bound to obtain, and that by force of arms, "the annexation and union in perpetuity of the kingdom of Norway as an integral part to the kingdom of Sweden," that we cannot refuse to co-operate with our fleets in accomplishing this object, if Sweden should require us to do so. I am not here speaking of the justice or injustice of wresting Norway from Denmark. What I am contending for is, the sacredness of treaties, which, I say, ought to be *literally* and *strictly* fulfilled, otherwise we violate the first principles of moral justice. Now that Bernadotte has crossed the Rhine, and gone into France, a very little time will shew, whether he has taken this step on purpose to fight Buonaparté, or only to suplicate the interference of the Allies with respect to Norway.

OCURRENCES OF THE WAR.—In my last I stated, on the authority of French official papers to the 15th instant, that Buonaparté had commenced offensive operations against the Allies, and that these had been attended with very considerable

success. Since then, accounts have reached this country from France to the 21st instant, which not only confirm the above statement, but present to the view a series of victories which, for splendour and decision, stand unparalleled in the history of the world, and exalt the military character of Napoleon far beyond the pitch it had formerly reached. The first of these engagements, which have terminated so glorious to the French arms, and so disastrous to the invaders, was fought on the 10th, at Chateau Thierry, about 60 miles from Paris, with a division of Blucher's army, amounting to about 8,000 men. Buonaparté commanded in person, and the result of that affair was from 5 to 6,000 prisoners; among whom were the general and his staff, with 30 pieces of cannon, and all the waggons and baggage of the Russians. Next day, the 11th, Napoleon attacked and defeated another division of this army near Montmirail, about the same distance from Paris. This was a hard fought battle, and continued the whole of the 11th. I have not been able to ascertain the number of troops engaged on both sides, but they must have been considerable, as the loss of the French "amounted to more than 1,000 men killed or wounded," and that of the Russians to 8,000, in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Nine pieces of cannon, and 6 stand of colours, were the fruits of this day's victory. "This memorable day," says the French bulletin, "which founds the pride and boasting of the enemy, has annihilated the élite of the Russian army." On the 12th, the remains of this army were pursued by the French cavalry. Their retreat having been covered by the arrival of some fresh troops, these were attacked on all sides; "an horrible carnage" of them was made; three pieces of cannon, which they had brought with them, fell into the hands of the French, who also took 2,000 prisoners, and a Russian General. On the 14th, Blucher advanced in person at the head of 20,000 men towards Montmirail. Buonaparté, who was at Chateau Thierry, when he received the accounts of this movement, set out from that place at four in the morning, and having reached Montmirail about eight, he immediately commenced operations against the Russian general, who was stationed at the village of Vauchamp. The contest was not long doubtful. Marshal Blucher was defeated, with the loss of "10,000 prisoners, 10 pieces of cannon, 10 colours," and a great number in killed and wounded.

"Thus this army of Silesia," concludes the French official accounts, "composed of the Russian corps of D'Yorck and Kleist, and about 80,000 strong, has been in *four days* beaten, dispersed, annihilated, without a general action, and without occasioning any loss proportioned to such great results."—After Napoleon had thus disposed of Blücher's army, we find that he then made dispositions to proceed against Schwartzburg, who had reached Nangis, only 40 miles distant from Paris. Here the French Emperor attacked him on the 17th; took 6,000 prisoners, among whom were several generals and a great number of officers, and 14 pieces of cannon." In consequence of this defeat, the Austrian general fell back to Montereau, about 20 miles from Nangis, where he was next morning again attacked by Buonaparte, and overthrown with the loss of 3,000 prisoners, one general and three pieces of cannon.

From Italy we learn, through the same channel, that the arms of France have also been victorious in that quarter. On the 8th instant a battle was fought with the Austrians on the Mincio, in which the Prince Viceroy took 2,500 prisoners, among whom were 40 officers. Five thousand of the enemy were killed and wounded." The French admit that they lost in this affair "2,500 men *hors de combat*." Another engagement was fought on the 10th, in which the Austrians had 200 killed, and the same number taken prisoners; the French 20 killed, and 150 wounded.

Nothing has transpired as to the progress of the negotiations. Dispatches are said to have been received from Lord Castlereagh, dated from Chatillon, the 18th. Of course

his Lordship may still be supposed to remain at that place.

The messenger who brought over the dispatches from Lord Castlereagh, is said also to have brought accounts from headquarters, "that Marshal Blücher lost in the whole of his actions with Buonaparte about 13,000 men, but his corps was re-established at Chalons, and, by the reinforcements which he had received, it amounted to upwards of 50,000 men, in the highest order, with which he was marching upon Troyes."—The same messenger states, that he "received information on the road, that Buonaparte had forced the Austrian corps at Montereau; but no general battle had taken place."

—The *Gourier*, from which I have taken these accounts, also contains the following article:—"Advices have, we understand, been received from Admiral Young, in the *Roompot*, dated the 22d, stating, that on the 14th, General Winzingerode had stormed the strong camp of Soissons. Two Generals and between 6 and 7,000 men were killed, 3,000 prisoners, 13 pieces of cannon, and many ammunition waggons taken.—Of this great victory not the least mention has been made in the Paris Papers."

Dispatches have been received from Lord Wellington; but their contents have not transpired. If it is true, as has been generally stated, that transports have proceeded to Holland, to convey General Graham, and the troops under his command to the Passages, an attack of the enemy may probably be anticipated, against which Lord Wellington wishes to provide.

Two French frigates, the *Alcmene* and *Iphigenie*, have been taken off Madeira, by the *Venerable*, one of our 74s, and the *Cyane* a sloop of 20 guns.

NOTICE.

Some of those Gentlemen, who preserve the Register in *Volumes*, having expressed their regret, that the STATE PAPERS, and other important DOCUMENTS of a public nature, are, in future, to be excluded, and their representations appearing to have great weight in them, it has been determined on to continue the publication of these Official Papers; not, however, in the *Weekly Numbers* of the Register, but in a compilation, to be published once in 2, 3, or 6 months, as shall hereafter appear to be best adapted

to the purposes in view. It is intended to print these documents in the same type, form, and size of paper with the Register itself. The price will, of course, be proportionably lower, because no stamps will be required, as it will be unnecessary to dispatch this part of the work by post. There will be, as at present, an *Index* Sheet to the Weekly Numbers, and another Index to the Public Papers. The latter publication may be taken, to be bound up with the Weekly Numbers, or not, at the option of the Reader.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

WAR OF EXTERMINATION.—The faction, in this country, who began, and who have so long been such strenuous advocates of, under all circumstances, the war against France, have been, on many occasions, and upon tolerably good grounds, accused of wishing for a war of *extermination*; but, I do not know, that they have, until this time, ever *openly* and *unequivocally* avowed such wishes. Heretofore, they have usually disguised their real views under the pretence of wanting to obtain *security*, *safety*, the *independence*, or the *deliverance* of Europe. Now, however, they, without any disguise whatever, come forward, and express the ardent desire never to have peace with France, till the Sovereign of that country is deposed; nay, until he be *put to death as a malefactor*.—These sentiments are expressed in an article, published in the Courier news-paper of about a fortnight ago, under the title of a Meeting, held at the Thatched-House Tavern, in St. James's-street, on the 12th of February. —I shall insert this article at full length. It is a great curiosity in its way. It will deserve attention hereafter; and, it will certainly account, in some measure, for any bitterness of hostility which may be discovered by Napoleon against this country, should he chance to survive his dangers, and to triumph over a combination, the greatest that ever was, I believe, known, or heard of, in the world.—The article to which I allude, and on which I am about to comment, was published in the following words:—"At a meeting of Gentlemen at the Thatched-House Tavern, St. James's-street, Saturday, 12th of February, 1814, the following Public Address was agreed to:—Approaching, as we now seem, to the conclusion of a warfare, that has been sustained for the maintenance of Government and the social system, *against the assaults of the French Revolution, during a period of more than 20 years*, it appears to us, that a Declaration from the people at large, of sentiments that are suited to the circumstances of the present moment, will be highly

useful to the great Cause, and will contribute to strengthen the Government of their measure of negotiating with the Allies. —It appears to us, that the people of this kingdom, having made trial of one Peace, which was used by the Ruler of France only as an interval of breathing and recruiting for levying fresh war upon his neighbours, have, for years, made up their mind to the necessity of carrying on war as long as the same monster is endured by the French nation as their Ruler. There is, accordingly, throughout this prosperous nation, no call for peace, as has been in all former wars, Persons of all classes acquiesce, with patience and with fortitude, in the burdens and misfortunes attendant on the defensive struggle, which is to protect us against the slavery imposed upon others, who did not so defend themselves. Happily the Sovereigns and the People of the Continent have, at length, followed our example; and the whole of Europe is now united against the common enemy, who appears, at last, to be at their mercy, pursued, as he is, into his own territory, where there is no sign of a disposition in the people to stand by him, and save him from military execution. —In this crisis of Europe, it is our opinion, our earnest prayer, and our firm hope, that there will be no contract, no treaty, no parley, with the Man whom the French still suffer to be their representative among the Powers of Europe. He is a *known liar*, *impeator*, *thief*, and *murderer*; one who would not be borne, as a private person, in a low station of life from which he had been raised during the reign of wickedness in France. And how can Britons consent that their King should enter into covenant with such a one, as his equal! or that a British Nobleman or Gentleman should be degraded to the office of treating, or holding converse, with such instruments of assassination and villainy as are the Ministers and Servants of such a Monster! The like repugnance, we are sure, must be felt in the breasts of our Allies; because it must be wherever

“there is any thing royal, any thing noble, any thing honest. But we having been the leaders in this war, it seems peculiarly our province to give the word, and be the first to proclaim our opinion, with whom it can, and with whom it cannot, be terminated. — While we declare thus peremptorily against peace with the hateful Ruler of France, we are conscious that we speak only from a desire and a love of peace; being fully persuaded, that such happy state is never to be enjoyed while that man has the power of disturbing it, whenever it suits his projects of rapine and desolation so to do; and being convinced, as we are, that such a sentence of disqualification, pronounced against him by the Allied Powers, is the last step that need be taken for terminating the war, and restoring the former state of things in Europe. *It would be a signal to the French people to do justice on their oppressor, whom they have long determined not to spare at home*, when they once see him thoroughly beaten and discredited abroad. — The contempt, the hatred, the abhorrence of that man's character, have long been general throughout this country; and, on the present occasion, we believe it to be a general sentiment, that he ought not to be recognised as a Sovereign Prince, and treated with for peace; *but rather, that justice should be done upon him as a malefactor*. If this is really a general sentiment, we trust it will be generally declared. It is a time for the people to raise their voice through the country. When the French first made war upon us with their revolutionary principles, and their revolutionary hostilities, the people spoke for themselves, in support of the King and Constitution; and it was their public declarations and associations that gave a tone to the exertions of Government, which has been our main support through this long warfare. The contest seems now to be reduced to one single object, *the overthrow of the odious Tyrant himself*. Let the people now shew themselves, to put a finishing hand to their own war. Let them declare against a peace with the Tyrant of France. When the popular opinion of this nation is once declared, we shall see what will be the conduct of the King's government; and, very soon after, we shall see what will happen in France. — *PRO REGE ET POPULO.* — Here, then, it is openly avowed, that we

ought to continue the war, until we have killed Napoleon, or caused the French to kill him. Motives of safety for ourselves; safety for Europe; motives of conquest, of honour, are all laid aside; we are now to spend our money and shed our blood, in this holy war, for the destruction of one man, and for the forcing upon the French nation, that great, populous, gallant, polite, and ingenious nation, a government, or, at least, a ruler, whom they now have chosen to set up over them. — This impudent faction say, that they have a great majority of the people of this country with them. I do not believe it; but, if it were so, that would not change the nature of the doctrine, which they promulgate. It would only prove, that it is more extensively prevalent, and would, to every just mind, afford additional cause of regret. — The French people are appealed to by this impudent and bloody faction. This faction, who only want the courage to make them murderers and assassins, tell us, that, if the whole of this nation were to join them in an expression of their sentiments, it would be “a signal to the French people *to do justice on their oppressor, whom they have resolved not to spare at home*, when once they see him thoroughly beaten and discredited abroad.” — Now, how impudently false are these facts! Napoleon, owing to his having confided in his German allies, has been thoroughly beaten abroad: his enemies, consisting of all the old governments of Europe, and all their fleets and armies, have driven him into France; they have invaded France on both sides, and nearly all round; they have marched to within 40 miles of Paris. And, have we seen any one symptom of his being hated by the French people? If they had been resolved *not to spare him*, why have they spared him? Does not an army rise up, as it were, by magic, at the sound of his voice? Is he not now exposed to that vengeance, which we have so long been told the people of France have in store for him? And yet, this blood-thirsty faction would persuade us, that the people of France are, above all things, desirous of his destruction! — But, we are told, that they are *to do justice* upon him; that is to say, assassinate him; or, at least, kill him somehow or other; whence we may fairly conclude, that the same faction have approved, if not been the instigators, of all those bungling attempts at assassination, which have been made by persons going from this country; and we can hardly help ad-

miring the magnanimity of the people of France, who have never attempted any act of retaliation. These men of blood do not seem to reflect on the *example* that they are giving, which example, if the people of France were base and bloody enough to follow it, might lead to the horrible deed of murdering our own sovereign. It must have occurred to most people to observe, that while our public prints are filled with such abominable sentiments as those above expressed; that, while our prints call the Emperor of France all sorts of foul names; that, while they assert, in so many words, that the sovereign, to whom our great and good Ally, the Emperor of Austria, gave his daughter in marriage, and by whom she has a son, heir to her husband's throne, is "a liar, an impostor, a thief, a tyrant, a murderer, and a monster," the French prints never utter a syllable of personal abuse of any of our Royal Family, but as carefully abstain from it as if the authors were liable to even our own *libel laws* for such abuse; and that while our prints are incessantly inculcating the right and the duty of the French people to assassinate their sovereign, the French prints express regret at the unhappy state of our good old king, and leave us in quiet to bestow our love and admiration upon him and all his family, contenting themselves with censuring, and that, too, in the most dignified tone and manner, the views, the policy, and the acts of our government; so that, the Paris papers scarcely ever contain an article, which our libel laws would not let pass, and which even I myself might not publish as my own production with impunity.—This contrast is no less striking than it is humiliating to us as a nation; and, if the two nations were to be judged of by it, how little, how low, how contemptible must England appear by the side of France!—And, upon what *ground* do the men of blood accuse Napoleon of being an *oppressor* of the people of France? It has been shown, that his code of laws is admirable; it has been shown that the Bourbons themselves, in order to pave their way to restoration, have been induced to promise the French people the continuance of that code; it has been shown, that he has done a great deal for the happiness and even for the liberty of France. Why are not these statements *answered*? Why does not some one of the men of blood show, that these statements are false? They never enter the field of argument with us. They never appear to take any notice of the facts

and reasoning on the side of the man, whose blood they thirst for. They do, however, know of them and feel their weight; but this only excites their rage, as it usually happens with those, who find themselves beaten in argument. They have read the *answer to the Bourbon Proclamation*; they have read the articles upon the subject of *Moreau*; they have read the several articles upon the subject of the state of France and the disposition of the people towards Napoleon. They know, they *must* know, that these articles contain facts and arguments that entitle them to an answer; but, *unable* to answer, they fall, like the lowest of the vulgar, to vile and odious railing. They are not ignorant, that men of sense and candour are on our side, because sense and candour yield to convincing proof in spite of prejudice; but, they are aware, at the same time, that the mass of the people are guided by their prejudices, cherished by the mass of the public prints; and, though the men of blood know that the sense and candour of the country hold them and their doctrine in abhorrence, they care little for that, provided they secure the mass of the people, and thereby keep alive the delusion that keeps alive the war.—But, upon what *ground*, again, do these men of blood presume, that a declaration of their sentiments, supposing it to become general in England, would influence the people of France, and induce them to abandon, or to murder, Napoleon? It is presumption in the highest and most ridiculous degree to suppose, that the French nation, consisting of thirty millions of men, the most active, most intelligent, most brave, and most proud of national glory in the world, would kill their sovereign merely because the thirteen or fourteen millions of people in these islands wished them to do it. If we could suppose it possible for such a declaration to have any influence at all upon their minds, we must suppose that it would be to make them love him more than ever; and I have, for my part, not the smallest doubt, that, if they ever do hear of the publications of the blood-men, those publications are very useful to Napoleon, as they must say to the people of France: "this is the man whom you ought to cherish, because, you see, that those who wish your humiliation, and who boast of being the *leader* of your invaders, so anxiously desire his death." Besides, suppose the people of France to receive and read such a declaration, might they not, and would they not, answer in somewhat

this way: 'Why do you wish us to destroy Napoleon? At the beginning of the war, you professed to fight against us, who had then declared ourselves *republicans*, in order to prevent the extension of our *disorganizing principles* to yourselves. There were some amongst us who said, that your government feared the effect of the example of freedom that we were giving to mankind; but, at any rate, all your public declarations professed your object to be to prevent the overthrow of *regular government*. Well! We have given up those disorganizing principles. Our government is *as regular* as that of England, or any of her numerous Allies, and, it is Napoleon who has made it so; why, therefore, would you have us assassinate Napoleon? At a later period, the war, on your part, assumed a garb of holiness. You were shocked at our irreligious principles, and you received, with open arms, those priests, monks, and friars, whom you formerly denominated cheats and impostors, and for listening to whom you abused us very grossly. You shed tears of pious pity over the fall of the Pope, whom you had formerly called Anti-Christ and the Scarlet Whore of Babylon. Your war against us now became a war for regular government and holy religion; and you listened with the zeal of converts to those who told you, that if you did not freely pay for the support of the war, we should deprive you "of the *blessed comforts of religion*."—Well! We are no longer of our, then, way of thinking, or, at least, we do not shock you with our Decistical notions. Religion, our old religion, is on foot again; masses are sung in all our churches; the good wives and their daughters go regular to confess their sins, and they count their beads, as formerly; and your religion, too, is fully tolerated amongst us, and, indeed, enjoyed, not as an indulgence, but as a *right*.—This change has been made by Napoleon. Why, therefore, do you call upon us to murder him? Why do you so eagerly seek his life at our hands? Why would you have us assassinate him, who has relieved you from all danger of being deprived by us of those "blessed comforts of religion," for which that worthy veteran George Rose, called on you to pay and fight, and who has restored those inestimable blessings even to us? Why, you men of blood, would you urge us to stick our knives into his heart?—It is true, indeed, that, in restoring *religion* to France;

in re-establishing Bishops and Priests, Napoleon has not restored the monks and friars to their convents and their immense property, by the means of which they led such easy lives and wore such fat and rosy cheeks, while those who tilled their land were skin and bone. Their lands were divided amongst us by the republican assemblies, and Napoleon has confirmed their grants. Is it for this that you so hate him? Is it for this that you so becall him? Is it for this that you lay on him with fouler mouths than those which have heretofore been regarded as the exclusive possession of your own dames of Billingsgate? Is it for this that you would have us cut his throat while he is asleep?—Or, are you offended, that he did not restore the *tithes* along with the parochial clergy? Is your zeal for the Church so very great, that you cannot abide the idea of her being robbed of any portion of her inheritance?—Come, come, do not shuffle at this point, at any rate, give us a direct answer. We have read with very erroneous eyes, if you yourselves do not regard tithes as a monstrous grievance; if great numbers of your leading men have not been forming schemes for their abolition in England; if one of your principal noblemen has not stated, to a great meeting of farmers and wool-dealers, that you *laboured under the disadvantage* of tithes, which *neighbouring countries* were free from. Is it, therefore, possible, that this can be the cause of your calling Napoleon a *tyrant*, an *oppressor*, and a man whom we ought to murder, and a man whom we must and shall murder, before you will let us have peace? Would you, indeed, have us butcher our ruler in cold blood, because he has not compelled us to pay the holy church her dues? If this be the cause, or any part of the cause, of your bloody-minded purpose, let us, at any rate, never hear any more of your own grumbling about tithes; for, we are not aware of any law of God, of Nature, or of Nations, making that oppression in England which is not to be deemed oppression in France. —So much for your war for "holy religion," as it was called by Mr. John Bowles, the Dutch Commissioner.—Your next object, or rather, objects, of war were, as expressed by that heaven-born minister, Mr. Pitt, "indemnity for the past and security for the future." Have you not got indemnity in the thirty millions of subjects which you have

acquired at Java? In all your immense conquests of territory and of people? In the Dutch and Danish fleets? Or, do you pretend to say, that all these put together are not worth a millionth part of the hundreds of millions that you have expended in the war? Be it so, then; but, would you have us murder Napoleon for that? Did he cause you to expend all these hundreds of millions? And, if he did, is that a reason why we should cut his throat while he is asleep, seeing that the money was expended in a war against us? And, as to "*security for the future*," you cannot, surely, now be apprehensive upon that score, seeing that, as you say, all your nation hold Napoleon in "*contempt*;" seeing that you declare him to be *fallen*; seeing, that from being a conqueror, you now regard him as a desperate wretch struggling for bare existence. Why, then, not suffer him, so contemptible a thing, to exist, it being so obvious, that a poor contemptible ruler in France must tend more to your future security than any thing else could? Why, then, not let us remain unstained with his blood? And, if all this be, at bottom, affected, on your part; if you fear that he will not only deliver France, but again carry the French standards into the territory of her numerous invaders, and, in the end put you in danger; if this be the case, if you think that he will retrieve his fortunes and our glory, and if you do not think us the greatest of fools, or the basest of mankind, can you expect, that, for this reason we should become his murderers?—Your war, in its last stage, became a war for "*the deliverance of Europe*." And is not Europe now *delivered*? Is not Napoleon now ready to make peace even upon the basis proposed by the Allies themselves? What more do you want of him? Would you have us murder him because he has consented to ratify your declared wishes? No, *this* is not the true reason why you want him assassinated. That reason we must look for in another of your publications, where you say: "Is this the time for us to pursue peace for the satisfaction of *restoring a veteran army to the Chief who so well knows how to make use of them*? Or is it our wish to try *how productive the war-taxes will become* when we have *the same army and navy to maintain as at present*, without the means of reaping laurels for the one, or *finding prizes for the other*; when we have *given colonies*

and commerce to the enemy, and have *silently withdrawn from both ourselves*?" —(Times news-paper, March 1). Oh, Oh! That is it, is it? What, this same Napoleon, whose character, but now, you said you held in *contempt*, is all of a sudden, become a chief, who well knows how to make use of a veteran army! Here you let your real motives peep out. You do not wish that our veterans, who are prisoners of war, should be restored to their country; and, therefore, you would keep on the war; which, by the by, seems not to square very well with all the pity, which you are eternally expressing for our *conscripts*, whom, one would suppose, you would wish to see return to those "*weeping mothers*," whose "*bleeding bosoms*" your Mr. Canning, in the true *Green-Room* style, so pathetically described, in one of his speeches to the wise men of Liverpool. —What of your "*war-taxes*?" Do you love those taxes so much, then, that you wish the war to continue for the pleasure of paying those taxes? Or, do you mean, that they will be continued in peace, and that they will not be so easily paid as they are now, the sources whence they were derived, having been dried up? But, kind friends of ours, why should you keep up "*the same army and the same navy as at present*?" You do not mean to say, surely, that your soldiers and sailors will not suffer themselves to be disbanded? Oh! we have it now! what you mean is, that, if Napoleon continue to be our sovereign, you will not dare to disband, he being so formidable an enemy to you, he "*understanding so well how to make use of a veteran army*." That is it, is it? and so, you would have us murder him, you would have us not only become assassins, but run the risk of a civil war and the loss of laws and property, you would wish to return to *Lettres de Cachet*, *Gabelles*, *Corvées*, *Seigneurial Courts*, *Provincial Judges*, *Tithes*, and *Game-laws*, and to kill Napoleon, to cut his throat or stick him while asleep, in order that some weak and unwelcome sovereign should render us too contemptible to put you to the expense of maintaining a large fleet and army in peace, and thereby expose yourselves to pecuniary ruin? No, thank you! It is *your* business to kill him (not by the hands of assassins) on this account; but, it is *our* business to stand by him; to support his authority; and to desire, most anxiously,

' a long duration of his life and health.
 ' —What! and do we understand you
 ' rightly, when you express your dislike
 ' of the return of peace to Europe, be-
 ' cause then your navy will "*find no*
 ' "*prizes*?" We would fain not believe you
 ' serious here. The ideas we have always
 ' heretofore had, and expressed, of the
 ' justice and generosity of the English
 ' character must, at least, make us con-
 ' clude, that those Englishmen, who ex-
 ' press such sentiments are few in number;
 ' otherwise we must suppose, that your
 ' nation has been so much changed by the
 ' war and by the writings of mercenary
 ' writers, as to have become most shockingly
 ' debased. What! would you continue
 ' war with all its miseries for the purpose,
 ' in part, at least, of enabling your naval
 ' officers and seamen to enrich themselves at
 ' the expense of innocent traders? Would
 ' you see the world remain in its present
 ' unhappy state; would you keep in exist-
 ' ence all those millions of evils which hu-
 ' manity deploras, for the sake of putting
 ' prize-money into the pockets of a part of
 ' the English nation? And would you have
 ' us murder Napoleon, because he is, as
 ' you infer, an enemy to your making those
 ' gains?—Again, you object to peace
 ' with Napoleon, because it will *give us*
 ' *colonies and commerce*; and thus you
 ' show how sincere your regard is for us,
 ' how firm a reliance we may place on your
 ' *friendship*, at the same time that you
 ' make a happy discovery of your own *mo-*
 ' *deration*, your abhorrence of *conquests*
 ' and *ambition*, and you give a clear eluci-
 ' dation of that *disinterestedness*, with which
 ' you have laboured in the *deliverance of Eu-*
 ' *rope*.—So that your war, after having
 ' been, first, a war for *social order and reg-*
 ' *ular government*; secondly, a war for
 ' the "*blessed comforts of religion*," as
 ' described by George Rose; thirdly, a
 ' war for "*indemnity for the past and se-*
 ' *curity for the future*;" fourthly, a war
 ' for the "*deliverance of Europe*," is, now,
 ' agreeably, to the language of your fac-
 ' tion, a war for the keeping of our con-
 ' scripts in prison, for preventing your
 ' war taxes from falling off, for giving
 ' prizes to your navy, and for (what our
 ' Emperor has always, as you say, falsely
 ' accused you of) engrossing all the colonies
 ' and commerce to yourselves.—Away,
 ' therefore, with your advice! Your de-
 ' clarations, if they were as numerous as
 ' your taxes, or the millions of your debt,
 ' would have no weight with us. You

' would fain divide us from our ruler;
 ' but, in this you never will succeed as
 ' long as we continue to see, that his ene-
 ' mies are the enemies of the power, the
 ' glory, and happiness of France?—
 Such would certainly be, in substance, the
 answer of the French people to any invita-
 tion that the everlasting-war faction might
 give them to assassinate Napoleon; and,
 therefore, whatever converts they may
 make at home, they may, with respect to
 the people of France, follow the old pre-
 cept, and "keep their breath to cool their
 porridge." And, I am of opinion, too,
 that the Allies would not be very anxious
 to get many more bloody noses in a war,
 which was to have the above objects in
 view. The powers of the Continent would
 hardly run any very considerable risk for
 the sake of *upholding our war-taxes*, though
 these sentiments of the writer in the Times
 may furnish them with information that
 they were not possessed of before.

MR. MANT AND CAPT. CAMPBELL.—
 In consequence of the article, containing
 the Statement and Affidavit of Mr. Mant,
 which was published in the Register of the
 19th of February, Capt. Campbell has
 thought it necessary to publish, through
 the same channel, a very short statement
 of facts, unaccompanied with any reason-
 ing upon the subject, and also an Affidavit,
 not made by himself, but by Capt. Wilson,
 of the Navy, who was, as will be seen, at
 the time referred to, the First Lieutenant
 of the Frigate *Unité*, on board of which
 Mr. Mant served, and which Affidavit he
 submits to a comparison with that of Mr.
 Mant.—Capt. Campbell states, that,
 with regard to the point which is the most
 important to him and to the public, name-
 ly, the *illegality of the selling of prizes*,
 and the other transactions, of which Mr.
 Mant, in his pamphlet, speaks in so loose a
 manner, the transactions were all made
 matter of charge against him by Mr. Mant
 to the Admiralty, in 1812, while Capt.
 Campbell was abroad, and after he had,
 by writing to the Transport Board, pre-
 vented Mr. Mant from being appointed to
 a Prison Ship; that, upon receiving this
 charge against him, the Lords of the Ad-
 miralty ordered Sir Edward Pellew, then
 become the Commander in Chief in the
 Mediterranean, to inquire into the matter;
 that Sir Edward Pellew, after such inquiry,
 informed their Lordships, that there was
 no ground for the charge, which he deno-
 minated a *base attempt*; that the Lords of

the Admiralty hereupon informed Sir Edward Pellew, that his report was perfectly satisfactory to them; and he states, that, in the transactions, as far as they really did take place, there was nothing contrary to the laws and usages in force, and in constant practice in the Mediterranean. He states, that, with regard to the commencement of this dispute, Mr. Mant not only began it by preferring charges against him while he was abroad, but that he found, upon his return home, that Mr. Mant had long been in the practice of showing to several respectable persons about Southampton the papers of which he speaks in his pamphlet, and also of reflecting most scandalously on Capt. Campbell's character, which induced Capt. Campbell to show the papers he possessed, in his own vindication, to his friends, and particularly to his brother officers in that neighbourhood; and that the real reason why he declined furnishing Mr. Mant with *copies* of the papers was, that he thought the request quite impertinent, seeing that Mr. Mant knew so well what the nature of the charges was, and seeing that the papers were, for the most part, in his own hand writing; besides which, Capt. Campbell wished, of all things, to avoid any thing like a controversy with Mr. Mant.—Capt. Campbell has no desire to add to the weight with which Mr. Mant is loaded, and would fain avoid saying one word as to his conduct in the transactions referred to; but, justice to himself and to the public demands a fact or two on that subject. He, therefore, states, that, with regard to Mr. Mant's *ignorance* of the pretended illegality of the transactions, and to his having *resigned* his occupation as agent in the concerns when he discovered their illegality, the fact is, that he was *removed* by the captors, on account of their conviction, that he had acted *unfairly* in the business, and was, from the same cause, excluded from messing with the officers in the *Unité*, as he had formerly done, which facts are known to so many persons, that they must be deemed indisputable.—As to the fact, alleged so stoutly by Mr. Mant, and to which so much weight is given in his defence; namely, that he was not fully informed of the accusations against him, nor of the name of his accuser, *until it was too late to confront him with that accuser*, a fact, if true, of very great importance, Captain Campbell states nothing, but refers the public to the subjoined Affidavit of Capt. Wilson, who was, at the time referred to, the First Lieutenant of the Ship; after the perusal of

which Affidavit, he is persuaded that no person will need any thing more in answer to any charge resting upon the *veracity* of Mr. Mant.

MR. WILSON'S AFFIDAVIT.

John Wilson, commander in the Royal Navy, maketh oath, That in the years 1806, 1807, and until Oct. 1808, he was senior Lieutenant of His Majesty's ship *Unité*, of which ship, and during which time, Mr. Thomas Mant was Surgeon; that Captain Patrick Campbell took command of the said ship (then off Cadiz) in August 1806, and was immediately ordered, with command of a small squadron, to the Adriatic. That the said Mr. Thomas Mant, in consequence of his knowledge of the Italian language, was intrusted to manage the prize concerns of the squadron at Trieste, &c.; that in the month of October 1807, the ship then off the Island of Lussin, on her way to cruise off Corfu, information was received, that passes intrusted by Captain Campbell to Mr. Mant, to deliver to merchants at Trieste, had been sold, and that Mr. Mant had derived emolument from such sale, and also received money for undervaluing prizes. That on the ship's arrival at Malta in December following, Mr. Mant made application to Captain Campbell to be allowed to go home, on pretence of ill health, or to exchange into another ship, which Captain Campbell refused, and told him, in the Deponent's presence, of the accusations against him, of receiving money for passes and undervaluing prizes, and until these charges were done away he could not comply with his request. That on the ship's return to the Adriatic early in 1808, this Deponent informed Mr. Mant, that George Jursovich, who accused him (Mr. Mant) of receiving two hundred dollars for letting him (Jursovich) have, on advantageous terms, prize goods which he bought, was then on board, and that it was necessary he (Mr. Mant) should clear himself from such accusation, or that he should be considered guilty of the charge; his reply was, that Jursovich was a damned rascal, and his word was as good as Jursovich's. The ship was several months up the Adriatic after this conversation took place; and although Jursovich was frequently on board, which Mr. Mant could not be ignorant of, yet Mr. Mant, to the Deponent's knowledge, never attempted to clear himself. In another conversation nearly about the same time, which the Deponent had with Mr. Mant relative to the sale of passes and undervaluing prizes,

the Deponent asked Mr. Mant, if he could lay his hand on his heart and say, he (Mr. Mant) had never received money on either account: Mr. Mant answered the Deponent by saying, it was nothing to him whether he received any or not, that he had taken the opinion of counsel on the subject and was desired not to criminate himself. This Deponent further saith, That he never heard Mr. Mant express any compunction for the share he had in the supposed illegality of the disposal of prize property in which he was a voluntary agent, and instead of withdrawing himself from the said agency, from any such compunction, he was removed from it by the captors, they having lost their confidence in him.

J. WILSON, Captain,
Royal Navy.

Sworn before me at Southampton,
1st March, 1814,
Thomas Ducell, J. P. for
the Town of Southampton.

GERMAN SUFFERERS.

SIR,—We are not called upon to ransack the library of the novelist for melancholy and affecting tales: the common occurrences of life will always furnish mankind, at least those of a mental turn, with matter sufficient to depress the powers of levity. But common concerns are of little moment when compared with those which now command the attention of Europe, and in which the fate of millions of human beings are deeply involved. Emperors, Kings, and Princes are tearing their subjects from the bosom of their families, to die—Where?—why, in what they are pleased to call the field of *honor*. But, however honorable such a death may be in their estimation, I can hear but of one, amongst the whole group, who makes a point of coming *within* the range of a cannon-ball; the rest rather choosing, for reasons of state, to preserve their *valuable* lives to the latest period, that they may then pour out their last breath on the bed of ease and indolence. —However, this reflection is not the only motive which induces me to solicit a page in your useful Register, and which, if I am refused, will neither hurt my pride nor wound my feelings, as I shall enjoy the consolation of having used my endeavour to prevent an evil which appears to me calculated to promote animosities and discord in many parishes. —A good name is certainly valuable; but let me take *just* and *proper* methods to acquire that good name. Some years ago, a being, in human form, in order to gain the esteem of his pot-com-

panions, gave them, what may be justly called, a good dinner; namely, roast beef, plum pudding, and four gallons of porter. On that very day, a friend of mine called at the donor's house, where he found a wife and five children who actually had not bread to eat, until the uncle (for such my friend really was to the infants) gave the mother a guinea to purchase food. I need not tell you, Sir, that such a character was unworthy the name of a husband and a father, and a disgrace to both. Will not the same observation, when applied to an individual, hold good as to a nation that acts in a similar manner? You have heard of a gentleman who, in a tavern speech, lamented that he was not so high in the church as his nephew was in the army. I suppose the good man (for I verily believe him to be a good man) meant, that if he was a bishop, every parish church in his diocese should be opened for a collection for the suffering Germans. He has since tried the experiment in his own chapel, and I am informed that he collected 400l. Very well; let the suffering Germans have it; and if those warm advocates for these Germans had made private subscriptions amongst themselves; nay, had they sent their whole fortunes to Germany, they would have heard nothing from me. But why make a parish affair of it? The hint, Sir, is taken by the church, and you may be sure that it will spread to the utmost corners of the empire. Every minister that will not open his mouth for the suffering Germans, will be looked upon as *disaffected* to the state. But that is not the extent of the evil. The parish officers will hold the dishes (for plates will be too small) at the church-door. They know each housekeeper; and every inhabitant who may think that his poor suffering neighbour has a greater claim to his bounty than the suffering Germans, and chooses to pass the dish without a donation, will be immediately denominated a *Jacobin*, an enemy to his country, and a friend of Buonaparté. But a *small* donation will not do. The minister, who is to preach next Sunday for the benefit of the suffering Germans, declared, that he expected his congregation to be *very liberal*; it was for the *honor* of the nation. I know "Church and State" to be an old song. Religion, that is to say, genuine religion and politics, have no affinity to each other, and can no more claim an union than the mire of the streets can pretend to be sterling gold: it is a most unpleasant mixture, and

is as unsavory to the mind as a compound of honey and mustard would be to the palate. — I say, *politics* must make a part of the sermon; the distress of the suffering Germans must be pointed out; then the *cause* of the distress, which is *the war*. — Here I could wish to make a very long pause, as I cannot help thinking, that there are hundreds of thousands of suffering English and Irish in the United Kingdom, who have a much greater claim upon the humanity and honor of the nation, than the suffering Germans. — I deny that the Germans have any claim upon the gratitude of the nation, *as a nation*. But I will allow, that they have a claim upon many thousands of individuals *in the nation*, now living. They have a claim upon the whole body of the *alarmists*, at the head of whom stood that political apostate Pitt: that bitter scourge to Britain and to civil liberty. They have a claim upon the *life and fortune* gentlemen. They have a claim upon the *Corporate Bodies*. They have a claim upon the *Rotten Boroughs*, who have bound themselves, by their signatures to their addresses; and they have a claim upon *Government Contractors* of every description. All these compose what may properly be called the *war-faction*. — These are the men, the very men, upon whom the suffering Germans have a claim. They have been the cause, the only cause of the war. It is unjust to say that the suffering Germans have a claim upon the nation. — Take the nation at large, eighteen out of twenty, were against going to war with the French, because they chose to make an alteration in their Government. — The very best friends the nation then had, and still have, were entirely against the war, and are so to this hour. Had their advice been attended to, Britain, in point of circumstances, would have been just the reverse of what she now is, and Germany in a state of tranquillity. It is true, the friends of the country wished a *reform*, and I humbly hope they will one day obtain it. It is certain the real friend of his country did not desire a reformation before it was greatly wanted. It is equally certain, it was *not a revolution* he looked for. — The alarmists, to gain their point, instantly let loose their favourite Hobgoblins, *Fear and Dread*, twisted, and dressed up in the most terrific form and colours. To oppose and attack those two monsters, the whole Regiment of these renowned Knights the *Life and Fortune* gentlemen, turned out to a man. — But the alarmists were too wise to be scared by ghosts of their own raising; they had their *fears* 'tis

true: but those fears sprung from quite a different source. *Theirs* was a fear of losing their *Sinecures* and lucrative places, which, rather than part with, they preferred reducing the nation to what it now is. However those two unmanly spirits are, by the aid of some divines, (Bishops I suppose) happily laid for a *limited period*. Not in the Red Sea, where the old women's spirits are usually laid, but in the snuff-box of a Minister of State. — But why, in the name of fortune, should there be so much sympathy for the suffering Germans, and so little feeling for the suffering English? I have heard of no Tavern speeches, proposing a general opening of church pulpits, (this severe winter) for the benefit of the many, many thousands of *our own* suffering poor, who have actually wanted bread. — I know but of one church in the City of London, the pulpit of which has been devoted to so laudable a purpose; and, to the honor of the Rector be it spoken, whose heart is abundantly blest with the milk of human kindness and fellow feeling.) it was that of the church of St. Ann, Blackfriars. — The same gentleman, I understand, proposes, from the best of motives, though he has not taken into consideration the extent of the injury, to devote the same pulpit for the Benefit of the suffering Germans. — It should be remembered, however, that the Germans have been fighting, — *not for us*, but for *themselves*. — They have been fighting their *own* battles, in which, as a nation, we are not interested. It is true, our good souls have given to the respective sovereigns of Germany, who have caused their troops to take the field, many millions of pounds in hard cash, by way of subsidy; — and it is equally true, if there is any comfort in the information, that our children, and great, great g. and children, will have to toil and labour for money to *pay the interest* of the many millions of hard guineas which have so pleasantly filled the coffers of the German princes. Therefore, it is to their respective sovereigns, that the suffering Germans ought to look for assistance. Their princes have received the British guineas, and their princes are in duty bound to attend to the wants of their suffering subjects. — If I had a few dollars to spare (as for guineas they are all fled to the Continent,) I should think myself a base wretch to send them to the suffering Germans, while I have so many suffering neighbours, who cannot procure sufficient bread for themselves and families. — I should, by such an act, be an exact copy of that worthless being I

have mentioned above, who, to gain a *good name*, indulged Jack Noaks and Tom Styles with a good dinner, while his *feeling heart* left his wife and family without bread. No! rather let me attend to the wants of those dear children, those sixty out of seventy school-boys, who had not wherewith to break their fast, until the humanity of the school-master supplied their craving wants.—How many, many thousands of my fellow countrymen are at this very moment in a similar situation, who have a much stronger claim upon my bounty than foreigners, for I am taught to believe, that “charity begins at home.”—You are at liberty to bestow what name or appellation upon me you please, but I am convinced, from my own feelings, that I am a FRIEND TO HUMANITY.
Blackfriars, 2d March, 1814.

DUTCH INDEPENDENCE.—It appears at last that the wise-acres, who lately excited the clamour of *Orange Boovan*, and saw nothing in the restoration of the house of Orange but the overthrow of Napoleon's dynasty, begin to think that they were too sanguine in their expectations, and that the Dutch, like all other nations who have once tasted of liberty, are not so wedded to the divine rights of kings, or to hereditary monarchy, as to be insensible of the difference between a free representative government, and that in which the dictum of one individual is paramount to the law. When the French Emperor ventured to give Holland a king, the *enormity* of the deed was stigmatized as without a parallel: it was held up as an instance of despotism far surpassing all his former acts of tyranny, and the deplorable situation to which the Dutch people were thereby reduced, was said to be infinitely worse than that of the most abject state of slavery recorded in history. The miseries of the poor Hollanders were, indeed, painted in such glowing colours, that even the “flinty heart of their tyrant” was said at times to relent, when he contemplated the “fell havoc” which his “cursed ambition” had made amongst this gallant people. But mark the difference when the inauguration of a sovereign, vested with the same unlimited powers of a Buonaparté, came to be the act and deed, at least to receive the countenance and support of the good people of this country; when they assumed to themselves the right of establishing a *new order* of things, of putting down even the bare semblance of a *Republic*, and of destroying the last remains of liberty in the extinction of the

States General, and erecting in its stead a *hereditary kingly government*, “a *sovereign prince* of the United Netherlands.” Observe, I say, how soon these men changed their note, when the giving of a king to Holland was done in a way which conformed to their views, and in which they somewhat participated. The measure became, all on a sudden, a grand and sublime effort of the genius of this country; a bright emanation from that “happy constitution” which is the “envy of the world,” and of which none can form a just estimate but those who live under its “benign influence.” Here the magnanimity of Englishmen had reached its climax; for what could be more generous, what more noble, what more elevated, than to confer a portion of that liberty which Englishmen enjoy upon a people who were no way solicitous about it?—One would have thought that this unlooked for favour; this unexampled generosity; this anxiety to restore a whole nation to independence, to happiness, and to security, equal to what we enjoy under “the best government on earth,” would have called forth the warmest acknowledgments of the Dutch; have stimulated them to throw off the Napoleon yoke; have roused them to expel their oppressors; and led them to present a barrier to the future encroachments of Buonaparté, which even all his legions could never overthrow. Had this people been in reality the unwilling and abject slaves of the ruler of France; had their sufferings been even less severe than they were represented, it was unquestionably the fittest moment they could have chosen to emancipate themselves from this disgraceful vassalage, when the power of their oppressor was broken, when he himself was under the necessity of becoming a supplicant, and when the whole strength and resources of Great Britain were employed in endeavouring to crush him for ever, and to raise from the dust all those nations who had been compelled to acknowledge his “tremendous sway.”—It appears, however, that the Dutch entertained a very different view of the matter from what was held on this side the water. If, they were in reality oppressed by one sovereign, they seem to have thought that they might be oppressed by another. Buonaparté had altered the form of their government, in lieu of which he had established his own sovereignty. The Prince of Orange had supplanted this assumption of power by declaring himself the *sovereign prince* of the Netherlands. Here, then, was a mere change of masters, in which the pro-

ple saw nothing worth fighting for. At least, having had a trial of Buonaparté's government, they were not, perhaps, so very tired of it as to determine, all at once, to sacrifice their lives for the new king, of whose government they had had no trial, and which had nothing more favourable in its aspect than the former to recommend it. This train of reasoning was naturally to be expected of a people so proverbially phlegmatic as the Dutch. The page of history no doubt represents that nation, at one period, engaged in a gallant and successful opposition to foreign domination. But in that case the consequence of submission was the entire loss of independence, while the advantages of resistance were manifest and incalculably great. In the present instance, and supposing them to have been stript of their political rights by Buonaparté, it nowhere appears that the Prince of Orange intended to restore them. On the contrary, his Royal Highness took upon himself the title of a king, and, it is to be presumed, he has since exercised all the powers of sovereignty. It is true, the noise and clamour which the first news of this counter-revolution occasioned, and the importance which government attached to it, operated, for a while, to make some believe that the *people* of Holland had in truth thrown off the French yoke. In the House of Commons it was said, by Lord Castlereagh, that this revolution was "the result of the *spontaneous and unanimous* wish of the *people* of Holland of *all parties*;"—and the event was every where hailed as a triumph of freedom over oppression. But the less credulous were not long in discovering that the *people* had nothing to say in the business; that they interested themselves as little, perhaps less, in the fate of William the first, the "Sovereign Prince of the Netherlands," as what they did in the fate of the Emperor Napoleon. In no shape did they justify Lord Castlereagh's statement; for if the impulse had been *spontaneous and unanimous* in favour of William, this would have been seen in its corresponding effects. All Holland would have been in arms to make good the claims of the house of Orange. Like France, the voice of the sovereign would have aroused the people; like France they would have united their fortunes to his; and, like France, they would have discomfited the armies, and baffled the projects of all the combined Powers of Europe. But no—the Dutch were actuated by no such feeling. Whether they were attached to Buonaparté, or had experienced the beneficial

effects of the excellent code of laws which he has established; whatever were their motives for acting the part they did, it is certain they never gave that support to the *new* government which it was asserted they had given. On the contrary, though Napoleon was compelled, by reverse of fortune, almost to abandon Holland to its fate, "the Sovereign Prince of the Netherlands" has not been able to clear his kingdom of French troops, even with the assistance of at least 10,000 of our best troops, an incalculable quantity of military stores, and a sum of money from this country fully adequate to his views. But men and money can accomplish nothing in the cause of a sovereign, when that cause, as is evidently the case here, is not also the cause of the people. This is a fact of which we ought to, (and I am certain might) have informed ourselves better than we did, when we espoused the interests of the house of Orange. Had we acted in this cautious and prudent manner, we might have avoided the disgrace which must attend the withdrawing our troops from Holland, without accomplishing the object for which they were sent thither; and we might have saved the Prince of Orange the mortification which he must feel if, as is likely to happen, he should be forced to relinquish a crown, which was assumed without any calculation of chances as to the probability of his being able to retain it. But instead of acting in this way, the proceedings were gone into with the greatest rashness by the managers in this political drama, and the lookers on, without any regard to the consequences, displayed the most consummate folly in the applause which they gave to the first act of a piece which so very soon disappointed their hopes, and which may now, in all probability, terminate fatally to the individuals who were urged on, by the most flattering promises, to become the chief actors. But this is not all. Our news-paper press, with its usual regard for truth and justice, has commenced an indiscriminate and abusive attack upon the people of Holland and the house of Orange, because the result of the event which they were so active in promoting (and on the failure of which every judicious person might easily have calculated) has not been what they expected, and what they were so forward in telling the public it would assuredly be. The *Times* paper, which takes the lead when any dirty work is to be performed, has opened its budget of abuse with the following article:—"The Dutch proceed very *leisurely* in their efforts to *distinguish*

themselves among the *allied nations*. Gorcum was taken possession of on the 20th instant; but Naarden, *even yet*, shows no indication of an intention to surrender. It is difficult to say whether this *supineness* reflects more *discredit* on the *people* or on the *government*; but we cannot help thinking, that one or the other must be *much to blame* to suffer the existence of any foreign garrison in the heart of their country so long after all external danger has been removed from the frontiers. Do they still allow the traitor Verhuel to insult them with impunity? Do they not look on the fortresses occupied by a foreign force, as the very badges of their recent slavery, most intolerable to the eyes of freemen?—The other *allied powers* have a right to expect that Holland shall not set an example of *apathy* in the sacred cause. Unless *they* see in her a spirit to maintain her independence, *they* will hardly venture to guarantee, much less to secure it by stronger barriers, or *new accessions of territory*; and if the House of Orange does not act up to its hereditary greatness, it will be ill suited to an union with that of Brunswick."—So, if the Dutch *people*, according to this writer, do not make common cause with the Allies against France, they are to be punished with the loss of independence, and of new accessions of territory; and if the Prince of Orange does not do what his subjects will not let him do; if he does not accomplish an *impossibility*, he is to be punished also, by denying to his son his affianced bride, the Princess Charlotte of Wales, who, we have long known, was destined to be the wife of the hereditary Prince of Orange. I dare say the Dutch *people* feel themselves very little interested in the business. To them it must appear a matter of indifference whether the man who is to be their ruler marries a greasy Hottentot or a refined European. Their views chiefly centre in commerce, and from the experience which they have acquired during the last 20 years, I am inclined to think, if the question were asked them, that they would prefer an alliance with Buonaparté's family to that of every other, because they would find it more conducive to their *interest*. But to punish the house of Orange for the fault of another; for misplaced confidence in the patriotism of a nation, after being assured by Lord Castlereagh that that nation had *spontaneously and unanimously* declared in their favour, would be a species of cruelty and injustice unexampled in history. The most absurd and curious part of the *Times*' statement is,

that which respects the *Allies*. It appears, that it was at one time in contemplation to enlarge the ancient boundaries of Holland by "new accessions of territory," and this idea is fully warranted by the *new* title which William the First assumed when he landed in Holland. But it is not so clear that the *allied powers* were parties to this arrangement, or that it had even been communicated to them prior to that Prince's declaration. It seems to have originated entirely with this country; and as a proof that neither the sovereigns of Russia, Austria, nor Prussia were consulted in the business, we find them, at the breaking out of the counter-revolution, offering to Napoleon to recognise the title of his brother Louis to the crown of Holland. It was *our* interest undoubtedly, in the event of a family compact, that that kingdom should be *enlarged*. Though this might not give *us* direct possession, it would extend our influence on the Continent; and, what is of far greater consequence, enable us to cripple the maritime power of Buonaparté. Here is the true secret of our anxious wishes for the restoration of the Orange family. Not the emancipation of the Dutch *people* from the tyrant of France, but the establishment of an order of things in Holland, which would enlarge our political influence, and increase our means of annoying our greatest enemy. Hence our wish to get possession of Antwerp; hence our anxiety to burn or get into our power the Scheldt fleet, and hence the virulence of the *Times*, the *Courier*, and the whole tribe of hireling writers, against Admiral Verhuel, whom they impudently denominated a *traitor*, because he is acting in strict conformity to his oath of allegiance, and in a way which does credit to his valour and to his integrity. Instead of landing the army under General Graham at a point where, from the well-known skill and courage of that gallant officer, something might have been effected, in conjunction with the Allies, of importance to the common cause, these troops were ordered to take the nearest route to Antwerp, in the expectation, no doubt, that that place, amidst the consternation and confusion which prevailed, would be taken by surprise, or present a feeble resistance to a besieging army. Could the Allies be ignorant of all this? Are they so stupid as not to have discovered in this proceeding the particular object we had in view? Is it to be supposed that they are not aware of the policy which influences Great Britain in her hostility against France? that it is the annihilation

of her maritime power which we aim at ; and that, this once effected, they may perhaps find it necessary at no very distant period, to arm against us in defence of their own naval rights. In these circumstances, it is ridiculous to talk of the Allies having a *right* to expect any thing from the *people* of Holland. It must, in the first instance, be shown that the Sovereigns of Europe are disposed to forward *our views* as to that country ; that they are willing the succession to the crown should be fixed in the Orange family ; that the proposed matrimonial alliance with this country should be carried into effect ; and that they are inclined to submit to the vast accession of maritime power which this would eventually give us. It is proper, I say, to clear up these necessary points, before we presume to threaten the Dutch people or the house of Orange ; because we might, perhaps, find, as we have often done, when it was too late, that it is one thing to manage a government and a people when they look upon us as friends, and another when we have made them our enemies by our arrogant and unjust pretensions. Whatever the aggregate of the English nation may think, it is very clear to me, that the allied powers will not stand by and suffer Great Britain to maintain the sovereignty of the seas, while their own rights, as naval powers possessing a large extent of sea coast, are compromised ; nor do I believe they will permit France, Holland, or the other maritime states, to become a prey to the inordinate ambition of any sovereign, be his power and pretensions what they may.

MURAT, KING OF NAPLES.—I dare say the Emperor Napoleon begins to think that the kings he was lately so active in making, have turned out rather scurvy fellows.—First, Bernadotte deserts his cause, leagues with the Allies, and then invades France, regardless of what fools may say about patriotism, and rebellion against one's country. Then comes the alleged defection of Murat, a personage whom, we had every reason to believe, was the *particular* favourite of Buonaparté, and who always evinced a decided attachment to his cause. It was some time, I confess, before I could persuade myself that this last sovereign of Napoleon's creation had followed the example of the "great Prince of Sweden," and, like him, taken up arms against his native country. But this reluctance on my part, I now find, was owing to inattention ; for if I had considered aright the *nature* of those stimulants

which have been used to bring Murat round to the cause of the Allies, I could not for a moment have hesitated as to the fact. It no where appears that Britain is to allow the King of Naples a subsidy in money, as we do Bernadotte for his *magnanimous* conduct. But Murat has received, and actually taken possession of territory, as a *bonus* for joining in the "sacred cause," equal in point of real value to the whole kingdom of Naples.—The *Courier* at first told us that Murat was "to have an *accession* of "territory from the Papal States." It appears, however, he has not only got a *part*, but the whole of these States ; he has taken "possession of the south of Italy as far as "the right bank of the Po."—Why the Allies should have given up so much ; why they should have sacrificed so large a portion of this fine country, for the mere co-operation of a Power like Naples, has excited a good deal of surprise. Our newspapers, such as the *Times* and the *Courier*, have attempted to create doubts as to the arrangement, on account of the very advantageous terms obtained by Murat.—Others again, while they give implicit credit to the fact, have thought they discovered some symptoms in the transaction of a scheme, a stratagem, on the part of Napoleon, to save Naples from falling into the hands of the Allies, at a moment when, from the dangers which threatened him on all sides, he could not afford her any succours in case she should be attacked by a superior force.—As to the apparent defection of Murat, I see no reason to doubt this because he has obtained better terms than the *Times* and *Courier* would have allowed him. But I have not discovered any thing which enables me to form a positive opinion as to the other point—namely, that the whole is the result of a deep policy on the part of Napoleon to preserve Naples. This may be the case ; it is likely enough ; but, as far as is yet seen, nothing positive can be advanced on the subject. Still, sufficient has transpired to satisfy me, that Murat has *not* been a *willing* instrument in the business, but has yielded only to circumstances, which he could not control. In short, that it was *necessity*, as in the case of the Danes, which led him to join the Allies. In proof of this, we have his own proclamation, published at Milan, on the 17th of January, which runs as follows:—"Milan, Jan. 30th. The King of Naples, "on the 17th inst. issued the following "proclamation:—Having, for *sundry* "weighty causes, found ourselves *OBLIGED* "to adopt measures for being admitted into

"the Alliance of the States united against France, we have in this instance been successful. We have given up the three islands situated opposite to Naples, and our whole fleet: but for this we are to have a sufficient compensation. We are going to take possession of the South of Italy, as far as to the right bank of the Po. We shall always remember our duty; and those persons in office who have always performed their's, and who have made no opposition to our measures, may assuredly reckon on our protection, and on keeping their respective posts."

—From this document it is sufficiently clear, that Murat was *obliged*, from "sun-dry weighty causes" not explained, to solicit an alliance with the powers "united against France." It requires very little penetration to discover what these causes were. He could not be ignorant of the recent disasters of France, on which alone Naples can depend for assistance in the hour of danger. Surrounded on all sides by the enemies of that sovereign to whom he owed every thing, it was, indeed, a wise and profound policy on the part of the Neapolitan king to avert the threatening storm by conciliation. Whether this was the result of Buonaparté's schemes or not, it seems to me that terms have been obtained by Naples, much more favourable than she had any reason to expect. These, indeed, have excited the indignation of the *Courier*, which exclaims, "A sufficient compensation with a vengeance! for as 'the Po, having its source in the Alps in Savoy, flows into the sea, north of Comachio, Murat would, besides Naples, have all the Papal States, Tuscany, Modena, Parma, Bologna, &c.!"—It is no way surprising to find our hireling press venting its spleen in this way; but it is somewhat singular, if we can believe Buonaparté *serious*, to see him censuring the conduct of Murat, recalling, as he has done, all Frenchmen from Naples, and denouncing their defaulters, who would be "pursued by the agents of the public government," if they did not "return into the territory of the empire within the space of three months." Napoleon is either acting a double part in the business, or he is become quite unreasonable if, as Murat says, he was actually *obliged* to adopt measures for being admitted into the alliance. By that step he has not only preserved Naples from being invaded by the Allies, but all Italy to the south of the Po; and young Beauharnois has shewn by his late successes, that the rest of Italy

may safely be left to his care. Should Murat, however, have been influenced by motives really *hostile* towards Buonaparté, of which the latter, it must be acknowledged, is the best judge, he has only himself to blame for confiding so much as he has done in his generals, and showing so great a partiality for the craft of king-making. He may, perhaps, at this moment, be accusing himself, and repenting his ill-placed confidence; but he should recollect, that kings are but men, whose vices and propensities do not always change with a change of circumstances. He should also remember, that he is not the first sovereign who has had to struggle against the treachery of friends. King Henry the Vth had much to complain of in that way; and although I never was a great admirer of Shakespeare, I cannot resist the temptation, for once, of giving an extract from the above play, which, I think, contains a pretty apt illustration of the point under consideration:

But oh!

What shall I say to thee, LORD SCROOP, thou cruel, Ungrateful, savage, and inhuman monster! Thou that didst bear the key of all my counsels, That knew of the very bottom of my soul, That almost might'st have coind me into gold. Would'st thou have practis'd on me for thy use? May it be possible that *foreign hire* Could out of thee extract one spark of evil That might annoy my finger? 'Tis so strange, That though the truth of it stand off as gross As black and white, mine eye will scarcely see it. Treason and murder ever kept together As two yoke-devils, sworn to either's purpose, Working so grossly in a natural cause, That admiration did not whoop at them; But thou 'gainst all proportion didst bring in Wonder, to wait on treason and on murder; And whatsoever cunning fiend it was That wrought upon thee so preposterously, Hath got the voice in hell for excellence: And other devils that suggest by treasons Do botch and bungle up damnations With patches, colours, and with forms, being fetched

From glittering semblances of piety; But he that temper'd thee had thee stand up, Gave thee as instance why thou shouldst do treason Unless to dub thee with the name of traitor. If that same demon that hath gull'd thee thus, Should, with his lion-gait, walk the whole world, He might return to vasty Tartar back, And tell the legions, I can never win A soul so easily as I won his.

King Henry the Vth, Act the 2nd.

PEACE OR WAR?—If we are to judge from the altered tone of that vile press, which has, for twenty years, sacrificed every principle of justice, of honour, and of humanity, to its interested clamour for interminable war, the great question is now about to be settled, and Europe once more restored to a state of peace. Not many

days have elapsed since we were told in the *Courier*, that the Allies had *determined* not to make peace with the Emperor of France *until they were in possession of his capital*. This insolent language was doubtless suited to the narrow views of those who had been all along endeavouring to persuade the country, that France was sunk in a state of apathy, and unwilling to continue the contest any longer in support of its present government. It was language quite consistent with the assurances they gave their readers, that the Allies were actually in possession of Paris, and were about to "dethrone the tyrant," and restore to France the "*mild* and virtuous sway of the house of Bourbon." In fine, it was language every way becoming men who talked and boasted thus in the absence of the intelligence of Napoleon's victories, which, like a powerful talisman, has in one instant overthrown their vain and towering hopes, and converted their imperious exultation into doleful lamentations. Those, in particular, who were the most active in sounding the everlasting war-whoop, and who *piouly* told us that "to make peace with Buonaparté would be to make war against virtue and against God," are now the most forward in proclaiming their expectations of an *immediate* peace. It has been this expectation, they say, which has led to another prorogation of parliament to the 21st instant, before which day, they confidently assure us, the preliminaries will have been signed; not merely by the ministers of Russia, Prussia, and the other continental powers, but also by Lord Castlereagh in behalf of this country. This is what the newspapers, who pretend to be in the secret, and who, only the other day, told us a very different story, would now have us to believe is the state of the negotiation for peace. It is possible that what they say *may* at last be true; these lying oracles *may* for *once* have spoken the truth, and many of their former dupes, notwithstanding the repeated proofs they have had of their total disregard of all honest principle, may credit every iota of it. For my part, however, I confess that peace, a *general* peace such as these newspapers have described, is an event which does not appear to me so very near. The recent disasters of the Allies, may have disposed the minds of those who manage our affairs *at home*, to pursue more peaceable measures with the French Emperor than we were lately taught to expect; and this may have superinduced a persuasion in some minds, that nothing now stands in the way of an

amicable termination of the negotiation. With such shallow-minded people, Great Britain is every thing; she is the fulcrum which moves and directs all the proceedings at Chatillon; she is the pivot upon which the whole must turn. To say nothing of France, with a population of 30 millions of people, who are now in a condition to dictate terms to their invaders, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and the whole of the confederates must, according to these sage politicians, submit to be controlled by the whim and caprice of this country; must prosecute the war if England resolves on war; must make peace if it suits her pleasure. Highly absurd and ridiculous as this must make us appear in the eyes of other nations, it is a sort of language not only to be found in the mouths of thousands who can neither read nor write, but, to their eternal disgrace, of thousands more who have received a liberal education, and, of course, ought to know better. In fact, the same false ideas with regard to national importance and national superiority, pervades all ranks, and disgustingly obtrudes itself upon our notice in every news-paper and political pamphlet which issues from the press. The period is fast approaching when the eyes of mankind will be open to this horrible delusion, and when they will be made sensible of the folly of treating every other nation with contempt that does not bow to the mandates of an unjust and imperious domination. But let peace come when it may, it will be found, to our sad experience, that it would have been more to the advantage of Great Britain if, instead of assuming a dictatorial tone, and being the prime mover in the greater part, if not in all the coalitions that have been formed against France, she had confined her views to the improvement of her manufactures, to her agricultural pursuits, and to the encouragement of the other useful arts. Then, indeed, she might have been great; then she might have had reason to be proud of her superiority. But she preferred a state of ruinous warfare, which has had the effect of giving to the people against whom she fought, the pre-eminence she might have enjoyed; and caused herself to tremble at the prospect of peace, which she dreads because it must be fatal to millions, and place the country in a situation in which it will poignantly feel all the pernicious effects consequent on the destructive system which has so long desolated Europe. No one can suppose me an enemy to peace, without supposing me destitute of the common feelings of humanity. But I cannot

join with those who flatter themselves that a peace with France, *in the present state of things*, will prove a blessing to this country. Much, very much indeed, must be done in the way of *reform*, before any of the comforts which many look for, in a suspension of hostilities, can be realized. Meanwhile, it does appear to me, that a general peace is neither so near nor so easily to be obtained as most people are inclined to believe. The multitude of interests involved; the extent of territory to be adjusted; the continental and maritime rights of the belligerents, which have been rendered complex by the long endurance of the contest, and the different pretences, and arrogant assumptions of ambitious individuals; are points not to be settled in a day, or a month, perhaps not in a year. As a preliminary point, I think Napoleon may insist upon the evacuation of the soil of France by the Allies. It was while they were on the *other side of the Rhine*, that he agreed to the terms which they proposed as a basis of a peace. They refused to give his ambassador a passport, though fully empowered to enter upon an immediate negotiation; and followed up that refusal by an invasion of the territory of France. Napoleon even suspended all military operations, till they had penetrated into the heart of his kingdom. Conferences were no doubt held at Chatillon, said to be of a pacific nature; but it was a strange way of settling the terms of peace by cutting each other's throats. It was impossible both parties could be sincere. Now that the Emperor of France has lowered the presumption of those who would listen to no terms until they were in possession of his capital, I am inclined to think he will not treat with the enemies of France till they re-assume the position which they occupied when he signified his acquiescence in their original proposals. He may meet the views of the Allies so far as to consent to a suspension of hostilities; but I am persuaded he will not go into discussions respecting a definitive treaty, until the whole of the invading army has re-crossed the Rhine. If this should be his plan, and the Allies refuse to accede to it, we may then, instead of an immediate peace, have war in perpetuity.

THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON AND HIS ARMY.—What I foresaw in my last, without pretending to the spirit of prophecy, and which any other man, who ex-

ercised his reasoning powers, might have foreseen as well as me, has actually happened. Napoleon has forced the combined army to fall back to Troyes, 111 miles from Paris, and 75 miles from the point which they had previously reached. This fact was first ascertained by the receipt of dispatches from our military agents who accompany the allied army, the 1st of which is dated Troyes the 17th ult. These dispatches fully confirm the leading facts stated in the previous French bulletins, and clearly show, that the object of the Allies, the capture of Paris, had completely failed. Since then French official papers have been received to the 25th, in which it is stated, that Buonaparté's head-quarters were at Nogent on the 20th, and that his advanced guard was "half way between "Nogent and Troyes;" that is, within 25 miles of the latter place; so that it is more than probable, as Napoleon was bringing forward his troops on all sides, and actively preparing for new and offensive operations, that another battle may have been fought, unless hostilities have been suspended by an armistice. The latest official intelligence which, by the last accounts, was received at Paris from the army, was dated the 20th.—If a battle had been fought on the 24th, or even the 26th, sufficient time has elapsed for the particulars to have reached this country.—That no advices have been received, can only be accounted for upon the supposition that some pacific measure has been adopted, or that the French papers, containing the details of another engagement have been kept back here, as I believe they have often been, to serve stock-jobbing purposes. Be this as it may, I think it cannot be long ere intelligence be received of a decisive nature from one quarter or another.

OCCURRENCES OF THE WAR.—I have little to add, under this head, to what I stated in my last. The storming of Soissons by the Russians, who, it was said, took 3,000 prisoners, 13 pieces of cannon, and killed and wounded between 6 and 7,000 of the enemy, is represented in the French bulletin to have been a very paltry affair. The garrison, it is there stated, consisted only of 1,000 men of the national guards. The *redoubtable* Winzingerode considered it the safest way, after the mighty achievement of surprising this formidable garrison, to decamp from Soissons, and follow the fortunes of Blücher.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

FRENCH SUFFERERS.—If the accounts, with which the French official papers have lately been filled, of the sufferings of the people of France, in consequence of the war, be true, which I see no reason to doubt, it appears to me that they are as much the objects of compassion, and have as great a claim upon the charitable benevolence of this country, as the suffering Germans, or any other suffering people on earth. The religion which we profess does not only enjoin it as one of the duties of a Christian, to feed the hungry and clothe the naked of his own particular nation or sect, but it inculcates *universal* benevolence. It does more; it commands us to *love our enemies*; and, in conforming to these precepts, it assures us that we conform to the Father of All, and by him will be rewarded in due time for these virtuous deeds. What other impulse; what other motives than these influence the great mass of the community, who are just now so actively engaged in promoting the subscription for the suffering Germans? Among these I observe the names of the great bulk of the people called Quakers, who utterly disclaim all motives of action in this case but those which arise from the benevolent maxims of the religion which they profess; who say they are actuated by no interested consideration, and who give their money for the relief of the miserable victims of war in Germany, not because these unfortunates have a higher claim upon their purse than others who may be equally unfortunate, but because they hold it to be the duty of all Christians, and, indeed, of all mankind, whatever may be their religion, to contribute towards the amelioration of suffering humanity, whether the call be made by an Englishman or by a German, by a Frenchman or by a Spaniard. These philanthropic principles are what I have often heard avowed by the Quakers, and I have often witnessed them exemplified in the conduct of many a worthy member of that association.—I should hope they are not confined to the narrow circle of my observation. I should hope that it is not with

a *profession* of philanthropy merely, that this numerous and respectable body of my fellow-citizens are satisfied. I trust it is not a *few* of them who are alive to the misery and wretchedness of their fellow-men, but that they *all* feel alike on this subject, and are *all* employed, as far as they have the means, in administering the comforts of life to those who are in want of them. I say, I hope and trust this is the case. But, I do confess, I have my fears upon the subject. I entertain strong doubts that their present interference in behalf of the Germans, is not altogether so disinterested as they would have the world believe. Have they no wish, no desire, in this age of *universal patriotism*; when the cry of *general liberty* and the *emancipation of Europe* is in every one's mouth, to appear as patriotic as their neighbours? At least, does not the *very active* part which they have taken in raising money for *our Allies*, show that they do not wish, in this *loyal* age, to be suspected of incivism? I may be mistaken; but when I look into the history of the Quakers, I am very apt to think that their present *decided conduct* is somewhat tainted with the feeling which I have mentioned. Still I admit I may be wrong in my conjecture. The moment, however, is arrived, which must remove all doubt on this head; which must serve as a *touchstone* to try the *sincerity* not only of this extensive class of religious professors, but of innumerable other classes, all over the country, who boast, as much as the Quakers do, of their *universal benevolence*, and who point to their names in the subscription list for the suffering Germans, as proofs of their philanthropy. The hour, I say, is come, which must either confirm the claim of these numerous sects to the genuine character of Christians, such as they themselves describe it to be, or entirely overthrow all their pretensions. The people of France are now afflicted with all the horrors of war under which the neighbouring states and kingdoms so recently groaned, and which excited the commiseration of this country in their behalf. To so great a height, indeed, have these suffer-

ings arisen, that they have attracted the particular notice of the Municipality of Paris, who have held several public meetings for the purpose of receiving the reports of the Deputies employed to collect information as to the extent of the evil. These reports, says the *Courier*, "which are given at length with the signatures of all the Deputies, in the *Moniteur* and other papers, are *too long*, and *too revolting* to be given entire. They present a series of pictures, which may serve as *companions* to those of the *atrocities* of the French themselves in those *unhappy countries* which have witnessed the retreat of their discomfited armies." It is not my intention to make any remarks upon the important fact here admitted by the *Courier*, that if the French armies committed *atrocities* in the countries which they lately overrun, these have been since *equalled*, have since found *companions* in the interior of France. The fact, indeed, was sufficiently known before, by the proclamation of Marshal Blucher, who found it necessary to threaten his soldiers with military execution on the spot, if they persisted in their depredations upon the inhabitants. What I wish principally to remark upon the above passage is, that the sufferings of the French people are *admitted* to be at least as *great* as those of the Germans. The details of them are represented to be extremely "*revolving*," and the miseries of both nations are aptly described to be fit "*companions*." But why the *extent* of these sufferings, and the *enormity* of the "*atrocities*" committed, should have been considered a reason for *suppressing* these details, I cannot discover; unless, indeed, those who have the management of these matters were afraid that a perusal of these *revolving* accounts, might excite a kindred feeling to that which exists on behalf of the Germans. Every circumstance connected with the sufferings of the latter has been ransacked from all quarters; and, as appears to me, without proper attention to the sources whence the greater part of the information has been drawn, obtruded upon public notice with an unjustifiable degree of anxiety; whereas the details which have been furnished of the great extent of French suffering, and of French misery, on the authority of men officially employed for the purpose of drawing them up, and whose reports have been *authenticated* by their appearance in the *Moniteur*, are considered *too long* for publication! Of all these numerous and highly important documents, the following is the

only one to which it has been thought prudent to give an English dress; and which, though limited in the information it contains, I have given here, because I consider it calculated to lay a foundation for the exercise of that benevolence, of that general philanthropy, which is so much in vogue in this country.

Report to his Excellency the Minister of the Interior, by M. Desprez Crassier, Auditor to the Council of State, dated March 2, 1814.

"I now lay before you the heart-rending picture of the calamities and outrages which the inhabitants of the communes I have visited have experienced from the enemy. It will be an abstract of the subscribed depositions taken by verbal examination, and an abridged detail of the *havoc* which I have seen with my own eyes.—That part of the enemy's army which caused all these evils was chiefly composed of Russian troops, a small number of Bavarians and Wurtembergers, and some Hungarian hus-sars.—At Nangis the *inhabitants* generally had to complain of *pillage*; their *personal outrages* leave *frightful recollections*; pillage itself was always accompanied with *menaces*, very often with *ill-treatment*; and it was with *pistols at their breasts*, and *the sabre over their heads*, that these brigands compelled the unfortunate *inhabitants* to declare where their money and valuable effects were concealed.—The 1st and 2d depositions state, that a *female* received from these miscreants a *blow on the loins*, with the flat side of their sabre, which *deprived her of sense*; that they held a *knife to the throat of another*, to compel her to disclose where her money was; that the two husbands of these women were *ruelly struck*, and that one of them, *after being beaten in his own house*, was driven to the enemy's camp, with *blows of the fist*, and the butt ends of muskets: there the brigands *compelled him to strip*, and were about to *shoot him*, when an officer fortunately came up, and delivered him out of the hands of these barbarians.—At the house of the man of landed property, who makes the sixth deposition, they perpetrated the *most horrible excesses*. With *blows of the fist* and the butt end of their muskets, they demanded his *brandy and money*. *I myself saw the bloody marks of the blows which he received*; but their *fury* did not stop there; *four females* from the commune of Bailly, and *canton of Mormant*, had taken refuge with this proprietor: two of

them were girls from 12 to 15; the others were women from 28 to 35. These unfortunate creatures were the *victims of the brutality* of these ferocious men; and an eye-witness, who wished to prevent their outrages, was himself severely beaten.—[The report, after describing a variety of similar outrages on the persons of individuals, proceeds as follows:]—There is not a farmer, an innkeeper, or an inhabitant, who has not seen his cattle, his implements of agriculture, his property, his furniture, carried off, wasted, or burnt. The churches and ministers of religion have not been spared more than others.—*The strongest language would fail in describing the mournful aspect which these ravaged habitations present.* The Secretary of the Mayor of Rampillon, who has been a soldier, declared to me, that he never saw troops deliver themselves up to pillage with such horrible rage, even when licensed so to do.—At Nangis I visited a number of farm-houses, which had been previously well furnished; but now in all the apartments nothing was to be seen but fragments of broken and half-burnt furniture, feather-beds and mattresses torn to pieces, and the feathers and wool scattered about. It was with the wood-work of this furniture, of waggons and ploughs, and with the fruit-trees of orchards and gardens, that they lighted their fires at their bivouacs, and roasted the cattle which they had carried off and killed.—In all the places I have passed through, the inhabitants have declared that these banditti spoke only of pillaging and burning Paris. I have been assured that each of them had a torch slung at his back; and when asked what use they meant to make of it, they universally answered, that it was to set fire to Paris, where they calculated on arriving by the 18th of February. This fact was confirmed to me by M. Grabwisky, Mayor of Mormant, a Pole by birth, who understood their language.—*The picture of the calamities which these unfortunate people have suffered, and which are reserved for all those of the other departments into which the enemy may penetrate, must rouse the indignation of all Frenchmen, and give them the courage and energy necessary to repel those hordes of barbarians beyond the frontiers, and force them, by a peace glorious for France, at last to give repose to all Europe.*"

Whether the calamities, the misery, the wretchedness, which is depicted in the preceding narrative, are justifiable or not accord-

ing to the system of warfare now introduced into civilized Europe, is a point entirely foreign to my present purpose, and which can in no shape affect the question, whether the French people, who are *confessedly* as great sufferers by the war as the Germans, have not the same claims as the latter upon our Christian charity. All that is generally required to induce an exercise of this benevolence, is the making out of a case; is a statement of facts sufficient to remove all doubts as to the persons being proper objects of our compassion. Here then, ye professors of a religion, characterized by the purest system of morality established amongst men, is a case made out to your satisfaction, which even the most inveterate political enemies of France have not dared to question. Here are objects upon which to exercise that charity which you so much extol, because its operation is not confined to any particular time, people, place, or circumstances; because it embraces the whole human race in its benign circle; and because it is only necessary to give a nation or individuals a claim upon your bounty, that they are suffering distress. Here you have a picture of the "heart-rending calamities" of a people who have been deprived of every thing they possessed on earth, even of their habitations during a long and dreary winter, by the rude hand of ferocious war. Here you have the young and the old, the infirm as well as the healthy, the matron and the virgin, imploring relief from the hands of those who are far removed from this dreadful scourge, and who have it in their power to give them that relief. Where then, ye philanthropic Dissenters; where, ye pious and charitable Churchmen, are your bowels of compassion for suffering humanity? If you do not step forward immediately and afford relief as liberally to the French sufferers, whose case is so powerfully recommended to your notice, as what you have done to their neighbours the Germans, you will belie all your professions of universal benevolence; you will fully justify the suspicion, that you are actuated by motives very different indeed from those which your religion inculcates. In short, if, after the appeal which is now made to your humanity in behalf of the French people, you should nevertheless turn a deaf ear to that call, it will no longer remain a doubt, that the part which you have taken as to the German sufferers, is altogether *political*; that you have been impelled to this from the mere selfish consideration of

wishing not to be behind in demonstrating your *loyalty* at a moment when so much stress is laid upon this mode of showing one's patriotism. You may by such conduct escape the charge of *jacobinism*, if this be your object; but it never can procure you the respect of the virtuous, nor satisfy your own minds, that you are acting a consistent part; whereas, by extending your benevolence to *all*; by relieving the distresses even of your *enemies*, (supposing you consider the *people* of France in that light) you insure the applause of all good men, and the approbation of your own consciences. Those who object to giving money for the relief of the sufferers in France, for no other reason than that we are at war with that country, are to be looked upon as *mere politicians*, who have no pretensions to Christian benevolence, and who, of course, cannot be moved by any of the foregoing remarks. These cold-blooded, these flinty, these steel-hearted mortals, would do well to recollect, that though we are at war with the French government, that it is not in behalf of any of its members, nor even of its wounded soldiers, that we are called upon to interest ourselves. It is in behalf of the suffering *inhabitants*, who, it is clear, take no part in the war; it is in behalf of the aged and the infirm; it is in behalf of the youth of both sexes; it is in behalf of the farmer and the artisan, who were pursuing their lawful occupations in the bosom of peace, and who, till lately, were remote from the din and horrors of war, that the appeal is made. Like the inhabitants of Germany, who were following similar pursuits, they have been suddenly and unexpectedly deprived of comfort and ease, and thrown upon the wide world to seek even the bare means of subsistence. Like the Germans, therefore, they have an undoubted claim upon our humanity. Besides, if it be true, as these *natural enemies* of France tell us, that the people there are groaning under a disgraceful and despotic tyranny; that they are the *unwilling* instruments in the hands of an arbitrary government, of perpetuating the scourges of war; that they are at all times liable to be dragged from their homes, to fill up the ranks of the armies of the man, who thus lords it over them, and who can check and restrain every disposition towards emancipation, by the powerful military force which he always has at his command. If, I say, this is a *true* picture of the situation of the people of France, how can those men, who give us these representations, and who vouch for their accuracy,

blame the *inhabitants* of that country, for being at war with us? or why ought they to be punished, by being left to starve, on account of the misdeeds of their government? To me, it appears, quite clear that, instead of this deplorable and *helpless* condition, affording a reason for visiting them with *additional* calamities, they are entitled on that account alone, to more commiseration than the Germans, who, we are positively assured, have enjoyed the most *perfect liberty* ever since the French were driven out of their country. It is entirely fallacious then to refuse pecuniary aid to the *peaceable* inhabitants of France, who are suffering the horrors of war in an equal degree with, if not in a greater, than their neighbours, *merely* because the French government chooses to continue hostilities. Indeed, if there is any thing at all in the argument, it applies with equal force to the Germans as to the French; for are not both their governments prosecuting the war with the same resolute determination? and are not the miseries which at present overwhelm so large a portion of continental Europe, the result, (as stated by the *Courier*) of the ravages of the soldiers of *both* the opposing armies? Away then with those hypocritical pretensions, with those senseless clamours about benevolence, philanthropy, and Christian charity, which are founded on so unhallowed a base. He only is the true philanthropist, who extends his arm to succour distress wherever it appears, whether the object of it be a Turk or a Pagan, a Jew or a Christian, a worshipper of Bramah, or an adorer of the terrible Odin. He only can be called benevolent, who seeks out the victim of misfortune, regardless of peace or war, and raises him from the dust, whatever may be his place of residence.

WAR OF EXTERMINATION.

MR. COBBETT.—The strength, clearness, and accuracy of your reasoning, whether your discussions relate to political or religious topics, cannot but procure you many admirers among your numerous readers. But much as I am disposed to concur in this general sentiment, and much as I am inclined to subscribe to the greater part of your opinions, there are some particulars in which I find I cannot bring myself exactly to your way of thinking; some points as to which you appear to me to have reasoned wrong, and to which, I am rather afraid, you have not given that attention which their great importance demands. One of

these topics is that which I have chosen for the title of this letter, and upon which, I observe, you made some very pertinent remarks in reference to Bonaparte in your last Register. In so far as you there endeavoured to hold up to public execration the crime of assassination, you fully met my views; but, when you seemed to recommend a termination of the war with such a people as the French, and to advise us to enter into treaties with them, and acknowledge them as brethren, I found I could not go any farther with you in opinion. I found, on an examination of these arguments, that they were contrary to the ideas almost universally entertained in this country; and, if adopted, that they might prove fatal to our religious and political establishments. But what was of still greater importance, I discovered that it would be a direct violation of an express law of God to follow up your recommendation. In short, it is evident to me, that the *extermination of the French nation* is absolutely essential to the security of Great Britain, and its expediency clearly demonstrable from reason and from scripture. You, Mr. Cobbett, need not be told, that God selected the Jews of old for the purpose of clearing the earth of idolators, and putting them, his chosen people, in possession of "a land flowing with milk and honey," In conformity to this example, it is incumbent on all godly nations to wage war against the *impious*, the *sacrilegious*, and the *ungodly*: but it is particularly incumbent on this *our* nation, as being by far the *most godly* nation on the face of the globe. For the truth of this assertion, I appeal to all our controversialists for almost 200 years back, who have boldly affirmed, and, I think, fully proved, that as of all forms of religion, Christianity is the most godly, so, of all modes of Christianity, that professed by the Church of England is the purest and most orthodox.—A nation, then, *professing and practising* this orthodox and pure religion, may well be denominated the people of God: consequently this people ought to exterminate all God's enemies. When the Amalekites, who vainly endeavoured to oppose the entrance of the children of Israel into the land of promise, were discomfited by Joshua (as is related in the 17th chapter of Exodus), "the Lord said to Moses, write this for a memorial in a book, and rehearse it in the ears of Joshua, for I will utterly put out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven. And Moses built an altar,

"and called the name of it Jehovah-Nissi: for he said, Because the Lord hath sworn, that the Lord will have war with Amalek from generation to generation." Now, what are the French people but a race of Amalekites, who have, in a great measure, renounced Christianity, and who bend the knee to the *God of nature*, and to that idol monster called *human reason*? That the French have, in a great measure, renounced Christianity, is clear from their having abolished its *political* establishments, and left it to struggle the best it can for its own existence. No revenues, no emoluments, no provision made by the state for its ministers! no respect paid to its temples, no regard to its festivals, no veneration for its rites and ceremonies! What is there sacred in religion which they have not profaned? Chalices, candlesticks, crucifixes, pixes, ostensories, images, shrines, and reliquaries; all have been converted into current coin! Baptized bells have been transformed into cannon bullets, and consecrated churches to armories and arsenals! Their bishops they have banished; their priests they have persecuted; their whole hierarchy they have overturned! They have even sacrilegiously dared to turn the Holy Father (God's vicar on earth) out of the Papal chair, and to detain him in woeful captivity.—I know that some well-meaning Protestants think, that, in all this, the French did little harm; or, rather, that they did much good. It was (say they) only overturning the throne of Anti-Christ, abolishing an idolatrous and blasphemous worship, destroying an *overgrown body of superstition* (as Addison somewhere calls it), and clearing away the nasty filth with which the *scarlet whore* and her paramour had polluted the house of God. Such reflections I have heard made by Protestants, and even by some of the established clergy. But these, I presume, were Protestants of the *old school*; disciples of Stillingfleet, Tillotson, Newton, and Hurd. Our modern divines, however, teach them a more orthodox, certainly a more charitable doctrine. They teach them that the Roman Catholics are our *dear brethren* in Christ; that their bishops and priests are confessors and *martyrs* for the true faith; that destroying their supposed implements of idolatry was *sacrilege*; and that robbing them of their revenues, was *impiety*: and so think I.—The French, then, being an impious, sacrilegious, ungodly nation, a set of real Amalekites, and we the chosen people of God, it is plain that we ought to "have

"war with Amalek from generation to generation." It will be said, perhaps, or at least thought, that this conclusion is rashly drawn. But, I hope I shall be able to make the contrary appear. The objection, taken in its full force, seems to be the following:—"Granting that we are now 'the chosen people of God, as much as the Israelites were of old,' and that the French 'are as hostile to God and us as the Amalekites were of old to God and the Israelites, it doth not follow that we have a right to wage a continual war against them, unless we have a special commission from heaven so to do. To us the Lord hath not sworn that the Lord will have war with the French, from generation to generation." Nor has he declared it to be his will, that "the remembrance of France should be utterly put out from under heaven." This may be the wish of the war faction, but it is not so clear that it is the will of God.—I answer: To me it is perfectly clear; for, let me ask, how the will of God is manifested to any nation but through the medium of its government, especially in the case of making peace or war? Indeed, I can see no good reason why a nation should go to war at all, if they do not consider the will of the sovereign the will of heaven itself. When our gallant troops were ordered across the seas to subdue the Americans, did they hesitate a moment to march, from the reflection that they were going to carry on an *unjust* war against the will of heaven? No; they embarked in the implied idea that they were doing their duty; and the will of government to them was the will of God. Again, When government said to Marquis Wellington, "Choose men; go out; fight with 'the French;' the noble Marquis paid the same obedience to that order; and our brave armies followed him, in the supposition that he was executing the will of God, by executing the will of his Majesty's ministers, the vice-gerent of God's vice-gerent. This is a doctrine that cannot be too often and too deeply inculcated on the minds of subjects; it is the base of all subordination, from the King's servants down to my servants. According to the Apostle Paul, every common servant is to consider the will of his master, every common master, as the will of God himself. How much more are not subjects, then, obliged to consider the will of the supreme magistrate as the will of the Supreme Being?—But the will of heaven, with respect to warring against the French, has been sufficiently expressed,

not only by the voice of government, but by the voice of the people (which, to a proverb, is the voice of God) through their representatives in parliament, and by the whole bench of Bishops. It is beyond a question, then, that whenever government engage in a war, and when that war is sanctioned by the national representatives, it is the will of heaven that it should be carried on, and carried on until its object be attained. If it be asked, what this object at present is? I answer, that it must be the total extirpation of the French nation; putting out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven! — It has been said, that the object of the war with France is to replace a Bourbon king on the throne; but this cannot be true: for when the nation had a king of that race, they were just as hostile to us as they are at present; perhaps more so: and if they had a king of that race to-morrow, they would not cease to be as hostile to us as before. In a word, with respect to us, they would be still down-right Amalekites: for these, too, had their kings, the last of whom Samuel hewed in pieces before the Lord at Gilgal. — But it has been hinted, that we are at war with France on account of French *principles* propagated in the code Napoleon, and that we must continue this war as long as these principles are cherished and avowed in France, lest, peradventure, they should cross the channel, and debauch the minds and morality of God's people on this side the water. This, I allow, has a plausible appearance; and I am inclined to think that it may be one, although not the *only* or principal reason, for persevering in the war with France. The order which God gave, by the hand of Moses to exterminate the Canaanites, was given, partly, to prevent them from contaminating the minds and manners of the Israelites, by their heterodox doctrines and corrupt morality. And although the same charge is not explicitly brought against the Amalekites, we may believe that their faith and their practices were not so much better than those of the Canaanites; and therefore we may reasonably suppose, that this was at least *one* cause for God's *swearing* eternal war with them. But still the great and the only ostensible cause was their "coming out to fight with Israel in 'Rephidim;' or, as it is expressed in the first book of Samuel, "because they laid 'wait for him (Israel) in the way when 'he came out of Egypt.'" On this account, Saul was ordered to "Smite Ama-

"Iek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass," but the unseasonable commiseration of this milk-hearted monarch, led him to disobey this order, which provoked the just resentment of Jehovah against him, who deprived him of his kingdom.—I infer, then (and the inference, I think, is strictly logical), that it was not precisely the bad principles or practices of the Amalekites, which drew down upon them celestial vengeance; but their coming out to fight with God's people in Rephidim, and endeavouring to retard their march into the land of Canaan. From a strict similarity of cases, I must equally infer, that the main cause of our present war with the people of France, is not their principles or practices, but their opposing us in our *march to Paris*.—In fact, if the fear of French principles had been the sole or chief object of the war, it would not have been necessary; it would not even have been expedient, to march our armies into France or Holland; we have only to guard our coasts against their introduction hither, as we do against the introduction of smuggled goods. We might have treated French principles as we treat French liquors: the duties on them might have been made so high, and the penalties so enormous, that they could not have readily been imported; or if imported, could not be within the reach of the *rabble*, who were the most likely to be corrupted by them: whereas, by sending our soldiers, who form a considerable portion of that rabble, into France and Holland, we gave them an opportunity of tasting French liquors and French principles, and thus relishing both; for French principles and French liquors are equally agreeable to the bulk of mankind, who have not the discernment to distinguish between what is pleasing to the senses and pernicious to the soul, and who perceive not easily the latent poison that is mingled in the delicious draught.—Our offensive war against France, then, had some other object; we wanted to *get possession of the country*, as the Israelites wanted to get possession of the land of Canaan: and I know not but that we had as good a right to the one as they had to the other. We are God's own people as well as they;—in his name, and at his will, we march and move as well as they;—we have a Moses to direct us as well as they;—we have Aarons and Hurs to support his heavy

hands as well as they; we want only a portable *sanctuary*, which may soon be constructed at a much less expense than theirs.—On the other hand, the *iniquity of the French Amalekites* is universally acknowledged to be *full*: their sins, like those of Sodom and Gomorrah, have been long crying to heaven for vengeance; and we are unequivocally called to be the instruments of inflicting it.—We had a right, then, to march our armies into France, in order to take possession of it; and because *Amalek* came out to fight with us in Rephidim, we have an implicit and virtual order from heaven to make war with Amalek until he be utterly destroyed.—Hitherto the parallel has been uniformly and astonishingly just; but there is here at last a dissimilarity, which demands explanation. When the Amalekites came to fight with Israel in Rephidim, *they* were "discomfited:" but when the French came to fight with us *we* were discomfited, and obliged to make a sudden retreat. I think I hear some incredulous scoffer tauntingly say, 'if the people of this country are God's chosen people, how came they to be defeated, and prevented from marching to Paris by these modern Amalekites?'—This, I confess, is a hard question; and, perhaps, the solution I am going to give, may not seem altogether satisfactory. It may be that many of our soldiers, and some of their commanders, had not *sanctified* themselves previously to the engagement.—It may be, that they were *Amalekites* in practice, although *Israelites* in profession. It may be, that the measure of their iniquity, although not quite so full as that of the French, was sufficiently so, to make God abandon them on those occasions, by way of fatherly chastisement, to induce them to repentance and reformation.—Or it may be, that one or more of them have touched "the accursed thing." A rich brocade, or a piece of Brussels' lace, may have tempted some Achan to "put forth his hand, and take them, and hide them in his tent;" and, perhaps, the sin is yet unexpiated!—But, as I am unwilling to throw any degree of blame upon our brave soldiers, I will not urge mere possibilities as causes of the failures we have experienced; but rather charge these failures to the negligence and inattention of those who planned the expeditions. We must not, then, be disheartened by the want of success which has hitherto attended our arms; nor diverted from *marching to Paris*, because we

have been frequently impeded in our career. We have only to avoid our former errors, to supply our former omissions, and to persevere in our heaven-directed attempts. Those who think their losses irreparable, think like dastards. The greater our misadventures have been, the greater reason have we to hope they may be retrieved. Such was the language of Demosthenes to his fellow citizens, when they were trembling for the safety of the state: "Despair not of your affairs, Athenians, although, indeed, they are in a bad plight. What has, for the past, been the most pernicious to you, is the stronger motive of hope for the future! Why? our affairs are in so bad a condition, because we have done precisely what we ought not to have done, and not done what we ought to have done."—In order, then, to insure success in future, we must arm our respectable citizens, an honest yeomanry, and independent gentlemen. These must be headed by bold Barons, Peers, or the sons of Peers; such soldiers as our ancestors sent to *Cressy*, to *Agincourt*, and to *Poitiers*. With these troops ought to be blended no foreign mercenaries, who are sold for money to the best bidder, and who may stand in the field of battle to be knocked on the head, but who would never do honour to the cause in which they might fall. Of all such we must purge our armies. We must renounce every alliance with *idolators*, *infidels*, and *heretics*, if we wish to draw down the blessing of heaven on this holy enterprise. But what is of still greater importance, we must not send our soldiers, however *select*, however *holy*, however *devout*, without being accompanied by our legislators, or at least their representatives: not indeed to *fight*, but to influence by their presence, and by their prayers. Let it be remembered, that, while Joshua and his chosen army were fighting in the plain, Moses and his companions were praying in the mountains. Let my Lord Liverpool then, as our chief legislator, our Moses, go out with our troops, with the rod of God in his hand; that wonderful magic wand with which he has of late performed more miracles than Moses did in Egypt. Let our Aaron and our Hur accompany him to the summit of some hill, where our hosts may engage the French Amalekites: let them set our Moses on a stone; let him sit thereon, and stretch out his hands to heaven; and when his hands grow heavy, let them be supported by his two associates until the going down

of the sun; and I pledge my existence that the French Amalekites will be discomfited; and that our troops shall march to *Paris* without further impediment.—Whether, at the time, it will be proper to destroy the whole nation, *man, woman, infant, suckling, ox, sheep, camel, ass*; or whether, that is to be left to some future period, I will not take upon me to decide: but this I will affirm, that "we must have war with Amalek, from generation to generation, until the remembrance of Amalek be put out under Heaven!" If, even with all the preparation and precautions which I have mentioned, we should not, at first, be successful (which I can hardly doubt), still we may persevere in the contest, and not be dismayed at one, or even more defeats. The war of the other Israelites with the tribe of Benjamin, related in the Book of Judges, was at least as *pious* and just a war as that in which we are now engaged: and yet the Benjamites routed them twice, and slew 40,000 of their best and chosen men! And it was not until after having consulted the High-priest Phinehas, and using a stratagem to decoy the enemy into a snare laid for them, that they were at length victorious. With these splendid results before our eyes, it is base, it is cowardly, to listen to the senseless clamour for *peace* which has gone abroad among our fellow citizens. We ought to disregard the murmurs of peevish discontent; to stop our ears against the Siren voice of these who urge the plea of humanity, let them chant it ever so sweetly. We ought to come forward with willing hearts and open hands, and empty our purses into the minister's budget: give full and implicit confidence to one who never once abused our confidence. He has only as yet demanded one tenth of our income: if he should demand a *fifth* let us give it him: if, in short, he should demand the *whole*, let us part with it cheerfully; for when he shall have conquered France, and extirpated its inhabitants, great, exceeding great will be our recompense. Then, instead of adulterated bread, we shall eat loaves of the purest wheat; instead of insipid potatoes, we shall eat high flavoured truffles; instead of beef and mutton, we shall feast on red-legged partridges, beccoficos, and ortolans; instead of goose-berries and crab apples, we shall eat grapes and peaches; olives, instead of elder-berries; and oranges instead of hips: instead of pernicious gin, we shall drink generous brandy; and, instead of sharp small beer,

quaff the nectar of the Gods! Nothing but want of faith in God and in government can make us forego these great blessings, which we are certain of obtaining if we persevere in the war until "the remembrance of France be put out under "heaven."

POLEMOPHILUS.

MAGNANIMITY OF BONAPARTE.

Sir,—In the Morning Chronicle of Feb. 25, is the following article: "The Count de Escars arrived, we are told, on the 8th, at night, at Troyes, the headquarters of the Allies. The two Counts de Polignac, who, as our readers may remember, were arrested and tried with Moreau, have made their escape from Paris, and are arrived at headquarters."—The above paragraph, if true, exhibits a trait of the blackest ingratitude; for it is, without doubt, in the remembrance of thousands, the magnanimous conduct of Bonaparte to those two brothers who had forfeited their lives by conspiring with Pichegru, Georges, Moreau, and others, to put to death the saviour of their country. Indeed, some men are so base and depraved, that to do them a service is to make them your enemy for ever after. The following extract from Miss Plumpton's Tour in France, vol. 3, will bring the fact to the recollection of your readers, and put to shame (if they have a particle left) the malignant slanderers of the French Emperor.—"The Counts de Polignac being tried for the conspiracy above alluded to, the elder was found guilty and condemned; the younger was acquitted. The elder was married and had a family, to whom he would have been a great loss; the younger was single. The latter went to Bonaparte and earnestly intreated him to take his life instead of his brother's, stating what a fatal thing to his family it would be, that the head of it should lose his life in such a way; that he being a single man, his life was of no importance to any body. Bonaparte applauding the generous feeling that dictated the request, immediately granted a free pardon to both." If you think this worthy a place in your valuable and useful Register, its insertion will much gratify your constant reader.

2d March, 1814.

T. H.

To the Editor of the Political Register.

Sir—Through the medium of your impartial paper, I shall be very much oblig-

ed, if you will allow the following an insertion, *verbatim*, in your next Register. —I am, &c.

THOMAS MANT.

Southampton, March 7th, 1814.

MR. MANT, AND THE CAPTAINS CAMPBELL AND WILSON.

Mr. Mant begins, in answer to Captain Campbell's statement of the subject in question, which appeared in the Register of the 5th inst. respecting the "illegality of the selling of prizes, &c." and states, he is not at all conscious of having represented, "*in a loose manner, these transactions,*" and which term is totally opposite to his meaning, particularly so, as they have so lately been noticed in this Register as requiring a more serious attention; nor does it appear, Captain Campbell is at all sensible of the impropriety of those transactions, as he shows no inclination to defend them, except *loosely* expressing, "there was nothing contrary to the laws and usages in force, &c., as far as they really did take place," yet surely, Captain Campbell cannot forget the nature of the king's order, of the 26th of July, 1806, and the three Orders in Council of the 11th of November, 1807; and those papers previously adverted to, in the Register of the 19th ult. page 229, and in my possession, as being immediately under their influence;—2ndly. Mr. Mant admits he did make the charges to the Admiralty, against Captain Campbell, but observes, *not* before he had represented Mr. Mant's conduct *unjustly* to the Transport Board, and that also *privately* and partially, as stated in pages 48 and 49 of his pamphlet, and which Captain Campbell now corroborates; and Mr. Mant, also admits, on the Inquiry that took place, on Captain Campbell's conduct respecting these transactions, and by order of the admiralty; but still it must be recollected, that the result proves only an *ex parte* adjudication, as the admiralty have never called on Mr. Mant, or any other person, publicly, to substantiate, his statements on this head; nor have their Lordships ever been put in possession of such documents, as could sufficiently authorize impartially, the opinion, that Captain Campbell thinks so satisfactory, their Lordships having twice refused Mr. Mant an interview for that purpose; and which are still in his power to bring forward; and by a reference to the pages 54 and 55 of the same pamphlet, the whole of this matter will be found more fully explained.

—3dly. Mr. Mant, in regard to the "commencement of the dispute," says he has no recollection whatever of preferring charges against Captain Campbell, when abroad, and positively denies the "showing of papers, to several respectable gentlemen at Southampton," (and this can easily be refuted by his mentioning the names) and but in a very partial manner elsewhere; nor did he ever show papers, or did he ever speak of Captain Campbell in any disrespectful way, prior to Captain Campbell's writing to the Transport Board, and exposing those papers he circulated against Mr. Mant, in this neighbourhood; and it is certainly most extraordinary, "where Captain Campbell says, he wished of all things to avoid anything like a controversy with Mr. Mant," that he should not recollect, that he was through this channel, regarded as having given the challenge, now strengthened by his last declaration, viz. "of having reported Mr. Mant's conduct to the Transport Board, previous to the circumstances rendered to the Admiralty of himself," and further corroborated by the statement of Mr. Mant, in his said pamphlet, page 46, viz. "expressive of his unwillingness to enter into a further controversy with Capt. Campbell, &c. being in some measure satisfied with the justice, that had been rendered his character, by the extract of that letter Captain Campbell sent to Lord Collingwood, as the explanation of the several reports, viz. "to the purport of informing his lordship that, *after a diligent search, &c. he could not find any thing to criminate him;*" and moreover the *perfect acquittal* of the several charges, &c., by the Deputation's letter to Captain Campbell, with whom the peculation was said to have existed, and both which may be seen at pages 20 and 24 of the said pamphlet.

—4thly. Mr. Mant also observes, that his integrity will not permit him to *feel* that weight, which Captain Campbell so *piteously commiserates*; as he can with the purest truth say, he never had any idea of the *illegality of the proceedings*, till Captain Campbell, had acquainted him of the calumnious reports, and then at Malta; for on his return to the Adriatic, he was solicited by the deputation to re-commence their negotiations, which he *refused*, and was never informed *his services* would not be required further on his agency, *by any one*; nor did it ever appear to him, that the deputation, after his refusal, &c. ever continued their negotiations, as very soon

after, Mr. Mant refused his assistance to them, the *Pilot, Haire*, entered on the agency, as so particularly described at page 38 of the said pamphlet; and further respecting his "not messing as usual," he also observes, that Captain Campbell never refused to sit down with him at his mess-table, till December 16, 1808, although the charges had been known to Captain Campbell, in the latter part of September, 1807; and this circumstance, of such a considerable time having been suffered to elapse, before the objection was resorted to, surely must in the minds of his readers experience a powerful conviction, that this act did not proceed altogether from the subject of the supposed unfairness in conducting the prize-affairs, but in a great measure owing to the information, Mr. Mant felt himself obligated to render to the officers of the *Unité*, which took place on the 10th of December preceding, respecting the present of 1,500 N. Zeechens sent to Captain Campbell, and which he had received; the statement of which is made at p. 30 (vide Pamphlet); and for which statement he was confronted with Captain Campbell, on the said 10th of December, in the presence of the then first Lieutenant, G. H. Watson, and Haire, the pilot, when Captain Campbell could not contradict the facts; therefore this circumstance is somewhat different; and certainly both the *facts*, as *Captain Campbell calls them*, now become *disputable*; particularly as it was not the wish of every member of the mess for Mr. Mant to quit it, but of a partial occurrence, of which he now furnishes a proof, by inserting the following declaration, legally authenticated, of an officer of the *Unité*, who did and must ever stand high in the opinion of Captain Campbell and others, to this effect, viz. "in regard to your quitting the mess (meaning Mr. Mant), was contrary to my wish; and as to your general character, I have only to say, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that your conduct during the whole time we served together, nearly four years and a half, appeared to be strictly conformable to that of the officer and gentleman;" and Mr. Mant now asks, what officer in the navy would not be obliged to comply with *his Captain's desire* for the exclusion of a member from his mess, whether *deserving of it or not*?—Again, Mr. Mant asserts, that *Captain Campbell* never did show any disposition to confront him with Jursovich, and always refused him a personal inter-

view with other persons, who had preferred charges against him of a greater magnitude, and never fully informed him of the accusations against him, or of the names of his accuser, or ever talked to him about the said Jursovich's charges, till the early part of the year 1809, when near to Malta; and when going to the Commander in Chief, as before said, for an explanation of the circumstances, or ever till this moment, has Captain Campbell showed to Mr. Mant the Declaration of the said Jursovich. —Mr Mant having now replied to the essential points, stated in Captain Campbell's Declaration, wishes to observe, yet trusts he need not point out to the candid reader, that Captain Campbell has confined himself principally to those charges said to reflect on Mr. Mant's conduct, having, but in a very slight manner, touched on Mr. Mant's "statement of facts," which appeared in a former register, and extracted from his pamphlet, viz. the taking and compromising for neutrals, &c. and procuring a bond as an indemnification for the money received, drawn up in his own diction and writing, &c.; nor has Captain Campbell publicly accounted for the 40,000 Spanish dollars, and the apparent giving away of the "four valuable vessels, &c. to a particular person at Trieste" (a circumstance very desirable), as the Document in Captain Campbell's own hand-writing and signature now exists; but this matter appears either to have been most artfully evaded, or it must have ensued from *want of memory*: it must be evidently manifest, that the reason Captain Campbell has endeavoured to render so much injustice towards his character, proceeded chiefly from private motives, and of a mere personal nature, and not as might have been supposed to have originated from a pure desire of protecting the respectability of that service to which he belonged, and for the honour and interest of the officers and crews of those ships, which had been placed under his orders, during the *ever memorable command of the Adriatic squadron*. —Mr. Mant now notices the several accounts contained in Captain Wilson's affidavit, and having made notes of the very matter, at the time, and having also lately referred to them, declares the circumstances of the case to be, as follows, viz. —1st. That Mr. Mant having applied for leave to return to England, in consequence of ill health, was informed by Captain Campbell, of some of the malicious reports now in question, and this at the

latter part of December, 1807, at Malta; on which information, Mr. Mant desired to recall his application, requesting Captain Campbell to use the most prompt measures for procuring an investigation of the business, assuring him at the same time, he would lend Captain Campbell every assistance in his power, for promoting so desirable an object, and this stands in print. —2dly. Mr. Mant, respecting the charge "of Jursovich, &c." declares, that he made answer to Mr. Wilson, by saying, as Captain Campbell had promised him a formal investigation of all these matters, shewing, (as has before been stated,) been already denied "a meeting with some of his accusers, that had preferred charges of a greater magnitude," that he should wait the event of the investigation; but acknowledges to have said, that the fellow was a damned rascal, and that his word was as good as Jursovich's. —Mr. Mant, respecting "to the other conversation" also asserts, that his reply to Mr. Wilson on this circumstance was, that "his conscience was perfectly easy on the subject, but he must decline giving any further answer, 'till the inquiry on his conduct had been instituted, as this was the counsel of a friend, whose advice he had received at Malta." —And finally, as to Mr. Mant's not expressing any compunction, (of the "999th part of a thousandth") of his share of the supposed illegal proceedings, says, it is scarcely worth speaking about, but it is notorious, and has been for several years, *that he did refuse to continue the agency*, and such has been likewise, a considerable time in print in this country. —Mr. Mant having now also replied to the principal accounts contained in Captain Wilson's affidavit, observes, that Captain Wilson must have made those assertions, just alluded to, from inferences in his own mind, drawn from the conversation that passed between them, particularly as Mr. Mant's explanation, as said before, has been transcribed from notes made at the time, Mr. Mant therefore cannot allow to go forth to the world, what his own words will not, or cannot warrant, and further in order that the public may not remain uninformed of the full cause, that prevented his speaking about the particulars of Captain Wilson's affidavit. Mr. Mant now publishes the following, viz. —That immediately at the period, to which Captain Wilson alludes, Mr. Mant was in daily expectation of answering to a public, a full investigation of all these matters, in consequence of some calumnious

reports, which were at that moment in general circulation, documents of which, Captain Campbell had said he held, and had promised to bring forward. Mr. Mant therefore considered, that any conversation whatever, on a subject, whereon a formal trial was pending, and especially *with a party interested*, would not only be highly improper, but it might experience an unjust representation, and at any rate it would have been a "supreme act of folly," well knowing the powerful effects of prejudice, which was then in existence, (and since so prevalent in other quarters,) and of so forcible a nature, as not to suffer even real "*truth a fair chance of success*;" and this was also the counsel of his friend at Malta, a major in the army; and in consequence, Mr. Mant avoided giving the then required explanation of Captain Wilson; and Mr. Mant now submits *this declaration* of the several accounts, likewise *to a comparison* with those of the two Captains, and states in regard to his *own veracity*, that he has a full authority from numerous friends, and of the greatest respectability, to publish, that *his veracity stands unimpeached*, and which at any rate, has been ever considered as *equal* to that of either Captain Campbell or Wilson; and it ought to be remembered, that the channel through which Captain Campbell, &c. has always received these reports, &c. said to reflect on Mr. Mant's conduct, have been obtained, chiefly, by the means of the said Haire, or his associates. Men whose characters were such, as few persons would have listened to. Mr. Mant lastly observes, that as he has been very recently informed, that Captain Campbell does not intend to enter into any defence on the charges made against himself, and Mr. Mant being fully convinced his *affidavit*, as inserted in the Register of the 19th ult. *remains uncontroverted*, declines troubling the public further with this controversy, at least by this mode of conveying his sentiments, yet trusts his readers will do him the justice, if not already too much satiated, with the recollection of the *base attempts*, that has been so *invidiously*, but so *unsuccessfully* aimed at his *reputation*, to read with leisure and attention the *whole* contents of his pamphlet, and candidly bear in their minds, the *substance* of the paragraphs contained in the pages, 42 and three following, together with those of 55, 56, and 57, of the same publication—and which may be had gratis at Southampton.

THOMAS MANT.

Southampton, March 7th, 1814.

THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON AND HIS ARMY.

Contrary to general expectation, nothing *decisive* has lately transpired respecting the operations of the contending armies, though some circumstances have occurred which justify the view I have taken of the operations of the campaign, and the more than probable result of the contest. The last official accounts from the French headquarters were dated Troyes, the 26th ult. which city was evacuated by the Austrians on the night of the 23d, and next day occupied by the French. It appears that Buonaparté, previous to this, had, with such admirable skill and promptitude, brought forward the great mass of his troops, that Troyes was actually invested, and the greater part of Prince Schwartzburg's army in danger of falling into his hands. At this critical moment "a Russian Aide-de-Camp came to the advanced posts to demand time to evacuate the city, *otherwise it would be burnt*." What a trying circumstance for a mind like Bonaparte's. He had almost the whole of the Austrian army in his power; they were in fact encompassed as if they had been caught in a net. What a triumph it would have been to his ambition, had he availed himself of the opportunity which this afforded of annihilating, by one blow, the flower of an army which had threatened to dictate terms to him in his own capital! Had he been that blood-thirsty, that sanguinary tyrant which his enemies represent him to be; had he been as regardless of the comforts and happiness of his subjects as we are told he is; and had he, as is said, been a total stranger to the feelings of humanity, he would not have hesitated one moment in attacking Troyes, notwithstanding the threat of burning it held out by a *Russian General*, and that the place contained about 60,000 inhabitants, and ranked as one of the principal cities in the empire. But no, Bonaparte is *not* the tyrant he is held out to be; he is not the sanguinary unfeeling wretch that could sacrifice so many interests even for the *glory*, great as it was, which was within his reach. He had done enough for glory; but he felt that he never could do too much for humanity. "This consideration arrested the movements of the Emperor:" Troyes was saved; and the Austrian army, which had frequently before been in the power of the conqueror, experienced, on this occasion, a singular mark of his forbearance and moderation.—What a contrast does the conduct of the French Emperor, in this instance, present to that of those who ordered the burning of Moscow?

This, however, is a contrast upon which, I feel, I cannot enter. It may one day or another "point a moral or adorn a tale;" but, in the present fettered state of the British press, any attempt of this nature, I am fully aware, would be dangerous in the extreme. But though I am sufficiently alive to this degraded state of what is called a free press, I cannot allow myself to pass by unnoticed, the reception which the inhabitants of Troyes gave to Napoleon when he entered their city, not as a haughty conqueror, exulting over ruins and devastation, caused by his inordinate ambition; but having obtained a greater victory, a victory over himself, which must ever endear him to his subjects, and to all good men.— "The Emperor (say the Paris papers) has gratified all our wishes, by passing three days in his good city of Troyes. The house which he inhabited was constantly surrounded by an immense crowd, who always entertained the hope of seeing his Majesty; but during these three days the Emperor did not stir out once. On the 27th, at midnight, his Majesty, surrounded by his brave guards, took the road to Arcis. The people pressed around him in passing. The air resounded with cries of *Vive l'Empereur*. The same enthusiasm was excited by the presence of his Majesty, when he entered our walls victorious; all thought they could not testify too much gratitude; and, in fact, the details with which we have been made acquainted, could not fail to add to our love of the Sovereign. The French army had arrived in a suburb about three in the afternoon; it could have entered the city with the fugitives, but the Emperor chose rather to suspend the march of the troops than to expose our city to the flames, with which it was threatened by an enemy enraged at having been vanquished.—His Majesty passed the night at a miserable hamlet, and it was not till eight in the morning that he made his entrance into our city. The circumstances of that happy day will never be effaced from our memory. Every body approached the Emperor, spoke to him, pressed his hand, thanked him with tears. His Majesty seemed affected, and saw in these marks of attachment the joy of children on the return of a cherished father."—It is unnecessary for me to add any thing to a description so affecting. After the Austrians were allowed to evacuate Troyes, they proceeded to Bar-Sur, a retreat of nearly 20 miles from their position at Troyes. While Bonaparté was thus proceeding in his victorious career, several

stand of colours taken from the combined armies arrived at Paris, and were presented to the Empress by the Minister of War, who, on that occasion, delivered the following impressive speech:—"Madam,—New orders from the Emperor lead me to your Majesty's feet, to lay there new trophies taken from the enemies of France.—At the time when the Saracens were defeated by Charles Martel, in the plains of Tours and Poitiers, the capital was adorned but with the spoils of a single nation. This day, Madam, when dangers equal to those with which France was then menaced have given rise to successes more important, and which were more difficult to obtain, your august Spouse offers you standards taken from the three great powers of Europe.—Since a blind hatred has raised up against us so many nations, even those which France has restored to independence, and for whom she has made such great sacrifices, may we not say that these standards are taken from all Europe?—When our enemies, listening only to the suggestion of revenge, in contempt of the ordinary rules of war, resolved to penetrate into this empire, leaving behind them the vast chain of fortresses which surrounds it on all sides; when they designed, by a rash manœuvre, to get possession of the capital, without thinking of the means of effecting their retreat, in the midst of a population whom their conduct has exasperated, how was it possible that they were not stopped in this gigantic enterprise by their knowledge of the genius, of the talents, of the character of the Emperor? In a few days they have learned the falseness of their calculations. The bold and rapid operations which have just baffled their designs, recal to every mind the glorious and memorable campaign in Italy in the year five, and those which succeeded it.—It was against the flower of the troops allied against us, at the battles of Montmirail and Vauchamp, at the combat of Montereau, that the ten standards were taken which I present to your Majesty from the Emperor.—These pledges of French valour presage to us new and greater successes, if the obstinacy of the enemy protracts the war. This noble hope is in the heart of every Frenchman. You share in it, Madam; you who, always confiding in the genius of your august Spouse, in the efforts and the love of the nation, have continued to shew, in all the circumstances of this war, a firmness of mind, and virtues worthy the admiration of Europe and posterity."—It will be seen by the extract given above from

the French papers respecting the reception of Napoleon at Troyes, that, after remaining in that city for three days, he set out to Arcis on the 17th ult. This movement, which carried him nearer to Paris than Troyes, is now explained by the arrival of dispatches from Colonel Lowe, who accompanies Blücher's army. The previous accounts brought by Mr. Robinson informed us, that, in consequence of considerable reinforcements which the Marshal had received, he was then at the head of a new army of about 60,000 men. With this force, and while Bonaparte was pursuing Schwartzberg, Blücher made a rapid movement towards Paris, and reached Meaux on the river Marne, only 25 miles north of that capital. Here he had spread out his troops in various directions, evidently for the purpose of forming a junction with the different reinforcements advancing through Germany. In his advance to Meaux, Blücher encountered a French division under Marmont; and, in a partial affair with these troops, he was slightly wounded. The intelligence of the progress of Blücher immediately drew Bonaparte from Troyes, where he left 45,000 men to watch the motions of Schwartzberg, while he proceeded with the main body of his army towards Meaux. Very important intelligence may, therefore, be soon expected from that quarter, as Bonaparte, occupied as he is with two separate armies, must bring one of them into *immediate* action, in order to prevent the other from reaching Paris. That this has been attempted by the Austrian general since Napoleon set out from Troyes, is evident from dispatches received from Lord Burghersh up to the 2nd inst.—By these it appears that there had been some hard fighting at Bar-sur-Aube, during which Schwartzberg was wounded, but that these encounters terminated in favour of the Allies, who had in consequence determined again to “advance upon Troyes.” It is rather singular, however, that Lord Burghersh has furnished us with no details of the particulars which immediately preceded and accompanied the evacuation of Troyes by the Allies. He speaks of General Wittgenstein having “quitted the positions of Nogent and Pont-sur-Seine,” He mentions some *intended* movements upon the road “between Bar-sur-Seine and Châtillon,” places considerably in the rear of Troyes, but he nowhere notices the investment of Troyes itself by Napoleon, the threat to burn it if the Austrian army were not

allowed to leave it unmolested, the proposal of an armistice mentioned in the French bulletin, its subsequent occupation by Bonaparte, nor his departure from it on the 27th, to proceed against Marshal Blücher. These were circumstances surely which could not fail to attract his lordship's notice as of some importance, particularly that which respected the armistice, yet none of them are alluded to in his dispatches. This *silence* in the *Gazette* is the more extraordinary that the *official* bulletin, which was issued on the receipt of the dispatches, left no doubt in any one's mind that his lordship had given the details of the above occurrences. In that bulletin, as it appears in the *Courier*, I find the following statement: “Intelligence being received that Bonaparte was marching with a part of his army on Sezanne to act against Marshal Blücher, Prince Schwartzberg had ordered an immediate advance upon Troyes. It is understood that Bonaparte, leaving 45,000 men on the line of Troyes, had marched with the rest of his army against Marshal Blücher.” If the information communicated in this bulletin was obtained from Lord Burghersh, how came his dispatches to be afterwards published *without* containing any allusion to Bonaparte's “marching to act against Blücher,” or, “his leaving 45,000 men on the line of Troyes?” It is *possible* his lordship may have not said anything as to these and the other omissions which I have noticed, though I should think it very extraordinary if this turned out to be the fact. But even then, if these particulars were actually drawn from another source; if they were the substance of dispatches from another accredited agent, I should still think that these dispatches ought to have been published, or some very good reason assigned for keeping them back. Until some such reason is given, I am afraid there are many who will continue to believe, with me, that they are not put in possession of all the information which, in my opinion, the public, who are the principal parties interested, have an undoubted right to expect. With regard to the complexion of the military intelligence contained in our official dispatches, it does not appear to me of sufficient importance to influence the question one way or another, whether the French Emperor will be successful or not in repelling the invasion of the Allied powers? I have distinctly stated it to be my firm persuasion that he will drive them out of France. Nay more, that he will

not agree to an armistice, unless the armies of the Allies retire across the Rhine, and take up the positions they occupied when they issued their famous proclamation at Frankfort. These opinions are founded on a belief that the French people are *unanimous* in favour of the present government; and, finding that sentiment of unanimity prevail, I cannot entertain a doubt that they will be successful in all their endeavours to support Bonaparte.

THE BOURBONS IN FRANCE.—An article lately appeared in a German newspaper, which stated, that the Allies had been applied to by Louis the XVIIIth, for permission to enter France by Basle, and to circulate the Bourbon proclamation; but that this permission had been *refused*. Upon this article, the *Courier* observed, though the Allies might be desirous of seeing the ancient family restored; yet that “they may be afraid of encresing the partisans of Bonaparte by publicly declaring in their favour, or of putting an apparent affront on the French nation, by seeming to choose for it a monarch. The Allies evidently stand on the best possible footing with the French people, and they are *wise not to endanger their ground*. If they were to defeat Bonaparte in a general battle, and to obtain possession of Paris, *then* the friends of the Bourbons would feel confidence in declaring themselves, because they would know they could be protected. *At present they must remain quiet*, or they may be cut off, to the great injury of the cause.” One would have thought, after this *sage* advice to the allied Sovereigns, and to the partisans of the Bourbon race, to remain *quiet* for the present; to avoid every step which might *increase* the friends of Napoleon; to be anxious not to *affront* the French people by seeming to choose a monarch for them; and to be careful not to weaken the hold which the Allies possessed in the affections of that nation. It might have been expected, I say, after giving such *deliberate* advice, that the *Courier* writer would not have been in *great haste* to applaud proceedings which had a tendency to show that his counsel was held *impertinent*, far less that he himself would soon act a part which demonstrated he was conscious, at the time of giving the advice, that it was not only improper, but would not be attended to by either of the parties for whom it was meant. This, in my mind, was the natural conclusion to be

drawn from the premises. But here, as in almost every other case, this prostituted journal has shown its contempt of all principle, all decency, all propriety, and all truth; for *on the very same day*, in which the above remarks appeared, its columns announced, in the form of a *second* edition, accounts of the *entrance of Monsieur into France*, in a way which showed its *entire approbation* of the measure, although Bonaparte had not been “defeated in a general battle,” and although the Allies had not “obtained possession of Paris.” The following is the manner in which the above intelligence was announced in the *Courier* of the 9th inst.—“*Second edition—Courier Office, 3 o'clock.*—We have made inquiries at places where the best information might be expected, and have received three copies of the following letter from different quarters, which we have no doubt is genuine:—*Vesoul, 22d of Feb. 1814.*—We left Basle on Sunday the 19th, and have arrived in Franche Comte. We have been received in *all* the French towns and villages with *acclamations* by the *whole* of the people, and with cries of *Vive le Roi Louis XVIII. Vive les Bourbons.*—The people are *enchanted* with our dear Prince, who has conducted himself with great affability and condescension. The old, the women and the children *kissed* his hands and his cloaths. *Happiness* was painted in every face, and the people were *so touched* with the affability of Monsieur, that *tears of joy* flowed on all sides.—The old said, “we shall die contented, since we have had the good fortune of beholding the return of our ancient Masters, who have *ever lived* in our hearts.”—Others said, “I give you my heart, for the *Monster* has only left me that.” On arriving here, at Vesoul, the *whole* population, about 5000, came out to meet us. They requested we would walk in on foot, that they might behold their Prince.—Gentlemen arrive from all parts, announcing that the peasants of their communes place themselves at their service, and desire to march for their legitimate sovereign.—A person has just arrived from Alsace, requesting powers to raise a legion with the white cockade.—*Every place desires* to surrender to Louis XVIII. *All France is ready to rise*. If attempts are made to throw difficulties in the way, it will be found that France will liberate herself.—The first day Monsieur entered France, we travelled thirty-three leagues (about seventy

miles) in the territories of his august ancestors. Had he been an angel from heaven, the people could not have shewn more eagerness and joy at receiving him.—

It is not my intention here to make any remarks upon the above *precious* document, and that for a reason which, I dare say the reader has anticipated—namely, that the intelligence comes in most questionable shape; in the form of a *private letter*, and that even *without any signature*. It is besides dated as far back as the 22nd of February, since which government have had *official* accounts from France so late as the 2nd *instant*, without one word being said either about the entrance of Louis, or the “*enchantment*” of “the old women and children,” who are said to have “kissed his hands and his clothes,” and to have shed “tears of joy” on seeing the “*dear prince*.”—I have no hesitation, therefore, in saying, that the whole appears to me a most impudent *fabrication* invented for stock jobbing purposes. I shall not be sorry, however, to learn that it has had the effect intended; for if there are people so foolish, so credulous, as to believe such ridiculous lies, they ought to suffer for their folly and credulity.

In No. 3, of the *Register* for the present year, I published at full length, the *proclamation of the Bourbons*, and made some copious remarks upon it by way of answer. As the subject has been again revived, and the number which contained the proclamation and answer is in great request, and all the copies sometime ago disposed of, I intend *republishing* the same in a separate

form, and if leisure permits, to illustrate my observations, by extracts from the CODE NAPOLEON.

OCURRENCES OF THE WAR.—The last French bulletin stated, that a “*flag of truce*” was sent by Prince Schwartzburgh to propose an armistice” to Bonaparte on the 23d ult., while he was at “the little town of Chatres;” and that on the next day “Count Elahaut, Aide-de-Camp of the Emperor Napoleon; Count Ducca, Aide-de-Camp of the Emperor of Austria; Count Schonwaloff, Aide-de-Camp of the Emperor of Russia; and General Rauch, Chief of the Engineer Corps of the King of Prussia, have assembled at Lusigny, in order to treat of the conditions of a suspension of arms.”

—As I have noticed in another part of the *Register*, not a word is said of this important occurrence in the dispatches published in our *Gazette*, though they are said to detail the whole events of the war down to the 2d inst.—Paris papers have arrived to the 6th, but they contain nothing of an *official* nature. A minor paper of the 4th has the following article:—“The latest letters from the head-quarters, received yesterday evening, announce that the different corps of the army are performing grand manœuvres, and that his Majesty continues to enjoy the best health.”—Under the head “The Emperor Napoleon and his Army,” the reader will find the particulars of the different movements of the contending armies, as far as they had transpired when the *Register* was sent to press.

NOTICE.

Some of those Gentlemen, who preserve the *Register* in *Volumes*, having expressed their regret, that the STATE PAPERS, and other important DOCUMENTS of a public nature, are, in future, to be excluded, and their representations appearing to have great weight in them, it has been determined on to continue the publication of these Official Papers; not, however, in the *Weekly Numbers* of the *Register*, but in a compilation, to be published once in 2, 3, or 6 months, as shall hereafter appear to be best adapted

to the purposes in view. It is intended to print these documents in the same type, form, and size of paper with the *Register* itself. The price will, of course, be proportionably lower, because no stamps will be required, as it will be unnecessary to dispatch this part of the work by post. There will be, as at present, an *Index Sheet* to the *Weekly Numbers*, and another *Index* to the *Public Papers*. The latter publication may be taken, to be bound up with the *Weekly Numbers*, or not, at the option of the Reader.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XXV. No. 12.] LONDON, SATURDAY, MARCH 19, 1814. [Price 1s.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

LORD COCHRANE and the HON. COCHRANE JOHNSTONE.—Few persons have been worse treated, upon any occasion, than the gentlemen whose names stand as a title to this article, have been treated by the London prints and their prompters upon occasion of the recent *hoax* on the Stock Exchange.—The nature of the *hoax*, its history, and its effects, having been fully detailed in the public prints, I shall merely state the substance of the charge preferred against Lord Cochrane and his Uncle.—A trick having been played off, through the means of a pretended officer arriving from France with news of the death of Napoleon, and of the hoisting of the Bourbon cockade at Paris, a sudden rise was produced in the price of the funds. The *hoax* was soon discovered, and, it was asserted, that the pretended officer went to the house of Lord Cochrane, where, it was said, and *said in print*, that a part of his dress was found by a Bow-street officer, though it is not stated upon what *authority*, or in virtue of what *law*, that Bow-street officer either searched for, or took away, that article of dress.—In the meanwhile, the news-papers teemed with insinuations against his Lordship, his Uncle, the Hon. Cochrane Johnstone, and Mr. Butt, said to be their agents in a grand scheme of speculation and imposition. I will not quote the particular instances, which will, probably, become the cause of more serious inquiry; but, I cannot help observing, that, from the beginning to the end, there appeared to be, in these publications, as malicious a spirit as I ever saw at work in my life.—Very busily engaged in some important private concerns in the country, I was not able, last week, to pay that attention to this matter, which the matter itself merited, and which my heart as well as my mind would have disposed me to give it. But, I shall now, with the authentic documents before me, offer to my readers those reasons which have led me to the conclusion, *first*, that the gentlemen accused have been falsely accused in the public prints: and, *secondly*, that, if they had

really been the contrivers of the *hoax*, and had actually profited from its success, they would not have been chargeable with the commission of any *fraud*, or any immoral act, if *all gambling* be not immoral.—I have had no communication with either my Lord Cochrane or his Uncle, except that the latter, in a short note, received on Sunday, desired me to suspend my judgment, until the Report of the Exchange Committee should come out. I wanted no such request; for I did not care what the Report might be; my only fear really being, that he had *not* won the sum of money, which the news-papers told me he had won.—However, we will first take the Documents in their regular order: 1. The Report of the Committee of the Stock Exchange; 2. The Minutes of the Evidence on which that Report was founded; 3. The Affidavit of Lord Cochrane; 4. A Letter of Mr. Cochrane Johnstone; 5. A Letter of Mr. Butt.—When the reader has gone patiently through these, I shall offer him my remarks upon the subject, which will, in part, arise out of the malignant efforts, which some of the public prints are still making against the characters of the gentlemen accused. I perceive, and I perceive it with regret, that Mr. Cochrane Johnstone and Mr. Butt talk of *legal prosecution* of those who have made the publications in question. I am sure that they could not succeed in such a pursuit against the Stock Exchange Committee, who accuse them of nothing fraudulent, or criminal, other than the sort of immorality, if there be any, attached to gambling; and, as to the vipers of the press, who think that they ought to have *all* the loose money in the kingdom, they are too low for notice in a court of justice.—Here follow the documents:—

Report of the Sub-Committee of the Stock Exchange, relative to the late fraud.—Committee-room, March 7.

The Sub-Committee of the Stock Exchange, appointed to inquire into the circumstances relative to the late fraud on the public, have unanimously agreed upon the following *

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REPORT.

It appears in evidence, from the examination of various parties, and is already well known to the public, that a person, representing himself to be Colonel R. Du Bourgh, Aide-de-Camp to Lord Cathcart, came to the Ship Inn, at Dover, about one o'clock, on the morning of the 21st of February. He stated, that he had just arrived from the coast of France; that he brought the intelligence that Bonaparte had been slain in battle; that the Allied Armies were in Paris: and that peace was certain. He immediately ordered a post-chaise and four to be got ready; and after having dispatched a letter to Admiral Foley, at Deal, communicating to him the above information, with a view to its being forwarded to Government by the telegraph, set off with all expedition to London. This pretended messenger has been traced all the way to town, and it appears, that, about a quarter before nine o'clock, he arrived at Marshgate, Lambeth, where he alighted, and got into a hackney-coach, in which he was taken to No. 13, Green-street, Grosvenor-square. —It likewise appears in evidence, from the examination of various persons, that (whilst this grand plot was carrying on from Dover to London), a sort of under-plot was also carrying on from North Fleet to London. For, on the same morning, a person of the name of Ralph Sandom, who had absented himself from the Rules of the King's Bench, set off from North Fleet, in company with two other persons dressed as foreigners, in a post-chaise to Dartford. When they arrived there, they got into a post-chaise and four for London. They decked the horses with laurel, and directing the post-boys to drive over London Bridge, and through the City, they circulated on their way the same news as the pretended Du Bourgh at Dover. This chaise passed over Blackfriars-bridge, and stopped also within a short distance of the Marsh-gate. —The Sub-Committee, for various reasons which it is unnecessary here to allude to, refrain from making any observations on the evidence which they have obtained relative to this subject. They therefore communicate it without a single comment. Their only object has been to endeavour to find out the principal agents in this disgraceful and dishonourable transaction; and they are happy to state, that there is every reason to hope that the chain of evidence which they have been enabled to obtain, will finally lead to a full discovery of the offending parties; at the same

time they have the satisfaction of being able to declare, that it does not appear that any Member of the Stock Exchange has been implicated in the knowledge or participation of a measure which would have inevitably rendered him liable to expulsion from the House. —It is unnecessary here to state the time and attention which the Sub-Committee have devoted to the investigation of this subject. They cannot, however, refrain from noticing the great difficulties and delay which they have experienced in obtaining information on those points, which would have enabled them to have brought their labours to a more speedy and complete issue. For though they have had every means of assistance, voluntarily rendered to them by His Majesty's Government and by the Bank of England, in those cases where it was very essential and desirable, yet having no legal power to compel the attendance of persons whose evidence would have been of the greatest importance, they have been obliged to resort to a more indirect mode of procuring the information on which their report is founded. —Although the Sub-Committee, in thus presenting the result of their labours, may be considered as virtually dissolved, yet they beg leave to state, that they are ready and willing to continue their exertions, as long as they may be considered necessary. They are in possession of still further information on the subject, which it is considered proper not to disclose at present, and which they hope and expect will eventually crown their efforts with complete success.

CHARLES LAURENCE, Chairman.
CHARLES NAIRNE, Deputy Chairman.
BENJAMIN OAKLEY.
LEWIS ANDREW DE LA CHAUMETTE.
CHRISTOPHER TERRY.
FRANCIS WAKEFIELD.
FRANCIS BAILEY.
JOHN LEWIS.
JOHN CAPEL.
WILLIAM HAMMOND.

Minutes of Evidence.

Thomas Shilling stated, that he is a post-boy at the Marquis of Granby Inn, at Dartford—that he took up a person about half past seven o'clock on Monday morning, February the 21st; that he drove the wheel horses; that when the gentleman got into the chaise, the waiter asked him if he knew of any news, to which he replied that "it was all over;" that when the waiter asked him what he meant by its being all over, he said that Bonaparte was torn in a

thousand pieces, and that the Cossacks fought for a share of him; that, at the same time he said this, he was in the chaise; that he ordered the post-boys to drive fast, and that they accordingly did drive very fast for the first three miles; but when they came to Bexley-heath, he told them they need not drive so fast; that he said his business was not so particular now, since he thought the telegraphs could work. Shilling replied, that he was sure they could not, as he knew all the telegraphs; that the gentleman then looked out of the chaise-window and said, "Post-boy! you need not mention the news as you go along;" to which Shilling replied, "I shall not, Sir, unless you desire it;" and at the same time asked him what the news was. The gentleman then told him exactly what he had stated to the waiter, with these additional circumstances, that he came ashore within two miles of Dover, the Frenchmen being afraid to come nearer; that he came from the place where he landed to the Ship Inn at Dover, and left it at two o'clock in the morning: that he had sent the intelligence to the Port-Admiral at Deal, in order that the telegraph might be worked, and that he was obliged to do so. The gentleman then said no more to the post-boys till they got to Shooter's Hill, when they dismounted and walked by the side of the horses. He gave them out of the chaise part of a bottle of wine and some biscuit, and said to Shilling, "Post-boy! I think I shall take a hackney-coach." Shilling told him the first hackney-coach stand was at the Bricklayer's Arms. He replied, "I shall not get out there; that won't do; and asked if there was not a coach-stand in Lambeth-road, and desired him to drive on to that place, as the chaise would go faster than a coach. At the same time the Gentleman told Shilling, that he need not mention any thing as he went on, but that on returning he might mention it to whom he pleased. When they came to the Stags at Lambeth, there was no coach there. The Gentleman then drew up the side-blind of the chaise (at the corner where he sat), as if to hide himself, and the post-boys drove on to Marsh-gate. They stopped at the side of a hackney-coach standing there, and on the chaise-door and coach door being opened, the Gentleman got into the coach and drove off, after having given a gold Napoleon to each of the drivers. Shilling asked the waterman where the Gentleman ordered the coachman to drive, and he replied "to Grosvenor-square." Shilling described the

Gentleman as having a large red nose, large whiskers, face rather blotched, and that when he spoke his eyes seemed to catch; he thinks him about the height of Sayer, the Police-officer, but not quite so tall or so lusty: he had a brown surtout, and a red coat under it; a brown fur cap, with something like silver lace on it. He had also a sword and a small portmanteau, which were laid on the seat of the chaise. He paid for the chaise at Dartford, and ordered it to drive to Downing-street. Shilling says he has no doubt but that he should know him again.

William Crane stated, that he is the driver of the hackney-coach, No. 890; that he took up on Monday, February 21, at about forty minutes past eight o'clock in the morning, at the Marsh-gate, a Gentleman who had just alighted from a Dartford chaise and four; that he was directed to drive to No. 13, Green-street, Grosvenor-square, where the Gentleman alighted, and knocking at the door, inquired for Colonel or Captain — [the coachman did not hear the name], and was told by the servant that he was gone to breakfast in Cumberland-street: that on receiving this reply, the Gentleman asked if he could write a note to him, and on being answered in the affirmative, he went into the parlour apparently for that purpose; that he took his portmanteau and sword in his hand, and laid them down as if familiar with the house; that on Crane's asking him for more money, he came to the parlour door and gave him another shilling; that Crane then left him in the house, and the door being shut, he drove away; that he should know the house again to which he drove, and also that he should know the Gentleman again by his speech; that he looked like a foreigner, had a cough, and was a red-faced man, about the middle size; that he had on a brown great-coat, with a red coat under it, and a fur cap with gold lace; that the servant who opened the door was a short man, rather elderly, and dressed in black clothes.

Sayer, the Police-officer, stated, that on Saturday, February the 26th, he went with William Crane, the hackney-coachman, to Green-street, in order to identify the house. When they arrived there, he desired the coachman to knock at the door, and (under some pretence) to inquire for the Gentleman whom he had set down there on Monday. He did so, but was answered from the area, that the Gentleman did not live there: that Mr. Durand did live there, but that he had just left it;—that the family

now residing there was Lord Cochrane's, and that they came in only on Friday last. Sayer asked the coachman if he had any recollection of the servant, he replied, that it was not the same footman who opened the door on Monday when the Gentleman alighted.—At a subsequent examination, Sayer stated, that he had obtained information in the neighbourhood, that Mr. Durand left No. 13, Green-street, on Wednesday, February the 16th, and that Lord Cochrane came in a day or two afterwards.—Sayer being instructed to obtain the most correct information upon this subject, stated, at another examination, that he had ascertained that Lord Cochrane came into the house, No. 13, Green-street, on Thursday, Feb. 17, but that it is uncertain whether Mr. Durand slept there that night or not; he likewise stated, that he had ascertained that Lord Cochrane, his brother, and three or four more men, live in the house; that the man-servant had been turned off, and another hired; that the servant who let in the pretended Du Bourgh is sent into the country; that the maid-servant is not allowed to be seen or spoken to: that the house is Mr. Durand's, who has let it (furnished) to Lord Cochrane; that Mrs. Durand has been seen to wear such a cap as the one which the pretended Du Bourgh is said to have worn.

Mr. Laurence (chairman of the committee) stated, that he had been to Messrs. Bond and Co. bankers, and had ascertained that the four 1*l.* Bank-notes which the pretended Du Bourgh is said to have paid away to the landlord of the Ship-inn, Dover, together with another 1*l.* note which he had paid away on the road, were in their hands between the hours of one and two o'clock on Saturday, the 19th of February; on being asked whether they could tell to whom they had paid away any quantity of 1*l.* notes after that time on Saturday, they said they could not without a great deal of trouble, but that if Mr. Lawrence would mention the name of any person, they would turn to their account, and endeavour to ascertain the fact: he requested them to see if any cheque of Mr. Fearn's was paid on that day, wholly or in part, in 1*l.* notes; but it did not appear that any of his cheques were paid in that way. One of his clerks, however, stated, that about three or four o'clock on that day, Mr. Thomas Christmas, a clerk to Mr. Fearn, requested to have fifty 1*l.* notes in exchange for four 10*l.* notes and two 5*l.* notes, which were accordingly given to him.

Mr. Thomas Christmas stated, that he was a clerk to Mr. Fearn, but could not recollect having exchanged the notes in question; he, however, said, that he would not take his oath he did not. After much hesitation and apparent unwillingness, he at length acknowledged that he had exchanged the four ten-pound and two five-pound notes for Mr. Butt, to whom he delivered the fifty one-pound notes.

Mr. Glover, from the Bank of England, investigator of Bank-notes, stated, that the four ten-pound bank notes which had been delivered by Mr. Butt to Thomas Christmas, in order to get exchanged, were paid on February 16, by Messrs. Bond and Co. in part of the value of a draft for 75*l.* drawn by Mr. Fearn, and payable to Mr. Butt.

Mr. Joseph Fearn, a stock broker, stated, that he knew Lord Cochrane, the Honourable A. Cochrane Johnstone, and Mr. R. G. Butt; that he had been in the habit of transacting business for each of them in the public funds: that on the morning of the 21st of February, he sold for various persons Consols and Omnium to a very large amount, in the whole about 928,000*l.* Of this sum there were sold for

	Omnium.	Consols.
Lord Cochrane	- 139,000 <i>l.</i>	None.
Hon. A. C. Johnstone	120,000 <i>l.</i>	100,000 <i>l.</i>
Mr. Butt	- 154,000 <i>l.</i>	168,000 <i>l.</i>

most of which had been purchased in the course of the week preceding; that Mr. Butt often acts for Lord Cochrane, in his instructions to buy and sell stock, and that such bargains are always acknowledged as correct by Lord Cochrane; that Lord Cochrane, Mr. C. Johnstone, and Mr. Butt, were with him by ten o'clock on the morning of the 21st of February; that Mr. Cochrane Johnstone took an office for him in Shorter's-court, (next door to the Stock-Exchange) without his knowledge, and that he entered it on the morning of the 21st of February; that although he sold a great deal of stock on that day, yet (with the exception of the three names above mentioned) he did not sell for any one person above 55,000*l.*; that Lord Cochrane bought 20,000*l.* of the omnium above mentioned, on Saturday, Feb. 19, and Mr. Cochrane Johnstone bought 60,000*l.* of it on Friday, Feb. 18; that he thinks Mr. Cochrane Johnstone and Mr. Butt acted in concert on Monday, Feb. 21, although at other times they have occasionally acted different ways in the purchase and sale of stock; that the whole of the above business was done for the next settling days, and not for money.

Mr. Hichens, a stock-broker, was sent for, but it being understood that he was confined to his bed with a severe fit of illness, *Mr. Wakefield*, (one of the Sub-committee) waited upon him, and learned from him, that although he had known *Mr. Cochrane Johnstone* for some years, yet he had not done any business for him in the Public Funds before the present year,—that about the 8th of February he began to make some purchases in Omnium, which had increased to such an extent, that on the 14th of February it amounted to 565,000*l.*—that of this sum 200,000*l.* was sold on February the 16th, and 115,000*l.* on February the 17th,—that the remaining sum of 250,000*l.* was sold on the morning of Feb. the 21st;—that out of this sum of 250,000*l.* it was stated by *Mr. Cochrane Johnstone*, that 50,000*l.* was for a friend of his, and he consented to be a guarantee for any loss which might accrue;—that he does not know Lord Cochrane or *Mr. Butt*.

Mr. Smallbone, a stock-broker, stated that he had bought (a few days prior to February the 21st) 40,000*l.* omnium for *Mr. Cochrane Johnstone* and 40,000*l.* omnium for *Mr. Butt*; that both these were sold in the morning of Feb. the 21st; that the bargains were made for the next settling day, and not for money.

Mr. J. M. Richardson, (a bookseller, but occasionally acting as a stock-broker), stated, that on the afternoon of Saturday, Feb. the 19th, *Mr. Butt* applied to him to buy 150,000*l.* omnium for the next settling day; that he had once purchased 20,000*l.* omnium for him, and gained $\frac{2}{3}$ th per cent. on the transaction; but that he declined entering on so large a speculation as the one now proposed; that, however, he did purchase 30,000*l.* omnium for him as he requested; and that he sold it on the morning of February the 21st.

[From these statements it appears, that on the afternoon of Saturday, Feb. 19, the three parties above-mentioned may be considered as having purchased for the next settling days the following sums, viz.—

	Omnium.	Consols.
Lord Cochrane -	139,000 <i>l.</i>	None.
Hon. A.C. Johnstone	410,000 <i>l.</i>	100,000 <i>l.</i>
Mr. Butt - - -	224,000 <i>l.</i>	168,000 <i>l.</i>

Total - 773,000*l.* 268,000*l.*

The whole of which was sold on the morning of Monday, Feb. 21.]

F. Baldrey stated, that he is a post-boy at the Rose-inn, Dartford; that on Monday, February the 21st, he took up *Mr. R.*

Sandom and two other persons at Dartford, in a post-chaise and four; that he was ordered to drive over London-bridge, through the city, and over Blackfriars-bridge, down the New-cut, towards the Marsh-gate; that the men had cocked hats with a white cockade in each; that the horses were decorated with laurel; that they came from Dartford to London in about an hour and an half; that they all three got out about two hundred yards from the Marsh-gate, where they arrived about twelve o'clock, and tying up their cocked hats, walked off in round ones; that he knows *Sandom* very well, but does not know the other two; that these two others had blue great coats on, one of which was laced across; that one of them is a thin man, and the other had a roundish face; that he thinks he should know one of them again, but is not certain of knowing the other. *Sandom* gave the post-boys twelve shillings each, but did not settle for the chaise; that he had seen *Sandom* since.

Mr. Wolfe stated, that on the evening of the 21st of February he was at the Carolina Coffee-house, where he saw *Sandom*, who said that he had received an order to bring the two persons to town with him; that *Sandom* shewed him the order, which was written in French; a gentleman present copied it.

Mr. P. Foxall, master of the Rose-inn, Dartford, wrote to the Sub-committee, enclosing *Mr. Sandom's* order for the chaise, and at the same time mentioning that *Sandom* had not yet called to pay for it.

Mr. Vinn stated, that on Tuesday, February the 15th, he met by appointment at the Carolina Coffee-house, a person named Alexander M'Rae, whom he had formerly known; that *Mr. M'Rae* proposed to him a plan similar in every respect to that which was adopted on the following Monday by the pretended Du Bourgh; that if he would personate the Messenger, he would have all his expenses paid, and would be handsomely rewarded for his trouble. *Mr. Vinn*, however, considering it to be a dishonourable transaction, declined having anything to do with it, and has since been very active in endeavouring to find out M'Rae, but hitherto without any effect: M'Rae is considered as a man in distressed circumstances, and as intentionally secreting himself from the public.

Mr. Holloway, having requested to attend the Committee, stated, that although he knew *Mr. Sandom* and *Mr. M'Rae*, yet he was totally unacquainted with the plot,

which was carried into effect on February the 21st; that he certainly did sell some stock on that day, but not so much as he had been in the habit of doing at other times, when a rise in the public funds took place.

Mr. R. Sandom having requested to attend the Committee, stated that he resided at Northfleet; that about an hour before day-light on the morning of February the 21st, two men, dressed like foreigners, and pretending to have come recently from the coast of France, landed near his house from a six-oared galley, and having called him up, delivered to him a note, purporting to have been written by a person of the name of Partridge, whom he had formerly known at Dover, requesting him to take these two persons to London, who had great public news to communicate to Government, but not to suffer them to be at any expense; that he accordingly did order a chaise from Dartford, and they proceeded (in the manner already described) to Marsh-gate, where they alighted; that they then went to Westminster-bridge, and took a boat to Whitehall, and on entering one of the passages of that building, the two men took leave of him, by saying they had no farther occasion for his services: that he has not seen or heard of them since; that he has, however, seen Partridge, and finds that the order sent to him was a forgery. *Mr. Sandom* stated, that he had no account in the Stock Exchange; that he had disclaimed all knowledge of any of the parties in the plot, and said that for some time he believed the report (which was circulated) to have been true.

Lord Cochrane's Affidavit.

Having obtained leave of absence to come to town in consequence of scandalous paragraphs in the public papers; and in consequence of having learnt that hand-bills had been affixed in the streets in which, I have since seen, it is asserted that a person came to my house, at No. 13, Green-street, on the twenty-first day of February, in open day, and in the dress in which he had committed a fraud, I feel it due to myself to make the following Deposition, that the Public may know the truth relative to the only person seen by me in Military Uniform at my house on that day.

COCHRANE.

13, Green-street, March 11, 1814.

No. 13, Green-street, Grosvenor-street,
March 11, 1814.

"I, Sir Thomas Cochrane, commonly

called Lord Cochrane, having been appointed by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to active service (at the request, I believe, of Sir Alexander Cochrane) when I had no expectation of being called on, I obtained leave of absence to settle my private affairs previous to quitting this country, and chiefly with a view to lodge a specification to a patent relative to a discovery for increasing the intensity of light.—That in pursuance of my daily practice of superintending work that was executing for me, and knowing that my uncle, Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, went to the City every morning in a coach, I do swear, on the morning of the 21st of February, which day was impressed on my mind by circumstances which afterwards occurred, I breakfasted with him at his residence in Cumberland-street, about half past eight o'clock, and I was put down by him (and Mr. Butt was in the coach) on Snow-hill, about ten o'clock.—That I had been about three quarters of an hour at Mr. King's manufactory, at No. 1, Cock-lane, when I received a few lines on a small bit of paper, requesting me to come immediately to my house; the name affixed, from being written close to the bottom, I could not read: the servant told me it was from an army officer, and concluding that he might be an officer from Spain, and that some accident had befallen to my brother, I hastened back, and I found Captain Berenger, who in great seeming uneasiness made many apologies for the freedom he had used, which nothing but the distressed state of his mind, arising from difficulties, could have induced him to do. All his prospects he said had failed, and his last hope had vanished of obtaining an appointment in America. He was unpleasantly circumstanced on account of a sum which he could not pay, and if he could, that others would fall upon him for full 8000*l*. He had no hope of benefiting his creditors in his present situation, or of assisting himself. That if I would take him with me, he would immediately go on board and exercise the Sharpshooters (which plan Sir Alexander Cochrane I knew had approved of). That he had left his lodgings, and prepared himself in the best way his means allowed. He had brought the sword with him, which had been his father's, and to that and to Sir Alexander he would trust for obtaining an honourable appointment.—I felt very uneasy at the distress he was in, and knowing him to be a man of great talent and science, I told him I would do every thing in my power to relieve him; but as to his

going immediately to the *Tonnant* with any comfort to himself, it was quite impossible. My cabin was without furniture; I had not even a servant on board. He said he would willingly mess any where. I told him that the ward-room was already crowded, and besides, I could not with propriety take him, he being a foreigner, without leave from the Admiralty. He seemed greatly hurt at this, and recalled to my recollection Certificates which he had formerly shewn me from persons in official situations; Lord Yarmouth, General Jenkinson, and Mr. Reeves, I think, were amongst the number. I recommended him to use his endeavour to get them or any other friends to exert their influence, for I had none; adding, that when the *Tonnant* went to Portsmouth, I should be happy to receive him; and I knew from Sir Alexander Cochrane, that he would be pleased if he accomplished that object. Captain Berenger said, that not anticipating any objection on my part from the conversation he had formerly had with me, he had come away with intention to go on board, and make himself useful in his military capacity; he could not go to Lord Yarmouth, or to any other of his friends in this dress (alluding to that which he had on), or return to his lodgings, where it would excite suspicion (as he was at that time in the rules of the King's Bench), but that if I refused to let him join the ship now, he would do so at Portsmouth. Under present circumstances, however, he must use a great liberty, and request the favour of me to lend him a hat to wear instead of his military cap: I gave him one which was in a back room with some things that had not been packed up, and having tried it on, his uniform appeared under his great coat; I therefore offered him a black coat that was laying on a chair, and which I did not intend to take with me: he put up his uniform in a towel, and shortly afterwards went away in great apparent uneasiness of mind; and having asked my leave, he took the coach I came in, and which I had forgotten to discharge in the haste I was in.—I do further depose, that the above conversation is the substance of all that passed with Captain Berenger, which from the circumstances attending it, was strongly impressed upon my mind: that no other person in uniform was seen by me at my house, on Monday, the 21st of February, though possibly other officers may have called (as many have done since my appointment); of this, however,

I cannot speak of my own knowledge, having been almost constantly from home, arranging my private affairs. I have understood that many persons have called under the above circumstances, and have written notes in the parlour, and others have waited there in expectation of seeing me, and then gone away; but I most positively swear, that I never saw any person at my house resembling the description, and in the dress stated in the printed advertisement of the Members of the Stock Exchange: I further aver, that I had no concern, directly or indirectly, in the late imposition, and that the above is all that I know relative to any person who came to my house in uniform on the 21st day of February before alluded to. Captain Berenger wore a grey great coat, a green uniform, and a military cap.

—From the manner in which my character has been attempted to be defamed, it is indispensibly necessary to state that my connection in any way with the Funds arose from an impression that in the present favourable aspect of affairs, it was only necessary to hold Stock, in order to become a gainer, without prejudice to any body: that I did so openly, considering it in no degree improper, far less dishonourable: that I had no secret information of any kind; and that had my expectation of the success of affairs been disappointed, I should have been the only sufferer.—Further I do most solemnly swear, That the whole of the *Omnium* on account, which I possessed on the twenty-first day of February, one thousand eight hundred and fourteen, amounted to one hundred and thirty-nine thousand pounds, which I bought by Mr. Fearn (I think) on the twelfth ultimo, at a premium of twenty-eight and a quarter: that I did not hold on that day any other sum on account, in any other Stock, directly or indirectly; and that I had given orders when it was bought, to dispose of it on a rise of one per cent. and it actually was sold on an average at twenty-nine and a half premium, though on the day of the fraud it might have been disposed of at thirty-three and a half. I further swear, That the above is the only Stock which I sold of any kind on the twenty-first day of February, except two thousand pounds in money which I had occasion for; the profit of which was about ten pounds.—Further I do solemnly depose, That I had no connexion or dealing with any one, save the above-mentioned, and that I did not at any time, directly or indirectly, by myself, or

by any other, take or procure any office or apartment for any Broker or other person for the transaction of Stock affairs.

COCHRANE.

Sworn at my House in Great Queen-street, Lincoln's Inn-fields, in the county of Middlesex, the eleventh day of March, 1814, before me,

A. GRAHAM.

Mr. Cochrane Johnstone's Letter.

MR. EDITOR,—Although the public newspapers have of late been filled with statements affecting my character, originating from the Members of the Stock-Exchange Committee, I have thought it to be my duty to remain silent until the Report, daily promised from that Committee, should be printed, and that I should be put in possession of it. Having this day seen it by accident, for it is only circulated among their own body, although it was the bounden duty of the Committee, if they had been men of honour, to have sent me a copy of it, I can no longer refrain from publicly contradicting the infamous and unfounded statements contained in the said report, which can be done upon oath by the very parties stated by the Committee to have given them the information.—I have instructed my Solicitors immediately to adopt those measures which my Counsel may deem proper, in order that justice may be done to my character, and to punish those who have dared to put their names to the most unfounded statements which malice could invent, and which they must have known to have been false at the moment they were affixing their names to the Report.

A. COCHRANE JOHNSTONE.

No. 18, Great Cumberland-street,
March 12, 1814.

Mr. Bull's Letter.

MR. EDITOR,—As I have delayed replying to the infamous and gross falsehoods circulated in the public papers, defamatory to my character, relative to the late fraud upon the Stock Exchange, until the Report should make its appearance from the Committee appointed to investigate the circumstances attending the inquiry, and having to-day been favoured with a perusal of it, I beg you to insert this letter in your paper immediately, in which I positively deny the accuracy of the statement therein made, and the evidence there declared can be denied upon oath by the parties themselves, who have been stated by the Committee to have given the evidence so described. My solicitors have received orders from me instantly to commence a prosecution against

the Committee of the Stock-Exchange, for inserting falsehoods as infamous and unfounded as ever appeared in publication.

R. G. BUTT.

*Ibbetson's Hotel, Vere-st. near Bond-st.
March 12, 1814.*

Such are the documents illustrative of this transaction; and, I think, it is hardly necessary, even upon the showing of the Committee themselves, to pronounce, that the parties accused have been falsely accused and shamefully aspersed by the public prints. What are the circumstances upon which the charge is founded? First, that the *Hoaxer* (for I will call him neither *cheat* nor *impostor*) went to the house of Lord Cochrane. Grant this to be true; does it follow that my Lord Cochrane knew of the hoax? His Lordship has shown, that he had very good grounds for listening to the story of Mr. Berenger, and, in a subsequent publication, he has shown, that the idea of Mr. Berenger going out in his ship originated, not with himself, but with Sir Alexander Cochrane, and that the Admiralty also had, in some sort, given their countenance to the thing. But, supposing these circumstances not to have existed at all, ought it to be concluded, that Lord Cochrane was privy to the Hoax, merely because the Hoaxer went directly to his house from the Dartford post-chaise? Will any man in his senses believe, that Lord Cochrane, if he had been a hatcher of the scheme, would have so arranged matters as to bring the Hoaxer to his own house directly, and thereby to give a clue for sure and inevitable detection? Would he not, above all things in the world, have avoided doing this very thing, upon which the charge has been built, and upon which he must have been quite certain that such a charge would have been built?—The Hoaxer, himself, too, if he wished to avoid detection, took the worst way in the world to accomplish his purpose, supposing Lord Cochrane to have been a party to the hoax, and supposing the detection of this party to have led to his own. For, how does he go to work? He alights, in the open street, from a post-chaise: gets into a hackney-coach; drives directly to the house of a nobleman, well known. A very ingenious mode of proceeding, if he meant there to borrow a new dress, and to take shelter elsewhere; but, will any man in the world believe, that he would have gone to that house if he had wished to keep Lord Cochrane from being suspected? He knew that it was as easy to trace him to that house as

it is to trace a mail-coach in its progress from one town to another; and, I greatly wonder, that it did not strike the Committee, that a man, so clever as the Hoaxer must have been, would naturally go to some intermediate house *between the coach and his place of refuge*; between the coach and the residence of his associates.——The reader will observe, that we are here talking, not of a hasty and unadvised act; not of a thing done upon the spur of the moment. We are talking of the execution of a scheme, which must have been the subject of long deliberation amongst acute men. They had had leisure to digest all the parts of their plan, which was not difficult of execution, except in as far as related to the avoiding of detection. This must have been the thing to which all their skill was directed. And, with the knowledge of this in their minds, how could the Committee conclude, that a part of the plan would be for the Hoaxer to go, in open day, directly to a house, where he “appeared to be *famili-“liar,”* and that the associate in the hoax lived at that house?——Upon the face of the thing, this one single circumstance must be conclusive, in the mind of any impartial man, that Lord Cochrane could have no participation in the hoax.——But, the Hoaxer's fur cap was found at Lord Cochrane's house; another pretty good proof that his Lordship was wholly ignorant of the hoax; for, otherwise, having furnished his associate, or, rather, his agent, as they would have it, with a disguise, would he not have taken care to destroy, or hide this remarkable cap; this memorial of Cockney gullibility? Dennis, in his most witty and admirable critique on the stupid tragedy of Cato, makes one burst one's sides with laughter at his remarks on the circumstance of the conspirators coming from their own houses, in all parts of the town, to hold their conferences in *Cato's Hall*. “What! here again,” says he; “can you, you fools, find no other place than this to deliberate on a plot against the governor?” But Syphax and his associates were not half so foolish as Lord Cochrane, supposing him to have been a party to the hoax; for he, this deep-plotter, this grand schemer, has no scruple to bring his brother hoaxer to his own house, and, in the face of his servants, and even by their agency, to furnish him with a disguise, and then to take special care to preserve, and leave hanging up in his hall, the famous fur-cap, in which the Hoax had been performed; leave hanging up in his hall, or, at least, in some unlocked part of his house, to which every one in

it had access, that very article of dress, which every consideration, connected with a desire to keep himself clear of imputation, must necessarily have urged him to hide or destroy!——The Bow-street officer is said, by the Committee, to have asserted, that the man servant of Lord Cochrane has been since *sent away*, and that he hears, that the said man servant has been *sent into the country*.——Now, supposing this to be *true*, and I merely suppose it for the sake of the argument (not believing one word of the matter), the man must either have been *turned away*, or, he must have been sent out of the way, *for fear he should give disagreeable evidence*. If the former, it is too ridiculous to suppose, for one moment, that his master thought him the depository of a dangerous secret: if the latter, is the *country* a place to hide a man in? Or, is he gone to the *mines*, or to some *cavern* in some wilderness in this woody and desert island, where he is led by ravens, as the Prophet of old? Why not bring him forth, Mr. Sayers? Why not ferret him out?——But, did it ever occur to any man in his senses, and particularly to the deep contriver of a plot, to let a dangerous witness out of his own hands? If my Lord Cochrane had disguised the Hoaxer for the purpose of avoiding detection, would he have called his servant to assist in the work? Would he have suffered a servant to see the work of disguising going on? Could he not have got the disguise and have fitted out the Hoaxer himself? What devil, what bungling imp could have prompted him to call in a footman, without the smallest necessity for it, and to make him a party to a fact, which he had taken so much pains to hide from all the rest of the world?——But, suppose all this to have been the case. In spite of the incredibility, and almost the impossibility of it, supposing all this to have happened, why should this same footman be *sent away*? If my Lord Cochrane thought him *faithful*, he, of course, could have no motive for getting him out of the way, seeing that no one had authority to question him upon oath touching the matter. If he thought him *unfaithful*, disposed or liable to betray his master, or apt to get drunk and to blab; if watchfulness over him was necessary, if bribes were wanted to be supplied, where could he have been so effectually watched, where could he have been kept so completely out of the way of temptation, as under the roof of his master? Was it likely that that master, if he wished to keep locked up the lips of his footman,

would have suffered that footman to ramble forth into the world with his pockets stuffed with money, to booze and blab in every pot-house and brothel at the West end of the town?—It is said, and the circumstance is dwelt on, that Mrs. Durand, who lets the furnished house to Lord Cochrane, *has been seen to wear the famous fur cap*. So, here is Mrs. Durand, whom the “*conspirators*,” as the Times news-paper calls them, took care to *provide before-hand* as a witness against themselves! These conspirators beat hollow Syphax and his associates. They could not get a fur-cap at any shop in London! They must needs have a fur-cap; and nothing will suit them but the identical cap of Mrs. Durand, and a cap, too, that she had been in the habit of wearing publicly, and of so remarkable a description into the bargain, that her neighbours knew it, at once, from all the other caps in the world!—Mrs. Durand was a party with the conspirators, or she was not. If she *was not*, would *they* have borrowed or bought of her, living close in the neighbourhood, so remarkable a cap? If she *was*; if she was a party, and must have been anxious to avoid detection, would *she* have dressed the Hoaxer in her own notorious cap? If the Committee of the Stock Exchange could believe either of these propositions to be *true*, they must be persons so credulous and foolish as to merit no more attention than so many worms; and, if they believed them to be *false*, what are we to say of their stating them to the world as grounds of charge?—As far, therefore, as relates to my Lord Cochrane, *every circumstance*, brought forward and promulgated by this Committee with a view to throw odium on him, has a clearly contrary effect; and, upon *their own showing*, it is made appear, not only to have been improbable, but almost impossible, that his lordship should have been privy to the Hoax, supposing that gentleman to have been the Hoaxer who went to his house.—My Lord Cochrane, in his affidavit, gives a very circumstantial, natural, and satisfactory account of the fur-cap and its wearer. But, though I would sooner believe his lordship’s bare word than the oaths of all his aspersers put together, I will not appeal to that affidavit, which, if I had been to advise, would never have been made, it being my opinion, that it was beneath the character of his lordship to enter the lists, to put even his word in competition, with any thing that his aspersers were able to say, or publish.—I will not appeal to the affidavit. I take the charge upon the showing

of the Committee themselves. The sole basis of that charge is the fact, which I, for argument’s sake, admit to be true, that the Hoaxer went directly from the Dartford chaise to Lord Cochrane’s house; and, if that fact, and the other facts, relating to the cap, the footman, and Mrs. Durand, be all true, the charge against his lordship must be false, unless you can show, that, in this particular instance, human nature underwent a complete revolution.—Now, then, as to Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, where are we to look for the probabilities of *his* having been concerned in the Hoax? You will observe, reader, that the whole charge, as shown by the Committee, rests upon the before-mentioned circumstances, and, if those circumstances themselves demolish the charge with regard to Lord Cochrane, how can they affect Mr. Cochrane Johnstone? Had he been one of the “*conspirators*,” would he have brought the Hoaxer to the house of his Nephew? Would he, who is so attached to that Nephew, who lives upon such terms of kindness with him, have made *his* house, above all the houses in London, the *entrepot* of the Hoaxer? Would he not, on the contrary, have taken great care, that the Hoaxer should change his dress in no house, to which the name of *Cochrane* could be traced? Must he not have known, must he not have been well aware, that a natural association of ideas would, at once, have connected him with a hoaxer, taking refuge in the house of his nephew; and must not any man, and especially such a man as Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, have perceived all the consequences of so suspicious a circumstance? Was Mr. Cochrane Johnstone a likely man to borrow, or buy, the notorious fur-cap of Mrs. Durand? Was he a man to do this? I should as soon suspect him to be capable of borrowing, for the purpose, the wig of Lord Chatham out of Westminster Abbey, with the consent, in writing, of the Dean and Chapter—Well, then, what have we now remaining to prop up, to give a colour to, this stupid charge? Why, the fact, that my Lord Cochrane, his uncle and Mr. Butt, a gentleman, who, it seems, was connected with them in stock-business, took advantage of the rise, occasioned by the hoax, and sold out stock to a great amount, by which they gained 30,000*l*. I am sorry to see, from the affidavit of Lord Cochrane, that, as far as relates to *him*, this fact is false, and most sincerely hope it to be true as far as it relates to Mr. Cochrane Johnstone. But, I will, as I said before, rest nothing upon

the affidavit, which, I repeat it, was an ill-advised act; and will, for argument's sake, take the fact for granted, in its very fullest extent. And, then, let me ask, whether, if they had been the authors of the hoax, they would have sold out all this stock in their *own names*? They might, in five minutes, have transferred it to their black-servant or chamber-maid, or to John of Noaks and Tom of Styles, and have sold it out in their names instead of their own. If they had been the authors of the hoax, they must *necessarily*; I do not say, *probably*, but *necessarily*, have been apprehensive, that the selling out of all their stock, and such an immense sum, would create suspicion and lead to a discovery, which, in the settling, would defeat their purpose; and, therefore, it is beyond the scope of credibility, that, if they had been the authors of the Hoax, they would have sold out in their *own names*, it being perfectly optional with them, whether they should do so or not.—But, they *did* sell out, and how came they to do so at that particular and lucky moment? —There is a much better reason for this than any that the Committee of the Stock Exchange have been able to discover. The reason was, that the possessed information generally, and sagacity superior to the mass of Stock-dealers, or gaublers in the funds. Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, coming from the West end of the town, in the daily habit of conversing with military men, with well-informed persons out of the army, knowing the actual situation of the hostile armies, being able to form a probable conjecture as to the truth or falsehood of the report in circulation, was more likely than almost any person in London, or, at least, any person that I can think of, to form a correct estimate of the worth of the intelligence received. And, this is quite sufficient to account for his being, as I most anxiously hope he was, a fortunate gamester on the day of the Hoax. *He* was not a person to be so hoaxed; and that is the sum total of the grounds of charge against him. It is very natural for *losers* to be out of temper, and to find out an excuse for their losing and a pretence for not paying what they have lost; this may be the case in the present instance; but this is no ground for accusation against the winners.—Without, however, supposing Mr. Cochrane Johnstone to be possessed of more than ordinary sagacity, what was there unnatural in his selling out? There was a *certain gain* presented itself, and was not that, of itself, inducement enough to sell out? Who but a fool would not

have sold out at a *certain gain*, while not to sell exposed him to the *chance of a loss*?

—Reader, when you consider these circumstances, what need have you of *surcaps* and *Mrs. Durands* to account for this selling out? There were scores of persons to sell out as well as Mr. Cochrane Johnstone. Were they *all* concerned in the Hoax? Was *nobody* to doubt of the truth of such a humbug story, because *some persons* believed it? Because the rabble at the 'Change and in the streets believed that Napoleon had been torn piecemeal by the Cossacks, and, in spite of the dictates of reason, common sense, and known facts, believed that the people of Paris had hoisted the White Cockade, was Mr. Cochrane Johnstone to believe the same; and is he to be abused and most foully calumniated because he acted upon his disbelief? Really this is a mode of judging of the actions of men hitherto unknown, I believe, in the annals of injustice; and, for my part, I am only sorry, that the accused parties should have thought it necessary to give to their accusers any other answer than that which might have been gathered from their silent contempt.

—I must stop here, for the present. In my next I will take up the questions, 1. whether it was peculiarly improper in my Lord Cochrane and his uncle to be concerned in dealings in the funds; 2. Whether my Lord Cochrane acted improperly as to Mr. Berenger; and 3. Whether Mr. Berenger, supposing him to have been the Hoaxer (and I shall admit the fact only for argument's sake) was guilty of any thing either *unlawful* or *immoral*, supposing gaming in general *not* to be immoral. With this latter admission, which the Stock gamblers, at any rate must make, I have no doubt of being able to shew, that all these three questions ought to be decided in the *negative*. Men are too apt, especially, when their pockets are touched, to rush on to conclusions without any examination into premises; but, to call names, to deal in insinuations and charges without being prepared with either facts or arguments, is to act the part of a Billingsgate Trull.

DUTCH AFFAIRS.—The failure of the recent attack upon the enemies' formidable position at Bergen-op-Zoom, is fraught with important and useful instruction to the people of this country, if they would only open their minds to receive it. In the Register of the 5th inst. I stated, that the troops which were sent to Holland under

the "gallant Graham," could never be expected to effect any thing *there* which would be of service to the common cause; and this opinion I was led to form in consequence of observing, that the military operations which we were carrying on in that quarter, were not supported by the Dutch, nor countenanced by any of the allied powers. It would be base to exult over the dreadful disaster which has overwhelmed so many families with despair. It would be cowardly to censure the mode of conducting operations which terminated so fatally, merely because the result has not been attended with those beneficial consequences which were expected by those who projected the expedition. But while the relatives of our brave countrymen who fell in the "fatal strife," who expired on that "bed of honour" which, now-a-days, is so much coveted: while these relatives are deploring the loss of their fathers, their sons, their nephews; while they are *feeling* the bitter pangs which a separation, forever, from their dearest friends occasions, it appears to me proper that they should not only *feel* their situation, but that they should also *think*; should also *reflect*, should also carry in their minds the *why* and the *wherefore* that led to the dreadful catastrophe which they so deeply deplore. It is not my intention here to go back to the commencement of the war, or to enter upon an examination of the causes to which it has been ascribed, and which have been as various as the changes of theameleon's skin. It is sufficient for my present purpose to remind the reader of a fact to which I very lately directed his attention, namely, that the endeavours of this country and the great sacrifices we were making of blood and treasure to bring about the restoration of the Orange family in Holland, would not be productive of any good, because the people of that country seemed no way desirous to aid and assist us in our views. The representations of the state of the public mind there, with which we were a few months ago amused, have turned out completely fallacious. We no more hear of the "groaning of the Dutch under the weight of Bonaparteian tyranny." The accounts which now reach us are of a very different complexion. By these we learn that the people of Holland "appear to manifest a *partiality* rather than a hatred for the French."—Yet it was to assist these *lovers* of the French; these *friends* of Napoleon; these *admirers* of his code of laws, that we sent British troops to Holland, lavished upon the Dutch

immense sums of money, and, when the business was every day assuming a more unfavourable aspect, led to the slaughter of thousands of our brave countrymen. It is idle to talk now of the Dutch people having *deceived* us. It is folly to pretend that we have been *abandoned* by the Allies; for it is a well known fact, that the people of Holland never called for our interference, and that the Allies, if they were consulted at all in our designs as to the House of Orange, never gave these designs any countenance. These important and decisive facts are demonstrated by this circumstance alone that, in the assault made upon Bergen-Op Zoom, there were no other troops employed but the native troops of this country. Not even a Dutchman, in whose cause we fought so bravely, appeared to give us any support. That the Dutch and the Allies would act in this way, appeared to me very probable when the first accounts of a counter-revolution in Holland rendered the people here almost frantic; when the cry of *Orange Boven* resounded from the palace to the cottage; and when the whole country was intoxicated with Dutch liberty. If this was my conjecture, with the limited means of information which I then possessed, how much more ought those who had the chief management of the business, to have known better? And, having that knowledge; being fully apprised that the Hollanders manifested a *partiality* in favor of the French Emperor, and would not take up arms for the Prince of Orange, how came these men to involve us in a contest which has ended so fatally? These are questions which those who *feel* the baneful effects of these measures ought to ask themselves; ought not only to ask themselves, but ought also to ask those who were the first to tell the people of England, that this counter-revolution was "the result of the spontaneous and unanimous wish of the people of Holland of all parties;" who were the foremost in crying up Dutch independence, and in giving currency to opinions which, to our sad experience, we have found to be entirely groundless. The *Courier* writer by way of *consoling* its readers for the disgraceful termination of our interference in Dutch affairs, "thanks God it has to discharge but *rarely*, the task of communicating the failure of a British expedition." When this servile journalist congratulated himself in this way upon what he calls a *rare* occurrence, he seems to have forgot the very recent attempt against Antwerp, in which we completely failed after the loss of many

valuable lives, and he appears to have lost sight of the ever *memorable* Walcheren Expedition, which proved the grave of thousands of our best troops. To these might be added the Buenos Ayres, the Corunna, the Helder, and the Dunkirk disasters; the Quiberon and the Toulon Expeditions, besides a number of others equally fatal, a recurrence to which is sufficient to show that our *failures*, instead of being *rare*, have of late years been more numerous, and more disgraceful, than at any former period. But though they had been fewer in number and less disastrous, this circumstance could, in no view, alter the nature of our connexion with Holland, or afford a ground of justification to those who have so basely and so wantonly deceived us as to the state of the public mind in that country, and which has led to the terrible calamity that is so much and so generally lamented. Whether the Prince of Orange, when he set out for Holland, joined in the project to deceive others, or was himself deceived, it now seems that his Highness, who has been several months in that country, and must unquestionably have strained every nerve to excite an interest in his favour, appears at last to have formed a correct idea of public feeling, and to be convinced that he has no chance of succeeding in the competition he has set up with Napoleon; unless he concedes to the *people* as much at least as his rival has done; unless he gives them a constitution under which they will enjoy advantages *equal* to those enjoyed in France; and which will guarantee all their civil and religious rights as effectually as they were guaranteed under the Code Napoleon. Impressed with this conviction, he has caused a new constitution to be prepared, which, he says, is calculated to "*secure the freedom of his subjects against all possible abuses*:" which, he tells them, is "*built upon their manners, their habits, and corresponding to the wants of the present time*."—At first sight, the conduct of William of Orange, appears entitled to approbation. It was certainly a great effort in a prince, educated in the corrupt school where he acquired his notions of liberty and maxims of government, to bring his mind to acknowledge, that the *people* have rights which ought to be secured against all *possible* abuses, and that their manners, their habits, and their wants, are objects deserving the consideration of sovereigns. This, I confess, was admitting a principle which I little expected, would, at this time of day, have been re-

cognised by the head of one of the old regular governments of Europe. It so much resembles my ideas of liberty that, if it were not for some other points connected with this Prince's sentiments, at least with what he has been *advised* to utter along with this declaration, I should be half inclined to consider him a *real* friend of freedom, such as I understand it to be, and which has procured for me, and many others who think as I do, the honourable title of *jacobin*. But though the *Courier* and the *Times* have been as severe in their *abuse* of the Prince of Orange for the sentiments he has uttered, as they could have been were he the most incorrigible of jacobins, I am free to admit, that it would be unjust and slanderous, nay libellous, to bestow that appellation upon this Prince. I say, William is not a jacobin, and, I think, his own words will bear me out in this assertion. He says, at the commencement of his Declaration, that he was *invited* to the Sovereignty by the *people* of Holland. I have heard of a meeting at Amsterdam of a few merchants, about a dozen or so, who were closely connected with this country, with whom the measure, of sending a deputation here to invite the Prince, altogether originated. Even this step they would not have dared to take, had not the state of the French Emperor's affairs at that time, obliged him to withdraw his troops from several of the towns in Holland. The *indifference* which the *people* have since shown to the Orange cause, renders it indisputable that they never were consulted in the business, and consequently that his Highness was *not* invited by *them* to assume the sovereignty. His Highness seems to have been rather unfortunate in that part of his appeal, where he speaks of the *terrible experience* which the Dutch have had of a foreign *tyranny*, and of their having *sighed*, of late years, under the most *oppressive yoke*; for, if this yoke had been so terrible, this tyranny so oppressive, how came it, when their tyrant and oppressor was overthrown at Leipsic, and forced to return to France with a mere handful of soldiers; how did it happen when he found it necessary to withdraw the greater part of his troops from Holland, and when the advance of innumerable and victorious legions guaranteed the integrity of the Netherlands? How was it, I ask, that the Dutch *people*, with such an opportunity of liberating themselves from the chains of Napoleon, did not avail themselves of it? How came they not to join in the general chase, which was intended to hunt down this op-

pressor of the human race; this monster who had made his Dutch subjects, in particular, experience more terrible inflictions than had been "imposed since the Spanish times?" And how happens it, when nearly the whole combined powers of Europe at this moment have carried the scourge of war into the very heart of France, that we do not find among these numerous armies, any troops belonging to Holland; any of those men in arms against Bonaparte, who, if we believe his Orange Highness, made them suffer such terrible evils when he was in the plenitude of his despotic power, and could exercise his tyranny with impunity? Either what the Prince of Orange tells us is true, or it is not true. If true, the Dutch must be the most stupid and insensible people on earth, and totally unworthy of the notice of his Highness. It is, indeed, surprising that he continues to risk his personal safety amongst a set of men who are so indifferent about their own affairs, and so passive as to the terrible sufferings they have endured, as to let slip an opportunity, so favourable as that which now offers, of being revenged on their oppressor. But if these representations as to the situation of the Dutch under Bonaparte, are highly coloured and exaggerated; if, in short, they are *not* true; and the Hollanders, as there is good reason to believe, "manifest a *partiality* rather than a hatred for the French," it certainly did not display a very profound policy on the part of the advisers of the Prince of Orange, to designate the sway of Napoleon "a foreign tyranny which acknowledged *no right*, when it wanted means for its own maintenance by *violence*."—This sort of language is extremely well calculated to excite disgust, and bring those into contempt who use it; and however fair the promises that accompany it; however anxious the individual to make it be believed, that he is a *better* man than his rival, and will be more careful of the liberties of his people, it is clear that the purpose generally intended by the use of scurrility and abusive language, will always have a contrary effect to that intended by those who employ it. Notwithstanding all the abuse which is unceasingly poured by his enemies upon the name of Bonaparte, the Dutch people cannot be such fools as not to perceive that these injuries are not reasons, and that they are never resented by the Emperor of France, nor even retaliated by any of the French writers. Consequently, in drawing the contrast between the government of Napoleon and that now

proposed by William, the latter, who employs invective instead of calm argument, must be an infinite loser by the comparison. There are many other points in the Prince of Orange's declaration, which, in my opinion, must determine the question against him; but these I cannot enter upon at present.—The reader who considers what has already been remarked with an unprejudiced mind, will, I think, be at no loss to conclude, that our interference at first in the affairs of the Dutch, was no way warranted by any favourable symptoms appearing among that people; that it was the height of folly in us to attempt, with a mere handful of troops, to drive the enemy out of Holland; and that, considering the unwillingness of the people themselves to take up arms even in defence of the Prince of Orange, and their known partiality for the Emperor of France, it is idle to expect that any assistance we can give, or any sacrifices we can make, will render Holland an independent country.

THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON AND HIS ARMY.—"Honest John Bull," has of late been rather somewhat restless, and dissatisfied with his situation; so much so indeed that his keepers have found it necessary to apply some of their *artificial* stimulants, in order to exhilarate him, and restore him to his wonted meek, quiet, and passive, temper. It has been said of the people of England, that they are the greatest deceivers, and the easiest deceived of any nation in the world.—It may be added, with equal truth, that they are the most discontented under affliction, and the most elevated under prosperity, of all other people. They hailed the counter-revolution in Holland as the bright era which was to restore to afflicted Britain her long lost happiness, and put an end to all the miseries she had suffered during the long continuance of this destructive war. Commerce, the soul of Britain's glory, of Britain's former prosperity, was to revive, and give an outlet to our manufactures, and to that vast accumulation of Colonial produce, with which our docks and our warehouses were almost entirely filled. A market was no doubt found for our cottons, our coffees, and our sugars. This had the effect of raising the price of these articles about 25 per cent. But then it obliged the man of limited income to deny his family many of the comforts to which they were accustomed, in order to enable him to meet the exorbitant increase upon his dress, and upon articles which habit had long rendered ne-

cessaries of life. Had a suitable return been made for this; had the numerous vessels which have arrived from the ports of Holland, poured into this country a portion of the products of the Continent, at a *fair price*, in return for the extensive exports of sugar, of coffee and of cotton, which we have made, no one, I believe, would have felt disappointed; no one, I am persuaded, would have complained of a change of circumstances, so well calculated, in one view, to promote the general interest. But instead of the expected advantages proving reciprocal; instead of the high price of sugar, coffee, and cotton, procuring us cheap butter, cheap cheese, cheap candles, cheap soap, cheap iron, or cheap flax, every one of these articles have reached a price *far beyond* what they were prior to the opening of the ports of Holland and the Baltic. The effect produced on the public mind by this unlooked for change, was to create *chagrin* and *disappointment* among all classes, particularly among the middle ranks, with whom there is a greater demand for the above articles than any other class; and the late disasters in Holland, combined with the other unfavourable circumstances which have transpired respecting that country, no way tended to remove the general dissatisfaction. Perhaps, too, the prolongation of the march to Paris, and the *delightful* conflagration of that city by the "unimitated and inimitable Cossacks," who, according to the *Times* and the *Courier*, were prepared to "destroy this den of the Corsican," had a share in exciting the disgust and chagrin which so much prevailed on account of the overthrow of our commercial hopes. But be this as it may, John Bull was not altogether himself of late. It was found necessary therefore to soothe him; to *pat* him on the head; to amuse him with some *splendid*, some *glorious victory*, that he might not, by brooding too much over his misfortunes, be led to make his guides repent the many scurvy tricks they have served him. Accordingly, it was thought advisable, in pursuance of this plan, to announce to the good people of London, another *total defeat* of Bonaparte and another approach of the grand Allied army to Paris. Knowing the characteristic *credulity* of Englishmen; recollecting the observation, with which I set out, that they are more depressed under affliction, and more elevated under prosperity, than any other nation; it will not appear surprising if this intelligence, apparently authenticated by an *official bulletin* and by the firing of the Park and

Tower guns, should have produced the wished for effect; and, however improbable the event, that it should be received with the most unbounded rapture. If the public were displeased before; if they then felt chagrin, disgust, and disappointment, they have now reached the other extreme, and seem as happy at the "glorious news," as if sugar, coffee, and cottons had never risen; as if the opening of the ports of Holland had not enhanced the price of butter, cheese, and tallow; and as if Paris was actually in flames, Bonaparte on a gibbet, and the dear, the *loving* Cossacks revelling, in all the gaiety of their hearts, upon the rich viands which were formerly in use to regale the Parisians. But leaving these dupes of a cunning and interested policy, to enjoy for a little their *fancied* triumph, let us turn our attention to the military operations of Napoleon. In these we are sure to find something more substantial than the ephemeral successes of his opponents: it is to the warlike exploits alone of this extraordinary character that we ought to look, at this critical moment, for a solution of the many important questions which agitate the public mind to a greater degree than at any former period. In the last Register, I left Bonaparte on his way from Troyes, to attack Marshal Blucher, who had penetrated to within 25 miles of Paris. Since then official accounts have been received from France, which bring Bonaparte's operations down to the 9th instant, and by which it appears that Blucher, on hearing of the approach of Napoleon, abandoned his advanced position, and retreated to the neighbourhood of Laon, a distance of 80 miles from the capital. Here, at a small village called Craonne, he was attacked by Bonaparte, and, after sustaining a signal defeat, he again retreated, and "was pursued four leagues." "On the next day, the 8th, (says the bulletin) we pursued the enemy to the defile of Urcel. The result of these operations is a loss to the enemy of from 10 to 12,000 men, and 30 pieces of cannon." But these accounts do not rest entirely upon the credit due to the *Moniteur*. They have, in substance, been confirmed by our own bulletins, in which it is stated "that Blucher had *retired* on Laon; had been *pursued* with great activity by the French army commanded by Bonaparte in person, and had an affair of *importance* with him on the 7th."—If to 80 miles we add four leagues, the distance which Blucher was pursued after the battle, we shall find that he was compelled to retire at least 92 miles from Paris on the

evening of the 8th instant. But I shall be told, and our *Extraordinary Gazette* will be referred to as *proof* of the fact, that even admitting all the previous advantages of Bonaparte to be true, they are now of no consequence, because he was TOTALLY ROUTED on the day following by Blücher, and compelled to FLY with only 15,000 troops. I do not mean to say that this is an *impossible* occurrence. I am not so stupid as to pretend that Napoleon is *invincible*. But I do not think in the present case, that there is sufficient grounds for believing that the French Emperor has been *totally* defeated. I have even my doubts as to the *correctness* of the information which has reached this country as to any engagement having been fought on the 9th. With regard to Bonaparte himself being in the supposed action, it is said in a postscript to the dispatch that "it is *not known positively* if Napoleon commanded in person. Most of the prisoners assert they saw him; but deserters say that he set off on the night of the 8th, with 15,000 men in the direction of Paris, the grand Allied army under the orders of Prince Schwartzburg having taken Fontainebleau." If a battle had been fought on the 9th, in which Bonaparte commanded in person, it is very clear the fact might have been easily ascertained by Blücher, who would have announced it in *positive* language, instead of leaving us to *guess* at the truth between the *opposite* statements of the *prisoners* said to be taken, and the *deserters*.—As to the *accuracy* of the intelligence, it comes through so indirect a course, that I find myself compelled to suspend giving my unqualified assent to it, till further accounts are received. The communication to Government, it will be observed, has not been made by Colonel Lowe, our accredited agent with Marshal Blücher, and from whom only we have been in use to receive intelligence of the operations of the Silesian army; but from a Captain Hamilton Smith, residing at Brussels, who saw nothing of the affair, and who merely transmits "an extract of a letter," to a Count Lottum, from the Duke of Saxe Weimar, containing another "extract of a letter," *without a date*, from Marshal Blücher; the whole having been forwarded to the War-Office by Admiral Young. The number of persons through whose hands the accounts are said to have come, will naturally bring to the reader's recollection the pleasant little story he has often

read at school, which begins with "This is the house that Jack built." We know that the surrender of Dresden was, a few months ago, announced in our *Gazette*, and the Park and Tower guns fired to celebrate the event; yet this afterwards turned out a false report. I do not, however, say, that Captain Smith's letter contains a false statement; nor do I say that the defeat of Bonaparte is *impossible*. But, taking the above circumstances into view, and connecting these with the fact, that Blücher was actually defeated on the 7th, at or near Laon, and was in full retreat on the evening of the 8th; it does appear to me rather improbable, that he should have returned on the *same day* (as Captain Smith has it) *to his former position*, concentrate his forces, and be able not only to defend himself, but to obtain a splendid and decisive victory over the French. Supposing, however, he did return, and supposing a battle was fought, it is evident this must have been of a *partial* nature only.—Whether, therefore, Blücher engaged the French on the 9th or not, I have no hesitation in saying, that the result of this battle, even admitting the loss to be as great as stated, will, in my opinion, have little or no effect on the grand scale of operations upon which Napoleon now appears to be acting.

OCURRENCES OF THE WAR.—An attack was made on the 8th instant, by a division of the British army in Holland, consisting of about 3,500 men, upon the almost impregnable fortress of Bergen-op-Zoom, which our troops, after scaling the walls and entering the town, were compelled to relinquish, with the loss of 300 killed, and 1,800 wounded or prisoners. Among the officers killed were General Gore who commanded the division, 2 Lieutenant-Colonels, and 8 others of inferior rank. Seventy-three officers were wounded, and 10 missing.

The main army of the Allies reoccupied Troyes on the 3d, the enemy having previously evacuated the place in terms of a convention. It is not pretended, that the *French* threatened to set fire to Troyes if they were not allowed to escape. It is said, in a *minor* French paper, that Marshal Augereau had obtained possession of Geneva, and was advancing, at the head of a numerous army, in the rear of Prince Schwartzberg.

By dispatches received from Lord Wellington of the 26th ult. it appears that some dispositions had been made with the view of crossing the Adour, in consequence of the French having been driven from several of their positions. "The enemy (says his Lordship) retired in the night across the Gave d'Oleron, and took up a *strong position* in the neighbourhood of Sauveterre, in which they were joined by other troops."

* * Capt. Campbell will, in the next Register, just beg the attention of the public to a few words, in answer to one part of Mr. Mant's last publication.

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THE CASE

OF LORD COCHRANE, MR. COCHRANE JOHNSTONE, AND MR. BUTT, RELATING TO THE LATE HOAX ON THE STOCK EXCHANGE.

THE answer to all those, who, in this country, at any time, complain of public grievances, of abuses in the government, of the want of a reform, of the number and weight of the taxes, or of any other political evil; the standing answer is, "what you say may be true; but, where will you find *justice* so impartially administered as it is in England?" This is our great national boast; this is held out as a compensation for all sorts of political evils; that every man's property and character are under the safe-guard of the law, and, that it is the habitual, and almost instinctive, bent of an Englishman's mind, to abhor whatever is *unjust* or *unfair*.

Yet, I will venture to say, that, under no wild democracy, under no military despotism, under no hypocritical and cunning oligarchy, under no hellish tyranny upheld by superstition, was there ever committed an act more unjust and more foul, than what has, within these three weeks, been committed, in the city of London, through the means of the press, against the three Gentlemen, whose names stand at the head of this paper. The death of CHALAS; the

cruel torture, the judicial murder, of this innocent and most virtuous father of a family, upon the ground of his having been the assassin of his own son; this abominable act, committed to appease the infuriated rabble of Toulouse, urged on by a horde of sanguinary priests; this act was, indeed, much more *horrid*, but it was not, in the smallest degree, more *unjust*, nor did the perpetrators proceed upon grounds less probable and more absurd, nor was their conduct in that proceeding more partial, more malevolent, or more contrary to the settled rules of morality or of law.

In this case every artifice, which cunning, sharpened by malice, could devise, appears to have been brought into play, in order to excite in the public mind a prejudice too strong to be removed by any thing which the accused might produce in their defence; in order to dam up the entrance to reason and truth; in order so to commit the whole mass of the public themselves, that it should become with each individual a point of consistency to persevere in the errors adopted; and thus, with an act of atrocious injustice, to associate the means of effectually preventing the injured parties from ever obtaining a chance of redress. The *motives* to an act like this are but too clearly pointed out by every man's experience in the world. The rage, the envy, the thirst for revenge, which always, in a

degree proportioned to his loss, fill the breast of the *losing gamester*, were quite sufficient to urge the seeking of a *victim* of some sort or other; and this anxious desire to accuse being met by an equal desire in the public to see those who had duped them detected, the work of exciting a wide-spreading prejudice required very little ingenuity or time. And, we shall, I think, in the course of this statement, see instances of credulity (on the part of those who have believed in the accusation), to which no parallel has ever been witnessed, even within the walls of the Mad-house or the Meeting-house.

Notwithstanding, however, that this prejudice has spread so widely, and has taken, apparently, so fast a hold upon the public mind, I have that opinion of what is fairly considered as the *public* in England, which induces me to believe, that, when they are clearly shown, *that those premises are false*, upon which they have been led to build their injurious conclusions, they will be ready, not only to confess their error, but to resent the conduct of those, by whom they have been misled into a participation in an act of flagrant injustice. And, notwithstanding the difficulty which must always attend the proving of a negative; notwithstanding the well-known maxim, that every man is to be presumed to be innocent, till he be *proved* to be guilty; notwithstanding that every man is to be regarded as a mere calumniator, who makes a charge, or insinuation, against another, which he does not or cannot *prove* to be true; notwithstanding that to rest a defence upon the *proof of the negative* of the mere assertions of an accuser, is to forego the use of the best arms, with which the rules of law have furnished calumniated innocence for its defence, even this I am ready to do, on the part of the accused upon this occasion; and, if I fail in producing *proof* of

the *falsehood*, I mean the absolute falsehood, of every material assertion which has been made in support of the charge against them, I will be ready to acknowledge, that the accusation was just.

Before, however, before I state, as I shall by and by, in distinct propositions, the several grounds upon which the charge in question has been made, it will be necessary to revert to the transactions, which were the cause of the charge, and to trace the several heads of accusation to their source. What has been inserted in a *former Register*, may, possibly, never meet the eye of some of the readers of the *present*. Therefore, in order that this statement may be as complete as my time and room will allow me to make it, I shall preface the refutation of the charge with a short narrative, or history, of the case.

The subject of complaint is a thing called, in the slang of the day, a HOAX, meaning a *deception*; and this hoax, which took place on the 21st day of last month, and which consisted of an account of the destruction of Napoleon and the entrance of the Allies into Paris, appears to have been *intended to have*, and certainly *had*, the effect of raising the price of the several sorts and descriptions of Stock in the public funds, whereby those, who were privy to the hoax, and who dealt, or gambled, in the funds, were enabled to gain, without any risk of loss, sums of money proportioned to the extent of their dealings. The hoax was practised by a person, who came from Dover, very early in the morning of the 21st Feb. pretending to have come over in a boat from the coast of France. He hastened, after dropping his news at Dover, on to London in a postchaise and four, the last chaise being taken at *Dartford*. He personated, in point of dress, an officer in the army, said he was the *aid-du-camp* of Lord Cathcart, and called himself *Co-*

l'onest Du Bourgh; and, having got out of the post-chaise at the Marsh-gate, took a hackney-coach, and went off. Concurrent with this part of the hoax another was going on from Northfleet, whence came two gentlemen, accompanied with a person, named Sandom, who is stated to have absented himself from the rules of the King's Bench. These persons, when they arrived at Dartford, took a post-chaise and four, dressed the horses in laurel, spread the same news that the pretended Du Bourgh had spread, drove over London Bridge, through the City, over Blackfriars' Bridge, and having alighted near the turnpike, called the *Marsh-gate*, at Lambeth, they went to the bank of the Thames, took a boat to go to Whitehall, and thus disappeared. This branch of the hoax made a great stir in the City, especially among those who were interested in the price of stock. In the meanwhile, as has been stated in the public prints, *expresses*, amounting in number to ten or a dozen in all, conveyed in post-chaises and four, were pouring in from Dover and Northfleet with the intelligence to particular persons; a fact both curious and important, because it shows, that the fund-dealing transactions include a regularly established system for the *obtaining of early intelligence from the coast*, which, of itself, appears to be little short of the act alleged against the pretended Du Bourgh. These expresses appear to have confirmed the success of the delusion. Some of the wary birds were shy, at first; but, as in the case of the bird-catching *à la Pipée*, practised in France, when the pies, the jays, the crows, and jackdaws began to flock in, the noise and confusion were such as to be sufficient to terrify even the bird-catcher himself. To this scene, which those who witnessed it appear to be utterly unable to describe; to this scene of joy and and of greedy expectation of gain, succeeded in a few hours, that of disappoint-

ment, shame at having been gulled, the clenching of fists, the grinding of teeth, the tearing of hair, all the outward and visible signs of those inward commotions of disappointed avarice in some, consciousness of ruin in others, and in all boiling revenge, so strongly and so beautifully, or, rather, so horribly, depicted by the matchless pencil of Hogarth.

Unless we take into consideration, that it was under the influence of feelings like these, so naturally opposing obstructions to the operation of reason and common sense, and so necessarily hostile to the ascertaining of truth and the doing of justice; unless we take this into our consideration; unless we consider, that it was under this senseless, this mad, this almost infuriated influence, that the pursuit after the authors of the Hoax was commenced and continued, we shall in vain seek for a cause sufficiently powerful to have produced those assertions, so flagrantly inconsistent in themselves in some cases, and so audaciously false in others, on which the charge against my Lord Cochrane, his Uncle, and Mr. Butt, has been founded, and which assertions, after a few more words in the way of narrative, it shall be my business to refute and expose.

A Committee of what is called the *Stock Exchange*, and the *true description* of which body I may hereafter have to give, was formed; and, for the sake of greater dispatch of business, I suppose, they appointed what they called a SUB-COMMITTEE, consisting of ten persons, whose names were as follows: CHARLES LAWRENCE, CHARLES NAIRNE, BENJAMIN OAKLEY, L. A. DE LA CHAUMETT, CHRISTOPHER TERRY, FRANCIS WAKEFIELD, FRANCIS BAILEY, JOHN LEWIS, JOHN CAPEL, WILLIAM HAMMOND. These gentlemen, on the 7th instant, made and published a *Report*, and added to it what they called "*Minutes of Evidence*," which

minutes, as far as they at all relate to the question before us, that is to say, to the charge against Lord Cochrane, Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, and Mr. Butt, I shall here insert, word for word. To these minutes the reader must pay great attention, because they contain the greatest part of the assertions, upon which the charge has been founded.

MINUTES OF EVIDENCE.

‘THOMAS SHILLING stated, that he is a post-boy at the Marquis of Granby Inn, at Dartford—that he took up a person about half past seven o’clock on Monday morning, February the 21st; that he drove the wheel horses; that when the gentleman got into the chaise, the waiter asked him if he knew of any news, to which he replied that ‘it was all over;’ that when the waiter asked him what he meant by its being *all over*, he said that Bonaparte was torn in a thousand pieces, and that the Cossacks fought for a share of him; that, at the same time he said this, he was in the chaise; that he ordered the post-boys to drive fast, and that they accordingly did drive very fast for the first three miles; but when they came to Bexley-heath, he told them they need not drive so fast; that he said his business was not so particular now, since he thought the telegraphs could work. Shilling replied, that he was sure they could not, as he knew all the telegraphs; that the gentleman then looked out of the chaise-window and said, ‘Post-boy! you need not mention the news as you go along;’ to which Shilling replied, ‘I shall not, Sir, unless you desire it;’ and at the same time asked him what the news was. The gentleman then told him exactly what he had stated to the waiter, with these additional circumstances, that he came ashore within two miles of Dover, the Frenchmen being afraid to come nearer; that he came from the place where he landed to the Ship Inn at Dover, and left it at two o’clock in the morning; that he had sent the intelligence to the Port-Admiral at Deal, in order that the telegraph might be worked, and that he was obliged to do so. The gentleman then said no more to the post-boys till they got to Shooter’s-Hill, when they dismounted and walked by the side of the horses. He gave them out of the chaise part of a bottle of wine and some bis-

cuit, and said to Shilling, ‘Post-boy! I think I shall take a hackney-coach.’ Shilling told him the first hackney-coach stand was at the Bricklayer’s-Arms. He replied, ‘I shall not get out there; that won’t do;’ and asked if there was not a coach-stand in Lambeth-road, and desired him to drive on to that place, as the chaise would go faster than a coach. At the same time the Gentleman told Shilling, that he need not mention any thing as he went on, but that on returning he might mention it to whom he pleased. When they came to the Stags at Lambeth, there was no coach there. The Gentleman then drew up the side-blind of the chaise (at the corner where he sat), as if to hide himself, and the post-boys drove on to Marsh-gate. They stopped at the side of a hackney-coach standing there, and on the chaise-door and coach-door being opened, the Gentleman got into the coach and drove off, after having given a gold Napoleon to each of the drivers. Shilling asked the waterman where the Gentleman ordered the coachman to drive, and he replied ‘to Grosvenor-square.’ Shilling described the Gentleman as having a large red nose, large whiskers, face rather blotched, and that when he spoke his eyes seemed to catch; he thinks him about the height of Sayer, the Police-officer, but not quite so tall or so lusty: he had a brown surtout, and a red coat under it; a brown fur-cap, with something like silver lace on it. He had also a sword and a small portmanteau, which were laid on the seat of the chaise. He paid for the chaise at Dartford, and ordered it to drive to Downing-street. Shilling says he has no doubt but that he should know him again.

‘WILLIAM CRANE stated, that he is the driver of the hackney-coach, No. 890; that he took up on Monday, February 21, at about forty minutes past eight o’clock in the morning, at the Marsh-gate, a Gentleman who had just alighted from a Dartford chaise and four; that he was directed to drive to No. 13, Green-street, Grosvenor-square, where the Gentleman alighted, and knocking at the door, inquired for Colonel or Captain — [the coachman did not hear the name], and was told by the servant that he was gone to breakfast in Cumberland street: that on receiving this reply, the Gentleman asked if he could write a note to him, and

‘ on being answered in the affirmative, he
 ‘ went into the parlour apparently for that
 ‘ purpose; that he took his portmanteau
 ‘ and sword in his hand, and laid them
 ‘ down, as if familiar with the house: that
 ‘ on Crane’s asking for more money, he
 ‘ came to the parlour door and gave him
 ‘ another shilling; that Crane then left
 ‘ him in the house, and the door being
 ‘ shut, he drove away; that he should know
 ‘ the house again to which he drove, and
 ‘ also that he should know the Gentleman
 ‘ again by his speech; that he looked like a
 ‘ foreigner, had a cough, and was a red-
 ‘ faced man, about the middle size; that
 ‘ he had on a brown great-coat, with a
 ‘ red-coat under it, and a fur-cap with
 ‘ gold lace; that the servant who opened
 ‘ the door was a short man, rather elderly,
 ‘ and dressed in black clothes.

‘ *SAYER, the Police-officer*, stated, that
 ‘ on Saturday, February the 26th, he went
 ‘ with William Crane, the hackney-coach-
 ‘ man, to Green-street, in order to identify
 ‘ the house. When they arrived there, he
 ‘ desired the coachman to knock at the door,
 ‘ and (under some pretence) inquire for the
 ‘ Gentleman whom he had set down there
 ‘ on Monday. He did so, but was an-
 ‘ swered from the area, that the Gentleman
 ‘ did not live there; that Mr. Durand did
 ‘ live there, but that he had just left it;—
 ‘ that the family now residing there was
 ‘ Lord Cochrane’s, and that they came in
 ‘ only on Friday last. Sayer asked the
 ‘ coachman if he had any recollection of the
 ‘ servant, he replied, that it was not the
 ‘ same footman who opened the door on
 ‘ Monday when the Gentleman alighted.
 ‘ —At a subsequent examination, Sayer
 ‘ stated, that he had obtained information
 ‘ in the neighbourhood, that Mr. Durand
 ‘ left No. 13, Green-street, on Wednes-
 ‘ day, February the 16th, and that Lord
 ‘ Cochrane came in a day or two after-
 ‘ wards.—Sayer being instructed to ob-
 ‘ tain the most correct information upon this
 ‘ subject, stated, at another examination,
 ‘ that he had ascertained that Lord Coch-
 ‘ rane came into the house, No. 13, Green-
 ‘ street, on Thursday, Feb. 17, but that
 ‘ it is uncertain whether Mr. Durand slept
 ‘ there that night or not; he likewise stated,
 ‘ that he had ascertained that Lord Coch-
 ‘ rane, his brother, and three or four more
 ‘ men, live in the house; that the man-
 ‘ servant had been turned off, and another
 ‘ hired; that the servant who let in the

‘ pretended Du Bourgh is sent into the
 ‘ country; that the maid-servant is not
 ‘ allowed to be seen or spoken to; that
 ‘ the house is Mr. Durand’s, who has let
 ‘ it (furnished) to Lord Cochrane; that
 ‘ Mrs. Durand has been seen to wear such
 ‘ a cap as the one which the pretended Du
 ‘ Bourgh is said to have worn.

‘ *MR. LAURENCE* (chairman of the com-
 ‘ mittee) stated, that he had been to
 ‘ Messrs. Bond and Co. bankers, and had
 ‘ ascertained that the four 1*l.* Bank-notes
 ‘ which the pretended Du Bourgh is said
 ‘ to have paid away to the landlord of the
 ‘ Ship Inn, Dover, together with another
 ‘ 1*l.* note which he had paid away on the
 ‘ road, were in their hands between the
 ‘ hours of one and two o’clock on Satur-
 ‘ day, the 19th of February; on being
 ‘ asked whether they could tell to whom
 ‘ they had paid away any quantity of 1*l.*
 ‘ notes after that time on Saturday, they said
 ‘ they could not without a great deal of
 ‘ trouble, but that if Mr. Laurence would
 ‘ mention the name of any person, they
 ‘ would turn to their account, and endea-
 ‘ vour to ascertain the fact: he requested
 ‘ them to see if any cheque of Mr. Fearn’s
 ‘ was paid on that day, wholly or in part, in
 ‘ 1*l.* notes; but it did not appear that any
 ‘ of his cheques were paid in that way. One
 ‘ of his clerks, however, stated, that about
 ‘ three or four o’clock on that day, Mr. Tho-
 ‘ mas Christmas, a clerk to Mr. Fearn, re-
 ‘ quested to have fifty 1*l.* notes in exchange
 ‘ for four 10*l.* notes and two 5*l.* notes,
 ‘ which were accordingly given to him.

‘ *MR. THOMAS CHRISTMAS* stated, that
 ‘ he was a clerk to Mr. Fearn, but could
 ‘ not recollect having exchanged the notes
 ‘ in question; he, however, said, that he
 ‘ would not take his oath he did not. After
 ‘ much hesitation and apparent unwilling-
 ‘ ness, he at length acknowledged that he
 ‘ had exchanged the four ten-pound and
 ‘ two five-pound notes for Mr. Butt, to
 ‘ whom he delivered the fifty one-pound
 ‘ notes.

‘ *MR. GLOVER*, from the Bank of Eng-
 ‘ land, investigator of Bank-notes, stated,
 ‘ that the four ten-pound bank-notes which
 ‘ had been delivered by Mr. Butt to Tho-
 ‘ mas Christmas, in order to get exchanged,
 ‘ were paid on February 16, by Messrs.
 ‘ Bond and Co. in part of the value of a
 ‘ draft for 75*l.* drawn by Mr. Fearn, and
 ‘ payable to Mr. Butt.

‘MR. JOSEPH FEARN, a stock-broker, stated, that he knew Lord Cochrane, the Honourable A. Cochrane Johnstone, and Mr. R. G. Butt; that he had been in the habit of transacting business for each of them in the public funds; that on the morning of the 21st of February, he sold for various persons Consols and Omnium to a very large amount, in the whole about 928,000*l.* Of this sum there were sold for Omnium. Consols.

‘Lord Cochrane - 139,000*l.* None.
‘Hon. A. C. Johnstone 120,000*l.* 100,000*l.*
‘Mr. Butt - - 154,000*l.* 168,000*l.*

‘most of which had been purchased in the course of the week preceding; that Mr. Butt often acts for Lord Cochrane, in his instructions to buy and sell stock, and that such bargains are always acknowledged as correct by Lord Cochrane; that Lord Cochrane, Mr. C. Johnstone, and Mr. Butt, were with him by ten o’clock on the morning of the 21st of February; that Mr. Cochrane Johnstone took an office for him in Shorter’s-court, (next door to the Stock-Exchange) without his knowledge, and that he entered it on the morning of the 21st of February; that although he sold a great deal of stock on that day, yet (with the exception of the three names above mentioned) he did not sell for any one person above 55,000*l.*; that Lord Cochrane bought 20,000*l.* of the omnium above mentioned, on Saturday, Feb. 19, and Mr. Cochrane Johnstone bought 60,000*l.* of it on Friday, Feb. 18; that he thinks Mr. Cochrane Johnstone and Mr. Butt acted in concert on Monday, Feb. 21, although at other times they have occasionally acted different ways in the purchase and sale of stock; that the whole of the above business was done for the next settling days, and not for money.

‘MR. HICHENS, a stock-broker, was sent for, but it being understood that he was confined to his bed with a severe fit of illness, Mr. Wakefield, (one of the Sub-committee) waited upon him, and learned from him, that although he had known Mr. Cochrane Johnstone for some years, yet he had not done any business for him in the Public Funds before the present year,—that about the 8th of February he began to make some purchases in Omnium, which had increased to such an extent, that on the 14th

‘of February it amounted to 565,000*l.* —that of this sum 200,000*l.* was sold on February the 16th, and 115,000*l.* on February the 17th,—that the remaining sum of 250,000*l.* was sold on the morning of Feb. the 21st;—that out of this sum of 250,000*l.* it was stated by Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, that 50,000*l.* was for a friend of his, and he consented to be a guarantee for any loss which might accrue;—that he does not know Lord Cochrane or Mr. Butt.

‘MR. SMALLBONE, a stock-broker, stated that he had bought (a few days prior to February the 21st) 40,000*l.* omnium for Mr. Cochrane Johnstone and 40,000*l.* omnium for Mr. Butt; that both these were sold in the morning of Feb. the 21st; that the bargains were made for the next settling day, and not for money.

‘MR. J. M. RICHARDSON, (a bookseller, but occasionally acting as a stock-broker), stated, that on the afternoon of Saturday, Feb. the 19th, Mr. Butt applied to him to buy 150,000*l.* omnium for the next settling day; that he had once purchased 20,000*l.* omnium for him, and gained $\frac{1}{2}$ ths per cent. on the transaction; but that he declined entering on so large a speculation as the one now proposed; that, however, he did purchase 30,000*l.* omnium for him as he requested; and that he sold it on the morning of February the 21st.

‘[From these statements it appears, that on the afternoon of Saturday, Feb. 19, the three parties above mentioned may be considered as having purchased for the next settling days the following sums, viz.—

Omnium. Consols.
‘Lord Cochrane - 139,000*l.* None.
‘Hon. A. C. Johnstone 410,000*l.* 100,000*l.*
‘Mr. Butt - - - 224,000*l.* 168,000*l.*

‘Total - 773,000*l.* 268,000*l.*

‘The whole of which was sold on the morning of Monday, Feb. 21.]’

Previous to the promulgation of these Minutes of Evidence, as they were impudently called, and which were sent forth with all the pomposity and authoritative air of a public board, it being, indeed, expressly stated in the Report, as it was called, that “His Majesty’s Government” had been

aiding and assisting the Sub-Committee with all the means in its power; *previous* to the promulgation of these Minutes, all sorts of means had been taken to prepossess the public mind against the three gentlemen in question. A placard, containing their names, was stuck up at the Stock-Exchange, clearly signifying that they had been the authors of the hoax. This placard immediately found its way into the news-papers, and that pack of curs opened, full-cry, upon all the three parties, but especially upon Lord Cochrane and his Uncle, who were, by these impudent and unprincipled men, destined to be *expelled from Parliament* and to be *put in the pillory*. It would be endless to give an account of all the abominable paragraphs which were published before this Report and these Minutes of the Sub-Committee appeared; but, the appearance of these was the signal for such a general, such an outrageous assault upon the character of these gentlemen as the oldest man living has not witnessed; and, the wonder really is, that their houses were not demolished by the populace and themselves torn to pieces. It was spoken of as a matter quite settled, that my Lord Cochrane was to be turned out of the naval service, and that both he and his Uncle were to be expelled from the House of Commons.

In this state of things, Lord Cochrane made and published the affidavit, which was inserted in the last Number of the Register, and which certainly gave a turn, or, at least, a check, to this tide of public opinion. But, the accusers, though time had, in some degree, cooled their rage, appeared to be unwilling to let go their prey. My Lord Cochrane has made another publication since, which seems to have produced a proper effect. I have, therefore, now much less to do than I at first expected; nevertheless, it will be necessary to go into every point of charge, and to show, that *every thing*, on which these infamous calumnies have been founded, is false. As I proposed, therefore, I shall state the *assertions*, on which the charge has been built, in distinct propositions; and then examine those propositions, under their separate heads, applying, or referring to, my authority or evidence, as I proceed.

1. That the Hoaxer went directly from the Dartford post-chaise to Lord Cochrane's house, No. 13, Green-street, Grosvenor-square.

2. That Lord Cochrane went home to him immediately, from the city, upon receiving a note from him.
3. That Lord Cochrane was at Mr. Fearn's, the Broker's, office, in the city, at ten o'clock, on the morning of the Hoax, along with the other two gentlemen.
4. That, immediately after this, one of Lord Cochrane's servants was turned away, and another sent to the country.
5. That the gold Napoleons, expended by the Hoaxer, on the road, were purchased by Lord Cochrane, at Binns and Co. by the means of a *draft* on his banker.
6. That the Bank Notes, expended by the Hoaxer on the road, were obtained by Mr. Butt, at a Banker's, in the City, on Saturday, the 19th of February.
7. That the office, used by Mr. Fearn, the Broker, had been taken for him, without his knowledge, by Lord Cochrane and Mr. Cochrane Johnstone.
8. That, on the afternoon, Saturday, the *nineteenth* of February, the three accused gentlemen, purchased above *a million of stock*, which was all sold for them on the morning of the Hoax, that is to say, on the very next Monday the *twenty-first* of February.

Now, when the reader has gone through these propositions; these assertions, so boldly, so unqualifiedly made, he will not be surprised, that the public should have believed in the charge; for, though some of them are of a nature not to be believed; though it is to set reason and nature at defiance to believe them to be true; yet, taking them all together, they form a chain of circumstances so complete, that conviction becomes inevitable, especially as the greater part of them come forth under the name of "*evidence*," the public not adverting to the important circumstances of this "*evidence*" not having been given upon oath. I have, if I can find time and room, much more to say, and I will say it now or hereafter, of the conduct of this Sub-Committee of the Stock-Exchange; but, at present, I shall go on with my inquiry into the assertions, above stated, in their regular order.

1. That the Hoaxer went directly from the Dartford post-chaise to Lord Cochrane's

house, No. 13, Green-street, Grosvenor-square.—My Lord Cochrane has sworn, that he was sent for home to Captain Berenger, who was dressed in a *grey* great-coat and a *green* under coat. His three late and present servants swear to the same dress, as far, at least, as relates to the collar of the under, or uniform coat.—It is stated, in the Sub-Committee's evidence (which was *not taken upon oath*) that the officer, who was taken to Lord Cochrane's house by *Crane* the hackney-coachman, was dressed in a *brown* great-coat and a *red* under coat. This is stated by *Crane*; and *Shilling*, the Dartford post-boy, gives the same description of the dress of the officer whom he put into the hackney-coach.—In opposition to this, here are the affidavits (not the bare words) of *Thomas Newman*, *Isaac Davis*, and *Mary Turpin*, (Nos. I. II. and III.) late and present servants of Lord Cochrane, who swear, that Captain Berenger, or the person who came to the house on the day alluded to, and in consequence of whose arrival one of them went for Lord Cochrane, was dressed in a *grey* great-coat, buttoned up, and that they saw a *green* collar of an under coat. Lord Cochrane, who saw the great-coat taken off, has before sworn, that Capt. Berenger's dress was, a *grey* great coat, a *green* uniform, and a military cap. Colours more opposite, more strongly contra distinguishable, cannot be well imagined. How the Dartford Post-boy and the Hackney Coachman came so exactly to agree in a declaration so directly opposite to all these oaths the public will, before we have done with the subject, probably, be able to guess.—But, according to the shewing of the Sub-Committee itself, how do these their witnesses agree, in other respects? One says, that he stopped “by the side of a hackney coach,” and that, “on the chaise-door and coach-door being opened the gentleman got in to the coach” and drove off.” This clearly means, that he got out of one vehicle into the other. This is the true meaning of the words. But, *Crane*, the hackney-coachman says, not that the gentleman drew up along side of him, in a Dartford post-chaise, and got out of the chaise into his coach; no; but, that he “took up” a gentleman, “who had just alighted from a Dartford post-chaise and four.” Are not these stories very different, and must not one of them be false?—It is a fact not generally known, that Captain Berenger lived in Lambeth, within about fifty yards of the

coach-stand, where Crane took up the gentleman; and the fact, I dare say, was, that Crane might suppose, the coincidence in point of time and place being so nearly exact, that the gentleman he drove was the man. There was offered, in a large placard, 50*l.* for such information as would lead to a discovery of the pretended Du Bourgh, and 250*l.* in case of conviction; and, as Crane was not upon oath, he might have persuaded himself, that *calours were deceiving*, and that a Dartford post chaise had really put down the gentleman that he took up.—It has been stated by these men, that the gentleman in question had a large red nose and blotches on his face. It is useless to multiply affidavits, or, we could prove, upon oath, that Captain Berenger had no blotches, had a pale face, and was uncommonly marked with the small pox.—At any rate, we have proof positive; we have the oaths of three persons, that only one person, at all answering to the description, was at Lord Cochrane's on the 21st of February, and that that person was dressed in a *grey* great coat and a *green* under coat; and, as the Dartford post-boy says, that Du Bourgh was dressed in a *brown* great coat and a *red* under coat, it could not be this man; it could not be the Hoaxer, who went to Lord Cochrane's; and, therefore, this first assertion is proved to be false.—It was shewn, in the last Register, that if he was the Hoaxer, his going thither amounted to very nearly proof of my Lord Cochrane's innocence; but, it is now clear, that he was not the hoaxer, unless Shilling and Crane have both declared falsely as to his dress; and, if their assertions be false, what is there left, whereon to rest this most important of all the circumstances?—But, since writing the above, real evidence has come forward which gives the coup-de-grace to this pretended evidence of *Mr. Crane*, the hackney-coachman, and which, indeed, sets this point at rest for ever, if it be possible for the injured parties to get the better of their indignant feelings at the conduct of this Sub-Committee.—*William Smith* and *Mary his Wife*, servants of Capt. Berenger, and living in the house with him at Lambeth, near the Marsh Gate (see Nos. XII. and XIII.), have voluntarily made oath, as the reader will see, that their Master was at home on Sunday, the 20th of February (the day before the hoax); that he slept at home that night as usual; that he went out in the morning of Monday, the 21st of February; that he returned home about

noon in a *black coat*; and that his *grey great-coat* and his *green under-coat* he brought home in a bundle.—Where are now the *colours* of Mr. Crane and the Sub-Committee? It is now *proved* upon oath, that Capt. Berenger was *not* the *hoaxer*; it was before proved upon oath that *no other* such person went to Lord Cochrane's house on the day of the hoax; and, therefore, this difficult negative is completely proved: to wit, that the *hoaxer* did *not* go to the house of Lord Cochrane; and, if he had so gone, it was before shown, that human nature must have undergone a complete revolution in order to have made it probable that his lordship had a hand in the hoax.

—Do the Sub-Committee want any thing *more*? Perhaps not; but they shall have it.—This Sub-Committee complain, in their report, “of the great *difficultly* and *delay*, which they have experienced in obtaining *information*.”

In the first place, they never sent to any one of the accused gentlemen to ask an explanation at their hands, though the latter instructed their Brokers to inform the Sub-Committee that they were ready to give them every information in their power, and though it is a well-known principle of common justice, never to condemn any one unheard. A different principle suited these gentlemen.—But, why did they not go to the servants, or to the house, of Captain Berenger? Nay, (and the abused public will hear it with indignation) these servants, *of their own accord*, and from their attachment to their master, went *last Saturday* to Union Hall, in order to make the affidavits now inserted here. They showed them to the officers there; but no magistrate being at hand the making of the affidavits was delayed.—Will the public believe, that this vigilant Sub-Committee, with Mr. Sayers at their elbow, *never heard of this*?—Moreover, on the 19th of March, *William Smith*, the servant of Captain Berenger, wrote a letter to *Lord Yarmouth*, as Commanding Officer of the Captain's corps, stating nearly what is stated in his affidavit, to which letter, he says, he received no answer. This letter does Smith very great honour, and will not, I hope, fail to insure him a reward for fidelity, so rarely to be met with, not only in his, but in any rank of life.

II.—*That Lord Cochrane went home, immediately, to the officer, upon receiving a note from him.*

III.—*That Lord Cochrane was at Mr.*

Fearn's, the Broker's, office, in the City, along with the two other gentlemen, at ten o'clock, on the morning of the Hoax.

These two assertions being so closely connected as to proof and disproof, I shall take them together.—Some weight has been given to the circumstance, that, when the suspected *hoaxer* arrived at the house of Lord Cochrane, the latter's servant *knew, at once, where to go after him, with the officer's note, and find him.* His Lordship has before stated, on his oath, that he was at Mr. King's manufactory, where some work was executing for him, in the completion of which he was very anxious; and that he was in the *daily* habit of going to Mr. King's. Mr. King's affidavit [No. V.] is subjoined, to prove, that his Lordship was at his manufactory, when the servant came to him with the officer's note; and this also proves, that that part of the evidence, or mis-named evidence, published by the Sub-Committee, which states, as from the lips of Mr. Fearn, that Lord Cochrane went to Mr. Fearn's office, in the city, along with Mr. Cochrane Johnstone and Mr. Butt, in the morning of the hoax, is untrue.—The public will perceive, that these assertions, published under the name and guise of “*evidence*,” by the Sub-Committee, exhibit circumstances calculated to *corroborate* and confirm the first main circumstances.—The plan, as they would have us believe, having been previously laid, an immense quantity of stock having been purchased on the *Saturday*, the planners were, *all together*, and all ready to *set to work*, on the Monday morning, at ten o'clock.—Now, to prove how false and how base this insinuation was, I have first shown, from the affidavit of Mr. King, that Lord Cochrane went to his manufactory, and not to the city; and the affidavit of *William Adams* (No. XI.) will show, that he, being driving the three gentlemen, on that morning, in his hackney coach, put my Lord Cochrane down at Mr. King's. His affidavit further shows, that, he had, for *eight days preceding the 21st* (Sunday excepted) been engaged to take up Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, at his house in Cumberland-street, and to drive him to the Royal Exchange, *at the same hour of the day, as on the 21st.*—So that, away goes, at once, all the base innuendoes built upon this circumstance of the gentlemen being in the city early in the morning of the 21st. Away goes this circumstance, so heavily dwelt upon as corroborative of the circumstance out of which the first suspicion arose.

Mr. Cochrane Johnstone and Mr. Butt were in the city no earlier on the 21st than on any former days; and the insinuation that they were so is thus completely exposed to the execration that it merits.—It is, I am aware, wholly unnecessary; but, here is (No. X.) an affidavit of Mr. Berry, proving, that, for a long while, it was the constant practice of Mr. Cochrane Johnstone and Mr. Butt to be in the city at nine or ten o'clock in the morning.

IV. *That immediately after the 21st February, one of Lord Cochrane's servants was turned away, and another sent into the country.*—I, last week, showed the absurdity of building a charge upon assertions like these, at the same time, declaring my belief that they were false.—I am now going to prove the falsehood of them in the sense in which they were evidently meant; and to show how malicious they are is wholly unnecessary.—In the evidence of the Sub-Committee, it is represented to have been stated by Sayers, the Police officer, that he had “ascertained, “that the man-servant of Lord Cochrane “had been turned off, and another hired, “and that the servant who let in the pretended Du Bourgh had been sent into the “country.” From the affidavit of Isaac Davis, who was the servant said to have been turned off, it appears, that he went away in consequence of a regular month's warning, which was given him when his master was appointed to a ship. From the affidavit of Thomas Dewman it appears, that he was hired by Lord Cochrane expressly for the purpose of going into the country, to supply the place of his Lordship's Captain's Steward, who was living at a residence of his Lordship in the country; and, the fact is, that he did so go, and that the Steward immediately came up to town, a few days before Lord Cochrane set off to join his ship at Chatham. Though, therefore, here really were one man discharged, and another sent into the country, what shall we say of the Sub-Committee's representation, by the means of Sayers, whence it must, as published by the Sub-Committee in all the news-papers, evidently be inferred, that the two servants were put out of the way with a view of getting rid of their evidence. The evidence of both is now offered to the public by him who had been, by insinuation, accused of a wish to smother all evidence relating to these transactions.—Of the veracity of this, Sayers, or, at least, of the veracity of what has been published under his name

by the Sub-Committee, the following is a tolerably good specimen.—This man is stated to have said, that he had ascertained, that Lord Cochrane, his brother, and “three or four more men, lived in the “house.”—Every one must see, that this description of his Lordship's house is calculated to produce an impression, that he kept a sort of house of ill-fame. The deponents, Thomas Dewman, Isaac Davis, and Mary Turpin, all positively swear, as will be seen by their affidavits, that no man whatever lived in the house, except his Lordship and his servants. Thus, there are three oaths, proving, that what Sayers (as the Sub-Committee say) had ascertained to be true, was false, and utterly destitute of the smallest colour of truth. The public will, it is imagined, want little more to give them a correct notion of the nature of that evidence, as it is called, to which the Sub-Committee have dared to give such extensive circulation.—Of the means, which have been resorted to, in order to obtain evidence, on this subject, the public will be able to form an idea from the second affidavit of Mary Turpin (No. IV.), whence it will be seen, that she was inveigled out of her master's house, and had money tendered to her, in the most artful manner, by persons unknown to her, if she would give them information. The scheme did not succeed, and, as it happened, it would have been of no consequence if it had; but, the attempt, in this instance, serves as a criterion whereby to judge of the whole series of acts perpetrated against the character of Lord Cochrane and the other two gentlemen, whose names have been, in so many ways, associated with his.

V. *That the GOLD NAPOLEONS, expended by the Hoaxer on the road, was purchased by LORD COCHRANE at Binns and Co's. by the means of a draft on his lordship's banker.*—This assertion was made in a paragraph in the Morning Chronicle news-paper, of the 7th of March.—This was, to be sure, an assertion, the boldness of which was calculated to be decisive with persons, who did not reflect, that, unless the sellers of the Napoleons had taken the precaution to put a private mark upon them, the fact was impossible to be ascertained. But, here is subjoined an affidavit of Mr. Thomas, (No. V.) the Successor to Messrs. Binns and Co. (whose name, as before observed, only remains in the house), denying the fact, in the most positive manner, and in the clearest and most compre-

hensive terms; for, Mr. Thomas swears, that he not only never sold any foreign coin to Lord Cochrane, but also, that he never, in his life, had any transaction with his lordship, and never received any draft, to which his lordship's name was affixed.

—What ground, what colour, could there have been, then, for this scandalous assertion in the Morning Chronicle? It is clear, that the assertion was not only *false*, but that there was not the smallest colour for it; that there was no circumstance, no possible circumstance, whereon to build an *erroneous* conclusion. So that the whole story must have been absolutely an *invention*. With *whom* such an invention could originate, and from what sort of *motive* and for what *purpose*, the public will be at no loss to judge, when they are informed, that, in the very same paper, in which this paragraph appeared, and of a date only two days later, there appeared an advertisement, addressed to the Electors of the City of Westminster (for which it is well known, that Lord Cochrane is *one of the Members of Parliament*), requesting them to suspend their choice of a new member, as a man of *real honour and purity* was ready to offer himself to them on the *expected vacancy*.

VI. *That the bank-notes, expended by the Hoaxer, on the road, were obtained by Mr. Butt, at a banker's in the city on Saturday the 19th of February.*—It is necessary to observe, here, in the first place, that, from the "*evidence*" of the Sub-Committee, any one, ignorant of the real fact, would, at once, conclude, that Mr. Butt was a mere *agent* employed by and in the pay of Lord Cochrane; a conclusion tending to what appears to have been the main object in view. Whereas the fact is, that Mr. Butt, so far from being an agent of Lord Cochrane, or of any body else, was a principal, giving his directions to his brokers on his own account, embarking his own capital, and receiving his own profits or paying his own losses. —Now, as to his having had in his possession, the small notes expended on the road by the Hoaxer, there is no *proof* whatever of the fact. The young man, named *Thomas Christmas*, Mr. Fearn's clerk, is said to have said, that he did change some larger notes for small notes for Mr. Butt. What he is *said* to have said amounts to nothing at all; but, his *affidavit* is subjoined (No. VIII); and I must press upon the reader, that justice to the young man and to the parties accused demand that this affidavit should be read, and compared with what the Sub-Com-

mittee have published as *his evidence*. Any thing more shameful than this treatment of that young man, this misrepresentation of him before the public, I have seldom seen.

—If it had been *fully proved*, instead of there being *not the shadow of proof*, of the Hoaxer's notes having been in the possession of Mr. Butt, on the Saturday preceding the hoax, who will believe, that Mr. Butt, if he had had any hand in the hoax, would have given the Hoaxer notes, so lately in the hands of a banker, where a record of them was kept, and whence they might have been so easily traced to himself?—Here is an affidavit, besides, from Mr. Butler (No. VII.) to show, that Mr. Butt, on the day alluded to, gave change out of his small notes, in the *afternoon* of the Saturday; and that this change was given in the presence of several persons and to an apparent stranger. If, therefore, Mr. Butt really had in his possession, on Saturday, any of the notes expended by the Hoaxer on the Monday, why might not the Hoaxer have come into the possession of them through *this channel*? But, I feel, that it is trifling with the public to dwell further upon such contemptible grounds of accusation.

VII. *That the office, used by Mr. Fearn, the broker, had been taken for him, without his knowledge, by Lord and Mr. Cochrane Johnstone.*—

VIII. *That, on the afternoon of Saturday, the nineteenth of February, the three accused gentlemen purchased above a million of stock, which was all sold for them on the morning of the Hoax, that is to say, on the very next Monday, the twenty-first of February.*

These two propositions come under one and the same head of answer; and, as they are both fully answered in the statement of Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, I here close what I had to say upon the subject, with observing, that, though I have experienced great pleasure in making what I am sure will be deemed a complete defence of the three accused gentlemen against the foul attacks of their calumniators, I cannot help expressing my regret, that it should have been thought necessary to exert the powers of the mind in the crushing of a swarm of such contemptible reptiles.

MR. COCHRANE JOHNSTONE'S STATEMENT.

Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, after having, for so many years, experienced the perse-

cutions of power ; after having so long had to endure the effects of a struggle of right against might ; after having had to encounter, from certain quarters, every species of foul play, that of subornation of witnesses, or, at least, something very nearly bordering upon it, not excepted ; after having, in short, by the most persevering malevolence, been obliged to descend from those high views, to which his situation in life, and every thing belonging to his character entitled him, without presumption, to look ; after all this, he did flatter himself, that it was not too much to hope, that he would be permitted, in an humbler walk of life, to exert, for the preservation of himself and family, those powers of mind, which all the persecutions he had undergone had not been able to subdue. Even in this hope, however, he was, it appears, to meet with disappointment ; and the same unrelenting spirit ; the same mean, undermining, and viper-tongued calumny, which had pursued him as a Governor and a General, was still to haunt him in his counting-house and his walks upon the 'Change. But, in the present instance, as in every former instance, those who have thought proper unjustly to assail his character, will find, that however he himself may suffer, he, at any rate, is not so to be assailed with impunity.

It is very clear, from all the circumstances, and from every thing that has been alleged with regard to the recent Hoax, that Mr. Cochrane Johnstone has been in no respect implicated, except upon mere vague suspicion.

The person, or persons, practising the Hoax, have not been attempted to be traced to him, not even in that ridiculous way in which it has been attempted to trace one of them to another place. In short, the only two false assertions, made with respect to him (and all the assertions have been false, whether regarding him, or Lord Cochrane, or Mr. Butt) ; the only two assertions

which, when looked into, affect him, in any degree whatever, are these, that he took an office expressly for the purpose of carrying on a traffic in the Funds, and as it were to be ready prepared for the Hoax when it should take place ; and that he did this without the knowledge of Mr. Fearn, the broker, who was to occupy that office. Mr. Johnstone, in answer to this assertion, declares it to be a most unqualified falsehood ; the fact being, that the office was given up to Mr. Fearn by Mr. Butt, at the earnest solicitation of the former, and merely to oblige him. Mr. Cochrane Johnstone having no interest whatever in the premises, either as proprietor or renter.

As to the second assertion, that Mr. Cochrane Johnstone was the purchaser of Stock to a large amount, on Saturday the 19th of February, and that he had it all sold out on the morning of the 21st of February, that is to say on the morning of the Hoax ; as to this proposition, he must first observe, that it will here be necessary to embrace in his answer the cases of Lord Cochrane and Mr. Butt, as well as his own, all three of them having been asserted to have acted in precisely the same manner, as far as relates to this buying and selling. The Sub-Committee of the Stock Exchange, after having given what they called the evidence of Mr. Fearn, and of Mr. Hichens (that of Mr. Smallbone and Mr. Richardson being of a trifling nature, but precisely of the same character), after having gone, under the names of these gentlemen, into a detail of monstrous sums, conclude with a remark of their own in these words :

" From these statements it appears, that
 " *on the afternoon of Saturday, February*
 " *19, the three parties above mentioned,*
 " *may be considered as having purchased*
 " *for the next settling days, the following*
 " *sums, viz."* and then they proceed to the detail of sums, making in the whole upwards of a *Million* of Stock, the whole

of which, they add, "*was sold on the morning of February 21.*"

It is quite impossible, that the Public should not have believed, from this most daring assertion, that the whole of this Stock had been purchased upon the Saturday, and sold on the Monday; and if the Public did believe this, it was next to impossible that it should not also have believed, viewing it in connexion with the other assertions, sent forth in the pretended evidence of the same Sub-Committee; that the three parties were all privy to the Hoax, and were guilty of what was called "an infamous fraud upon the Public."

To whom, then, will that Public be disposed to apply their epithets of infamous and fraudulent, when Mr. Johnstone asserts, and declares that he is ready to prove upon the oaths of his Brokers, and those of Lord Cochrane and Mr. Butt, that not one shillings worth of Stock was purchased for any one of the three, *on Saturday the 19th of February*; and that the Sub-Committee never were told by Mr. Fearn and Mr. Hichens, that the purchase was made *on the 19th of February*; nay more, that the Sub-Committee had the accounts of these two Brokers before them at the time; when they agreed unanimously as it appeared from their Report, to send forth this abominable falsehood in print. The truth is, that, instead of the 19th of February, on which day nothing was purchased by the parties, the Stock sold by them on the 21st had been purchased by them on the 12th and 14th of February, and a mere trifle on the 18th. If these parties had been privy to the Hoax, they would of course have purchased largely on the 19th, and they would have sold on the 21st from $33\frac{1}{2}$ to 35, Premium, but instead of which, they sold at an average of $29\frac{1}{2}$, being no more than about 1 per cent. profit. It is, therefore, not reconcileable to common sense to suppose that either of

the parties could have been privy to this Hoax. It should be observed also that, if they had been privy to the Hoax, they might have sold a Million, or Millions of Stock at 34 or 35, to have purchased back again on the same day at 27 or 28, by which hundreds of thousands of pounds might have been made with as much ease as the sum of *six thousand pounds* which was the total amount of the profits of the whole three upon the transactions of that memorable day.

Mr. Johnstone thinks, that it is quite unnecessary to bring forward affidavits in support of the truth of what he has here asserted; but at the same time he has to observe, that his Brokers, Messrs. Fearn and Hichens, are both ready to prove upon their oaths the truth of every word which he has here stated, and which statement he entertains not the smallest doubt will be perfectly satisfactory to every unprejudiced mind.

Mr. Cochrane Johnstone cannot conclude without observing, that the conduct of the Sub-Committee clearly appears to him to have been highly reprehensible in almost the whole of their proceedings; that they appear studiously to have sought for grounds of charge in all quarters and corners against himself and his friends, and as studiously to have avoided a contact with every thing likely to lead them to the truth; that they appear to have been actuated, from the beginning to the end, by a spirit of partiality and malevolence; and he sincerely hopes, that it is not amongst the smallest of their misrepresentations, that they had, upon this occasion, **THE VOLUNTARY ASSISTANCE OF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT.**

No. I.—I, THOMAS DEWMAN, do swear, That I was hired by Lord Cochrane expressly for the purpose of going to the country, and that about two days before I went down to relieve his Lordship's steward,

several gentlemen called upon his Lordship, as was the case daily. And further, that to the best of my recollection and belief, on Monday the 21st day of February, a gentleman came in a hackney coach, and finding his Lordship out, desired to go in and write a note, which he did in the parlour. He asked when his Lordship had gone out, and I told him he had gone to Cumberland-street to breakfast. I came back and acquainted the gentleman that his Lordship had gone into the City, and that it was most likely he would not be back before dinner-time. He said, his business was pressing, and asked if it was possible to find him; I replied, I was not certain, but I thought I might; and I went to Mr. King's tin manufactory in Cock-lane, where I delivered the note to his Lordship. The officer who sent me to the City wore a grey regimental great coat buttoned up; I saw a green collar underneath it; he had a black silk stock or handkerchief round his neck; he was of a middle size, and rather of a dark complexion. Several gentlemen called in the morning, but this was the only one that I saw in uniform at his Lordship's house, in which no man lived (as I have seen stated by Sayer, the police officer) except his Lordship and his servants. And I further depose, that I never saw Mr. Cochrane Johnstone or Mr. Butt in his Lordship's house, at No. 13, in Green-street, from the time he entered it until the time I left London, nor any person dressed as described by Crane, the hackney-coachman. And this deponent also swears, that the above statement contains all that he knows about the matter.

THOMAS DEWMAN.

Sworn at the Mansion House, London,
this 21st day of March, 1814.
Wm. Domville, Mayor.

No. II.—I, ISAAC DAVIS, do swear, That I was in Lord Cochrane's service. That when his Lordship was appointed to a ship, I received warning to provide myself with a place; and that on the 21st day of February, and when the month's warning had expired, I was in his Lordship's house in Green-street, where several gentlemen called in the morning, one of whom was Captain Berenger. He had on a grey great coat, buttoned, and a green collar under it. I knew him, having seen him when his Lordship lived in Park-street. And I do further swear, that no man lived in his Lordship's house but his servants;

and that I did not see any man dressed, or answering the description of Crane, the hackney-coachman, at his Lordship's house on the day above-mentioned.

ISAAC DAVIS.

Sworn at the Mansion House, London,
this 21st day of March, 1814.
Wm. Domville, Mayor.

No. III.—I, MARY TURPIN, do swear, That I lived as cookmaid with Lord Cochrane, and that I saw an officer in the parlour at Lord Cochrane's house in Green-street, on Monday morning the 21st of February last, when I went into the parlour for the purpose of mending the fire, and that the said officer had on a grey great coat and a sword, and that his under coat or his great coat had a green collar to it. And that he staid in the said house (as I verily believe) until his Lordship's return. And I further swear, that no men whatever have lived in the said house with Lord Cochrane except his servants. And this is all that I know as to the above matter.

MARY TURPIN.

Sworn at the Mansion House, London,
this 21st day of March, 1814.
Wm. Domville, Mayor.

No. IV.—I, MARY TURPIN, now maid servant with Lord Cochrane, do swear, That on Friday the 18th of March instant, between the hours of one and two o'clock of the forenoon of the said day, a boy, servant to Mr. Collingwood, green grocer, in Green-street, Grosvenor-square, came to me and informed me that a Lady wanted to speak to me at his master's house. That I went thither immediately and found a Lady standing just within the street door of Mr. Collingwood's. That the said Lady told me that a Gentleman in the street wanted to speak to me. That I went to the Gentleman, who took me a few yards on to the corner of North Audley-street. That the Gentleman asked me what sort of Uniform the person wore who came to Lord Cochrane's house, about three weeks ago. That I thinking it wrong to give him any information at all, told him that I could not tell him; "Oh! yes, you can," said he, "if you choose; and if you will, I will give you Five Pounds." That the Gentleman repeated this offer five or six times. That I did not take any money from him. That he then went away with the Lady.

That the Lady stood by, within hearing of the conversation, but said nothing.

MARY TURPIN.

Sworn at Guildhall, London, 22d day of March, before me, *Wm. Domville*, Mayor.

No. V.—I, SAMUEL THOMAS, successor to Messrs. Binns and Co. swear, That I never sold, directly or indirectly, to the best of my knowledge, any foreign or other coin, as stated in the public papers, to Lord Cochrane; that I never had any transaction with his Lordship in my life, nor did I ever receive any draft to which his Lordship's name was affixed, for any purpose whatsoever. SAMUEL THOMAS, Successor to Binns and Co. No. 102, Bank-buildings, Cornhill.

Sworn in the City of London, this 19th day of March, 1814, before me, *Samuel Goodbehere*, Alderman.

No. VI.—I, WILLIAM ROBERT WALE KING, of No. 1, Cock-lane, Snow-hill, manufacturer of tin and japanned ware, do swear, That on the morning of the 21st of February, 1814 (between ten and eleven o'clock, to the best of my recollection and belief), Lord Cochrane was at my manufactory in Cock-lane aforesaid, superintending the construction of his Patent lanterns, and while he was there received a note from his man, read it, and shortly after went away. W. R. W. KING.

Sworn at the Public Office, Hatton-garden, the 21st day of March, 1814, before me, *Thomas Leach*.

No. VII.—I, CORNELIUS BERRY, of Sweeting's Alley, Cornhill, Stationer, do make oath, that Mr. Cochrane Johnstone and Mr. Butt were constantly at my shop, during the time Mr. Butt had his office there, by half past nine or ten o'clock in the morning; and I do further state on oath, having seen the Report of the Sub-Committee of the Stock-Exchange, relative to the late fraud, seeming to intimate it was a singular circumstance those Gentlemen being in the City so early as ten o'clock on the morning of the 21st of February, I think it but justice to them to come forward and declare what is herein stated by me.

CORNS. BERRY.

Sworn at the Guildhall of the City of London, this 22d day of March, 1814. *Wm. Domville*, Mayor.

No. VIII.—I, THOMAS CHRISTMAS, Clerk to Mr. Fearn, Stock-Broker, do swear, that I never, at any time, received orders from Mr. Butt, or any other person, to conceal my having been employed by him to change Bank Notes at Messrs. Bond, Pattisall, and Co.'s, or at any other place whatsoever; and that any appearance of hesitation on my part in answering the questions put to me by the Sub-Committee of the Stock Exchange arose solely from timidity at my being so suddenly and unexpectedly called upon, not being yet seventeen years of age, and but a few weeks engaged in business of any kind. That the Sub-Committee of the Stock Exchange bade me recollect my father's character, and conjured me not to tarnish his fair name, or words to that effect. That they then asked me, whether I had not been desired to conceal my having changed notes for Mr. Butt; and that I answered, without the smallest hesitation, that I never had been desired to conceal my having done so, either for him or any other person.

THOMAS CHRISTMAS.

Sworn in the City of London, this 22d day of March, 1814, before me,

Samuel Goodbehere.

No. IX.—I, WILLIAM GIBSON, having read the Report of the Committee of the Stock Exchange, relative to the late fraud, in which Report it is stated, as a circumstance of surprise, that Mr. Butt and Mr. Cochrane Johnstone were at Mr. Fearn's office in Shorter's Court, by 10 o'clock in the morning of the 21st of February; in justice to those Gentlemen I do make oath, that during the time Mr. Fearn had his office at my shop, which he had until the afternoon of the 19th February, they were very frequently there by half past nine and ten o'clock, at No. 86, Cornhill.

W. GIBSON.

Sworn at the Guildhall, London, this 22d day of March, 1814, before me,

Wm. Domville, Mayor.

No. X.—I, RICHARD BUTLER, of Cheap-side, do make oath, that I was at my Stock-Broker's, Mr. Fearn's, at No. 86, Cornhill, on the afternoon of Saturday, the 19th February, where Mr. Butt was present; that I was witness to Mr. Butt's giving change in small notes, to some person in the office, who made that request of him in exchange for a large one. And I do further swear,

that there were several persons in the office at the same time.

RICHARD BUTLER.

Sworn in the City of London, this 21st day of March, 1814, before me,
Samuel Goodbekere.

No. XI.—I, WILLIAM ADAMS, hackney coachman, do swear, that I came with my coach to the door of Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, No. 18, Great Cumberland-street, on Monday, the 21st day of February, precisely at 9 o'clock, having been engaged for eight days preceding (Sunday excepted) at the same hour of each day, to go to the Royal Exchange. That I did, upon the 21st day of February, take up two Gentlemen, besides Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, at the said hour of 9 o'clock, from his house, and that I was desired to go as usual to the Royal Exchange. That, when the carriage got to the bottom of *Snow Hill*, I put down one of the Gentlemen, who I believe was *Lord Cochrane*, and I proceeded with Mr. Cochrane Johnstone and the other Gentleman to the Royal Exchange, where I put them down. (Signed) WM. ADAMS.

Sworn at the Public Office, Hatton-Garden, the 23d day of March, 1814. (Signed) *Thomas Leach.*

No. XII.—I, WILLIAM SMITH, servant to Baron de Berenger, do swear, that my master slept at home on Sunday, the twentieth of February, one thousand eight hundred and fourteen, as I let him in about eleven o'clock at night; that he went out early next morning. As I went into his room between eight and nine o'clock, and found him gone out. I went out about nine o'clock, and did not return till three o'clock, being that day at my mother's, cleaning some pictures for her; and when I returned, I then found my master at home, and I

went to him to ask if he wanted any thing; he desired me to get him some ale and a mutton chop, which I did. I saw his grey military great-coat and his green drill dress, and a black coat, which I knew was not his, laying upon a chair in the room. He went out that day to dine, between five and six o'clock, and came home about eleven that night. He slept regularly at home all that week until Sunday the twenty-seventh, when he went away in the evening, and desired me to carry a box of clothes with him to the Angel inn, which I did, and I there left him, and have never seen him since; and this is all that I know about my master. WILLIAM SMITH.

Surrey to wit.—Sworn before me, one of His Majesty's Justices of the Peace for the said County, the 24th March, 1814. *John Pinhorn.*

No. XIII.—I, ANN SMITH, female servant to Baron De Berenger, do swear, that my master came home about twelve o'clock on Monday, the twenty-first day of February, One thousand eight hundred and fourteen, in a hackney-coach; he had on a black coat, he had a bundle with him, which, to its appearance, contained his grey military great coat and green uniform; he went out the same morning before breakfast, without my seeing him. And I do further swear, that I made his bed, and cleaned his room, as usual, on the twenty-first day of February, which had been slept in; he always slept at home regularly, until Sunday, the twenty-seventh of February; and he went away that day, and I never have seen him since.

Surry to wit. ANN SMITH.

Sworn before me, one of His Majesty's Justices of the Peace for the said County, the 24th of March, 1814,
John Pinhorn.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

BORDEAUX AND THE BOURBONS.—The fabricators of political entertainments have lately got up another melo-drama for the amusement of their credulous dupes, whose appetites for lies seem to keep pace with the inventive genius of their interested guides. No sooner had the farce of the "march to Paris" run its hour, than the interlude of "Orange Boven" was brought forward with all the parade calculated to attract the notice of the gaping crowd; and when the versatile character of the multitude rendered it necessary to produce a change of performances, they were again amused by a tragi-comedy, in which a most glorious and splendid victory over the common enemy was introduced, and the benefits to be expected from it, delineated in the most fascinating colours. But even this alluring spectacle has lost its effect, and once more the managers have been driven to their shifts, in order to secure the hold which they have obtained in the minds of a credulous, and, in many cases, a too liberal and generous people. If the Allies have failed in their frequent attempts to reach the French capital, and to put an end to the dynasty of Napoleon; if the Dutch have refused to draw the sword against this scourge of their nation; and if 400,000 veteran troops, who are said to be at this moment in the heart of France, fighting against Bonaparte, have been unable to make any impression upon his raw undisciplined columns, it appears, notwithstanding the notoriety of these facts, that the mighty task of restoring the Bourbons; of giving the law to 30 millions of people; and of dethroning the sovereign of their choice, is to be effected by 15,000 British soldiers, who, without molestation, have been permitted to enter Bordeaux, a city which, when compared with the whole extent of the French empire, scarcely bears the proportion of one to a hundred. It is an insignificant force of this description, and the entrance of one of the Bourbons into a paltry town like this, which we are

gravely told is to fix the destinies of a nation like France: it is to this insulated corner we are desired to look for the emancipation of Europe; for the deliverance of the continent from the "iron grasp" of him who has become the "terror and the desolator of the whole earth." Before, however, we give implicit credit to a story so incredible, let us examine the nature of the intelligence which has given rise to this foolish expectation, and see whether or not it warrants the inference drawn from it by those who conduct our public press, and who have been most indefatigable of late in their endeavours to persuade the country, that Ministers had *secretly* pledged themselves to support the Bourbons; that there would be no peace with Bonaparte; and that, of course, we had the very pleasing prospect before us, not only of a counter-revolution in France, and the consequent slaughter of millions of our fellow-creatures, but of another twenty years' war, as if that which is gone by had not already burdened us with an unsupportable load of taxes, and accumulated for our posterity the payment of a debt, which must make them all their lives curse the authors of their calamities, and from which they never can escape but by a national bankruptcy.—The first notice given of the proceedings at Bordeaux was in the *Courier* of the 21st ult. In that servile paper it was said, "that Sir R. Hill entered Bordeaux without the slightest resistance on the part of the Inhabitants, who received the British troops as friends and deliverers, expressing at the same time a hope that no peace would be made with Bonaparte."—Next day we were told, in a Government bulletin, *not* that Sir R. Hill had entered the place, but that this business had been assigned to Marshal Beresford. "The inhabitants (added the *Courier*) came out seven miles to welcome the British hero and his gallant army; acclamations rent the air; they hailed them as their deliverers; hatred of the tyrant was the universal feeling; and they hoisted the Bourbon colours; they displayed the

white cockade; they called out for the Duke of Angouleme." Then came an *Extraordinary Gazette*, and the firing of the Park and Tower guns, to announce to the good people of London the *happy* intelligence. Were I to say all that I think as to the manner in which it was thought proper to frame this *Extraordinary Gazette*, I know I would soon hear of this from a quarter, which would probably make me repent of my temerity. But though I am restrained in my remarks upon it, I am not prevented laying it before the reader, nor can he be hindered forming his own opinion upon the *morceau* that has been given to the public, instead of the *entire* letter which it is admitted was received from Marshal Beresford.

"*Aire, March 14, 1814.*—I inclose Marshal Sir William Beresford's private letter to me, written after his arrival at Bordeaux, from which you will see that the Mayor and people of the town have adopted the white cockade, and declared for the house of Bourbon."

"Marshal Sir W. Beresford's private letter, to which Lord Wellington's dispatch refers, is dated Bordeaux, 12th March, 1814.—It states, in substance, that he entered the city on that day; that he was met a short distance from the town, by the civil authorities and population of the place, and was received in the city with every demonstration of joy.—The magistrates and the city guards took off the eagles and other badges, and spontaneously substituted the white cockade, which had been adopted universally by the people of Bordeaux.—Eighty-four pieces of cannon were found in the city; and an hundred boxes of concealed arms had been produced already."

The *Courier* lately told us, that the dispatches received from our foreign agents were *uniformly* laid before the public in the *exact form and shape* in which they are received. How comes it, then, that a letter of such magnitude as that which announced the rising of the people of France against "the usurper," and their spontaneous declaration in favour of the Bourbons, should not have been published at full length? How is it that we have been deprived of the *felicity* which the perusal of so precious, so interesting, so valuable a document must have afforded to every friend of social order and unlimited monarchy? I leave it to others, more known than I am, to answer these questions; for, in fact, the newspapers have dealt so much of late in garbled quotations and garbled extracts, that I have

found it a very difficult task to distinguish what was false from what was genuine. But, taking the whole of the above statement to be true; admitting that the people of Bordeaux really received the British troops as friends; expressed a hope that no peace would be made with Bonaparte; went seven miles to welcome Marshal Beresford as their deliverer; rent the air with their acclamations; hoisted the Bourbon colours; and displayed the white cockade. Supposing, I say, this to be no exaggeration of the state of the public mind in Bordeaux, what must be our opinion of a people who could, with these sentiments in favour of the former dynasty, submit so long as they have done to the tyranny and oppressions of Bonaparte? nay, not only submit to his exorbitant impositions, but actually furnish him with the means of perpetuating their own slavery. We must either believe them to be the most contemptible and servile wretches on earth, or we must withhold our assent to the representations which have been given of their warm attachment to the Bourbons. We cannot safely question the latter statement, because we have the authority of Government for believing it. We must, therefore, adopt the former; we must believe that the inhabitants of Bordeaux, when they took the oath of allegiance to Bonaparte, swore against their own consciences, and that their whole conduct; all that they have said; all that they have done in support of Napoleon's government, for these ten years past, has been nothing else but reiterated perjury and hypocritical adulation. If this be the case, and who can doubt it after reading the *Courier*, what reliance are we to have upon the declarations of such a people? Where is the rule, where the criterion, by which we can determine that the whole inhabitants of a place, who have been uttering nothing but lies for so long a period, are *now* telling us the truth? are now sincere in their professions?—Were it not that I might be called to account for questioning the authority of an official statement, I might be disposed to think that some mistake had inadvertently crept into our Gazette. I might, perhaps, contend, that it was more consistent with human nature to suppose, that the people of Bordeaux were on this occasion acting a part more consistent with their own safety, and their own interest, than with their loyalty to the house of Bourbon. They could not be ignorant, if an invading army entered their city as conquerors, that they would be subjected to severe impossi-

tions; but if invited to come, that both their persons and property might be respected. Accordingly, when it was first reported that a deputation had been sent from Bordeaux to welcome the approach of our army, it was distinctly stated, that this was "under a stipulation that no injury should be done to the inhabitants." By thus seeming to acquiesce in the occupation of the place, they were actuated by a very natural and judicious policy. Had they done otherwise, and offered resistance; they could not calculate on any thing but destruction, as they had not troops sufficient to oppose the invaders. But there is another view to be taken of the matter, which appears to me of some importance. Are we altogether certain that the invitation given to Lord Wellington by the inhabitants of Bordeaux, was not the result of a previous project of Marshal Soult to ensnare his Lordship; to place him in a situation where he could not defend himself, as at Torres Vedras, against a superior army; and thus compel him to seek for safety in his shipping? This, at least, has the appearance of probability; otherwise it is not easy to account for Soult leaving the road entirely open for our troops, when he must have known (if it be true) that the inhabitants of Bordeaux were unanimous in their hostility to his master, and decidedly attached to the Bourbons. Besides, we find that Napoleon entertains no fears as to our army in that quarter, nor of any attempts which can be made to give importance to the cause of his rival. He withdrew part of Soult's army to support his operations in a distant part of the empire, though he knew full well that the consequence would be the immediate advance of the British army, and that there was a member of the house of Bourbon with Lord Wellington. Considering the active police established in France, and particularly the late energetic measures taken to counteract all attempts at counter-revolution, it is scarcely credible that Napoleon could be ignorant of the state of the public mind at Bordeaux; and if it is such as has been represented, it is not easy to persuade one's self that he would have neglected all those precautions which prudence dictated to be necessary, for the purpose of counteracting the mischief which he knew would undoubtedly follow. I may be wrong in supposing that an understanding subsists between Soult and the people of Bordeaux; but when I consider the above circumstances, and also recollect that the inhabitants of that place, as well as of every other

city in France, so very lately evinced their devotion and attachment to Bonaparte by enabling him to recover his fallen fortunes, I am inclined to believe, that the cry which has been raised about the hoisting of the Bourbon standard in the South of France, will turn out like the clamour of Orange Boven, which, whether the Dutch have derived any benefit from it or not, has had no other effect here but to raise the price of many articles of the first necessity far above their real value. But it has been attempted by the conductors of the vile press of this country, not only to persuade the public, that the people of Bordeaux have proved themselves to be the infamous persons above described, but that "the whole of the South of France is in a state of insurrection against Bonaparte." They have even gone so far as to assert, that the British government have given their aid, their countenance, and their support, to the royalists who are now in France, and in the train of the Bourbons. Had a statement so unqualified as this appeared in any other journal than the *Courier*, it would have merited silent contempt. But appearing, as it has done, in a journal claiming the character of being the organ of government, and put forth with all the solemnity of an official statement, it ought not to be allowed to pass unnoticed. A pretended news-paper, said to have been printed and published at Bordeaux "by order," without mentioning by whom, or under what authority this order was given, has been referred to as evidence of the fact. But it will easily be seen from the nature of the language used by the *Courier*, that the writer of this journal intended it to be believed, that our government actually participated in the measures adopted by the partisans of the Bourbons, to restore Louis XVIII. to the throne of France. The following is the article to which I allude:—"These documents (says the *Courier*), supposing, which we see no reason to doubt, that the Bordeaux paper has given a faithful report of Lord Wellington's and Marshal Beresford's assurances, prove that the British Government have determined to afford their powerful support to the legitimate cause, to the rights of Louis XVIII. as King of France. We entered Bordeaux as a city acknowledging Louis XVIII.; we entered it as a city belonging to an ally. Our General caused this to be distinctly understood. He sanctioned the conviction in the minds of the people that we treated the Bourbon cause as our own. The sacred

flame spreads, under the belief that it is *nourished and cherished by this great nation*. Having broken the power of usurpation in Portugal and Spain, *we have entered France, and taking a Prince of the legitimate family in our hands, he has proclaimed his object to be, supported by us, the overthrow of the usurpation of Bonaparte and the restoration of Louis XVIII. Lord Wellington and Marshal Beresford have committed their Government, and it is impossible to suppose that they would have committed it without being authorised*. The knowledge of this will spread with rapidity from the South to every other part of France, and sure we are that it will be a town of strength to the good cause. The principle is now fairly afloat: it has room to act, and we shall be surprised indeed if its progress be not as rapid as the most sanguine friends to the cause could wish. Guyenne is the most populous province, we believe, in France. Guyenne, Gascony, and Bearn, have declared themselves. Poitou and Saintonge are said to have manifested the same disposition, and we cannot permit ourselves to doubt that Brittany will be eager to throw off the accursed yoke. *The proper steps have been taken to make the events that have taken place on the banks of the Garonne, known throughout France*. Above all, the tranquillizing assurance, that no change is intended in the state of property, an assurance which removes one of the main props of the Usurper's authority, is likely to have the most beneficial effect. Under all these circumstances, so full of hope and promise to the good cause, a cause in which are involved the real repose and happiness of the world, we cannot suppose that any of the Allies will longer entertain the idea of making peace with Bonaparte. Indeed he is not now Master of France; he cannot give security for the fulfilment of the terms of the treaty. He might be deprived of the sovereign authority the very week after this treaty had been signed with him."—After perusing the above statement, will any one for a moment doubt that our government had long ago made the cause of the Bourbons the cause of Britain,—and had determined to prosecute the war until they had overturned the throne of Napoleon? "The British government have determined to afford their powerful support to the legitimate cause, to the rights of Louis XVIII. as King of France."—"Lord Wellington and Marshal Beresford have committed their government, and it is impossible to

suppose that they would have committed it without being authorized."—Certainly not. If they were authorized to pledge the assistance of our government, they did right to commit it. They could not with propriety have done otherwise. But then how are we to reconcile this pledge, with the repeated professions of ministers for these last ten years, that they had no intention of intermeddling with the internal government of France? How account for their recognition of the title of Bonaparte, by sending Lord Castlereagh to enter into negotiations with his minister, by acknowledging his title of "Emperor of the French" in our public parliamentary debates, and in a variety of other instances?—How, I say, can we reconcile this marked and unequivocal sanction which our government has given to Napoleon's claim to the crown of France, with what the *Courier* now tells us has all along been the secret and hidden intentions of ministers? Either the *Courier* deceives the public (and this is nothing uncommon) as to the views of government, or this country is acting a part the most disgraceful imaginable, and which must render it an object of contempt among all other nations. If the former is the case, then ought the author of these lies to suffer the punishment which his conduct merits. If there is such a thing as a *libel* upon a government, surely the individual who attributes to its actions that which is manifestly infamous, ought rather to be made to feel the weight of an *ex-officio* information, than he who, perhaps inadvertently, has told too much of the truth.—In a subsequent *Courier*, something appeared like a *retraction* of what it had previously advanced respecting the alleged countenance given by our government to the Bourbons.—The *Times* newspaper also, which carries its viperation even farther against the French Emperor than its brother in iniquity, would fain recal all that it advanced upon the subject. It even gives the lie direct to the *Courier*, when speaking of the assurance said to have been given by Lord Wellington and Marshal Beresford to the partisans of the Bourbons. "No such occurrence (say the *Times*) took place in the present instance; and, indeed, if it had, the government would still have been at perfect liberty to disavow the unauthorized acts of its officers." But the *Courier*, feeling indignant at this treatment, and evidently repenting its former concessions, now thinks proper to reiterate the original statement in the following terms:—"It

is asked, do Ministers 'think it necessary to justify themselves from the charge of countenancing the Bourbons in the South?' *To be sure they do not*: war justifies us in doing what we can to annoy our enemy. Our orders to our Naval Commanders are to sink, burn and destroy. By land we must distress the enemy as much as we can; and even if we had no attachment to the Bourbons as the lawful family, still we should be justified in *countenancing* them, or any other party that was against Bonaparte." — I am willing, for once, to give the *Courier* writer credit for what he says about giving his support to any party that declares against Bonaparte; for I verily believe, if he thought he could form a league with the Devil to overthrow Napoleon, he would put his name to the contract to-morrow. But I am not disposed to assent so readily to what he says respecting the countenance given by ministers to the Bourbons. It is true, our commanders have a right to annoy the enemy's forces by land and by sea; but this is a very different matter from giving our support to a party, who meditate the subversion of the government, established by the people with whom we are at war. In a recent proclamation of Marshal Soult, he accused my Lord Wellington, though I would fain hope unjustly, of exciting the French to *civil war*, — to *revolt* and to *sedition*. — According to the *Courier* doctrine, this would be *justifiable*. Yet how often has this writer affected to repel the charge, with indignation, when brought against the Allies by Bonaparte, whom alone he accuses of meditating the overthrow of other States, and in whom only he considers this to be a crime. It is unnecessary to multiply words to show, what has been so often demonstrated, that no country whatever has a right to dictate the law to another, even in any circumstances; much less when the people whom it is attempted to controul, hold an elevated rank in the scale of nations. In the present instance, and supposing all that the *Courier* has told us about the Bourbons to be true, it is clear that this country has interfered without the concurrence of our Allies. I do not see that Alexander has declared himself explicitly on the subject, but there now remains no doubt as to the sentiments of Austria, and even the Crown Prince of Sweden, if his interference is to be considered of any importance, has actually *prohibited*, by a formal edict, the wearing of the white cockade in those parts of the Netherlands belonging to the French

Empire, through which he has passed. How then we, in this country, can think ourselves capable of bringing about a counter-revolution; how, single handed, we can calculate upon restoring the throne of the Bourbons, appears to me to be one of the silliest notions that ever entered the heads of any people. Even with the forces of nearly all Europe in our pay, and the command of means almost unlimited in their extent, we have not been able, after a war of more than twenty years, to make any sensible impression upon France. She has no doubt been frequently brought to a very low state, much lower than she is at present; but the greatness of her difficulties, her repeated disasters and defeats, have only served as a stimulus to her energies, and, in the end, to place her on a more elevated station than the one she previously occupied. If, therefore, she has already baffled all the attempts of the former coalitions; if, when her government was in the hands of feeble administrators, and her armies frequently betrayed by the treachery of her generals, she triumphed over all her foes; if when the South of France was almost entirely overrun by the adherents of the Bourbons, and the recollection of that unfortunate family yet alive in the minds of thousands, she was able to avert the storm that threatened her ruin; how much more must she be capable of extricating herself now when her affairs are in the hands of a chief who knows how to govern and how to conquer; who, in all circumstances, appears to possess the full confidence of his subjects; who has established a code of laws in France, calculated, in a very superior degree, to promote their happiness; and who has given to persons and to property a greater security than was enjoyed at any former period in that country. It is idle, it is ridiculous to say, that what has passed at Bordeaux affords evidence, that the whole people of France, or even a small portion of them, are prepared for a counter-revolution; because it is quite obvious, even supposing a fair representation to have been given of the business, that the defeat of Soult, which rendered the approach of Lord Wellington's immense army to Bordeaux almost certain, was sufficient of itself to produce an effect favourable to the Bourbons, whose cause care had been *previously* taken to make the inhabitants believe his Lordship had espoused, and whose misfortunes, he was about to avenge. Restore *Bordeaux* to its former situation, by removing our army to

a distance, and thus banishing from the minds of the people all fear of punishment in their persons or property, and it will then be seen how they will act. It may then be said, with some appearance of truth, but not till then, that the sentiments which they avow, are the genuine and spontaneous effusions of a free people.

FRENCH SUFFERERS AND THE QUAKERS.

"He that hasteth to be rich hath an evil eye."
Prov. c. xxviii, v. 22.

Sir,—You have made some very judicious and sensible remarks on the Quakers making so prominent a part in the list of subscribers to relieve the Germans; and you seem to think their principles would lead them to do the same for our enemies, the French; for that the latter are in the same situation as the former, you have proved by documents from the *Moniteur*, entitled surely to as much respect as the letters published by Ackermann, the printer and caricaturist. I am afraid, however, that upon due inquiry and observation, you will find the Quaker society as degenerated as the rest of us, and that they are guided by a few men, whose wealth having brought them into connexion with Government, they are eager on all occasions to evince their *loyalty*, or, in other words, their attachment to the Powers that be. *Commerce* has been the evil on which this society has split; commerce, which, as Thomas Paine observed, "they follow with a step as steady as time, and an appetite as keen as death." The influence of this baneful pursuit I remember to have been first visible during the American war; but its rapid strides during the present war are almost incredible.—We have now Quaker bankers, Quaker merchants, and Quaker contractors: yes, Mr. Cobbett, even contractors; men, whose dress shew them to be the pillars of "our Israel," will go from their silent meetings, and contract to supply Lord Wellington's army with flour, &c. Now, if the Society allows itself, on all public matters to be guided by this description of persons, they must necessarily be widely different from what they are represented to have been in the time of Barclay and Penn.—Compare the manly and nervous address on peace of the former of these eminent men to the profligate Charles 2d, and the late nondescript address of the Quaker body to

the Prince Regent, and you will form a pretty just idea of the degeneracy of this body of Christians.—With regard to the subscription, however, it should be remarked, that the *country* Quakers are more modest than their London brethren; for they send up their remittances under one head; while the names of the latter are displayed in the daily papers, with all Pharisaical pomp; but this, I suppose, must rest with their *Secretary*, Mr. HOWARD, who seems to know the modern mode of working on the benevolent! Nay, this man has taken upon him to print the names of the Quaker subscribers in London, and to send them all over England, to excite others to imitate their example; and, perhaps, to *shame* those sensible and reflecting men, who think they can take as much care of their money, and do as much good with it as other people. The dissenters are continually brawling against the degenerate clergy; but with what face can they do it, when such a proceeding as the above is tolerated in that sect, where so much manly independence used to be found! I am afraid I shall trespass too much upon your indulgence; but I wish to ask, how it happens, that in this German subscription, the *Royal* family and nobility are quite omitted? I do not perceive one name distinguished either in the political or literary world. Our ministers, also, do not come forward. Have no applications been made in these quarters? If so, I suppose they think proper to leave all the charity to the *honest* and well meaning, for such I believe are most of the subscribers, and they only want discrimination to make them good and useful citizens.—I am your sincere well-wisher,

GEORGE TRUMAN.

Fimlico, March 14.

P. S.—As Mr. Secretary Howard is a Quaker, perhaps the public will be furnished with all the items of expense attending advertisements, &c. &c. &c. occasioned by the German subscription.

VANITY AND HUMANITY.

MR. COBBETT,—It will not, I believe, be disputed, that if a man gains wealth by his own ability and industry, he certainly possesses power to dispose of that wealth in any way or manner he may think proper; but if a *good name* be his object, he would take a singular method to obtain it by bestowing his bounty upon *aliens* and *foreigners*, to whom he is a perfect stranger, when, and without any cause, he neglects

his needy relatives, whom he knows to be in a state of pauperism.—In my letter to you of the 2d instant, I took notice of a Charity Sermon that was to be preached on the Sunday following at the parish church of St. Ann, Blackfriars', for the benefit of the German Sufferers. I also observed, that the worthy Rector had devoted the same pulpit, some weeks before, to the same laudable purpose, for the sole benefit of the poor of his flock. I should have mentioned also, that the Afternoon Lecturer, in both cases, took up the subject, and made some small collection. There were, therefore, two separate Sundays devoted to preaching at the same church, by the same eminent Divine, to the same congregation, and upon the same occasion,—namely, to relieve *misery and distress*, and that brought on by the same cause,—the *calamities of war*.—The suffering German is expelled from his cottage and property by a merciless enemy; the suffering Englishman by the hand of a friend, a civil officer, who, at the command of a collector, takes forcible possession of his house, to seize for the King's taxes, and the landlord sweeps the cottage for the arrears of rent. They are both deprived of the comforts of a habitation, and find themselves and families reduced to misery and want.—Point out to me, Sir, if you can, the difference in the situation of these two parties. In the estimation of some people, there must be a difference, and a great difference too (though I cannot see it), as it is a notorious fact, that the suffering Germans have four times the pity and assistance of the suffering English.—What is it that these *newly* acquired friends, the suffering Germans, have done for us, which they have not already been paid for, that entitles them so strongly to our compassionate regard? It is not yet twelve months since they stood in battle array against us, and it is not impossible that in less than six months they may again assume the same hostile position. whoever will give themselves the trouble to examine into the conduct of the Germans towards this country for the last hundred years, will easily discover that *gratitude* is not their most prominent virtue. I hear many people prate about their love of country, and I have been simple enough to imagine they meant the *people* of the same country in which they were born and brought up; but I have discovered my mistake. It is the *soil* they mean, on which they tread, and *not* the people. The people may go to the—I'll say no worse—

to the workhouse, and that is bad enough.—No, no, it is the Germans, the *beloved* Germans, who have won our hearts, and claim our solicitude, our cares, and our attentions; to such a degree, indeed, that I should not be surprised if England should be nearly deserted, as it is very natural for men to be fond of the company of those who so completely possess their esteem and affection.—But, to return to the collection made for the poor of the parish of St. Ann's. The two sermons preached on that occasion produced a collection considerably under £30; but when the sermons were preached for the benefit of the German sufferers, the hearts of the hearers were certainly softened; they were thawed either by *political* heat, or the warm sun-beams of *vanity*: it is *impossible* it could be from *humanity*. The sermon in the morning produced £93, and, if I am rightly informed, that in the afternoon raised £17.—Judge, Sir, from these facts, what little feeling there is in the hearts of Englishmen for the suffering English, and that, too, in the severest weather I ever remember, and I am not a chicken.

A FRIEND TO HUMANITY.

Blackfriars, March, 1814.

STOCK EXCHANGE MORALITY.

MR. COBBETT,—It may be customary to introduce an anonymous letter with an exordium of high-flown compliments to the Editor. This, however, I must beg leave to waive at present.—Without any personal acquaintance with yourself, your Register has for many years afforded me both pleasure and information; and, except when you have condescended to drag *obscure* individuals into a kind of fame, by laying open to the public their silly speeches or dishonest actions, I have uniformly admired your talent and your selection of subject, deeming your labours highly beneficial to humanity.—A late event, I am glad to find, has not escaped your eagle-eye, nor your still sharper pen: I do not mean any of the *former*, but the last imposition practised upon that *highly esteemed* and truly *respectable* body of men, the Stock-jobbers;—men who *never* wish to profit by false rumours!—men who, for self-defence, ought to be particularly upon their guard against the manœuvres of Jacobins, who make no scruple of asserting that the war and the national debt yield support to the Stock-jobber, and therefore wish to put an end to both.—Morality, forsooth, in the

mouths of Stock-jobbers!—It is certainly very disgusting to hear men talk of a thing they themselves neither practise nor understand.—The squeamish consciences of these gentlemen are much revolted at the late hoax practised upon them. They are out of pocket by it; they are losers; therefore they have lugged in morality.—Pray what is the foundation of the national debt? What is the cause of its increase? What is the nature of Stock-jobbing in the Alley? Which bears the highest premium, Morality or Omnium? Is it customary for the buyers to proclaim a victory before they buy? or for the vendors to boast of bad news before they sell? Do they not all endeavour to buy cheap and sell dear? Do they not all seize upon the slightest advantage either way? Do they not most eagerly make a profit of credulity? Was this fraud the *first*, the *only one* that has ever taken place? Why do they appeal to Government for present redress and future prevention? Do they not see in our public papers fraud practised, openly avowed and authorized? Of what description was the act of that Commander who obtained the secret, and *counterfeited* the cypher of the enemy? Oh! but that was a *ruse de guerre*! say these gentlemen, and therefore allowable.—Very well; since you will have it so, let the hoax be also deemed a *ruse de guerre*. Gambling is a species of warfare; the combatants in the one case thirsting for blood, in the other thirsting for money! A Cossack and a Stock-jobber are more allied than is generally imagined; although, upon reflection, we may easily discover a relation's joy, a family affection, in the excessive caresses shewn to a cousin Cossack who visited the metropolis some months ago.—Excuse my hasty scribble, but I belong to a Bible Society, and some of our members as well as myself make a practise of going our rounds regularly, to discover what green-grocer or what chandlers' shops expose their ware to sale on a sabbath-night.

Sabbath evening. SIMON PANTEGUEL.

NATIONAL REFORM.

MR. COBBETT,—As your Register has been, and is now, the great means of diffusing important political truth to our *thinking* nation, you will oblige one of your constant readers, as well as the friends of general liberty, by inserting the following plan of national reform, to support our minds under the present expensive contest

with France. The plan which I propose is more certain and stable than the Sinking Fund, and is such as no honest man can, I conceive, oppose with any show of justice. It ought to unite all parties, because it is founded on general equity, and gives equal religious rights and privileges to all sects and denominations; and, as a great excellency, will do no injury to any individual.

1st. Let every person, of whatever order, office, or description, who belongs to and receives any emolument from the established national religion, enjoy his income during his life.

2d. Let the government sell all the tithes, at the death of the incumbents, and apply the church revenues to the purpose of paying off the interest of the national debt, &c.

This is the whole of my simple plan; and, besides its political usefulness, it will serve to restore religion to its primitive simplicity, as its Founder left it. It is well known, that Christianity, before it had any union with worldly establishments, or had received any support from national emoluments, even though opposed and persecuted, made its irresistible way through the Roman empire, but when it became a national institution, it lost its essence as a spiritual religion, was changed into a corrupt, mercenary, and persecuting religion, a kingdom of this world, and an engine of the state. No person of the church of England can reasonably complain of the above plan, because they may enjoy their religion on the *same terms* as all other sects; and being the minority, they ought to consider the good of the whole, but, as being *professing Christians*, they ought to remember that *equal justice* is due to all, without favour or distinction.

A FRIEND TO JUSTICE.

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.

ON THE VICE-CHANCELLOR'S COURT, AND POWER OF THE PROCTORS.

MR. EDITOR,—In the discussion that has taken place in Oxford, in consequence of the observations on certain statutes of that University, and on the power of the Proctors, which appeared in your Register of the 26th ult. I have heard the writer taxed with a culpable omission in not stating that the sentence of the Vice-Chancellor's Court is not final; but that any person, who conceives himself aggrieved by any proceedings in that Court, has means of redress by an *appeal*.—I beg leave to say, that the

appeal is generally considered as nugatory, and so completely out of the power of a poor client, as not to be worth mentioning, and as only calculated to add insult to injury.

—Respecting the appeal, BLACKSTONE informs us, that from the sentence of the Vice-Chancellor, his deputy or assessor, “an appeal lies to delegates appointed by the Congregation, from thence to other delegates of the House of Convocation; and if all three concur in the same sentence, it is final, at least by the statutes of the University, according to the rule of the civil law. But, if there be any discordance or variation in any of the three sentences, an appeal lies, in the last resort, to judges delegates appointed by the Crown under the great seal of Chancery.”*—Now, Sir, not to insist upon the impossibility of a poor client having recourse to so tedious and so expensive a mode of seeking redress from the sentence of this Court, I shall only observe, that the names of the Vice-Chancellor, of both the Proctors, and not unfrequently of some of the Pro-Proctors,† are among the delegates of appeals both in Convocation and Congregation! I hope, then, we shall no more hear of the easy method of a poor person's obtaining redress, and of the utter impossibility of his being persecuted by the University officers.

—I hope, as the matter is now *beginning to be agitated*, that the members of the University will express their abhorrence of some late disgraceful proceedings, which are well known, and which have long been the chief topic of conversation in Oxford.

—From my long residence in the University, I have been personally acquainted with several of the Proctors, who have been men of judgment and of acknowledged benevolence, and who have discharged the duties of their office with honour and integrity. It is to be lamented, that some others have displayed a total want of proper feeling, and have behaved like tyrannical school-boys.—To produce instances of cruelty and tyranny is always an unpleasant task, and is disgusting to the reader. The cause of truth and humanity, however, requires that facts be brought forward in support of assertions.—I can bring an instance of a Pro-Proctor, who carried his assumed power to such a length as to stop every woman he met walking by herself, in the streets, in the dusk of the evening, and to demand of her who she was, whence

she came, whither she was going. This, to say the least of it, was highly inquisitorial. It must have been done to gratify an impertinent curiosity, an insatiable lust of power, or something worse. To the inhabitants of the place, who are daily subject to the effects of such abuse of power, this conduct cannot but be irritating, and must conduce to keep up that jealousy and ill-will, which have always existed between the University and city. It may, perhaps, be said, that this exertion of assumed authority did not arise from any badness of heart, but merely from the excusable desire which a young man feels to display his consequence on his first entrance into office.

—It is difficult, indeed, to restrain the expression of our pity at the weakness of that man, who can be proud of an office, which is merely ministerial, and which places him, in the eye of the law, in nearly the same situation as that of a common constable.—It must, however, be remarked, that this was not only a very foolish, but a very illegal proceeding, being totally unwarranted either by the law of the land, or by the University-charters. By the latter, the time of watch and ward is limited between nine o'clock at night and five in the morning, during which time only the University-officers have the right or power of interference in the streets with any but matriculated persons. This, however, I know to have been done with impunity. An action could not be brought against the aggressor in any other court than that of the Vice-Chancellor.—I knew a Proctor, who, at the very time when several females, whom he himself had apprehended, were confined in prison, at a most inclement season of the year, had so little sense of propriety and feeling, and so much meanness and brutality, as to exult on the success of the *cunning* plans and stratagems by which he had entrapped his victims.—To add to this unpleasant, but necessary recital, I remember a circumstance to have happened, of so unjustifiable a nature, that the very recollection of it rouses my indignation. The Proctors took the trouble of going two miles out of Oxford, late at night, and entered a cottage, where five or six girls of bad character were dancing with countrymen who lived in their neighbourhood. On finding that no gowmsmen were there, it is said, that they all demurred except one of the Pro-Proctors, who declared that his walk should not be in vain. The fact, however, was, that they took the girls to Oxford, and the Vice-Chancellor commit-

* Blackstone's Commentaries, B. iii. ch. 6.

† Each Proctor has two Masters of Arts to assist him, who are called Pro-Proctors.

ted them to the county gaol for ten days, in very cold weather.* On what legal authority, or what law of the land, or statute of the University the commitment was founded, still remains a problem, which might be solved, could the cause be brought into any other than the Vice-Chancellor's own court.—The above facts can be well attested. Do not, however, imagine, that this severity has at all improved the morality of the place. The case is quite the reverse. The money of the young men is now expended, and their time wasted in hiring carriages and horses to pursue their pleasures in the neighbouring towns and villages, and in Oxford itself seduction is very prevalent.—It must be allowed, indeed, that the Proctors are not the only persons to be blamed for these injudicious proceedings. To the Vice-Chancellor for the time being must be attributed the greater share of the blame; for it must be remembered, that no commitment can take place but by his warrant, or by that of one of the Pro-Vice-Chancellors acting for him.—If the officers of the University had common sense or common prudence, they would act with some degree of moderation; they would not insist upon the enforcement of statutes, and the exertion of privileges, which were always odious and unconstitutional, and which ill accord with the temper and spirit of the times. If, however, they are determined still to persist in these measures, contrary to the voice of justice and reason, they cannot have any cause to complain if they shall be deprived of their means of annoyance; for this business now calls for the interference of Parliament; and a petition from the inhabitants of Oxford, stating their grievances, might place them within the protection of the law of the land, and put them on a footing of equal security with the inhabitants of other places.

Oxford, March, 1814.

CAPT. CAMPBELL AND MR. MANT.—

The Proprietor of the Register has received from Capt. Campbell the following short statement, which, alter the very ample space that has been given to the subject, he has determined shall be the *last*, unless

* There was no riot or disturbance in the house. When the men who were with the girls said that they were ready to protect them from the Proctors, the girls would not suffer any interference of that sort, but said that they would go quietly with the Proctors to Oxford, which they did.

some circumstance of importance, which he cannot possibly foresee, should induce him to depart from his determination.—

“Capt. Campbell, observing from Mr. Mant’s statement, in the Political Register of the 12th of March, that Mr. Mant “has the full authority from numerous “friends, and of the greatest respectability, to proclaim, that *his veracity “stands unimpeached*,” and this after “his *only* ground of defence had been “proved to be *false* by the oath of Captain Wilson; Captain Campbell observing “this, would gladly have avoided any “thing calculated to diminish the content “which must necessarily have arisen from “the consolatory decision of *so numerous “and respectable a circle*. But, Mr. Mant, “not satisfied with having thus happily “established his *veracity*, takes occasion “again to state certain pretended facts of “accusation against Captain Campbell, “which, though they present nothing new, “are now circulated in a manner that entitles them to some attention on the part “of Capt. Campbell.—The *first* is, “an insinuation respecting 1,500 Venetian “Zeechens. It is evident, that Mr. Mant, “in the passage alluded to, wishes to cause “the public to believe, that Capt. Campbell took this sum as *a sort of bribe*.— “The truth of the matter is this. The “sum was lodged, by the merchants of “Trieste, in the hands of the English Vice- “Consul at that place, for the purpose of “purchasing a sword, or a piece of plate, “for Capt. Campbell, in return for the “protection he had, at the desire of Sir “Alexander Ball, given to certain Austrian vessels, cleared out for Tunis, but “the real destination of which was Malta. “The Vice-Consul (not a very likely channel for bribe) made Capt. Campbell acquainted with it. But he, considering “that the offer did not come from his own “countrymen, and that it was not becoming him to accept of it, refused the offer; “and the money was returned to the Merchants.—Capt. Campbell has in his “possession the receipt of the Merchants, “given to the Vice-Consul for the return of “the money to them; the certificate of the “Vice-Consul that he had returned the “money; and, what would certainly excite the indignation of all mankind, except that “numerous and respectable “body of friends, who have fully authorized Mr. Mant to publish that *his veracity “stands unimpeached*,” Captain “Campbell has in his possession a paper

“(demanded from Mr. Mant in consequence of his former insinuations), signed by Mr. Mant, and drawn up in his own hand, “declaring *most solemnly*, that “this identical sum of money, offered as “above-stated, *was actually returned by* “*Capt. Campbell's direction.*”—The “Second allegation, or rather insinuation, “is, that Capt. Campbell has left 40,000 “dollars *unaccounted for*; from which “the public are left to believe, that he may “have really embezzled that sum.—The “sum was *twenty*, instead of *forty* thousand dollars, a mistake, which Mr. “Mant's “numerous and greatly respected “able friends” will, of course, look upon “as not the smallest ground of impeachment of his *veracity*. This sum belonged “to the squadron, on account of prize-vessels. It was sent by Capt. Campbell, “by the Captain of a brig of war, to “Malta. He, on calling at Corfu, on his way to Malta, received dispatches of importance from our Minister there to convey to Lord Collingwood, then at the mouth of the Dardanelles. He, therefore, deposited the money with Mr. Forresti, our Minister, to be forwarded to “Malta by the first conveyance. But, almost immediately after, Corfu was given up by the Russians to the French, and “Mr. Forresti was obliged to quit the place in such haste, that it was left behind, where, as he has informed Capt. “Campbell, it now remains. It is only necessary to add, that Capt. Campbell, “on behalf of himself and the squadron, “holds the bond of Mr. Forresti for this “money; and, that of all the history and “all the circumstances of this transaction, “Mr. Mant is, and from the first to the “last has been, perfectly well acquainted. —But, it would, doubtless, be no difficult matter for Mr. Mant to obtain the same *respectable authority* to publish as long as he pleased, that he was, in putting forth this insinuation, actuated by the “purest motives, and by any thing rather “than *malignity*.—The *third* insinuation is, that Capt. Campbell *gave away* “four vessels, prizes to the squadron under “his command. Mr. Mant calls it an *ap-parent* giving away, and, having such a “stock of current veracity at command, “says quite enough to produce a belief “(that is to say, amongst his *numerous* “and *respectable friends*), that Captain “Campbell made over the vessels to some “one, *to be disposed of for his own private* “*advantage*; or, in other words, that he

“committed an act of most flagrant *rogue-ry*.—It is not very probable that the “squadron should have quietly submitted “to so singular a distribution of prize-money. But, the facts of the case are “these.—The English Consul at Trieste “had given papers to four Austrian vessels, “coming out of that port, which papers “the masters of those vessels looked upon “as passports, or, at least, as the means of “insuring them from capture by English “vessels of war. The King's Order in “Council of the 7th January, 1807, made “all vessels liable to capture, coming out “of any port situated, with regard to the “enemy's influence, as Trieste then was, “and bound to another port under similar “circumstances. The four vessels in question were stopped by Capt. Campbell, in “sight of the port of Trieste; but, in consideration of their having sailed under “faith of the English Consul's papers, and “of their not having attempted to escape “from him; he directed them to return “into the port: and wrote to the Consul, “requesting him not to give any such papers in future, as it was only deceiving “the masters of the vessels, and doing injury to them and the merchants. This “communication to the Consul was made “by letter, the bearer of which letter was “Mr. Mant himself, who, as a further “proof of Mr. Mant's veracity, wrote a “letter, now in Capt. Campbell's possession, giving an account of his interview “with the Consul upon the occasion.— “Capt. Campbell has no doubt of his *strict* “*right* to have considered the four vessels “as lawful prize, under the Order in “Council; but, under all the circumstances of the case, he also has no doubt, “that a Judge of the Admiralty would “have directed them to be restored. At “any rate, they were *not made prize of*; “they were *not given away*: there was no “appearance of their having been given “away; and of these facts Mr. Mant is as “well acquainted as is Capt. Campbell “himself.—Capt. Campbell is sorry to “have taken up so much room with his “statement; but, it appeared to him not “too much to request after the large space “which had been allowed to Mr. Mant, “whom Capt. Campbell will now leave to “the enjoyment of the society of that numerous and respectable circle of friends, “who have given him full authority to “publish, “*that his veracity stands un-* “*impeached.*”

THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON AND HIS ARMY.

—It is now to be hoped that those who so very lately believed in the total annihilation, the complete defeat of Bonaparte's army by Blücher, will, at least, acknowledge that they were somewhat mistaken; that, instead of the French Emperor having disgracefully fled, first to Paris, and afterwards to Normandy with only 15,000 troops, and without any chance of ever again recovering himself, he neither retreated from the scene of action, nor was worsted in the field of battle; but, on the contrary, kept possession of the ground, in spite of the superior army which was opposed to him, and was only induced to suspend his operations in the North, that he might drive back the Austrian army which had again advanced in the South. The reader will recollect, when the subject of Napoleon's military exploits was last under consideration, in the Register of the 19th, ult., at which period the people of England were rejoicing over his fall, and celebrating the event by discharges of cannon, that I did not hesitate in advancing an opinion directly opposed to that which was then almost universally received; that I frankly avowed my disbelief of the intelligence which had been promulgated; that I regarded the battle of the 9th, if any was fought on that day, as a mere partial affair; and concluded my observations with this remark, that whether "Blücher engaged the French on the 9th or not, I have no hesitation in saying, that the result of this battle, even admitting the loss to be as great as stated, will, in my opinion, have little or no effect on the grand scale of operations upon which Napoleon now appears to be acting."—The result, at least as far as things have yet gone, has shown that I was not altogether mistaken in my opinion. Dispatches having been received from Colonel Lowe, containing details of the affairs before Laon, to the 12th ult., it appears from these that, though there had been a good deal of hard fighting, during which, he says, the Allies were in part successful; yet that, at the close of the contest, Blücher remained on the heights of Laon, while the French army occupied the plains below, almost close to the walls of that place. "The fires of his bivouack (says Colonel Lowe) were apparent along a very extended line at the beginning of the night; but in the morning it was discovered he had retired."—Marshal Blücher addressed a proclamation to the French from Laon on the 13th, in which he said,

"Our armies are at present *more numerous and finer than ever*," and told them, "in order to judge of the events of the war, you have only to enquire of the inhabitants of Laon, concerning what happened on the 9th and 10th of this month, on which days the French army, *commanded by the Emperor Napoleon in person, was totally defeated* under the walls of that town: ask of them if they did not see the army fly before our victorious troops, if they have not seen the trophies of our victory, consisting of 50 pieces of cannon, of numerous caissons, and some thousand prisoners? And it was, besides, only a part of the army entrusted to my command which gained this *decisive victory*, while another part made themselves masters of St. Quentin, where they took 45 pieces of brass cannon, and while the grand army, after having on the 3d and 4th defeated near Troyes, the corps opposed to it, is advancing on the other side towards your capital."—Without stopping to enquire whether this proclamation is genuine or not, I shall subjoin the French official account of what happened on the 9th and 10th, which, perhaps, will enable us to form a more correct opinion on the subject:—"On the 9th, at day break (says the French bulletin), we reconnoitred the enemy, who had joined the Prussian corps. The position was such as to be deemed unattackable. We took a position. The Duke of Ragusa, who had slept on the 8th at Corbone, appeared at two in the afternoon at Veslud, overthrew the enemy's advanced guard, attacked the village of Althies, which was carried, and was *successful during the whole day*. At half-past six he took up a position. At seven the enemy made a dash of cavalry, one league in the rear, where the Duke of Reggio had a park of reserve. The Duke of Ragusa proceeded thither quickly, but the enemy had time to carry off 15 pieces of cannon. A great part of the personnel was saved. —On the same day General Charpentier, with his division of the young guard, carried the village of Clacy. On the next day the enemy attacked the village seven times, and were seven times *repulsed*. Gen. Charpentier lost 400 prisoners. The enemy left the avenues covered with his dead. The Emperor's head-quarters were on the 9th and 10th at Chavignon.—His Majesty, judging that it was impossible to attack the heights of Laon, fixed his head-quarters on the 11th at Soissons. The Duke of Ragusa occupied on the same day Bery au Bac."—I shall say nothing here of the

vast difference in the above two accounts as to the number of cannon lost by the French; nor shall I make any remarks upon the statement of Blücher, who asserts, that the French army was commanded by Bonaparte *in person*, though Napoleon expressly says, that his "head-quarters were on the 9th and 10th at Charignon." But if, as Marshal Blücher says, his army was *more numerous and finer than ever*, how came he to shut himself closely up in Laon, and to decline marching this fine and numerous army against the French, who were confessedly *inferior* in every respect? According to our accounts, Blücher's force amounted to 90,000 veteran troops, while the French had only 60,000 raw undisciplined conscripts. With such a superiority of force, one would have expected that the redoubted, the valiant, and the enterprising Blücher, would have carried every thing before him; would, in reality, have annihilated the unskilful, the cowardly Bonaparte, and made good his march to Paris. But no; instead of descending to the plain, and punishing the audacity of his insignificant rival, he considered it more advisable to remain snug within the walls of an impregnable fortress, and wisely preferred security and safety, in the protection afforded by the cannon which bristled on the ramparts with which he was surrounded, to vain-glory in the field of battle, of which he did not stand in need: instead of wielding the sword to destroy "the enemy of the human race," and restore enslaved Europe to its former happy condition; instead of wasting his time on the "vile caitiff," the "bastard Corsican," he manfully seized the pen, and sent forth an address to the people of France, to make it known, "that the towns and villages whose inhabitants shall dare to take up arms against our troops, or oppose our military operations, SHALL BE BURN'T, *painful* as it will be to me, to be *compelled* in this manner to *punish the innocent with the guilty*." Humane and feeling old man! No one can doubt that a vengeance so exemplary, was *painful* to you: No one will suppose, that you could be driven to the dire necessity of thus outraging your tender feelings; of lacerating your kind and benevolent heart, but by circumstances which you could neither foresee nor controul your case is indeed a hard one; but there is one source remaining, to which you can still apply for consolation, and it is this,—that "the race is not always to the swift nor the battle to the strong." Though, from the most profound

reasons, you considered it the best policy not to risk a general engagement at Laon, the moment may again arrive when you shall have an opportunity of humbling your haughty opponent, as effectually as you humbled him at Leipsic.—But while the gallant Marshal was thus endeavouring to intimidate the people of France, Bonaparte was employed in following up his successes. Learning that a division of Blücher's army had surprised and taken possession of Rheims on the 12th, the French Emperor proceeded next day in person to that city, from which he drove the Prussians, who lost "22 pieces of cannon, 5,000 prisoners, and 100 artillery and baggage waggons." Meanwhile, the grand army, as it is called, under Schwartzberg, taking advantage of the absence of Bonaparte, made a movement, in advance, towards Provins and Nangis. Immediately on receiving intelligence of these operations, Napoleon set out for the South; passed the Aube and the Seine on the 19th; and reached Arcis-sur-Aube on the morning of the 20th, the Russians and Austrians flying in all directions on hearing of his approach. The head quarters of the Allied sovereigns, which were at Arcis-sur-Aube on the 16th, were transferred, in all haste to Troyes, and thence to Bar-sur-Aube, where by the last official accounts, they took up a position on the 18th. Thus we find that Napoleon has driven the Allied armies much farther from Paris than he had done at any period since he set out to command his army. Blücher was 80 miles north, and Schwartzberg was fully 120 miles south of the French capital. The *Courier*, with its usual confidence, tells us that "another blow has been dealt by the hand of the venerable and heroic Blücher, and it should seem as if it were ordained that the humbling of the *coarse* oppressor of Prussia, was especially reserved for that high spirit which could never brook that oppression, and which remained erect amidst the prostration of his country."—"This intelligence (continues the same writer) has been confirmed by accounts received by government." But if government had received accounts of this "other blow," is it to be believed that they would not have given them to the public in one form or another?—The fact is, this is the era of *hoaxing*, and those connected with the *Courier*, who perhaps know more of the late Exchange affair, than is generally believed, wished very probably to have another slice of the Omnium before it fell below their notice.

—This sort of Stock which was lately so high as $33\frac{1}{2}$ was on Wednesday down as low as 12 per cent. In the morning it had opened at 16; but its rapid decline having been perceived, an attempt was immediately made to counteract this. —A report was industriously circulated, that the Allies had defeated Bonaparte in a general engagement, and the *Courier* stopped the press at an early hour, to announce the intelligence in the following paragraph: —“*Courier Office, Two o’Clock.*—It is reported in the City, but we have not been able to trace upon what authority, that Blucher gained a great victory over Bonaparte, in which the latter lost 25,000 men, in killed, wounded, and prisoners.”—This new attempt to impose upon the credulity of the public, was, however, soon detected, and the Omnium market closed at a premium of $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Considering that the head quarters of Bonaparte and of the Allies were little more than thirty-five miles from each other when the last accounts came away, it is very probable we may soon hear of some important results from that quarter, providing the Allies do not, as they have hitherto frequently done, decline the battle offered them by Napoleon, and seek for safety in a precipitate retreat. If a general engagement takes place, it is my opinion that it will have a very different termination from that reported by the *Courier*. But if there has been no battle, no general affair, it is difficult to say, according to the present mode of conducting the war, when it may be brought to a conclusion.

PEACE OR WAR?—The prospect of peace seems to become the more distant as the parties advance in the negotiation. I have uniformly stated, that this was not a matter which could be so soon or so easily settled as most people imagined. In the House of Commons, on Wednesday evening, the following conversation, as it appeared in the *Morning Chronicle* of Thursday, took place on this interesting subject: —“*Mr. Brand* rose for the purpose of putting two questions to the Right Honourable Gentleman (the Chancellor of the Exchequer), to answer which he hoped there would be no objection. First, whether Government had sent out, or was about to send out, a ship to convey the Duke of Berri to Bourdeaux?—and, Secondly, whether Negotiations were still carried on at Chatillon between the Ambassadors of the Allies and of the Emperor of France?

—*Mr. Vansittart* replied, that with regard to the second question, he should have thought that the Honourable Member would have been aware, that in the present situation of affairs it would not be fit to give any answer upon the subject. On the first inquiry we understood the Right Honourable Gentleman to put a negative; but the low tone of voice in which he spoke would not permit what he said to be distinctly heard in the gallery.”—The *Times* of the same day, reported the conversation as follows: —“*Mr. Brand* wished to ask the Right Honourable Gentleman opposite, if any negotiation were now carrying on with the ruler of France.—*The Chancellor of the Exchequer* (as far as we could collect) declined to answer the question, upon principles of public duty.”—It is clear, from both these statements, that the negotiations have not made that progress which the country were long ago led to expect, partly in consequence of the frequent prorogations of Parliament, and partly from the statements of the *Courier*, which has asserted, more than once, that the preliminaries were actually signed, and on their way to this country to be ratified. It is some time since it was known, that the conferences for an armistice had failed, in consequence of the terms proposed by the Allies having been considered by Bonaparte as unjust. “We were agreed (said the French Emperor) upon the points of occupation in the North and East, but the enemy wished not only to extend his line upon the Soane and the Rhone, but to inclose Savoy in it. We replied to this unjust pretension, by proposing to adopt the *status quo*, and to leave the Duke of Castiglione and Count Bubna to settle it upon the line of their advanced posts. This was rejected.” I have no doubt that the line of demarkation agreed upon in the North and East, was on the German side of the Rhine. But be this as it may, I cannot help thinking, that it was rather asking too much, for the Allies to demand, that their troops should be allowed to extend their line on the South; that they should be permitted to enter territories which they had not been able to overrun; and which, it is more than probable, if the war continues, that they never will. Nothing could be fairer, in my opinion, than to leave the generals opposed to each other in that quarter, to settle the boundary “upon the line of their advanced posts.” This was the proposal of Napoleon; but it was rejected, and with this rejection terminated all conferences for an armistice. The *Cou-*

rier has since published the following bulletin, respecting the negotiations for peace:—"We understand the Preliminaries of Peace are in substance agreed upon. France is to be reduced to her ancient boundaries—those of 1789.—But the Allies insist upon certain fortresses in *Old France being given up* to them as securities till a definitive treaty of peace.—These are, Strasbourg, Metz, Valenciennes, Lisle, Bayonne, and Perpignan.—Upon the question of the surrender of these fortresses alone, if not entirely, we understand, the signature of Preliminaries stands over.—It is said that Bonaparte is *willing to surrender some of them*; the Allies, of course, to retire to the frontiers of *Old France*."—Now, upon this statement, I would remark, that if the Allies have really gone so far as to demand of Bonaparte the possession of any of the fortresses in *Old France*, as securities till a definitive treaty, it is *impossible* they can be sincere in their professions of peace; or that Napoleon will ever listen to their terms. If he held it to be an *unjust pretension* in the Allies to wish to extend their line upon the Soane and the Rhone, which may be considered mere *frontier rivers*, how much more unjust must he consider it in them to insist on the possession of several strong holds in the *very heart* of this kingdom?—The demand is, indeed, of so arrogant a nature, that one does not know whether to treat it with contempt or with ridicule. I cannot believe that the Allies, after the declaration which they published at Frankfort, in which they sanctioned the claims of France to a greater extent of territory than she enjoyed under her ancient kings, would, so soon after this, have presumed to demand the possession of any part of old France as the guarantee of a general peace. But though I do not subscribe to this absurdity, it appears to me that terms have been proposed to Napoleon which, if not departed from, will create a rupture in the negotiation. How and where the proposal has originated, it is not for me to say; but when I consider the *high and hostile tone* which has been assumed of late in the proclamations of the Generals commanding the opposing armies, I have little doubt that it is only the sword which can put an end to the contest. Let those who think otherwise read the following extracts from a proclamation addressed to the French, by Prince Schwartzburgh, on the 15th ult.:—"We will secure your happiness at the hazard of our own lives, and peace shall not be denied to you, *although it may be de-*

layed. That we may control it, reinforcements are arriving from all quarters. Thousands have flocked to my standard from Bohemia and Hungary, and others are hastening from Belgium and from Holland, from Prussia, and from every district of Germany. Entertain, then, no fears for the result; that is obvious and certain; and in the *painful interval* be assured that no means shall be neglected for your consolation, while you remain in a state in which you *must necessarily be exposed to many of the miseries of war*."—To this I shall only add the following extracts from a proclamation of the Duke of Dalmatia (Scut), which, though dated the 10th of March, may be read as an answer to the above; and then leave the reader to form his own opinion on the subject.—"Soldiers, you are called to *new combats*: there will be *no repose for us*, whether we be the assailants or the assailed, till this hostile army, formed of such extraordinary elements, shall be annihilated, or till it shall have *evacuated the territory of the empire*, whatever be its numerical superiority, and whatever progress it may make. It does not suspect the dangers which surround it, nor the perils which await it: but time will teach this army, as well as the General who commands it, that it is not with impunity that parts of our territory are invaded; that it is not with impunity that the French honour is insulted."—"As for us, our duty is marked out: *honour and fidelity!* that is our motto. To combat to the last the enemies of our august Emperor, and of our dear France; to respect persons and property: to pity the misfortunes of those who are for a moment subjected, and to hasten the instant of their deliverance; obedience and discipline, implacable hatred to traitors, and to the enemies of the French name, interminable war to those who should attempt to divide in order to destroy us, as well as to the wretches who would desert the Imperial eagles to range themselves under any other standard.—Let us have always in our minds fifteen ages of glory, and the innumerable triumphs which have rendered our country illustrious. Let us contemplate the prodigious efforts of our great Emperor, and his signal victories, which will eternize the French name; let us be worthy of him, and then we may bequeath to our posterity, without a stain, the inheritance which we have received from our fathers. Let us be Frenchmen, and let us die with arms in our hands rather than survive our dishonour."

OCCURRENCES OF THE WAR.—The great length to which the important case of Lord Cochrane and the Hon. Cochrane Johnstone extended in the last Number of the Register, having excluded the usual notices under this head, it becomes necessary that they should be here introduced. —Marquis Wellington, before effecting the passage of the Adour, attacked the French army under Marshal Soult near Orthes, and obtained over it a signal victory: the battle was fought on the 27th of February, and was contested for sometime with great obstinacy. "The enemy (says the official dispatch) retired at first in admirable order, taking every advantage of the numerous good positions which the country afforded. The losses, however, which they sustained in the continued attacks of our troops, and the danger with which they were threatened by Lieut.-Gen. Sir Rowland Hill's movements, soon accelerated their movements, and the retreat at length became a flight, and their troops were in the utmost confusion."—No account has been published of the extent of the enemy's loss. Ours has been stated at 1,610 men killed and wounded, among which there were 14 officers killed and 104 wounded. The Portuguese lost 70 killed and 500 wounded. On the 1st of March, part of our troops passed the Adour, while Soult retired, first towards Agen, and then to Taybis, leaving the road open to Bordeaux, which was afterwards occupied by a division of our army under Marshal Beresford. Lord Wellington, however, did not cross the Adour, but remained at Aire; and, from a dispatch of his Lordship's, dated at that place on the 14th ult., it appears, that Soult had effected a junction with the army of Catalonia, commanded by Suchet, and was collecting "a considerable force in the neighbourhood of Couchez," a small town in the rear of Lord Wellington, and only a few miles from Aire. It is probable, therefore, that we may soon hear of another engagement having been fought in that direction.

Accounts from Spain mention, that a very general interest has been excited there

by the expectation of the immediate arrival of King Ferdinand, who, it is well known, was lately advised to return to his kingdom by Bonaparte. It is even said, that he reached Madrid on the 17th ult. Whatever may be the ulterior views of Napoleon in promoting this measure, it is certain that a strong persuasion exists, both in Spain and Portugal, that he calculates upon effecting our expulsion from these countries, by the restoration of the former dynasty. The following extract of a letter from Lisbon, dated the 26th February, to a gentleman in London, may give some idea of the feeling of the public mind upon this subject. I have seen the original, which never has been published:—"The news from Spain is bad to-day, as the nobles and clergy want to ratify Ferdinand's treaty with Bony; and the Cortes and people are against it. There will be some trouble in that country. The Portuguese here are very jealous of the English, in consequence of the loss of the Brazil trade, which the English have almost monopolized, and from that trade (the Brazilian) the Portuguese principally derived their revenues. Lisbon has dwindled away very much in a commercial view; the number of English merchants are diminished one half."—To show that the writer of this letter cannot be charged with jacobinism, I have subjoined the following extract:—"As I shall deviate *one point* from the line of conduct I have chalked out, I can only do it for *your* advantage, being a *patriot*—that is, before you again *censure* what *you* consider a flaw in the British administration, just take a voyage, and see the *conduct* and *management* of other countries, and, take my word, you will consider it *your greatest pride* to call yourself an *Englishman*."

NOTICE.

The next Register will be published at No. 94, Strand, where all communications and orders (post paid) are requested to be forwarded in future, addressed as usual.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

RUPTURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.—

This is an occurrence at which I am no way surprised; it is an event which I have frequently prepared the reader to expect; and when the character which this nation has assumed, the stamp which has been given it, and the consequent bent of the public mind, are taken into view, it ought to surprise nobody that the prospect before us is interminable and exterminating war. Matters have not just yet reached that crisis, from which it can be clearly inferred, that Ministers really intend giving their support to the Bourbons; though, if we believe the journals which call themselves *ministerial*, this is their secret wish.—Of this, however, we cannot doubt, that the long endurance of the war; its continuance for the greater part of the lives of the present generation; and the means which have been resorted to, to make it popular, are circumstances which have rendered the views, the feelings, the customs, nay the very fashions, of the people, completely warlike. Every thing receives its tone from the events of the war: the influence of its occurrences, is not merely exemplified in our public amusements, but it determines our modes of dress; it regulates our domestic habits. It is not confined to the Exchange, to the coffee-house, to the tavern, or to the beer-house, but it forms the topic of conversation at all our meals, and is peculiarly the theme of the chit-chat of the tea-table. Formerly, the discussion of warlike exploits, the comparative deeds of mighty warriors, the merits and the demerits of their respective operations, were held to be the province only of the aged and the experienced.—Now, such is the prevalence of the war mania; such the taste for every thing warlike, that it is no uncommon thing to hear these topics animadverted upon, with seeming judgment and zeal, by boys who appear to have just escaped from the trammels of their mammæ, or are about to enter a preparatory school. In short, the achievements of my Lord Wellington, and

other modern heroes, being talked of every where, from the nursery-room to the board of our Cabinet Ministers inclusive, it cannot be wondered at, that the young as well as the old, the child, who can scarcely lisp papa's name, and the hoary head, whose tongue falters through the infirmities of old age, should all talk of war and warlike deeds; should have their very souls, as it were, modelled according to the ideas which are generally entertained of the god of war.—We are a commercial people; it is commerce that has elevated the country to the lofty station which she now occupies, and upon which, according to the system presently pursued, she must rely for future greatness. But clear and conclusive as these propositions appear, it is equally manifest, that, though the continuance of the war has already almost annihilated commerce, and its prosecution must in future effectually retard its revival, still nothing will satisfy, nothing please, nothing gratify, this enterprising and commercial nation, but perpetual, desolating, barbarous war.—War, then, they shall have, and that to the full. Their rulers have resolved to gratify their sanguinary disposition for blood; and, notwithstanding the contest (as may be seen by any one who chooses to take the trouble of calculating) has cost Great Britain *alone* the lives of upwards of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND of her *native troops*, the ferocious and implacable advocates of a “just and necessary war,” shall again have their fill of human gore; shall yet drink the blood of their fellow-men, whom the fell fiend of war has determined to immolate at his Moloch shrine, in order to give eclat to his ensanguined and dreadful triumphs over humanity.—In the last Register I stated, that when I considered “the high and hostile tone which has been assumed, of late, in the proclamations of the Generals commanding the opposing armies, I have little doubt that it is *only the sword* which can put an end to the contest.” It was not long after writing this ere the question was determined, by the following government bulletin;—

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"*Foreign Office, April 2, 1814.*—Lord Bathurst presents his compliments to the Lord Mayor, and thinks it right to acquaint his Lordship, that dispatches have arrived this morning from Lord Viscount Castlereagh, stating, that the *Negotiations at Chatillon are at an end.*"—Upon this announcement the *Courier* remarked:—"At length all doubt upon this subject is happily removed, and the event which the whole British Empire has so ardently desired, has been officially confirmed."—Some have thought that Ministers, who had raised the expectations of the nation to so high a pitch, by sending an ambassador to Chatillon, will find it somewhat difficult to extricate themselves from blame, on account of the rupture of the negotiations. But if, as the *Courier* tells us (and who can doubt the fact), the whole British Empire ardently desired this occurrence; fervently anticipated the happy hour when it would be announced; it would be the height of absurdity to suppose, that this same ardent-minded people were capable of finding fault with a measure, which they calculated, beforehand, would bring them so much happiness. It would be ridiculous to believe, however gloomy the prospect of perpetual war, and however horrid its attendants, that men, who derived such comfort from it; who *felicitated* themselves on the enjoyments which this state of things had in reserve for them; would for one single moment, even though reflection might impel them to it, raise their voice against those who had obtained for them the desire of their hearts. No, no, we wanted war; the whole British empire *panted* for it; and it is right they should have it to their souls' content. Let us have no more grumblings, then, about the *miseries* of war; let not the man who fancies himself a friend to humanity, because he succours the starving manufacturer, reduced to want by the casualties of war, again presume to lift up his voice or employ his pen in behalf of this class of unfortunates. Do they not form a part of the population of the "whole British empire," who have "ardently desired" a continuance of the war? Why, then, should they dare to solicit pecuniary assistance, when their losses have arisen from circumstances which they so heartily approve of, and when their restoration to independence is prevented by an event which they so fervently wished for? Neither let us hear any more of the *cant* of those who lament the shedding of human blood, always consequent on a state of warfare; for

are they not also among the number of the "whole British empire" who have so "ardently desired" a rupture, which must inevitably lead to the slaughter of thousands more of our troops? Let us, then, I say, silence these would-be philanthropists upon their own ground—"You (let us tell them) have wished, you have ardently desired a perpetuation of the war; your wishes have been complied with; here are we ready to carry it on for ever; only give us money to support it; and, as long as you continue to do that, you may depend on it we shall never cry hold, never that we have enough; we shall persist in the war, till we have conquered all your enemies, real or supposed, or we shall, with you, perish in the attempt." What can be more consolatory than this? What would the friends of war wish for more? They have only to part with a little of their superfluous money, with mere dross, to make sure of the incalculable advantages which *must* follow the prosecution of the war. No matter though they come to the *bottom* of their purses before the termination of the contest. They will have the satisfaction at least, if they fail, of having made the attempt; and, we all know, that "he who risks nothing can gain nothing."—But, as I may afterwards have occasion to inquire into the causes of the rupture of the negotiations, and may probably, though one of the members of the British empire, not be so hearty in my approval of the late proceedings at Chatillon, as the *Courier* supposes all the people of England to be, I think it proper, in this stage of the business, to lay before the reader all the statements connected with it which have been put forth, either in an official or demi-official form, that, when we come to consider the matter closely, we may be prepared to judge, with some degree of accuracy, as to the merits of the pretensions of the contending parties. This is the more desirable, that the subject is likely, from its magnitude, to occasion a more interesting discussion in parliament than any thing which has occupied the attention of the House for many years. I have already inserted the *official* bulletin, announcing the rupture of the negotiations:—The *Courier*, which, we are told, is the organ of Ministers, in two days after (4th April) published the following:—"Next to the welcome intelligence of the negotiations with Bonaparte having broken off, is the fact of their having broken off in consequence of the *outrageous extravagance of his demands*. Not that the Allies need

any apology for the rupture of the negotiations; the only apology, perhaps, they need, is for having opened them. But it is of great and beneficial importance to shew that this man's ambition is unconquerable: that it yields not to circumstances and events: that his heart is alien to all peace and moderation; that he will submit to no conditions that shall so far curtail his power as to prevent him from again disturbing the repose, the security, and the prosperity of the world. As his obstinacy produced that change in his fortune which dispossessed him of all his foreign conquests, and brought his antagonists to the gates of Paris, let us hope that it will lead at length to his utter overthrow and ruin. The following, we are assured, is the substance of his demands:—1. He demanded Italy, insisting that Eugene Beauharnois should be King, a nomination that would have made him as much master of that country as he has been whilst Eugene has been acting as his Viceroy. In this demand of Italy, Venice was included; so that he was more exorbitant in his terms than he was when the treaty of Luneville was concluded, by which Venice was ceded to Austria.—2. He demanded the Line of the Rhine. The Netherlands, therefore, to remain annexed to France, and he to continue master of Antwerp and the Scheldt.—3. He did not demand that Holland should be restored to him; but he did demand what would have made the independence of that country merely nominal—he demanded Nimeguen, and part of the line of the Waal.—4. Besides the demands we have just stated, he demanded provisions or indemnities for different members of his family who would be dispossessed of territories or titles. Thus an indemnity for Joseph Bonaparte for the loss of his Kingdom of Spain; an indemnity for Jerome Bonaparte, for the loss of his Kingdom of Westphalia; for Napoleon Louis, Grand Duke of Berg and Cleves; for Eugene Beauharnois, for the sacrifice of his claim to the Grand Duchy of Frankfort, upon the demise of Charles d'Albert, Archbishop and Grand Duke of Frankfort. The nature of these indemnities and provisions we are as yet unacquainted with.—Such, we are assured, was the substance of his demand or *projet*. The Plenipotentiaries of the Allies had in the commencement of the Negotiation, delivered their *projet*, which, we understand, went to reduce France to her ancient limits, including, besides, a cession *pro tempore*, of some fortresses now in the pos-

session of France. How much time was occupied in the discussion of this *projet*, we know not: but at length Bonaparte was required to deliver a categorical answer to it by a certain day, the 10th or 12th of March. When the time fixed had expired, he delivered his *projet*, containing the demands we have mentioned. And, what is perfectly new in the history of diplomatic transactions, where parties proceed upon the desire of agreement and accommodation, Bonaparte did not require any answer, or offer to consider and mutually concede disputed points, but at once ordered his Minister back to his presence."—Next day (the 5th) the following *addenda* appeared in the same paper:—"We have every reason to believe that the Documents, when they are published, will prove the correctness of the sketch we gave yesterday of the demands made by Bonaparte. In one point however we were rather under the mark. Bonaparte did not consent to abandon all hold upon Germany; for he demanded for the son of Louis Napoleon the Duchy of Berg, including in it Dusseldorf, Duitz, opposite Cologne, and other important points."—It is not my intention, at present, to make any remarks upon what is here given as the substance of the French Emperor's demands, because this might be regarded as prejudging a question which was not yet fairly before the public, as will be seen from what was said respecting it in both houses of parliament, the report of which I have taken from the *Courier* of the 5th instant. In the House of Lords the following proceedings took place.—"The *Earl of Liverpool*.—Before he moved, as he meant to do, that the house should now adjourn, he had to state to their Lordships, that he was commanded by the Prince Regent to inform them, that the Negotiations, which had been lately carried on for the conclusion of peace with France, were now at an end. While his Majesty's confidential servants deeply regretted that failure of their efforts for peace which had led to this communication, it must at least be satisfactory to all to know, that both in the principle on which that negotiation was broken off, and in the particular circumstances and causes which immediately produced the rupture, there was the most complete agreement and concurrence amongst the whole of the Allies. Their Lordships and the country would expect full information on this subject, and he had to state, in regard to that point, that it was the intention of the Allies to publish a declaration,

setting forth the whole of the circumstances and causes which led to the rupture of the negotiation. It would be the duty of his Majesty's servants to lay that declaration, together with such other information as might be necessary, before their Lordships, and this would be done with every possible expedition. In the mean time, it would be premature to enter further into the subject, and he therefore now moved, that the house do adjourn.—*Earl Grey.*—It was with the deepest regret that he heard the statement of the noble Earl, that the negotiations for peace were now at an end. It was undoubtedly a consolation, in the midst of that regret, to hear it stated, that both in the principle upon which they were broken off, and in the particular circumstances and causes which produced that termination, there was the most complete agreement and concurrence among the whole of the allied powers. To that consolation, when the proper information should be laid before the house, he trusted would be added the further satisfaction to know, that not only had this complete agreement and concurrence existed among the allied powers on the grounds which led to the rupture, but that these grounds were such as would prove, that the termination was owing to the ambition and injustice of the enemy, and that on our side and that of our Allies, there was nothing but justice and moderation.—The Noble Earl further stated, that it was the intention of the Allies to publish a declaration on the subject, and that this declaration, together with such further information as might be necessary, would be as soon as possible laid before their Lordships for their examination and discussion. He wished to know from the Noble Earl whether it was likely that this declaration and information could be laid before the House before they adjourned for the Easter holidays, so that they might be ready to proceed to the discussion immediately after Parliament should meet at the termination of the recess.—*The Earl of Liverpool.*—He had no objection whatever to give the Noble Earl the information which he desired. It certainly was not expected that Ministers would be in a situation to lay these documents before their Lordships before the adjournment for the Easter holidays. But in a day or two after the meeting of Parliament, subsequent to the adjournment, it was expected they might be able to lay the documents on their Lordships' table. To avoid delay, the papers would, if possible, be printed in the

interim, that they might proceed to the discussion with all the dispatch consistent with a due examination of the subject, and the convenience of their Lordships.—*Earl Grey.*—The statement of the Noble Earl on this point was perfectly satisfactory, but he trusted that the discussion of the subject would not be pressed forward with any undue degree of haste. Though there ought to be no unnecessary delay in coming to that discussion, the matter ought not to be hurried on before sufficient time had been given for due consideration.—*The Earl of Liverpool.*—There would be no attempt to hurry on the discussion. Ministers were only desirous of consulting their Lordships' convenience on that head, though it was desirable certainly that there should be no unnecessary delay.—Here ended the discussion in the House of Lords. In the House of Commons, the following passed respecting the same business:—*"The Chancellor of the Exchequer.*—I am authorised by his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, to inform the House, that the Negotiations lately opened at Chatillon have terminated in a rupture, and that a further communication on that subject will speedily be made to Parliament. I am happy to be able to state, that the mode and spirit in which these discussions have been conducted and carried on to the point of their termination, have met with the entire concurrence and approbation of all our Allies. (*General cries of hear, hear!*) That they are about to submit a Declaration to Europe, and to the world, in which they will explain the principles by which they have been guided, and justly themselves of all blame in the failure of this pacific attempt. (*Hear, hear!*) As soon as this Declaration is issued, and shall reach this country, it is his Royal Highness's intention, that it be laid, together with all papers and documents relative to the late conferences, before this House. (*Hear, hear!*) I cannot, with propriety, say any thing more upon the subject at present, and shall therefore move the Order of the Day.—*Mr. Ponsonby* wished to ask, in the first place, whether all the papers which were necessary to enable the House to form a correct judgment on the negotiation would be laid before them? and, secondly, at what time the communication would be made?—*The Chancellor of the Exchequer* said, that no communication would be made of any thing, the disclosure of which would be detrimental to the country; but that every disposition existed on the part of his Majesty's

Government to afford the fullest information to the House. It was impossible to ascertain exactly at what time the Declaration would arrive in this country, but, if possible, it would be laid before Parliament, with the other papers, shortly after the recess. Full time would then be given to the House for the consideration of the papers, as there was no disposition on the part of his Majesty's Government to press prematurely for a determination on the subject.—*Mr. Ponsonby* declared himself perfectly satisfied with the explanation of *Mr. Vansittart*.—Adjournment.—*Mr. Ponsonby* wished to ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer what was his intention with respect to the duration of the next adjournment which he should propose? That honourable gentleman had before stated his belief, that it would be of the usual length, which would delay the meeting of Parliament for a whole fortnight. It appeared that neither the house nor the country could expect any information from their own Government, but should be obliged to wait until it should please the Allies to issue their Declaration, and transmit it to this country, when it would be laid with the other papers before the house. The honourable gentleman had once said, that the duration of the adjournment might be shortened as circumstances might render it necessary; but it was evident, that if we were to wait the Declaration of the Allies, the length of time might be increased at their pleasure. This would be an awkward situation both for Parliament and the nation. It would be the wisest plan not to extend the adjournment to its usual length, but to shorten it so as to suit the impatience of the times.—*The Chancellor of the Exchequer* was not able to state the exact time at which the Declaration would appear. At the same time every one must feel that the Allies wished to lay this explanation of their conduct, their motives, and their views, as soon as possible, before the world, conscious of the favourable and powerful impression which it could not fail to produce. It was therefore reasonable to suppose, that it would be made public a very short time after the rupture of the negotiations, and that no great delay could occur in its reaching Government. Until that document arrived, there would be little use in the re-assembling of Parliament, whilst, if a sufficient time was allowed to elapse, the House might have the benefit of the presence and personal illustrations of the British Plenipotentiary who

represented England at the Congress. If after the recess, however, circumstances should have arisen to delay the publication of the Declaration of the Allies, then it might become a duty on the part of Government to enter into some more extensive explanations.—*Mr. Ponsonby* thought it quite unusual to make our own proceedings dependent on those of the Allies. He did not recollect any precedent to justify such conduct. The Honourable Gentleman seemed to consider that we were not at liberty to produce information, or make any declaration without receiving a communication from the coalesced Powers, although he added, that if they long and seriously delayed that communication, some explanation might be given by Government. It was a novelty in our political history to find that such a declaration was made, not by us, but in consequence of the proceedings of other Powers. It was indecorous, not to use a stronger term, both for Parliament and for the country to remain in such a case, dependant on other nations. He thought, at all events, that the adjournment need not be for so long a time as seemed to be intended.—*The Chancellor of the Exchequer* had been misunderstood. He had not meant to say that the communications which Government intended to make, should depend on the Allies; but that a Declaration being expected from the latter, it was more proper to wait till it had been received, than to produce the rest of the papers, or any part of them, without such an important document. The said Declaration, besides, was that of all the powers concerned in the war and the negotiations, and was therefore as much an act of our Government as of our Allies.—*Mr. Ponsonby* did not think he had misunderstood the Hon. Gentleman. He considered him to have stated, that the Allies were about to issue a Declaration, explanatory of their views and their principles, and that not until it should have reached Government, should any communication be made to Parliament respecting the late negotiations. This certainly justified the assertion which he had made, that the communications to be made to the House depended on the pleasure of our Allies. However, if the Hon. Gentleman was willing to give a proper explanation, in case of prolonged delay, he should not persist in his objection.—While we look forward with anxiety to the meeting of Parliament, when the documents, which are to explain the cause of the rupture, are

to be made public, and when we are to be *favoured* with a sight of the new Declaration of the Allies, which, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer admits, may be *delayed* in its publication by circumstances which may still arise; while, I say, we anticipate the information which we are then to be put in possession of, I have thought it proper to republish here, the famous Declaration of the Allies, which they issued at Frankfort on the 1st of December last; a declaration which the *Courier* afterwards treated as a forgery, but which, it has since been proved, was *genuine*, and is now rendered the more interesting and important, that it must have formed the topic of much discussion during the late negotiations, and have been frequently appealed to, particularly by the Emperor of France, as forming the basis of a treaty of peace. It will enable us also to judge, by comparison with the new Declaration, how far the Allies have adhered to their former professions, and whether their views as to the recognition of Napoleon's claim to the crown of France, and the independence of the French Empire, have since altered, and what are the causes which may have given birth to this, if any alteration has really taken place. The following is a copy of the Frankfort Declaration:—
 “The French Government has ordered a new levy of 300,000 conscripts. The motives of the Senatus Consultum to that effect contain an appeal to the Allied Powers. They, therefore, find themselves called upon to promulgate anew, in the face of the world, the views which guide them in the present war; the principles which form the basis of their conduct, their wishes, and their determinations.—The Allied Powers do not make war upon France, but against that preponderance, haughtily announced,—against that preponderance which, to the misfortune of Europe, and of France, the Emperor Napoleon has too long exercised beyond the limits of his empire.—Victory has conducted the Allied Armies to the banks of the Rhine. The first use which their Imperial and Royal Majesties have made of victory, has been to offer peace to his Majesty the Emperor of the French. An attitude strengthened by the accession of all the Sovereigns and Princes of Germany, has had no influence on the conditions of that peace. These conditions are founded on the independence of the French empire, as well as on the independence of the other States of Europe. The views of the Powers

are just in their object, generous and liberal in their application, giving security to all, honourable to each.—The Allied Sovereigns desire that France may be great, powerful, and happy; because the French power, in a state of greatness and strength, is one of the foundations of the social edifice of Europe. They wish that France may be happy,—that French commerce may revive,—that the arts, those blessings of peace, may again flourish; because a great people can only be tranquil in proportion as it is happy. The Powers confirm to the French empire an extent of territory which France under her Kings never knew; because a valiant nation does not fall from its rank, by having in its turn experienced reverses in an obstinate and sanguinary contest, in which it has fought with its accustomed bravery.—But the Allied Powers also wish to be free, tranquil, and happy, themselves. They desire a state of peace which, by a wise partition of strength, by a just equilibrium, may henceforward preserve their people from the numberless calamities which have overwhelmed Europe for the last twenty years.—The Allied Powers will not lay down their arms, until they have attained this great and beneficial result, this noble object of their efforts. They will not lay down their arms, until the political state of Europe be re-established anew,—until immovable principles have resumed their rights over vain pretensions,—until the sanctity of treaties shall have at last secured a real peace to Europe.”

ENTRANCE OF THE ALLIES INTO PARIS.

—This is an event which must afford real cause of joy and satisfaction to every one who values the rights and independence of nations; who wishes the speedy termination of a contest, which has for so long a period desolated the fairest portion of Europe, and inflicted misery incalculable upon the human race. It is an event which I am as serious in congratulating the nation upon, as any of the conductors of our daily press can possibly be. But I am somewhat of opinion, that our exultation arises from very different views of the subject, and that we anticipate a very opposite result from the same premises. Their ground of joy is, that the occupation of Paris by the Allies will extinguish; has, in fact, already extinguished, the power of Bonaparte; enabled the invaders of France to set limits and bounds to that vast empire; and put it in their option to force upon the French people their “ancient

principles and their ancient sovereign." Now my cause of rejoicing has nothing to do with the restoration of these *ancient* principles; nor does it proceed from any wish that the inhabitants of France should be restrained, or dictated to, as to the form of their government. — What I am glad of is, that the crisis has at last arrived, when this great question must be decided, **ARE THE FRENCH PEOPLE DETERMINED TO SUPPORT THE THRONE OF NAPOLEON?** — If they have not adopted this resolution; if, after the experience of twenty years of internal political convulsions, and external war, they have at last resolved to put down the man who, during the greater part of that period, has so highly gratified their passion for military glory, and has availed himself of this to establish himself on the throne of the Capets. If, I say, the French have resolved to get rid of Bonaparte, I do not see that any man has a right to find fault with them for this. They gave their consent to his assumption of the Imperial purple. Whatever his enemies may say, it is a historical fact, that of all the sovereigns who ever reigned in France, not one of them held the crown, except Napoleon, by the immediate suffrage or vote of the people. — This same people, who placed him on the throne, and even declared the succession hereditary in his family, have a right to call upon him to descend from that elevated station, and to compel him to submit, if he should refuse. But it yet remains to be seen, whether the people of France will act in this manner; whether they are so dissatisfied with Napoleon's government as to bring about a change; and whether that change will lead to the total exclusion of his dynasty, the restoration of the Bourbons, or of the Republic. If the establishment of a free republican government in that country, is to be the result of the possession of Paris by the Allies, then, indeed, would the fall of Bonaparte be a desirable event; then might the friends of freedom rejoice; then might they congratulate themselves, once more, on the opening prospect of liberty and independence being about to be restored to man. But if he is to be put down, merely for the purpose of placing another tyrant in his place, and of submitting the people to the arbitrary will and caprice of another despot, I do not see how any benefit is to result to mankind from this counter-revolution. Still, if the French people, who, it must be allowed, are the best judges of their own affairs, wish the change, in God's name let them

have it. Let them, if they will, restore the Bourbons, and, with them, the Bastille, and all the horrid and oppressive inquisitions which disgraced the reign of the ancestors of the remaining stock of that now unfortunate and degraded family. No friend of humanity will pity them if they bow to this; no hand will be found stretched out to succour them, if they should even submit to the chances of being again reduced to their former abject and deplorable state of political degradation. But, if we are to believe the conductors of the daily press, the work is already done; a counter-revolution has already been brought about; and nothing remains to complete the work, but to invite Louis to Paris, where he will be crowned amidst the shouts and triumphs of a loyal and grateful people. The *Courier*, in the plenitude of its frenzied zeal, thus exclaims: — "The march to Paris has at length been accomplished—the Capital of France has fallen; and Vienna, and Berlin, and Moscow, and Madrid, and Lisbon, have been avenged. Surely we may now apply with grateful piety the expressions which the Tyrant used at Dresden, 'Is not the finger of Providence here?' How often in our impatient indignation at the successful career of 'This Desolator of Europe,' have we wondered that he should be permitted to remain the scourge of men and of nations? Let us now confess that he has been spared till the harvest of his crimes and his disgrace was full ripe. The scene would have been imperfect, the denouement would have been incomplete, had he been cut off sooner: something would have been wanting to the moral; some finishing touch and colouring to the picture. The shame and prostration of his character would not have been so openly exposed, had not the edifice he had raised been crumbled to the dust, and had not he, who had profaned the capitals of the Cæsars and the Czars, beheld his own capital share the same fate." — Now one would have thought, that, instead of the mere occupation of Paris affording a proof of the *total subversion* of Bonaparte's power, the very recollection of what followed his possession of Vienna, of Berlin, of Moscow, and of Madrid, might have led the *Courier* writer to draw a very different conclusion from this event. Napoleon was in Vienna, as a conqueror, more than once; but we do not find that Francis lost his crown on that account, or that he was so crippled in his power as to be unable again to make head

against his opponent. Neither do we find that the Emperor of Russia, or the King of Prussia, were brought to this low pass when Bonaparte entered their capitals. Had they been so, they would not now have been found exulting over their powerful rival in the city of Paris. While they would do well, in my opinion, to imitate the moderation of their former conqueror, his apparent humiliation, I think, is calculated to afford them a very beneficial lesson as to the instability of fortune. What was their situation once, is now his. What at present is his, may again be theirs. These reflections, however, do not seem to have once occurred to the sovereigns who are now in possession of the French capital. Nothing but the subversion of Bonaparte's power will satisfy them; nothing but the restoration of the Bourbons will now induce them to sheath the sword. In a proclamation issued by Prince Schwartzberg to the inhabitants of Paris, he tells them, that "the attempts to put an end to so many misfortunes have been useless, because there exists in the very power of the government which oppresses you, an insurmountable obstacle to peace." "The allied Sovereigns seek, in good faith, a salutary authority in France which may cement the union of all nations and of all governments with her; it is to the city of Paris that it has fallen, under the present circumstances, to accelerate the peace of the world." Here we have an express avowal, that the power of Bonaparte presents an insurmountable obstacle to concluding any treaty with him, and, that the Allies had been led, in consequence, to seek for another power to treat with, which they call "a salutary authority in France." This authority they seem to think they have found in the city of Paris, and therefore they appeal to the inhabitants. "Parisians (continues the proclamation) you know the situation of your country, the conduct of Bordeaux, the friendly occupation of Lyons, the evils brought upon France, and the real dispositions of your fellow citizens. You will find in these examples the termination of foreign war, and of civil discord; you cannot search it elsewhere."—The conduct of Bordeaux.—Could there be a more explicit call than this upon the people of Paris to hoist the standard in favour of the Bourbons? But what removes all doubt as to this point, is the bold and unqualified avowal, which has been published in our own Gazette. "Our loss (says Sir Charles Stewart) has been something considerable;

but we may have the consoling hope, that the brave men who fell, will accomplish the work of the downfall of despotism, and rear the standard of renovated Europe under a just equilibrium, and the dominion of its legitimate sovereigns."—"Amen (says the *Courier*) to that sweet prayer! A British officer has pronounced it; his Government has repeated it; the Allies invite the people of France to accomplish it! Yes—they have consecrated the ancient standard, and what now can strike it down?"—Very well; we shall see by and by how matters will turn; for whatever the *Courier* may say, this fact at least is certain, that Bonaparte is still at the head of a powerful army, which, instead of having been wasted and dispirited by defeats, is in full strength, flushed with recent victory, and ready, I still think, to second his views against the allied powers. Had the possession of Paris followed the defeat of Bonaparte in a great battle, it might then have afforded a substantial triumph to his inveterate and personal foes; but this has not been the case. The Allies have reached the capital without any serious interruption; a circumstance which carries this conviction at least along with it, that Napoleon will not leave them long in undisturbed possession. Every circumstance, indeed, connected with this unlooked for alteration of affairs, renders it extremely probable that the French Emperor was not altogether unwilling to change the ground of action, and to place the Allies in a situation where he could operate upon them with more effect than he was able to do, consistent with the system of tactics upon which they had hitherto acted. The Allies themselves seem to have been puzzled by his movements; for, when he was advancing towards the rear of the Austrian army, we find by the following expressions in Sir Charles Stewart's dispatches, that no one could discover his real intention:—"Three objects might be now in his view, by the movements round our right; to force us back; if this failed, to operate upon our communications, and even proceed to form a junction with Marshal Augereau; or, finally, by moving to his fortresses of Metz, &c. prolong the war by resisting on a new line, while he placed us in the center of France, having taken the best precautions in his power for the defence of the capital."—Even after the combined army had been considerably in advance towards Paris, Sir Charles appears to have had no very consoling prospects as to the

result of this movement: "Whatever (says he) may be the *ultimate result* of the operations in progress, however brilliant they appear, the Sovereigns who are present, and the Prince Field Marshal who leads their armies, will have the proud and consoling reflection, that by their intrepid manœuvres, they have acted right by their countries, their people, and the great cause."

— Now why speak, why even think of *ultimate results*, when, according to their own sentiments of the matter, as echoed by the *Courier*, the possession of Paris has given the *death blow* to all Bonaparte's hopes? Why use *desponding* language when this great and glorious event has "signed the death-warrant of his fame and his power?" One would be apt to suppose that the Allies were in fact really apprehensive for their own safety; and that the "destroyer of nations" may actually intend, "by moving to his fortresses of Metz, &c. to prolong the war by resisting on a new line, while he placed them in the center of France." This would indeed be striking a blow which they were not prepared for; this, unfortunately for them, would be cutting off all their supplies and reinforcements; and, supposing this same "terrible destroyer" were to succeed in collecting an army, amounting to double the number of the Allies, and at the same time to bring the army *en masse*, which has been organizing of late, into action; I confess there would be some *small grounds* at least for alarm. O! but then, says my Lord Burghersh, "By an *intercepted letter* of Bonaparte's, the *objects of his movements were discovered*." Were they so? How then came Sir Charles Stewart to intimate, in a *subsequent* dispatch, that Napoleon *might* have three objects in view; and to evince, as he did, a total want of information as to which of these the enemy meant to adopt. Either the Allies had *discovered* Bonaparte's plans, or they had not. If they had, how came they to place themselves in a situation, where circumstances rendered it at least *possible* they might afterwards regret the step they had taken? But if, as Sir Charles Stewart seems to insinuate, the Allies were unacquainted with the *real object* which Napoleon had in view, it is very clear they must have been *deceived* by their "arch enemy;" who, having very likely heard of the late *hoax* on the Stock Exchange, had resolved to try the effect of a similar *ruse de guerre* on his unwary opponents. But whatever view may be

taken of this, the reader cannot have forgot the many tricks which have been played off by the belligerents upon each other during the contest. We have the recent, and highly applauded example, of a Spanish commander, who obtained possession of two fortresses by counterfeiting the cypher of the enemy. What is worthy of *praise* in our Allies, cannot surely be *censured* in Bonaparte, supposing he has resorted to a similar stratagem. After all, it does not appear to whom this letter, which contained such *important* information, was addressed. Some of our hireling prints say that it was "a letter to Bonaparte's wife."

— But can any one, possessing ordinary penetration, believe a tale so absurd as this? Is not *silence* one of the leading features of Napoleon's character? and are we to suppose that a man, who is known to mature all his projects in the closet, and never to have discovered these even to his most favourite generals, would sit down on this, or on any other occasion, to gratify his vanity (for it could be nothing else) by disclosing these important secrets to the Empress? We must adopt a new view of human nature, and of human intellect, before we can bring ourselves to admit an idea so ridiculous. Napoleon knew well, as his army was situated, that there was a *chance* at least of his letter being intercepted; he could easily give directions that the bearer should allow himself to be taken. To judge of him, therefore, as we have always judged of great military characters, and particularly of his own acting hitherto, we must suppose that he dispatched the letter in question, for the purpose of falling into the hands of the Allies, in order to *mislead* them as to his ulterior views. A very short period, perhaps a very few days, will determine how far I am correct in my supposition. While I write this, it does appear to me, notwithstanding what has happened, that those *favourable chances*, which the Allies seem to have calculated upon, of ultimate and full success, have no real existence. Connecting the above circumstances, particularly the uncertain and desponding language of Sir Charles Stewart, with other facts, which will occur to the reader, it does seem, that the *French people*, whatever they may do in future, *have not yet declared against Bonaparte*. Had any symptoms of this kind appeared, even among the *Parisian mob*, we should have heard of it long before this. The *gazette*; nay, all our lying journals, are silent respecting an oo-

currence, which, if it had happened, would have formed the most prominent and constantly recurring theme of their disgusting sirictures. Until, therefore, I see the PEOPLE of France declare against their Emperor, I never can persuade myself that 200,000 men, or even four times that number, will be able to shake the stability of his throne.

Since writing the above, I have been favoured, by a friend, with the following very pertinent and sensible remarks, on the subject of

BONAPARTE AND THE ALLIES. — In war the greatest events arise sometimes out of the slightest causes—The interception of a letter, or any thing equally trifling, may decide the fate of a capital. Yet, had Bonaparte, two years ago, marched to Petersburg, instead of going to Moscow, Alexander would not at this moment have been in Paris. Had Bonaparte, instead of making kings, converted the many countries he overran into republics, they would have secured him from royal ingratitude; they would have furnished him with troops to fight his battles, instead of suddenly starting up against him as foes and invaders. But the Allies are now in Paris, and the grand question is, what is to be the result?—The mask is now completely thrown off: the man who, but the other day, for the first time in this metropolis, was officially styled the EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH: the man with whom, under that title, long ago, by other nations, solemn treaties have been entered into: that man is now to be hunted down as a mad dog, and the Bourbons are to be set up in his stead. Even his father-in-law, and one of his quondam officers who owes him every thing, now join in the exterminating chase. Such are the ties of affection and gratitude among some crowned heads. For this purpose the Allies are in Paris, and we understand that Louis the XVIIIth has actually been sent for! So far then are the Allies successful. But Bonaparte is not yet killed: he is not yet taken: he is still at large, enjoying the affections of the people for whom he has done so much; and he is at the head of a large and powerful army, with others at his disposal, and having in his possession a chain of fortified and well garrisoned towns, which forbid exit to the invaders now in France. — No such large body as the allied army is reported to be, can long remain stationary, or cooped up in a town: they must shortly

bestir themselves, and think of going home again; when, having to encounter Bonaparte's well disciplined, well formed, and healthy armies of his different numerous garrisons, however they themselves may be loaded with *plunder*; with what is termed the soldier's legitimate harvest; yet encumbered with this plunder, and enfeebled by want and sickness, it is possible that, though they have made their way to the capital of France, they, on their return, may have sorrowfully to exclaim with the caged starling, mentioned by Sterne,

"I can't get out."

A wide-spreading torrent may devastate the neighbouring country; but the land it overflows, absorbs, in its turn, the wide-spreading element; the only remaining traces being stench and mud. Bonaparte's position is critical.—Not less so is the position of Alexander. Bonaparte is in his own country, and surrounded with friends.—Alexander is far from home, bewildered perhaps by flattery and foreign gold: in the country of an enemy from whom retaliation is every hour to be expected? Should a levy *en masse* take place, not merely the Allies, but our brave Wellington and his army would stand a chance of extermination.

—While thus stating our ideas on the possible results, let us not be misunderstood as casting the slightest censure on the cause in which the Allied powers are engaged. The contest is the more meritorious, that it is carried on by crowned heads, who, contrary to what has taken place in former times, are now combating, not for, but in fact, against themselves. They are, according to their own repeated declarations, fighting not for the paltry purpose of destroying an Emperor, to set up a King in his stead; but for the noblest of all purposes;—for that for which every man ought to arm—namely, for the purpose of restoring liberty to groaning Europe. — Often have they given us their royal word, that they are fighting for the liberties of Europe, and against despotism: this, therefore, implies that if they conquer, their intention is to render *all Europe* free:—to abolish despotism in every shape, and in every country; and to restore universally, to the long oppressed inhabitants of Europe, those rights to which they have an undoubted claim. — The Autocrat of Russia will then restore freedom to his vassals.—The King of Prussia will then abolish all Tyrannical proceedings in his dominions, if any exist. —The Emperor

of Austria will not wink at assassinations, nor suffer any victims to be entombed in dungeons; and the petty powers will no longer sell their subjects like Bullocks!—while, in England, we shall have only to put an extinguisher upon corruption, and a sponge upon the National debt.—Others may, perhaps, with a malign eye, view this Royal Alliance in an unfavourable light, and maliciously suggest, that they intend monopolizing that for which they have been fighting—the Liberties of Europe.—But many circumstances prevent us from being of this sentiment. Among others, the frequent appeals to the *people* made by the Allies, in our opinion, serve to show the consciousness of crowned heads that nothing can be done *without the people*:—that the people are not only respectable, but also formidable; and that, with the people, resides the foundation of all power.—The Allies are in Paris:—the white flag may be unfurled, and the white cockade may be worn by a small number of individuals.—But the Allies have not yet safely got out of France:—the Bourbons are not yet peaceably seated on the throne:—Bonaparte is not yet exterminated:—neither is the French nation yet prostrate.—The fate of war is various:—the conqueror of to day may be the captive of to morrow.

BONAPARTE AND THE BOURBONS.

Mr. Editor,—Having observed in your invaluable Register of the 12th of March, an article entitled “Magnanimity of Bonaparte,” in which there is an extract from Anne Plumptre’s narrative of a three years’ residence in France; I beg leave to direct your attention to the following remarks of the same able writer on the Character of the French Emperor, which at this eventual moment, when the restoration of the Bourbons is so much spoken of, may be deemed acceptable to your numerous readers. Speaking of the accusation of moroseness of temper, which the enemies of Napoleon have brought against him, Miss P. observes:—“But even supposing Bonaparte’s manners ever so violent and uncconciliating, he has a hold upon the public opinion of another kind, so forcible, that, while supported by that, it is difficult to conceive it in the power of any thing else to shake him. Military glory is, and ever has been, the idol of the French nation; and the greatest military heroes among their kings, Francis the First, Henry the Fourth,

and Louis the Fourteenth, are those, who were the most adored by their subjects. The misfortunes of the late king may have excited compassion in many a bosom, but not a note of admiration is ever uttered when he is mentioned. He is called *le pauvre Louis seize, le malheureux Louis seize*, while the names of the others are never mentioned but with enthusiasm, as *François le grand, Henri le grand, Louis le grand*. If such their fondness then for military glory, with what sensations must they not behold the emperor Napoleon!—Is it possible that he should not be the object of their admiration?—I have more than once observed, that if in the midst of repining and discontent with the revolution, and the present government, the days of Arcole, of Lodi, or of Marengo, have been mentioned, a glow of enthusiasm in an instant animated every countenance, and seemed to inspire every bosom; all other feelings were immediately absorbed in the idea that it was by the victor at Arcole, at Lodi, and at Marengo, the nation was governed, and the two following lines from one of their most celebrated tragic poets, were immediately applied to him:

*Le premier qui fut roi fut un soldat heureux;—
Qui sert bien son pays, n’a pas besoin d’yeux.*

CORNÉILLE.

A lucky warrior was the first of kings;—
Who serves the state, no matter whence he springs.

Will the days of Ulm, of Austerlitz, of Jena, of Friedland, of Aspern, and of Wagram, have contributed to lessen this enthusiasm?—If among those who were the most forward in expressing general dissatisfaction and discontent with Bonaparte’s government, inquiries were made into the reasons of their discontent, it appeared that these were not very easily explained. Was he addicted to gallantry? No.—To the pleasures of the table? No.—Was he a gambler? No.—Did he squander away the money of the country in gratifying idle fancies of his own? No.—Had not all his expense some great public object in view? Yes.—Had he not restored the nation, harassed by faction, to unanimity and tranquillity? Yes.—Had he not extinguished the dreaded flames of civil war? Yes.—Had he not restored the emigrants to their country? Yes.—Had he not restored their religion to all? Yes.—Were not religious opinions free and unshackled? Yes.—Did he neglect the duties of his station? did he leave to others the business which he ought to attend to himself? *Oh! parbleu non!*

He was always at business, he would hardly allow himself time to eat or sleep; nay, he would scarcely even allow those about him a moment's respite from their labour. His private secretary was kept so hard to work that he was obliged one day to remonstrate against it, and beg that a second secretary might be employed, to take some of the burden off his hands: but Bonaparte, instead of yielding to his remonstrance, answered, that he certainly should not take a second, that he only regretted the being obliged to have one; he wished nothing so much as that it were possible to do all the business himself.

"Let Bonaparte restore us our lawful king," say some, "and we will then confess that he is a truly great man." These are of those zealous royalists, "who, seated comfortably by the fire-side, with their feet upon the fender, declaim in very severe terms upon the dastardly behaviour of their countrymen towards their monarch; and who, it might therefore be supposed, had done prodigious things for him themselves; but who had in fact deserted him on the first approach of danger, and left him to scuffle through his difficulties as well as he could; the consequence of which was, that he could not scuffle through them at all: yet now they are very zealous for the restoration of his heir." But would Bonaparte do a real service to the French nation in restoring to them their lawful king? This certainly may be made a question. What sort of a service did Monk render to England in restoring the two sons of Charles the First? A very sorry one indeed:—one which occasioned the necessity of a second revolution only twenty-eight years after. And is there a better prospect in the restoration of the Bourbon princes?—have any of them ever evinced the talents requisite for guiding the helm of a great nation?—are they so exalted by their virtues above the rest of mankind, that they hence derive a just claim to command and rule over them?—or is it to be expected that in returning to power they would bury all their animosities in oblivion, and not execute what they would call retributive justice upon the authors of their sufferings? Nothing, that has hitherto appeared in any part of their conduct, gives reason to answer these questions in the affirmative. What then would be the prospect of the country in seeing them restored, but to become a prey to fresh scenes of carnage and desolation? The conduct to be expected from the ad-

herents of the Bourbon cause, if they should ever again obtain the ascendancy, is sufficiently demonstrated in the outrages committed by the *Sabreurs* at Marseilles. They plainly showed that they had no objection to license and anarchy, when they were themselves at the head of it; they only objected to it when they became its victims. To restore the family of Bourbon to the throne would now be only to sacrifice one faction to another; whereas the way to promote the general peace and prosperity of the country is to keep a vigilant eye over them all.—But there is yet another question to be asked, Is it in Bonaparte's power to restore this lawful king?—would the nation at large permit his restoration?—I am firmly of opinion, not. However attached these zealous champions of the royal cause may be to the ancient dynasty of their kings, it is by no means clear that the sentiment of the nation, taken in the aggregate, corresponds with theirs. Bonaparte might overthrow his own power in attempting to restore Louis the Eighteenth; but it is far from certain that he would seat him on the throne: the nation, which has delegated to him the task of governing it, would scarcely choose that he should delegate that task to another, without their opinions being consulted upon the subject; but, if he proposed to quit his station, would reserve to themselves the right of deciding who should fill it. Such an immense mass of interest against the return of the Bourbon family has been created by twenty years of revolution, that even if Bonaparte were as great a tyrant as he is represented, and his tyranny should become ever so insupportable to the nation, though they might make him descend from his present eminence, they would not invite a Bourbon to be his successor. In the time of the League, a priest of that party once, when he was to preach took for his text the passage in the sixty-ninth psalm, which in our translation runs, "*Lord, deliver us out of the mire!*" which he translated, *Seigneur, débourbonnez nous!*—In such a prayer I believe ninety-nine out of every hundred, or perhaps nine hundred and ninety-nine out of every thousand, among the French, would now join.—"Let Bonaparte restore me all that I have lost," say others, "and I will then acknowledge him truly the friend and benefactor of the country." This is modest; it is identifying the public good with their own individual ease.—One trifling objection, however, stands in the way of accomplishing what these gentlemen, who

are indisputably of the faction of the *imbatient*, require,—that the thing is *impossible*. Supposing Bonaparte ever so well disposed to comply with their wishes, yet where is all that they have lost to be found? —But have they forgotten that many of them were once strangers in foreign lands, wanderers on the face of the earth; and that they have now a home and a country, with the means of subsistence, though not of living in their ancient luxury? To attempt the restoration of all their possessions, would be to plunge the country into worse calamities than those from which it has recently been rescued; to relume in its bosom the flames of civil war. Instead then of murmuring and repining at petty inconveniences, which they find personally, and attributing them to the present government, they should reflect, that a very great length of time is necessary to correct the numberless abuses to which such a period of anarchy has given rise; and consider that the work of destruction is the operation of a moment, while that of regeneration is of necessity extremely slow. The one is the impulse of a hasty movement executed without reflection, under the guidance of a heated imagination; while every thing relating to the other, must be poised in an exact scale, weighing deliberately the advantages and disadvantages which may result from any measure proposed, without suffering passion or prejudice to give the least preponderance either to the one side or the other; and recollecting always that the general good is the main object to be kept in view, not the particular convenience of this or that individual.”—I am yours, &c.

ARISTIDES.

Edinburgh, 4th April, 1814.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY.

Two letters having already appeared in the *Register*, on the abuse of the Procuratorial power in the University of Oxford, the subject, which certainly is of great importance to the inhabitants of that celebrated place, appears to have excited a considerable degree of interest, and to have given rise to a discussion which, it is to be hoped, will lead to a radical reform of the abuses which are said to belong to the procuratorial office. In giving publicity, however, to these letters, it is not my intention to pledge myself for the accuracy of the statements which they contain. The writers are unknown to me; but, as *truth* will probably be elicited between them, and the

result be beneficial to the inhabitants of Oxford, the liberal and philanthropic mind, it is hoped, will not be disposed to object to the publication of this correspondence, merely because it is of a local nature. The two letters formerly given, were confined to one side of the question. The following, which I have since received, is intended as an answer to the one that appeared in the *Register* of 26th February.—It has already been published in an Oxford paper, together with the subjoined reply, from the able pen of the writer of the first letter:

MR. EDITOR,—I will not intrude upon so large a portion of your valuable columns as has been occupied by the writer of a letter from this place, which I have read in your paper. I have only to observe, that it is *utterly false* that the Proctors of the University exercise or possess any right whatever of being judges in their own causes; and I need not say that this is the main hinge upon which all your Correspondent's subsequent observations turn. It is equally false that the statute cited by your Correspondent conveys the power of a general search-warrant; inasmuch as the power of entering the houses of the inhabitants is given to those Officers of the University, solely and expressly for the necessary purpose of ascertaining whether any of their own body are therein; and cannot therefore, authorize them to proceed in the manner in which they would be entitled to act under the authority of a search-warrant. —It is absolutely false that any prostitutes have been apprehended “for merely appearing in the streets, though walking orderly and quietly in the day-time;” they are at no time put into confinement without suitable warning, nor without the most earnest endeavours to reclaim them from their vicious mode of life; and it is especially false, “that an instance is well known to have occurred in Oxford, of an unfortunate prisoner being driven into a state of insanity, from which she never recovered.” —The discipline and authority of the University, which are of vital importance to the interests of the State at large, cannot be impaired by the sophistical argumentation of your Correspondent; but it is perhaps due to a cause, however strong, to shield it from wilful misrepresentation of facts. Of such misrepresentations I have selected only some of the most glaring specimens; but I may safely assert, that there is scarcely a sentence in your Correspondent's letter, which does not contain some-

thing of the same nature.—I am, Mr. Editor, your obedient servant,

APSEUDES.

Oxford, 11th March, 1814.

MR. EDITOR,—From the style and manner of the above letter from Oxford, I have great reason to suppose it to be the production of one of the very persons, whose conduct I exposed in my "Observations on the Statutes," &c.—The anger of APSEUDES gives me much pleasure and satisfaction. I am gratified in seeing that my animadversions have taken effect. "Let the gall'd jade wince."—But now for matter of fact. The following short statement will, I think, sufficiently shew what claim this writer has to his assumed name of APSEUDES.—If APSEUDES will take the trouble of consulting the University Statutes, he will find, notwithstanding his assertion to the contrary, that the Proctors have the right of sitting as judges in the Vice-Chancellor's Court, without any restriction, "whenever they may think fit to attend," along with the Vice-Chancellor, or his Deputy or Assessor. The words of the Statute are these: "Cui [Curie] præsit Commissarius sive Vice-Cancellarius Universitatis, ejusve Deputatus; assidentibus sibi duobus (cum ipsis videbitur) qui pro tempore fuerint, Universitatis Procuratoribus." *TIT. xxi. § 2.*—This, however, is not "the main hinge upon which all my subsequent observations turn;" for I stated, that it is a court "in which there is no jury;" a court, in which "the process is tedious," and in which "the expenses are so great as to operate to the total exclusion of the poorer clients."—If APSEUDES, while the Statute Book is in his hand, will turn to *TIT. xv. § 4.* he will find that the University-officers have the power of searching houses both by day and night; a power equivalent in effect to that of a general search-warrant. I will, however, take this opportunity of pointing out an important difference in one respect, which seems to have escaped the sagacity of APSEUDES; it is, that their power does not extend to the forcing or breaking open of doors; though I heard an instance, a few years ago, in which this power was illegally exercised by them.*

* The officers of the University have not the power of forcing doors, or breaking into a house, if refused admittance, in any case whatever. If any person refuse them admittance, he is liable to a penalty of twenty shillings for the first offence. On a repetition of this offence, if committed by a non-matriculated man, he is to be

The words of the Statute are these:—"In subsidium Vice-Cancellarii et Procuratorum, potestas sit Præfectis Ædium Domos Oppidanorum intrandi; ut explorent an aliqui e suis illic versentur de die vel de nocte."—If APSEUDES from his own knowledge is not sufficiently acquainted with the fact, he will find, by making the necessary inquiries, that within the last twelvemonth (though, I believe, not before) prostitutes have been apprehended by the Proctors, and committed to prison by the Vice Chancellor, for "merely appearing in the streets, though walking orderly and quietly, in the day-time." Indeed the fact speaks for itself; for before this illegal severity took place, women of this description were frequently seen walking in the streets in the day-time, but now very rarely;† and, I am ready to allow, that if this alteration could have been brought about by legal means, exercised with proper temper and discretion, it would have been desirable. But the Proctors have not any power in the streets, in the day-time, over any but matriculated persons. The time of watch-and-ward does not commence till nine o'clock at night, and it ends at five in the morning, and it is only during that time that the Proctors have any power in the streets over those who are not matriculated; for all jurisdiction over them in the day-time belongs exclusively to the Mayor. I must here add, that if any endeavours have been used to reclaim prostitutes from their vicious mode of life, they are solely owing to individual exertion, and not to the officers of the University in their corporate and magisterial capacity.—If APSEUDES will condescend to ask almost any inhabitant of Oxford concerning an unfortunate female-prisoner "being driven into a state of insanity, from which she never recovered," he will learn that her name was Susanna Gray. She was a prostitute, and was sentenced to imprisonment, at the Quarter-Sessions, for being concerned in a riot. The circumstance happened nearly twenty years ago, and, at the time, made a great impression on the public mind. I have reason to think, from information with

deprived of all intercourse or commerce with privileged persons; and if committed by a privileged man, he is to be deprived of his privilege. See *Stat. Tit. xv. § 4.*—How these penalties are to be enforced, we are not informed.

† Their walking used to be checked, in some degree, by a kind of compromise or agreement, that if they did not appear in the streets, in the day-time, they would not be molested by the Proctors at night in their houses.

which I have been favoured, since I addressed my "Observations" to you, that she was not committed by the Proctors. At any rate, she affords a melancholy instance of the effects of imprisonment (however deserving of punishment she might have been) on the constitution of females of that description; which was all I wished to prove, and is all that was asserted.—— So much for *APSEUDES*, the detector of fallacies! If he will point out any other assertions, which he conceives to be false, for he says, of the misrepresentations he has "selected only some of the most glaring specimens;" and by so doing give me an opportunity of noticing them, he will make some amends for the coarse language into which his zeal has betrayed him, and, at the same time, confer a considerable obligation on, Sir, your obedient servant,

Oxford, March 26, 1814. Y. Z.

Another Correspondent has transmitted the following:—

MR. EDITOR,—The great power of the Proctors, and the frequent abuse of that power having become, in consequence of the letter which appeared in your Register of Feb. 26, the chief topic of conversation in Oxford, I send you the following case, which can be supported by the testimony of many respectable persons, and request you to lay it before the public.——In the summer of 1800, a few students of this University, met several successive evenings, at about eight o'clock, towards the upper part of the High-street; and violently assaulted those inhabitants of the city who happened to be passing.——On the third evening of their continuing the outrage, the Proctors came, and sent the students to their colleges.——On that evening, Mr. Bayliss, of the parish of St. Martin, in this city, was quietly standing at his own door, in Queen-street, at some little distance from the scene of riot. Mr. Alderman Yates came up to him, and inquired what was the cause of so many persons being assembled. They were soon afterwards joined by Mr. Thomas Ensworth, sen. of the Corn-Market; when the Proctors, with their attendants, came up to them, and desired Mr. Ensworth to go home. He said, he was standing on his own ground, that he had purchased the freedom of the city, and that he should go home when he thought proper. One of the Proctors next accosted Bayliss, who was a feeble inoffensive man, and upwards of seventy years of age, while standing at his

own door, with words to the following effect: "Unless you go into your house immediately we will take you to gaol." He replied, that "he had done no harm, and that he did not like to be driven like a dog into his kennel:" on which, without further parley, they instantly ordered him into the custody of their assistants, and he was taken to the county gaol, where he was confined two nights and a day, without being confronted by his accusers, in the vagrant-cell, a cold, damp, detached building; a place very improper for a man of his habits and situation in life, and still more so for one of his age and infirmities.

——The consequence of his being confined in that cold cell was, a severe fit of illness, which lasted several weeks: a violent cold settled in his limbs, and occasioned a lameness from which he never recovered; his mind, too, suffered so considerably from the thoughts of having been confined in a common prison, the receptacle of rogues and vagabonds, that he never appeared to have regained that happiness and serenity, which he had previously been accustomed to enjoy.——This unfortunate man was a fishmonger. He had kept a shop for many years in the High-street; but when this affair happened he lived in Queen-street.——An action at common law was commenced against the Rev. William Wood, one of the Proctors; but the acting officers of the University pleaded their privilege, obtained cognizance, and moved the cause into the Vice-Chancellor's court.——His friends, being aware, that in a court in which there is no jury, and in which the defendant, being Proctor, had a right to sit as one of the judges, he could have but little chance of redress, very prudently advised him to drop the prosecution.——The widow of Mr. Bayliss is still living, and resides in the parish of St. Clement. She can speak to the truth of all the material parts of the above case, and is willing to answer any inquiries.

Yours, &c. CIVIS.

Oxford, April 4, 1814.

THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON AND HIS ARMY.

——I shall not be induced to give up the title which I have chosen for this article, until I find that Bonaparte has not an army to command, even although the sovereign power should be assumed at Paris by Louis XVIIIth; because I do firmly believe, that the French people are warmly attached to Napoleon, not only from interested mo-

tives, but also from inclination; and viewing the matter in this light, I would be committing an outrage on my own feelings, were I to suppose that this people would give the preference to a man, whose name a great portion of them, perhaps, never heard pronounced, and whom a still greater portion never saw. In the last Register, we left Napoleon at Arcis-sur-Aube, on the morning of the 20th ult. The head-quarters of the Allies were, on the 18th, at Bar-sur-Aube. The *Moniteur* of the 29th contains the following short bulletin. "On the 26th inst. his Majesty the Emperor beat, at St. Dizier, General Winzingerode; took 2,000 prisoners, cannon, and many baggage waggons. This corps has been pursued far." In dispatches received from Sir Charles Stewart, of the same date, the above affair is noticed in the following manner:—"Winzingerode's rear towards St. Dizier seems to have been assailed on the evening of the 26th and morning of the 27th by a very preponderating force of the enemy, especially as to infantry. The details of the affair are not arrived; but it appears the General was obliged to retreat in the direction of Bar-le-Duc." Since this advantage obtained by Napoleon at St. Dizier, nothing certain has transpired as to his subsequent movements; but all Europe have, by this time, heard of the advance of the combined allied army to the gates of Paris, and the proposed capitulation of that city, though it yet remains to be seen whether actual possession was really given. The fact, according to present appearances, cannot be well disputed: still no official accounts had reached government, when the Register went to press, of the entrance of any of the allied troops into Paris. But where, it is naturally asked, was Bonaparte; what object was he pursuing; what important matter engaged his attention, that he did not make the smallest effort to prevent the grand army reaching his capital? There are questions to which, it must be confessed, no positive answer can be given till later accounts reach us. Meanwhile, if we may judge from the known and cautious policy of Napoleon, and from the frequency with which he has out-manœuvred his opponents, it cannot be supposed, as some pretend, that he allowed himself to be out-generalled, but that the object he proposed, by making so great a sacrifice, was still greater, and would be attended with consequences more decisive than any of those ephemeral advantages which he lately obtained over the Allies. Their great object was to obtain possession of Paris; and they appeared disposed to sacrifice every thing to this but a pitched battle. Tired by the predatory warfare which this occasioned, Napoleon seems to have determined on opening the way for them; and to have calculated on the chances, which this movement would necessarily give him, of bringing on a general engagement. It was, perhaps, a part of his policy to reduce the Allied Army as much as possible; in the first instance, by partial actions, in order that he might have the less to contend with when he had placed them in a situation where they could not decline the contest. Accordingly, we find him not only departing entirely from his former plan of forcing the Allies to retire, when they threatened an approach to the capital, but we see him advancing his whole army to so great a distance towards the Rhine, in order to preclude all possible chance of his being able to prevent the Allies reaching Paris.

They began their advanced march on the 23d, and yet, though Napoleon could not be ignorant of the junction of Blücher and Schwartzberg, and of the combined army having taken the direct road to Paris, we do not see that he troubled himself about this movement; but, on the contrary, after the affair of St. Dizier on the 26th, we still find him getting farther from the capital. "Bonaparte (says Sir Charles Stewart), in his present undertaking, seems to have pushed his object so far, by the passage of the Aube, with his whole army, near Vitry, as to have left himself completely open." Is it credible; can it be believed for a single moment, that Napoleon, while he was pushing his object so far; while he was carrying his whole army across the Aube, and laying the road to Paris completely open, he was all the while deceived as to the movements of the Allies? Impossible. He must have known all; he could not fail to be acquainted with their proceedings. The fair presumption then is, that Napoleon purposely left the way open; intending, in future, to carry on his operations against the Allies, upon a scale which would bring the contest to a more speedy termination. The first official intelligence from France, will probably enable us to judge how far these speculations are correct. Meanwhile, there is not any lack of rumours; the most prominent of which is, that the Allies had made proposals of peace to the Senate, who are said to have returned for answer, "that these could only be received by the Emperor." Whether true or false, the report has produced a considerable depression on the funds.

OCCURRENCES OF THE WAR.—The battle of Belleville, on the heights of Paris, which, it is said, led to the surrender of that city, may be regarded as one of the most remarkable occurrences of the war. The Allies, in their progress to the French capital, encountered several small divisions of Napoleon's army, who, notwithstanding the disparity of their numbers, did not shrink from the contest. A remarkable instance of this gallantry is described in our *Gazette*. "A corps, consisting of nearly 5,000 conscripts, though completely surrounded by the cavalry of both armies, refused to surrender, still kept marching on and firing, and did not lay down their arms." It is added, that the whole of this corps, except 20 men, were either killed or severely wounded. Joseph Bonaparte, having drawn out the National Guard from Paris, after forming a junction with the corps of Mortier and Marmont, also refused to surrender, though his whole army consisted of only 36,000 men, while the Allies amounted to nearly 200,000! The result of a battle could not be long doubtful. The French were driven from the heights by the vast superiority of the columns which attacked them; but they do not appear to have been completely routed, as they retired, in consequence of a formal cessation of hostilities, and carried with them about 100 pieces of cannon.

By dispatches from Lord Wellington, dated Samatan, March 25, it appears that Marshal Soult had retired with his army to Toulouse.

NOTICE.

Owing to yesterday being a holiday, the necessary arrangements could not be completed at the Stamp Office, for publishing the *Register* this week at Mr. Morton's, No 94, Strand, to whom all communications and orders (post paid) must be forwarded in future, addressed to the Editors.

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DETHRONEMENT OF NAPOLEON.

"It is ended," says the *COURIER* newspaper. "*The Drama is closed*," says the *CHRONICLE*; "Mine eyes have seen thy salvation," says the half-canting and half-blaspheinous *TIMES*.—Indeed, the grand contest is now come to an end, and we shall have leisure to look back and to contrast our situation at the commencement of it, with what it is now.—At present, I shall confine myself to some few observations (for thousands offer themselves) upon the *causes* and the *effects* of the dethronement of Napoleon.—The *immediate* causes of this event were, evidently, the loss of his army in Russia, the subsequent abandonment of him, in the midst of battle, by his German Allies, and the overwhelming force of the combined armies. But, the more distant cause, and the only cause, was his *vanity*; that vanity, which led him to seek family alliances with the ancient sovereigns of Europe. He lost the hearts of all the best men of France; that is to say, of the enlightened friends of freedom, by abolishing the Republic, by assuming the title of Emperor, and by acting the despot; but, he lost his crown by his vanity; and, by a species of vanity, too, the most contemptible of all:—He must needs be, not only a *Royal* personage, but he must be related to the *old* Royal race; he must marry amongst them; and, which was most abominable, after all that the people of France had done to get rid of the family influence of the House of Austria, he must needs bring a daughter of that house and place over that same French people: He must bring the niece of that same Marie Antoinette, whom the French people, in the excess of their resentment against her, had dragged to the scaffold.—This was an unpardonable offence in the eyes of the friends of freedom; and would have been atoned for by nothing short of his employing his power to the general benefit of mankind. But, to himself, the consequence of this vanity of his has been ruin. For, if he had been possessed with no such vanity; if he had even been resolved to be an *Emperor*, or a *King*, without this alliance, he

would, as he was able, have *destroyed all the old dynasties*; ALL the sovereigns of Europe would have been of his creation; their right to reign would, every where, have rested upon the same basis; and, of course, whatever *wars* might have arisen amongst them, the *dethronement* of no one would have been in contemplation. If he had, when he had it in his power, furnished Austria and Prussia with kings, he would not now have lived to accept of his life at the hands of the sovereigns of those countries. But, this would not have suited the purposes of his vanity; his contemptible vanity, which urged him on to seek family alliances with the old Royal race. He spared the father in order to obtain the daughter: He supported the old Royal race, because he wanted to secure a dynasty of his own: He made common cause, in fact, with the old Royal race, as towards the people, hoping thereby to have their aid and countenance in support of his title and that of his descendants: He joined the old Royal race, in the hope of their being reconciled to his power; he discouraged and forbade every act in France tending to expose to hatred, or contempt, any of the old Royal race in any country of Europe; and, as in the instance of *PONTANES's* speech, he sought to curry favour with sovereigns in general, by speaking contemptuously of the *people*. For *these things* he deserves his fate, and a fate a great deal worse than that which appears to have befallen him. *These* are his sins in my eyes. He had the power of doing great good; he had the power to give freedom to all Europe; he did much good to France; he established, or rather, he did not destroy, the good laws which the Republicans had made; he did not bring back and replant the curses, which the Republicans had rooted out: France, under him, was much happier than France was before the revolution. But, the lovers of freedom put great means into his hands; he had a mind calculated to give effect to those means; he did, for a while, employ them well; but, being seized with the vanity of being a king, and with that most abominable

rich of being a *papa* and leaving a son, descended from a mother of the old Royal race, he, from that moment, wholly abandoned the good cause, and laid the foundation of what has now come to pass. — When he received the notice from the Emperors of Austria and Russia and the King of Prussia to quit France, I dare say it occurred to him, that it would not have happened thus, if he had done what he might so easily have done after the battles of Austerlitz, Eylau, and Jena. If he had done *then* what he might have done; what he had the power to do: what the French nation wished him to do; what his principles at the out-set would have dictated to him; he would never have seen these sovereigns at Paris at the head of victorious armies. His vanity; his paltry vanity; his most nauseous vanity; his desire to connect himself by marriage with the old Royal race, and, in order to secure a succession to his throne, to make common cause with that race as towards the people; this it was that prevented him from using his power in that way, which alone could give security to his own authority. He might have been even an *Emperor*, if his vanity, the nonsensical vanity, of allying himself with the old Royal race had not seized him. But, it seems, that, having risen to an imperial crown *himself*, he did not think proper to raise others, his former equals, to royal dignities, except his own *brothers and relations*. He wanted a part, at least, and the main part, of the old Royal race to remain in power, that he might have the glory of being allied to it by the "*tender ties*," as the *Moniteur* used to call it; and this stopped him in the execution of those acts, which *alone* could, for any length of time, secure him upon his throne. — This is the cause of his fall. His fall is the fruit of his vanity; and, to indulge that vanity, he was led to betray the cause of freedom; to misuse the power which the friends of freedom had put into his hands; to put off, perhaps, for the life of man, the benefits which might have proceeded from his acting upon the principles of those from whom he derived his power. — He may now, in the Island of Elba, or in whatever other hidden corner of the earth he may be suffered to exist, enjoy the thought of being allied by the "*tender ties*" to his august father-in-law, the Emperor of Germany; the thought of having mixed his blood with that of Maria Theresa; the thought of having in his arms a niece of the Royal Marie Antoinette, whose

head the French people severed from her body. But, he may be deprived even of this; for, the Pope, being restored to a free exercise of his power, may be disposed to consent to a *divorce* of this daughter of Austria from a man, who was married at the time of his second nuptials. It is said, that the "*Empress, Queen and Regent*," has retired with him; but, I much question whether her father will suffer her to remain in that retirement. If he had been disposed to consider Napoleon and his child as part of his family, he would not have consented to his delthronement; and, therefore, as I observed, some time ago, this consent seems to forebode a divorce. — Now, as to the *probable effects* of this great event, as far as relates to *France*, in all likelihood, the ancient regime, with some exceptions, will be re-established. To believe that a *free government* will be established in France, under such auspices, would be foolish; but, it will be impossible to make the government what it was before. The nobility, the clergy, all that is left alive of the old school, will go back; but, the *seigneurial* and *provincial courts* and parliaments; the game laws of *Capitaines*, the gabelles, the *gabellas*, the *corvées*, and the hellish *lettres de cachet*, cannot be revived without a long and bloody civil war. The restoration of the property of the landed church may, in part, take place; but I question whether the restoration of *tithes* will be attempted. So that, even without any *constitution*; even without the positive and direct recognition of any one principle of liberty, the people of France will have been great gainers by their revolution; and those, who are now alive, will owe great gratitude to those who have shed their blood in the obtaining and securing of this better state of things. We shall see, by and by, what will be done; but, without waiting to know any thing about the designs of the King of France, we may venture to predict, and almost to assert, that what will have been gained by the people, will be found to be worth more than all the sacrifices that they have made, great as those sacrifices have undoubtedly been. There may be men to counsel vindictive measures; but they cannot punish a whole nation. The new government will not want a civil war to begin with. It will want, for a time at least, peace and the good will of the great mass of the people. It will have a *fighting* people to deal with. It cannot get rid of them. It cannot keep them in

subjection against their will; and, therefore, it must conciliate: it must not suffer the people to regret the fall of Napoleon. —This is a great point to keep in view. For, let the reader observe, that every proposition for the destruction of *bribery and corruption* will be now met with a remark, that we ought to look at the *example of France*. So that, it will be of the first, of the very first importance, for us to mark with great care what *that example* really does tell us. The Revolution is now ended: the “drama is closed:” and, though it has not closed in the way that the Republicans in France must have wished, we must take care to note, very carefully, what *difference* there is between the state of things about to take place, and the state of things *before the revolution*; and, if we find, that the people of France have been *bettered upon the whole*; if we find them *better* at the *end* than they were at the *beginning*, their example, at any rate, will be no very sound argument, why we should not, especially when all danger from without is removed, coolly, peaceably, and constitutionally demand our rights. —Before I proceed to remark upon the effects which the fall of Napoleon will be likely to produce in *this country*, I must stop, a moment, to observe, that this close of the drama leaves the friends of freedom nothing to be ashamed of. Napoleon was an *Emperor and King*; the son-in-law of an Emperor; allied by marriage to several royal families; the founder, not of free constitutions, but of despotic governments. He destroyed the Inquisition; he destroyed the temporal powers of the Pope; he did much good, but he was first a traitor to, and then the foe of, freedom. It is not a First Consul, it is not a republican chief, but it is an Emperor and King who has fallen. While the banners of freedom waved over his head, nothing could resist him and his armies. France was invaded before, and by the very same enemies who have invaded her now. She now has had all Europe to contend against, and so she had before; but, in 1792, she was urged on by the genius of *freedom*, and now she was led forth by an *Emperor and King*, the son-in-law of the Royal House of Austria. —These, therefore, who contend, that it is freedom which alone is capable of securing the independence of nations, will find in the history of the French revolution the *proof* of the truth of their doctrine. France was invaded before; she was actually invaded by Austria, Prussia, England, and Holland;

but, though in a state of internal distraction; though the people hardly knew who were their rulers, or from whom they received their orders; France then did not, like Napoleon, fill proclamations with professions of a desire for peace; but, on the contrary, proclaimed death to the first man who should be base enough to propose to *treat* with any power, so long as that power dared to keep a single soldier on the soil of France. This was the language of the Republicans of France, who rushed forth against their invaders, who drove them from their soil, or buried them beneath it; who pursued them; who punished them, and who made some of them, on their own soil, sue for peace at the hands of those whose liberties they had attacked, and whose principles and persons they had treated with disdain. This ending of the drama, therefore, only tends to confirm the doctrine, that liberty, besides being the greatest of civil blessings, is the only infallible defence of nations. The triumph is the triumph of *republicans*, indeed; for, it was not, ‘till the banners of republicanism ceased to be displayed, that defeat attended the Arms of France. It is not the “child and champion” of Jacobinism who has fallen; it is an *Emperor and King*; it is a *son-in-law of the ancient House of Austria*; it is a man, who, after having betrayed the cause of liberty, treated the people with contempt. I do not say, that this is the *best* termination that could have happened to the contest; but certainly it is the *second best*; for, to have left Napoleon with a *moderate* degree of power, would have been a million times worse than the restoration of the Bourbons, even with the old regime along with them. —But, what is much more interesting to *us* than every thing else is, the effect that this great event will have upon *ourselves*. It has been remarked, that this event, which, for so many years, has been wished for with as much impatience as the bridegroom wishes for the wedding day, has not produced so much exultation as a little victory in Spain, and not a tenth part so much as Napoleon's retreat from Moscow. —Some have supposed, that the joy of the nation is *too great for utterance*; but, the fact is, that those, who have been accustomed to be the loudest in their rejoicings at *victories* as being the *food or fuel of war*, have very different feelings at an event, which *must of necessity* produce a cessation of war and of *their gains*. This is the true cause of their apparently unaccountable

chagrin; and, let who will remark well the operations upon this occasion, he will find, that the demonstrations of joy will be mixed with a gloom, which no such demonstrations ever were before.—To those, who live by the *arts of peace*; to those who place their dependence upon the fruits of their *talents and industry*; to those who have derived, neither directly nor indirectly, any benefit from the war, this event, as far as relates to their private interests, at least, must be greatly beneficial. But, to those, who, whether as officers of the army or navy; as contractors, commissaries, pursers, paymasters, storeship and transport owners, biscuit bakers, great-coatmen, army tailors, district and staff commanders, inspecting field officers, surgeons of the army and navy, doctors and proctors, dock-yard people, commissioners, or as any out of all the endless retinue of war; to all these and their relations, on whom they depend; to all these classes, forming no inconsiderable part of the whole nation, this event has been a *stroke of thunder*.—The fact is, that the government has now the distributing of about 60 or 70 millions a-year on account of the war, or money to 700,000 persons at an average of 100l. a-year! Let any one imagine, then, with what feelings these, the most *loyal* part of the nation, will contemplate the change about to take place. They rejoiced very sincerely at *victories* over Napoleon; but, it was because those victories kept up the spirit of the people, and countenanced the continuation of the war. He was their political *Satan*, but they did not wish to see him *destroyed*. His destruction is to them similar to what the ministers of the Gospel would experience, if my worthy, though unbelieving friend, Mr. FORDHAM, were to succeed in making us participate in his disbelief of the existence of the *Devil*. The fishermen of Newfoundland, when I have partaken in their convivial meetings, always, as the first toast, gave “the *Pork*,” and, upon the same principle, I have no doubt, that Napoleon has been frequently toasted by army and navy contractors. The race, of which I am speaking, cried out most bitterly against Napoleon. They called him all manner of vile names. He was a murderer, a monster, a very devil incarnate; but, this was to prevent us from *making peace* with him. That was all. They did not want him *destroyed*. As long as they could keep the people in *alarm* at him; as long as they could, by any means, con-

trive to make us believe, that it was necessary for us to *pay them*, in order to be protected *against him*, it was all they wanted. Their wishes did not extend to the rooting up of the tree: they only wanted to continue to gather and eat the fruit.—They console themselves now with the hope, that *still a large naval and military force will be kept up*. For WHAT? Who are we *afraid* of now? What *pretext* is there now, or can there be *invented*, for keeping up such a force? And, this is one of the great advantages of the dethronement of Napoleon. For, if he had been left in power, however closely his nails might have been pared, there would never, with all these great interests at work, have been wanting a pretext for a vast military and naval expenditure, and for barracks, depots, and military colleges all over the country; aye, and for district and staff commands, and inspectorships; and local militia, and the like. But *now*, there can be no pretext. We have got rid of the scare-crow; the hob-goblin is gone; the political and military Devil is annihilated; and, what is more, we have restored in France precisely that order of things, which we always professed to seek for, as the sure and certain means of lasting peace.—So that from their carriages these gentry must descend. We, who sought for *peace*, shall have our wish. We thought that peace might be safely made with Napoleon. We were called Jacobins for that opinion; but, at any rate, we shall now have peace. This peace, and especially in the way that it will come, will produce a change in England almost worthy of the name of a *revolution*. The 50,000 poor souls, who have so long been cooped up in our prisons, will again see their fine country, and will leave all their keepers, their commissaries, their clerks, their beef and bread (I have a bit of the latter that I shall keep) contractors; all their turnip and potatoe contractors; all the swarm that lived in guarding and supplying them; all these *worthy* gentlemen they will leave to *cultivate the arts of peace*, to sell beef and bread to their neighbours, and to be employed by those who may stand in need of the services of such persons. That immense town of Portsmouth, and that other immense town of Plymouth, together with Chatham and others, will now be relieved from the press that annoy them. The loyal people of those places, who have built such fine streets for the reception of new comers, will now be able to give proofs of their public spirit and gra-

itude in accommodating, with large elbow room, the gentlemen who will return from the wars. No longer shall we see families plunged in mourning for the loss of relations on service; tender fathers and mothers, who, out of pure love of their king and hatred of Napoleon, have sent their sons into the army and navy, will no longer be looking with paternal anxiety into the lists of killed and wounded. They will now enjoy the society of their children by their own fire-sides: under their own vines, and own fig-trees they may sit, with no one to make them afraid. Those, who have been supplying great-coats for the army, and trousers for the navy; all the army butchers and bakers; all, *yea all*, may now, and *must* now, cultivate the arts of peace; that is to say, they must work, in some way or other, for their bread; for the warlike Devil is destroyed, and their occupation is gone.—And, oh! ye Barrack-Masters; ye guardians of the nation's coals and candles, and bed-steads, and bedding, and pots, and kettles, and fire-shovels, and pokers, what think ye of the fall of Napoleon? Think you that your horses will be so sleek and the livery of your servants so gay? Will your wives now find it so difficult to curb their steeds, sufficiently to restrain them from trampling on the people by whose labour they have been maintained?—The constables staff; this is the sort of arms, to which Englishmen formerly yielded obedience, and to which alone, let us now hope, they will, in future be, in any way subjected.—There is now no room for any pretext for keeping up any force greater than that, at most, which was kept up after the close of the American war, when, colonies included, the whole did not exceed *thirty-seven thousand men*.—But, if, contrary to every rational ground of hope, a great force should be kept up, and a great annual expence still incurred, what reason should we have to boast of this termination of the contest? It will be very easy to shew, when the proper time comes, that *all* which we shall now get; all which we shall now secure; that all which we say we shall get, we *had* before the war began, and might have continued to enjoy *it without any war, or any debt at all*; but that is too large and too interesting a subject to be treated of here, and especially before people's minds have settled down into any thing like sober thought. We are as yet in the delirious hour of the feast, and it is too soon to talk about the *reckoning*. The *bill*; the *bill* is the

serious subject. The *eight hundred millions of debt*; the paper-money; the income-tax, and such like topics must be reserved, 'till the delirium has subsided a little. At present, therefore, I shall deal with *minor* matters. If we do not reduce our expences; if we do not reduce very low our military and naval force; if barracks, and depots, and military colleges, are still to go on, what shall we have gained by this great event? While the war lasted, or, indeed, while the warlike Devil had been in power, people would have paid, as far as they could, with some degree of content; but this Devil being so completely destroyed, what will they say, if they have still to pay the *same taxes* as when he was in power, and when they were made to believe, that the income-tax was absolutely necessary to preserve them from being devoured by him?—This event will have fine effect in *opening of eyes*. We have been groping on blind-folded for twenty-two years. Many things were amiss, it was acknowledged, but *peace*, and especially the fall of Napoleon, would put all to rights. Now, then, we shall *see*. We shall see whether the income-tax will be repealed; we shall see whether the Bank will pay in specie; we shall see whether it was the malignant hostility of Napoleon that kept our guineas out of circulation; we shall see whether the paupers will become less numerous, without the repeal of taxes; we shall see whether loans will cease: and, if we see none of these, we shall see how the loyal people, who pay taxes and do not receive any, will stare at one another. They will all become jacobins, I am afraid; that is to say, people who do not like to work to earn bread for others, who do nothing, to eat. When a man now ventures to say, that he thinks it wrong, that one man should receive out of the taxes many thousands a year for doing nothing, he cannot be *answered* by an observation that he is a *partizan of Napoleon*. This *answer* will not now be given to those who say, that seats in parliament ought not to be bought and sold. Some other answer must now be found out; and, when the people are called upon for as much in taxes as they were before, they will look so silly at each other first, and then they will begin to bite their lips and grind their teeth. But, gentlemen! act like gentlemen. You have had a feast; you have just been shouting and rejoicing; and pray, *pay the reckoning*. People do not, now-a-days, have feasts for nothing. They pay the bill;

and John Bull, who is a very liberal fellow, ought to act like himself, and pay it without grumbling. This is what old George Rose will tell us, I am sure, when he calls a county-meeting in Hampshire, and at which meeting I shall, if alive and well, certainly attend to give my voice for congratulating the Regent upon the cessation of war and plunder, and upon the speedy approach of guineas in lieu of paper.—The *reckoning* is a part of a feast, which some people forget; but we must not forget it: we must keep it constantly in view; and, amongst the benefits of the French revolution to France, the French people have *no reckoning to pay*. They pay off the score of the old government, and they have contracted no *new* debt. They begin the world afresh, full-handed; and they will, as they would have done under Napoleon, start in the career of peace with amazing advantages. Their country has not been drained. It is the finest country in the world. Those who cannot live here and pay the taxes, will go thither to spend their money and live cheap. But, I suppose, the king of France, out of *gratitude* to this country, will not suffer his people to rival us! These notions are afloat. Wild as they are, they are afloat. The King of France, who certainly has shown great constancy in all his trials, will, I dare say, be highly gratified to see himself under the royal flag of the Duke of Clarence, waiving him over to France; but, that will scarcely deprive him of his *memory*. He must bear in mind a little what is passed. He has travelled about a good deal from country to country. He knows a little of mankind by this time; and, he must be strangely infatuated, if he does not do all that he is able to conciliate *his people*. His army is made to his hands, generals, soldiers, all will be given to him ready prepared; and such an army, too, as there is not in the world. He will not be so weak as to reject the services of such men as Soult and Marmont; and, we may lay our account with not seeing France reduced to a *shadow* to please us. The powers of the continent, having got rid of their dread; having no longer any occasion for our fleets, or our subsidies, will not be very desirous of leaving us absolute masters of all the colonies, and all the commerce of the world; and, besides the war-gentry, I shall not be at all surprised to hear many others, before this day twelve months, regret the fall of Napoleon.—The King of France, as he sails over with the Duke of

Clarence, may amuse himself with reading the Treaty of *Amiens*. That document will always be an instructive lesson to him; and will, doubtless, keep alive in his bosom that gratitude, which he is said to owe to this country.—In short, it is nonsense to talk in this strain. He owes no gratitude to any power. All the powers have, by turns, left him to his fate; and they have now restored him, because they were afraid of Napoleon, or of the example of another revolution. They have, for their own safety, put him upon the throne; and, if he be a wise man; if calamity has not been a teacher in vain, he will seek the good will of *HIS PEOPLE*, who alone can make that throne secure.—It now remains to be seen whether we shall have a commercial intercourse with France; whether we shall be upon the same footing, in that respect, as we were before the war began. If we are not, there will be a clear loss by the war; and, if we are, we shall see whether that intercourse will bring our guineas back again into circulation. So many topics arise, that the mind is puzzled which to choose; but, the event has a *great good* in it, as it will inevitably throw into honest labour, or send to Botany Bay, or the gallows, that swarm of reptiles, who have so long lived by the means of a *hireling press*. No more SECOND EDITIONS and THIRD EDITIONS. No more trumpeting of lies and cheating the public: Curiosity will now have nothing to work on: The alarm is over: The old maiden ladies will sleep in peace; especially if their incomes should be enlarged by the turning of paper into gold. The hirelings of the press will soon begin to find the lack of traffic. Their talents will soon cease to be vendable. They will be no more wanted than the commissaries and contractors for prisoners of war. Away goes that profitable branch of commerce, the dealing in *Moniteurs*. News will now come from the Continent by the post, and to every one who may have a mind to receive it. It will be no longer *treason* to correspond with France, or to shake a Frenchman by the hand. To revile a man now as a *jacotin*, will be senseless, and will excite ridicule amongst a people who have lost their *fears*.—This is a great good. The *tugboat* is gone: The *hobgoblin* is destroyed: Reason will now resume her sway; and, in spite of all that can be done, I do not care by what means, the lot of those who do not now live upon the taxes, *must be bettered*.

HAS NAPOLEON FALLEN?

MR. COBBETT.—“Whatever is right:”—So says Pope, and late events prove it true. It was right that France should be vanquished and that Napoleon should be deposed. It is a highly useful lesson to mankind, to nations, and to sovereigns. It is right *despotic* monarchs should be taught, that nations are not their *property*; that *their* will or caprice do not constitute law; and that the kingly office is but a *trust*! Often have they been told this; a Charles, a James, and a Lewis have, at their cost, been so taught.—These lessons, however, having proved insufficient, the French nation and Napoleon, have now given to the world another, and a more exalted specimen. The first of these have exerted their indefeasible right in deposing Napoleon. The latter has frankly acknowledged that right, by nobly signing his abdication; and, like Caesar, when assassinated in the Senate, on discovering his son among the conspirators, after feebly and tenderly exclaiming, *et la Brute*, covered his head with his robe, and sunk unresisting and silent. So Napoleon, when informed of the national will, expressed by the senate, with an elevation of sentiment to which few can attain, calmly and with dignity signed his own abdication! Let the unfeigned and grateful thanks of mankind follow him for having acted thus. After having rendered the most essential services to the nation while a Republic; after having accepted the crown and the throne, made hereditary in his family by the gratitude of that same nation, he, upon a change of the public opinion, and to procure peace to his beloved country, to prevent a civil war for his *personal* rights, acquiesces with its will, expressed by a Senate of his own choosing; calmly descends from the throne; writes, with his own hand, his abdication; and retires.—Monarchs of Europe, to you and to your people this lesson is addressed! From it learn, that it is both honourable and safe to attend to your *people's wishes*!—Napoleon in his abdication says, “The allied powers having proclaimed that the Emperor Napoleon was the only obstacle to the re-establishment of the peace of Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares, that he renounces for himself and his heirs, the thrones of France and Italy, and that there is no personal sacrifice, *even that of life*, which he is not ready to make to the interest of France.”—Here he asserts, not his crown merely, but his life

to be at the disposal of his country; and that he would joyfully lay down both for its salvation and prosperity. In the opposite scale to gold, he throws magnanimity; but, in this refined age, gold preponderates, and Napoleon falls! Yet this was the man of the people's choice.—Now the malignant scribblers of venality accuse him with cowardice for having so abdicated. These dastardly and time serving reptiles, well versed in the suggestions of cowardice, judging of Napoleon's mind by their own, cannot conceive any other motive for his resignation: But were they, or were the impartial and sensible for them, to revert to a public document published four months prior to the date of his abdication, they would there find that step intimated, not indeed in *positive* language but strongly hinted at, as the future purchase of peace to the French nation, if it should prove necessary. This is contained in the speech of M. De Fontanes to the Conservative Senate. The whole discourse would well bear, at this critical juncture, a republication, with explanatory notes, for the use of the good people of England.—The passage alluded to runs thus:—“This appeal to the national honour is dictated by the love of peace; of that peace, which is not obtained by *weakness* but by *firmness*; of that peace in short, which the Emperor, WITH A NEW SPECIES OF COURAGE, PROMISES TO GRANT AT THE PRICE OF GREAT SACRIFICES.”—Although the word ABDICATION is not here positively made use of, yet it is strongly implied in the expressions, *with a new species of courage and at the price of great sacrifices*.—Subsequent events have shown what, *that new species of courage* meant; though our venal and ignorant writers cannot comprehend this because it is made up of materials they are not provided with; because it is composed of principle, honour, self-command, and disinterestedness, of which they are wholly destitute. Noble France! Magnanimous Napoleon! if it be true that this twenty years war has cost Britain upwards of eight hundred millions; this dethroning, this abdicating lesson, is fully worth the expense; for although other nations may reap the benefit while we alone pay the cost, yet the whole human species will derive advantage from it. In marching the combined armies into France; in taking possession of the capital; in compelling the Senate to dethrone Napoleon: and to assign reasons for so doing, the Allies have jointly given the death blow to despotism

all over civilized Europe; they have delineated, in strong colours, the facility of a people's overthrowing every species of tyranny; they have taught their own subjects that they are *men*; that reason, right, and power, belong to the people. Their soldiers, after receiving instruction in France, will carry it to their fellow subjects at home.—The very savage and fierce Cossack will say, it was in obedience to the *sovereign will of the people* that the great, the renowned Napoleon, who had so often and so valiantly vanquished their sovereigns, and then extended his friendly hand to raise them from the dust; that this very Napoleon, the conqueror of Emperors, the maker of Kings, had abdicated his crown at the wish of his people!—He did not make war upon them; he did not reproach them as rebels; he abdicated. On learning this, Russians, Prussians, Austrians, and Germans of every denomination will ask, have the people then such rights? Have the people such powers?—Reflexion follows.—But these advantages are confined to our Allies.—Our King (God bless him) can do no wrong. We, therefore, can have no pretence for voting him out of the throne. But our good King, like unto a valuable plant upon a hot-bed, may grow surrounded by noxious weeds; may be both stunted and shadowed by them. These weeds it is equally a gardener's, as a nation's duty, to pluck up by the roots; and among other such weeds now growing rapidly, and surrounding the royal plant, we certainly must class *corruption*, and consider it an imperious duty to root it out most speedily.—**REFORM OF PARLIAMENT**—a dreadful sound to the corrupt;—a Reform of Parliament, now the sole means of saving the country, can at present meet with no opposition but from corruption.—A Reform of Parliament to remedy the past and to prevent all future abuses—a Reform of Parliament will lay open to the public eye all the items of an expenditure of 800 millions—a Reform in Parliament will, by economy, reduce such extravagant expenditure for the future; and a Reform in Parliament, by acts of justice, may bring back much of it to the public purse. The flimsy excuse, *that this is not the time, for we are at war*, is now upset. We are no longer at war. None, then, but the base and the corrupt, can now resist a **REFORM OF PARLIAMENT**.

ARISTIDES.

SPANISH GRATITUDE.

MR. COBBETT.—If the opinion of an individual, who has long perused your weekly pages, is of any consequence, I venture to say that you effected a most judicious *reform* in your work, when you excluded the official papers, and threw open the whole scope of its pages for original discussion.—It is of little consequence, in the end, perhaps, whether a public writer, like you, be, in heart, a lover of truth, provided there be, in all that he puts forth under his own name, a proper degree of apparent earnestness, and immediate consistency. The *thinking* part of the nation, there is no fear, will afterwards exercise their own judgment, with good effect, and decision.—Your strong remarks on the war in Spain; on the general continental policy of this government; and on the public and private professions of regard for the *national independence*, as it is called, of states, which are so common with a certain set of *interested* and half *deluded* men, have always appeared to me important and well deserving of attention, not only for the ultimate moment of the subjects themselves, which were discussed, but for the manner in which they were brought home to the "work day" consideration of every Englishman.—My object in troubling you with this simple note, is to copy for your Register, if you choose, an extract from a letter addressed by a private soldier in the British artillery to his mother in this city. The substance of this extract is accurate, and such as any man of honour might attest. I shall only further premise, that the writer is an Highlander of spirit—pretty fair sense at the bottom, and of good common education. This distinction is necessary to satisfy some persons; but you will say, I suppose, that with such useful, though not shining, gifts, any man may be a good member of society, and many with nothing more have made bold, able, and useful attempts. The letter is dated, at St. Sebastian's, in the month of January last.—"I am now here, in the hospital, and, as some of my comrades are writing to Edinburgh, I cannot omit to tell you the real state of my present situation, for fear that you should get, through other channels, or by report, an alarming account of me. The house in which I, and others of my comrades lately lodged, at a place not far from this, unfortunately took fire, in the night, and we had only time to escape with our lives. Some how or other, the inhabitants had most errone-

ously and falsely taken a notion that we had set the house on fire; and they came to us, in our naked and miserable state, to reproach us, and to have revenge. By one of these people I was stabbed, with a knife, in several places, particularly to a great depth in the fleshy part of my side, and left on the ground, with some other wounded companions, to crawl to shelter if we could, or to die. I am now recovering fast. But I cannot help saying, my dear parent, that the wounds in my flesh would have been hardly felt, had they been inflicted by the hand of a generous Frenchman*, in the field of battle, when I had at least the honour of my native land to maintain; but it cuts me to the soul to think how I have suffered from the stabs of a fellow who came behind me when I was naked and distressed; a cowardly and malignant Spaniard! And it is certainly both wonderful and provoking, to the last degree, that our country should spend its millions, and shed its best blood, under pretence of assisting a superstitious, a degraded, and an ungrateful people."—Amidst all those obvious and outward signs of decay that present themselves to the wearied eye, it is consoling to think, Mr. Cobbett, that we have, in the ranks of our army, men who can write so shrewdly, and feel so honourably.—God grant that these fine materials may be less abused than they have been.—I leave this young soldier to you and your readers, with this short remark: I can allow much for a natural feeling of jealousy in any people towards Allies that come among them, and share their homes, and occupy their fields, as we do; and I think I have some notion what may be the conduct of a victorious army, flushed with success, and actuated by a spirit of revenge; not to view them, also, in the light of a great body of men, in a comparative sense, left to the full scope of all the mere animal passions, and all the worst vices of humanity. In such a state of things, acts will be committed that are calculated to injure, and to enrage any people, and to disgust them even with that cause which may have abstracted truth and general reason on its side. This is a point of universal feeling on which there can be no dispute. Every man needs only to put the case in his own person, and every man

that has reason is capable to decide.—Taking the conduct of the Spanish people on the whole, however, I can neither join in the shouts of Mr. Canning, to "the universal Spanish nation," nor in the parenthetical and inflated encomiums of Mr. Henry Brougham, on the *noble conduct* of "that many-headed beast the multitude."—I have heard it stated by persons of good credit, that they had been told, by officers from the Peninsula, friends of theirs, that they would rather choose to lie down, in the field of battle, at night among Frenchmen, than take up their quarters in a Spanish village.—It is for you, Mr. Cobbett, to solve such difficulties. You seem to luxuriate in them: your powers of illustration are peculiarly suited to them; and I gladly leave them to you.

Edinburgh,
5th April, 1814.

J. M.

RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS.

Sir—I am rather surprised at our excessive rejoicing on account of the restoration of the House of Bourbon to the throne of France, as it is without doubt the most unfavourable event, for this country, that could possibly have taken place: for, in a short period of time, we probably may, and certainly shall, see the *family compact*, and the united force of France and Spain, acting against us, and their joint fleets, perhaps, riding triumphant in the channel as they did during the latter part of the unfortunate American war. That masterpiece of politics, which united the different branches of the House of Bourbon in the closest connexion, was projected and concluded by the Duke of Choiseul, whom his countrymen, though they found in him the vastness of Richelieu, the activity of Louvois, the magnificence of Seignelay, and the amiableness of Pomponne, dismissed, as they have done Napoleon to whom France is infinitely more indebted in various respects, than she has been to all her monarchs taken together. This extraordinary man has fulfilled his duty to that country to the very last, from which it would have been a scandalous departure in him to have put into the possession of her enemies the strong holds or fortresses, which they unreasonably demanded. For she had as good a right to make such a demand on them as they had on her: and but for the *treachery* of the very creatures of his own making, who will probably meet the just reward of their ingratitude, success could not possibly have attended

* These are the exact words of this candid and spirited private soldier; one of the *rabble* who are so often complimented by certain orators.

the Allies; who, in their conduct at Paris, have recognized, on the part of all Europe, the principle, (which though true in theory, ought to be perhaps but seldom acted on) *that the people have a right to dethrone and dismiss their rulers, whenever they become tired of them, or conceive they have acted improperly.* This principle, may possibly, ere long, be brought home to all concerned in such a recognition; to Alexander, the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, and even to the Brunswick dynasty itself. It will, however, do much good to mankind, if it produce the effect of putting princes on their good behaviour, and making them pay proper deference and attention to public opinion, and the sentiments of those they govern.—As to peace, no reasonable or thinking man can expect to see one of long continuance or duration while the bank of England exists in its present state, and goes on making such excessive issues of paper, as it has been doing. The greatest evil attending the funding system consists in this, that it is a great encourager and promoter of warfare and bloodshed, by affording the means of carrying them on with facility.

CIVIS.

COUNTER REVOLUTION IN FRANCE.

This unexpected event which has given a new turn to all political and military speculations, and which promises to restore peace, for a season, to suffering Europe, has been accomplished without bloodshed, without a civil war; and the Bourbons, who, twenty years ago, were driven from their native land by a justly incensed and indignant people, are now said to be recalled by that same people as the only family who can confer prosperity and happiness upon the nation. Time, which tries all things, will probably soon determine this great question. Meanwhile the rapidity of the occurrences, the multiplicity of topics which these occurrences suggest, their vast magnitude and importance, and the novel circumstances connected therewith, which almost every recurring day bring under notice; render it a matter of prudence to avoid, at least for the present, much discussion respecting them, until the ebullition of public feeling, has somewhat subsided, and mankind are in some degree, restored to their wanted rationality. As, however, I shall afterwards have frequent occasion to refer to the memorable documents which have appeared during this short, but momentous period, I have thought

it proper, to publish the most important of them here, as they form the ground work of every thing that may be said in future respecting this new revolution, and the effects which it is calculated to produce upon the present aspect of civilized, as well as of uncivilized Europe.—When the allies obtained possession of Paris on the 31st. ult. they issued the following declaration of their views and sentiments:—"The armies of the Allied Powers have occupied the capital of France; the Allied Sovereigns receive favourably the wish of the French nation.—They declare, that if the conditions of peace ought to contain stronger guarantees when the question was to bind down the ambition of Bonaparte, they may be more favourable, when, by a return to a wise government, France herself offers the assurance of this repose.—The Sovereigns proclaim, in consequence, that they will no more treat with Napoleon Bonaparte, nor with any of his family.—That they respect the integrity of ancient France, as it existed under its legitimate Kings: they may even do more, because they profess it as a principle, that, for the happiness of Europe, France must be great and strong:—That they will recognise and guarantee the Constitution which France shall adopt. They, therefore, invite the Senate to name immediately a Provisional Government, which may provide for the wants of the Administration, and prepare the constitution which shall suit the French people.—The intentions which I have just expressed, are common to all the Allied Powers. (Signed) ALEXANDER."—Here was an unqualified avowal, made for the first time, that the allied powers would no longer respect the dynasty of Napoleon, or the integrity of France, except under the reign of the Bourbons. The Senate, which had been created by Bonaparte, were thus placed in a situation in which they had only one choice. With the sword drawn over their heads, they assembled to consider the state of *degraded* France, and the following has been published as the result of their *deliberations*, if that name can be given with propriety to acts which were the consequence of *fear*, while the Senate House was surrounded by a foreign army:—"On the 1st of April, 1814, at half-past three, the Members of the Senate met in consequence of an extraordinary convocation. His Serene Highness the Prince of Benevente, Vice-Grand Elector, President.—His Serene Highness the Prince Vice-Elector, President, then spoke as follows;—Sa-

NATORS!—The letter which I have had the honour of addressing to each of you to inform you of this extraordinary convocation, acquaints you with the object of it. It is intended to lay proposals before you. This one word sufficiently paints out the liberty which each of you brings into this assembly. It gives you the means to give a generous flow (essor) to the sentiments with which the soul of each of you is filled—the desire of saving your country, and the resolution of hastening to the assistance of a forsaken people.—Senators—Circumstances, however difficult they may be, cannot be above the firm and enlightened patriotism of all the Members of this Assembly. You have, doubtless, all equally felt the necessity of a deliberation which may shut the door against all delay, and which may not let a day pass without re-establishing the action of the administration, the first of all wants, for the formation of a Government, whose authority, founded on the necessities of the moment, cannot but re-assure people's minds."—The Prince Vice-Elector having ceased speaking, several proposals were made by different Members; the question being put, the Senate decrees:—1st, That there shall be established a Provisional Government, charged to provide for the wants of the Administration, and to present to the Senate the plan of a Constitution which may suit the French people.—2d, That the Government shall consist of five Members; and then proceeding to their nomination, the Senate elects for members of the Provisional Government, M. Talleyrand, Prince of Benevente; Count de Bournonville, Senator; Count de Jaucourt, Senator; Duke of Dalberg, Counsellor of State; M. de Montesquien, ancient member of the Constituent Assembly.—They are proclaimed in this quality by the Prince Vice Grand Elector, President.—His Serene Highness added, that as one of the first cares of the Provisional Government ought to be the drawing up of the plan of a Constitution, the Members of the Government, as soon as they shall employ themselves on this plan, will give notice of it to all the Members of the Senate who are invited to contribute by their wisdom to the perfection of so important a work.—Some Senators demand that this act shall contain an account of the motives which have determined the Senate, and rendered its meeting indispensable.—Other Members, on the contrary, demand that these motives shall form part of the address, which will be published by the members

of the provisional government.—The Senate adopt this last proposal.—A Member proposes to lay down as a principle, and to charge the Members of the Provisional Government to comprehend in substance in the address to the French people:—1. That the Senate and the Legislative Body are declared integral parts of the intended Constitution; subject to the modifications which shall be judged necessary to insure the liberty of the suffrages and opinions.—2. That the army, as well as the retired officers and soldiers, shall retain the ranks, honours, and pensions which they enjoy.—3. That the public debts shall be inviolable.—4. That the sale of the national domains shall be irrevocably maintained.—5. That no Frenchman shall be made answerable for the public opinions which he may have expressed.—6. That the liberty of worship and of conscience shall be maintained and proclaimed, as well as the liberty of the press, subject to the legal repression of the crimes which may arise from the abuse of that liberty.—7. These different proposals, seconded by several Members, were put to the vote by the Prince Vice Grand Elector, President, and adopted by the Senate.—A Member demanded that to reconcile the adoption of these proposals with the confidence due to the Members of the Provisional Government just established, the address to the French People, which this Government is to draw up, shall announce that they are charged to prepare a constitution, such as it shall not in any manner violate the principles which are the bases of these propositions. The Senate adopts this amendment. The Senate adjourns till nine o'clock this evening, to hear and adopt the definitive redaction of the *proces verbal*, and to sign it individually.—Senator Count Barthelemy, Ex-President of the Senate, is appointed President in the absence of the Prince Vice Grand Elector, who cannot be present at this sitting.—It is decreed that the extract of the *proces verbal*, containing the nomination of the Members of the Provisional Government, shall be immediately made out under the signature of the President and Secretaries.—The Senators who, for want of being informed in time, have not been able to attend this sitting, are to be again convoked for the sitting this evening.—These deliberations being finished, the Prince Vice Grand Elector put an end to the sitting. The same day, April the 1st, 1814. At nine in the evening the sitting is resumed; Senator

Count Barthelemy, President. The Senate hears the proces verbal of this day read, and adopts it with some amendments. —It is demanded that this process verbal shall be printed, and six copies distributed to each of the members. This proposal is adopted. —The Members then proceeded to sign the proces verbal as follows:—M. M. Abriel, Barbe de Marbois, Barthelemy, Cardinal de Bayanne, Belderbusch, Bertholet, General Beurnonville, Buonacorsi, Carbouara, General Count Chasseloup, Laubat, Cholet, General Colaud, Cornet, Davous, de Gregory Marcoringo, General Deniharrere, de Pere, Destust de Tracy, General Dharville, Daubersart, General d'Hodonville, Dubois Debay, Emmery, Fabre-de-l'Aude, General Ferino, Fontanes, Garat, Gregoire, Herwin, de Jaucourt, Journu Aubert, General Klein le Jeas, Lambreschts, Lanjuinais, Lannoy, Le Brun de Rochemont, General Lespinasse, Le Mercier, Maleville, Meermann, Monbadon, Pastoret, Pere, Pontecoulant, Porcher, Rigal, Roger Ducos, St. Martin de Lamothe, General Sainte Suzanne, Saur, Schunnelpennineck, Marshal Seimier, General Soules, Tascher, General Valence, Marshal de Valmy, Vandeden, Vandepoll, General Vaubois, General Villetard, Vimar, Volney —The Members absent from indisposition sent their adherence."

The Provisional Government having been nominated in this manner, the Ex-President Barthelemy addressed to each of its members the following letter:—*"Paris, April 2d.*—Gentlemen, Members of the Provisional Government, The Senate commissions me to request you to signify to the French people to-morrow, that the Senate, by a decree passed in its sitting this evening, has declared, that the Emperor Napoleon and his family have forfeited all right to the throne, and consequently absolved the French people and the army from their oath of allegiance. This act will be sent to you to-morrow, with the motives and reason of it. I have the honour to salute you,—The President of the Senate, BARTHELEMY."

The Senators of Paris were not more prompt in their obedience to the mandates of the allied powers, than the Provisional Government was to comply with the wishes of the Senate. Barthelemy's letter was dated on the evening of the 2d, and next day, the 3d, was named when the request which it contained was expected to be complied with. But these docile ministers,

resolved not to wait for copies of the act which deposed Napoleon; not wishing to be behind hand with the Senate, which had met twice in one day, and, probably, being previously prepared for the part they were to act, hastened to show their devotion to the magnanimous Alexander, by immediately issuing the following proclamation or address to the French army:—*"Interior, Paris, April 2, 1814.* Soldiers, —France has just broken the yoke under which she has groaned with you for so many years.—You have never fought but for the country; you can no longer fight, unless against it, under the colours of the man who leads you.—Behold all that you have suffered from his tyranny: you were lately a million of men; nearly all have perished: they were delivered up to the sword of the enemy, without food, without hospitals; they were condemned to perish of misery and hunger.—Soldiers, it is full time to end the calamities of the country; peace is in your hands. Will you refuse it to desolated France? Your enemies themselves demand it of you; they regret to ravage these fine countries, and wish only to take up arms against your oppressor and ours. Shall you be deaf to the voice of the country which summons and entreats you? It addresses you by its Senate, by its capital, and, above all, by its misfortunes; you are its noblest children, and cannot belong to him who has ravaged it, who has delivered it up without arms, without defence; who wished to render your name odious to all nations, and who would have compromised your glory, could a man, who is not even a Frenchman, ever weaken the glory of our arms, or the generosity of our soldiers.—You are no longer the soldiers of Napoleon: the Senate and all France absolve you from your oath."

On the 3d, the following proceedings took place in the Senate:—*"The sitting which had been adjourned was resumed at four o'clock, when the Senator Count Lambrechts read the revised and adopted plan of the decree which passed in the sitting of yesterday. It is in the following terms:—'The Conservative Senate, considering that in a constitutional monarchy, the monarch exists only in virtue of the constitution or social compact:—That Napoleon Bonaparte, during a certain period of firm and prudent government, afforded to the nation reasons to calculate for the future on acts of wisdom and justice; but that afterwards he violated the compact*

which united him to the French people, particularly in levying imposts and establishing taxes otherwise than in virtue of the law, against the express tenor of the oath which he had taken on his ascending the throne, conformable to Article 53 of the Act of the Constitutions of the 28th Floreal, year 12;—That he committed this attack on the rights of the people, even in adjourning, without necessity, the Legislative Body, and causing to be suppressed, as criminal, a report of that body, the title of which, and its share in the national representation, he disputed;—That he undertook a series of war in violation of article 50, of the act of the Constitutions of the 22d Primaire, year 8; which purports, that declarations of war should be proposed, debated, decreed, and promulgated in the same manner as laws;—That he issued, unconstitutionally, several decrees, inflicting the punishment of death; particularly the two decrees of the 5th of March last, tending to cause to be considered as national, a war which would not have taken place but for the interests of his boundless ambition;—That he violated the constitutional laws by his decrees respecting the prisoners of State;—That he annulled the responsibility of the Ministers, confounded all authorities, and destroyed the independence of judicial bodies.—Considering that the liberty of the press, established and consecrated as one of the rights of the nation, has been constantly subjected to the arbitrary controul of his Police, and that at the same time he has always made use of the press to fill France and Europe with misrepresentations, false maxims, doctrines favourable to despotism, and insults on foreign governments:—That acts and reports heard by the Senate have undergone alterations in the publication;—Considering that, instead of reigning according to the terms of his oath, with a sole view to the interest, the happiness, and glory of the French People, Napoleon completed the misfortunes of his country by his refusal to treat on conditions which the national interests required him to accept, and which did not compromise the French honour;—By the abuse which he made of all the means entrusted to him in men and money;—By the abandonment of the wounded without dressings, without assistance, and without subsistence;—By various measures, the consequences of which were the ruin of the towns, the depopulation of the country, famine and contagious diseases;—Considering that, for all these causes, the Imperial

Government established by the *Senatus Consultum* of the 28th Floreal, year 12, has ceased to exist, and that the wish manifested by all Frenchmen calls for an order of things, the first result of which should be the restoration of general peace, and which should also be the era of a solemn reconciliation of all the states of the great European Family—The Senate declares and decrees as follows:—Art. 1. Napoleon Bonaparte has forfeited the throne, and the hereditary right established in his family is abolished.—2. The French people and the army are released from their oath of fidelity towards Napoleon Bonaparte.—3. The present decree shall be transmitted by a message to the Provisional Government of France, conveyed forthwith to all the departments and the armies, and immediately proclaimed in all the quarters of the capital.

While the Senate was thus engaged in fulminating its decrees, the following correspondence took place betwixt Prince Schwartzberg and the Duke of Ragusa (Marmont) respecting the personal liberty and safety of Napoleon:—“April 3, 1814. —Monsieur le Mareschall—I have the honour to transmit to your Excellency, by a safe person, all the public papers and documents necessary to render your Excellency perfectly acquainted with the events which have taken place since you quitted the capital, as well as an invitation from the members of the Provisional Government to range yourself under the banners of the good French cause. I supplicate you in the name of your country and humanity, to listen to the proposals which will put an end to the effusion of the precious blood of the brave men whom you command.—SCHWARTZENBERG.”—“Monsieur le Mareschall—I have received the letter which your Excellency has done me the honour to address to me, as well as the papers which it inclosed. Public opinion has always been the rule of my conduct. The army and the people being exempt from the oath of allegiance towards the Emperor Napoleon by the decree of the Senate, I am disposed to concur in an union between the army and the people, which will prevent all chance of civil war, and stop the effusion of blood; consequently I am ready to quit with my troops the army of the Emperor Napoleon, on the following conditions, of which I demand from you the guarantee in writing:—Art. 1. I, Charles, Prince of Schwartzberg, Marshal and Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies, guarantee to all the French

troops, who, in consequence of the decree of the Senate of the 2d of April, shall quit the banners of Napoleon Bonaparte, that they may retire freely to Normandy, with their arms, baggage, and ammunition, and with the same considerations and military honours, which the allied troops reciprocally owe to each other.—2. That, if in consequence of this movement, the events of the war should cause the person of Napoleon Bonaparte to fall into the hands of the Allies, his life shall be guaranteed to him, and his liberty, in a space of ground and circumscribed territory, at the choice of the Allied Powers and the French Government. *RAGUSA.*—“Monsieur le Mareschall—I cannot sufficiently express the satisfaction which I feel in learning the eagerness with which you accept the invitation of the Provisional government, to range yourselves conformably to the decree of the 2d of this month, under the banners of the French cause. The distinguished services which you have rendered to your country are generally acknowledged, but you have crowned them by restoring to their country, the few brave troops, who have escaped the ambition of a single man. I entreat you to believe that I particularly appreciate the delicacy of the article which you demand, and which I accept relative to the person of Napoleon. Nothing could better characterise that amiable generosity, which is natural to Frenchmen, and which particularly distinguished the character of your excellency. Accept the assurance of my high consideration. (Signed) SCHWARTZENBERG. At my head-quarters, April 4, 1814.”

The following letter of Marshal Ney, Prince of Moskwa, was addressed to the Prince of Benevento, Chief of the Provisional Government:—“My Lord—I proceeded to Paris yesterday with Marshal the Duke of Tarentum and the Duke of Vicenza, with full powers to the Emperor of Russia to defend the interests of the dynasty of the Emperor Napoleon. An unforeseen event broke off the negotiations which seemed at first to promise a favourable termination. From that time I saw that to save our dear country from the frightful evils of civil war, it remained only for the French to embrace the cause of our ancient Kings, and I repaired to-night to the Emperor Napoleon to manifest this wish.—The Emperor, convinced of the critical situation in which he had placed France, and the impossibility of saving her himself, has appeared disposed to resign,

and to give in his full and entire abdication. To-morrow I hope to have from him the formal and authentic act, and shall soon afterwards have the honour of waiting upon your lordship. I am, &c.—(Signed)—Prince of Moskwa.”—*Fontainebleau, April 5, Half-past 11 at night.*

Next day Napoleon abdicated the thrones of France and Italy by the following declaration:—“The Allied Powers having proclaimed that the Emperor Napoleon was the only obstacle to the re-establishment of the Peace of Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares that he renounces for himself and his heirs, the thrones of France and Italy, and that there is no personal sacrifice, even that of life, which he is not ready to make to the interest of France. Done at the Palace of Fontainebleau, the 6th April, 1814.”

On the same day in which Napoleon gave the above remarkable proof of magnanimity, which shows how much his passions were under the controul of his judgment, the Senate held another meeting at which the following plan of a new Constitution, prepared by the Provisional Government, was presented and approved of:—“The Conservative Senate deliberating upon the plan of a constitution presented to it by the Provisional Government in execution of the act of the Senate of the 1st instant;—After having heard the report of the special commission of seven members, Decrees as follow:—Art. 1. The French Government is monarchical and hereditary from male to male, in order of primogeniture.—2. The French people call freely to the throne of France LOUIS STANISLAUS XAVIER DE FRANCE, brother of the last King, and after him the other members of the House of BOURBON, in the ancient order.—3. The ancient nobility resume their titles. The new preserve theirs hereditarily. The legion of honour is maintained with its prerogatives. The King shall fix the decoration.—4. The executive power belongs to the King.—5. The King, the Senate, and the Legislative Body, concur in the making of laws.—Plans of laws may be equally proposed in the Senate and in the Legislative Body. Those relating to contributions can only be proposed in the Legislative Body. The King can invite equally the two Bodies to occupy themselves upon objects which he deems proper. The sanction of the King is necessary for the completion of a law.—6. There are 150 Senators at least, and 200 at most. Their dignity is immoveable, and hereditary from

male to male, in order of primogeniture. They are named by the King. The present Senators, with the exception of those who should renounce the quality of French citizen, are maintained, and form part of this number. The actual endowment of the Senate, and the Senatorships, belongs to them. The revenues are divided equally between them, and pass to their successors. In case of the death of a Senator without direct male posterity, his portion returns to the public treasure. The Senators who shall be named in future, cannot partake of this endowment. 7. The Princes of the Royal Family, and the Princes of the blood, are by right members of the Senate. The functions of a Senate cannot be exercised until the person has attained the age of 21 years.—8. The Senator decides the cases in which the discussion of objects before them shall be public or secret.—9. Each department shall send to the Legislative Body the same number of deputies it sent thither. The deputies who sat in the Legislative Body at the period of the last adjournment shall continue to sit till they are replaced. All preserve their pay. In future they shall be chosen immediately by the Electoral Bodies, which are preserved, with the exception of the changes that may be made by a law in their organization. The duration of the functions of the deputies to the Legislative Body is fixed at five years. The new Election shall take place for the Session of 1810.—10. The Legislative Body shall assemble of right each year on the 1st of October. The King may convoke it extraordinarily; he may adjourn it; he may also dissolve it; but in the latter case another Legislative Body must be formed, in three months at the latest, by the Electoral Colleges.—11. The Legislative Body has the right of discussion. The sittings are public, unless in cases where it chuses to form itself into a general committee.—12. The Senate, Legislative Body, Electoral Colleges and Assemblies of Cantons elect their President from among themselves.—13. No Member of the Senate, or Legislative Body, can be arrested without a previous authority from the Body to which he belongs. The trial of a member of the Senate or Legislative Body, belongs exclusively to the Senate.—14. The Ministers may be members either of the Senate or Legislative Body.—15. Equality of proportion in the taxes is of right; no tax can be imposed or received, unless it has been freely consented to by the Legislative Body and the Senate. The land-tax can

only be established for a year. The budget of the following year, and the accounts of the preceding year, are presented annually to the Legislative Body and the Senate, at the opening of the sitting of the Legislative Body.—16. The law shall fix the mode and amount of the recruiting of the army.—17. The independence of the judicial power is guaranteed. No one can be removed from his natural Judges. The institution of Juries is preserved, as well as the publicity of trial in criminal matters. The penalty of confiscation of goods is abolished. The King has the right of pardoning.—18. The courts and ordinary tribunals existing at present are preserved; their number cannot be diminished or increased, but in virtue of a law. The judges are for life and irremovable, except the justices of the peace and the judges of commerce. The commissions and extraordinary tribunals are suppressed, and cannot be re-established.—19. The courts of cassation, the courts of appeal, and the tribunals of the first instance, propose to the king, three candidates for each place of judge vacant in their body. The King chooses one of the three. The King names the first presidents and the public ministry of the courts and the tribunals.—20. The military on service, the officers and soldiers on half-pay, the widows and pensioned officers, preserve their ranks, honours, and pensions.—21. The person of the King is sacred and inviolable. All the acts of the Government are signed by a minister. The ministers are responsible for all which those acts contain violatory to the laws, public and private liberty, and the rights of citizens.—22. The freedom of worship and conscience is guaranteed. The ministers of worship are treated and protected alike.—23. The liberty of the press is entire, with the exception of the legal repression of offences which may result from the abuse of that liberty. The senatorial commissions of the liberty of the press and individual liberty are preserved.—24. The public debt is guaranteed. The sales of the national domains are irrevocably maintained.—25. No Frenchman can be prosecuted for opinions or votes which he has given.—26. Every person has the right to address individual petitions to every constituted authority.—27. All Frenchmen are equally admissible to all civil and military employments.—28. All the laws existing at present remain in vigour, until they be legally repealed. The code of civil laws shall be entitled, *Civil Code of the*

French.—29. The present Constitution shall be submitted to the acceptance of the French people, in the form which shall be regulated. LOUIS STANISLAUS XAVIER shall be proclaimed King of the French, as soon as he shall have signed and sworn, by an act stating, *I accept the Constitution; I swear to observe it, and cause it to be observed*.—This oath shall be repeated in the solemnity, when he shall receive the oath of Fidelity of the French.—(Signed) Prince of Beneventum, President; Counts de Valence and de Pastoret, Secretaries; the Prince Arch-Treasurer; Counts Abrial, Barbe Marbois, Emmercy, Bartlemy, Baldersbuck, Beurnonville, Cornet, Garbenara, Legrand, Chasseloup, Chollet, Coland, Davous, de Gregory, Decroix, Depere, Dombarrere, Dhaubersaert, Destatt, Tracy, d'Harville, d'Hedouville, Fabre (de l'Aude), Ferino, Dubois Dubais, de Fontanes, Garat, Gregoire, Herwyn de Nevelle, Jacourt, Klein, Journu, Aubert, Lambrecht, Lanjuinais, Lejeas, Lebrun de Rochemont, Lemerrier, Meermau de Lespenasse, de Mautbadon, Lenoir Laroche, de Mailleville, Redon, Roger Ducos, Pere, Tascher, Porcher de Rochebourg, de Ponte Coulant, Saur, Rigal St. Martin, de Lamotte, Sainte Suzanne, Sieyes, Schimmelpenninck, Van de Vandegelder, Van de Pol, Venturi, Vau-bois Duc de Valmy, Villetard, Vinat, Van Zaylen van Nyvelt."

Since the promulgation of the new Constitution, which, it appears, has been joyfully accepted by Louis XVIII. the following proclamation has been published by Marshal Jourdan, by which the fact is placed beyond all dispute, that Napoleon is to retire to the island of Elba on an allowance of six millions of franks, about £40,000 sterling per annum:—"Soldiers! The Emperor Napoleon has abdicated the imperial throne, and is to retire to the island of Elba, with a pension of 6,000,000 franks.—The Senate has adopted a Constitution which guarantees civil liberty, and insures the rights of the Monarch.—Louis Stanislaus Xavier, brother of Louis XVI. is called to the throne by the wish of the French nation, and the army has manifested the same sentiments.—The accession of Louis XVIII. is the guarantee of peace.—At length, after so many glorious campaigns, so many fatigues and honourable wounds, you are going to enjoy some repose.—Louis XVIII. is a Frenchman, he will not be a stranger to the glory with which the armies have co-

vered themselves. This Monarch will grant you the rewards which you have merited by long services, your brilliant deeds and honourable wounds.—Let us then swear obedience and fidelity to Louis XVIII. and let us display the White Cockade, as a sign of adhesion to an event which stops the effusion of blood, gives us peace, and saves our country.—This order shall be read by the commanders of the different corps, at the head of the troops. JOURDAN, the Marshal of the Empire, Commander in Chief of the 15th Military Division. Head-quarters, Rouen, April 8."

Although it might have been supposed, that the forming of a new constitution for France, was a labour of sufficient magnitude to occupy the whole attention of the Provisional Government, during the short period they were engaged upon it, we still find that they found leisure, even then, to direct their views to other matters.—By the first decree which they published, they declared the restoration of the Pope to his former power. By another, the total suppression of all those public schools, established in France by Napoleon, for the Education of poor Children; and, a third respecting the liberty of the press, ran as follows:

"The Provisional Government considering that the most effectual means of establishing public liberty is to prevent licentiousness; that the liberty of the press, which should be the safeguard of the citizens, ought not to become an instrument of insult and defamation; that, under present circumstances, such an abuse, and especially that which might be made of pamphlets and placards, would easily become a perfidious engine in the hands of those who might endeavour still to sow disturbance among the citizens, and thus impede the noble movement which should unite them all in the same just cause; order, —1. No placard or bill shall be posted in the streets or public places, without having been previously presented at the prefecture of police, where an imprimatur shall be given.—2. Every hawkers is prohibited from crying, selling, or distributing in the streets any pamphlet or sheet, the distribution of which has not been authorised by the prefecture of police."

NOTICE.

The Public are respectfully informed that the Register will, in future, be published by Mr. Morton, No. 94, Strand, to whom all communications and orders (post paid) may be transmitted, addressed to the Editor.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

TRIUMPH OF THE ARISTOCRATS.—TREATMENT OF NAPOLEON.—The triumph of the aristocrats is not greater than we had reason to expect; for reason bade us expect it to be *boundless*. We shall hereafter have to talk to them about the *gains* and the *losses* of different nations by that grand event, the *French Revolution*; but, though I wish to get on to a very important topic, the *designs with regard to America*, which are now of the first consequence to the world, I must stop to say a word or two upon the business of those, who so lately were the loudest in *praising* Napoleon, and who are now the most loud amongst his *calumniators*.—We are told of the joy, the plaudits, attending the arrival of *MONSIEUR* at Paris. Were they *greater* or more sincere than those, with which Napoleon was received at Berlin, at Vienna, or at Rome?—I very much question the fact. It is the voice of the base and weak and thoughtless at the dictation, or under the influence of the *strong*. We are told, that the Allied Sovereigns and troops took no share in the entry of *MONSIEUR*; that they were resolved, that it should be purely a *French* procession; an act of the *French people*! To be sure, they did not put their *hand* to the thing. They only formed a *ring round*, while it was going on. But this is all foolish trash. We *know*, all the world *knows*, that it is *force*: that it is a great, overwhelming military force; that it is the power, the sheer military power, of all the States of Europe combined through their fear of one man; all the world *knows*, that it is this *force*, and that it is this *force alone* which has produced the fall of Napoleon, and the restoration of the Bourbons. The triumph is, therefore, the triumph of the strongest; the triumph of him who has most bayonets on his side. There is no moral victory. The people of France had an opportunity of showing their attachment to the Bourbons long before; but, they waited till the allies were in possession of their capital. But, indeed, how monstrous is it to talk of their attachment to those, the head of

whom they had condemned to death, and the rest of whom they had (before NAPOLEON was heard of) proscribed, as they thought, for ever! This is a pretty way of showing *attachment* to a Royal Family.—We now see the same, the very same writers who justified, nay, who urged with all their might, the putting down of the Bourbons, exerting their skill to render their restoration palatable. *Cretelle* is mentioned amongst those who have uttered the most bitter things against NAPOLEON. It was he, who lauded his character the most; who praised his *humanity* to the skies; and who, in his history of the hero's exploits, gave a cut, representing him in the pest-house in Africa, discovering a trait of humanity and courage such as is not upon record, relating to any other man.—It is not time yet to take a view of the *result* of the French revolution; of its gains and its losses. When it is, we shall bring into view the putting down of the inquisition as well as the destruction of the Bastille. We shall, in a few months, be able to make the comparison of the previous state and the present state, of France. As to the *new constitution*, as it is called, we can yet know nothing of it. It is binding, or not binding, as the king shall please. But, at any rate, much *must* have been gained; because it will be impossible to bring things to their ancient state. The very materials are gone, and it cannot be done. I am not one of those, who think, that the sovereigns of Europe will *now*, taking a lesson of France, be more mild in their governments than they formerly were. I think the contrary: I do not think that they will make any *concessions to liberty*; but in France, to restore all the old abuses will be absolutely impossible. The *people* of France will have gained many things: any *one* of which was worth *all* the sacrifices they have made. To get rid of any one of their great curses was worth 22 years of war and all the lives that have been lost.—The *treatment* of NAPOLEON is what, indeed, he had to expect if ever he fell into the power of those Sovereigns, whom he had at his feet, and whom he had re-

placed on their thrones. It is such, too, as the republicans of France must rejoice to see him endure. They put him at the head of a republic; they placed an army of republicans in his hands; they sent him forth to pull down thrones. He betrayed his trust; he upheld thrones: he raised himself to a throne: he allied himself by marriage with a family, whom they regarded as their greatest enemy. He sold the liberties of his country, and, as far as he could, of Europe, for a wife and a dynasty. His offences are, therefore, against republicans, and not against royalists, of whom he has been the sole guardian and protector. His fall was not wished for, as yet, by me; because I thought, that he might, by continuing some years longer in power, do good in some respects. As being at war with my own country, I could not, of course, wish him success; but, as we had made one treaty of friendship with him, I saw no reason why we should not make another with him. But, the republicans in France must rejoice at his fall. It must have been much more galling to see him triumph, than to see the Bourbons return. He became, not only a king, but the friend of all kings; the supporter of kings, and by the means of that very power, which had been placed in his hands for the extermination of royalty and aristocracy. This is the light, in which he is viewed by the republicans of France, who, if they are now to submit to a government that they dislike, have, at any rate, the satisfaction to reflect, that the man, who has reduced them to the necessity of so doing, has been not severely punished; that, if they are not free, he, at any rate, does not enjoy the fruit of his treason against freedom. — FONTANES'S speech on the invasion of France, that speech, in which the allied sovereigns were reproached, not with their designs against the liberties of France, but with having, in their proclamation, given it to be understood, that they regarded the wishes of the people of France as something; that insolent speech, in which the people were told, that they ought to thank the government for repressing their audacity; that speech the author of which, as I remarked at the time, ought to have been thrown down the deepest well in Paris; that speech alone was an act to deprive NAPOLEON of all compassion on the part of the friends of freedom, notwithstanding all the good he had done in other respects. He seems, from the date of his marriage

into the house of Austria, to have lost all notion of respect for the people of France; and to have carried his dread of republicanism to a length hardly conceivable. It is, therefore, perfectly natural in the republicans of France to rejoice at his fall; but, the aristocrats are very ungrateful towards him: he has been their political saviour and redeemer: he has saved them from total destruction: he has restored them and their titles and their privileges in France, and has given them security, for some time, at least, in all other countries. If he had been and continued a republican; if he had faithfully obeyed the will of those who put power into his hands; there would not, in all human probability, have been a king thus day existing on the continent of Europe. But, he, so far from acting as the republicans of France wished him, not only spared the kingly race, but actually married amongst them, and took the lead amongst the aristocrats in abusing the people, and treating them with contempt; therefore, he is now justly treated, as the republicans of France must think. He would be an Emperor, would he! He must marry into the ancient House of Austria, must he, and be papa of a dignity of kings! He, who received all his power from republicans! These were the causes of the loss of his power; these were the causes of his fall; and, therefore, that fall must have given infinite satisfaction to the republicans of France, who will have to reflect with pride on the contrast exhibited in the invasion of France when under Napoleon, and when under the assembly and convention: when under an Emperor, and when under a republican government. They will always have to say, that all Europe combined was nothing against France animated by the voice of liberty; but, that France, under an Emperor and King, with a gagged press, yielded to the first invasion. — Napoleon's character, as developed at the close of the drama, we cannot yet judge of; because, in truth, we know nothing about his behaviour. All that we hear comes through a channel hostile to him. He could not fight without an army any more than another king. If he had dared appeal to the people; if he had still had the cup of liberty upon his head, in place of an ill-gotten crown, he might have been able to make a last stand; but, like all other despots, bereft of his bayonets, he was powerless as a child. — It has been stated, that his Empress (we

always ought to call her by that title), and the King of Rome, are to be separated from him, and that the former is to go to a *convent*. They would do well to make a *monk* of him. One monk discovered gunpowder, and, I am sure, NAPOLEON has, in this respect, shown a true zeal for the discovery of his predecessor. I still think, however, that he will be *divorced*. The House of Austria will hardly endure to continue him as a relation; and, I dare say, that the *Holy Father*, will have little objection to relieve her from the dishonour of such an alliance. Perhaps NAPOLEON'S *death* is the most likely thing of all. It would remove numerous difficulties. We shall hear, I dare say, that he has *put an end to his existence*; and then there is an end of him and his dynasty for ever.

—We hear great boastings of the *pro prowess* of the allied powers; but, do what they will, they never can get rid of the fact of their having been *all defeated* by the armies of France; which armies, and under NAPOLEON too, have entered *all* their capitals. They have all been beaten, over and over again by France, and France alone. Their countries have all been subdued by Frenchmen; and, until the ruler of France married amongst the ancient sovereigns, they were all together, unable to resist her prowess.—These are facts that never can be gotten rid of. France has placed a king in Spain, in Holland, in Naples, in Italy. She has beaten all that she could reach; and this will be recorded by history in spite of every thing that can *now* be done or said.—That the fall of NAPOLEON will be followed by that of *all* his family and relations, there can be little doubt: and, indeed, the allied sovereigns would be greatly to blame, upon their own principles, or upon any principles of sound policy, to suffer any of them to remain in power. It was wise in them, if they were able, wholly to extinguish NAPOLEON himself; for they must have been very certain, that, with the power of France in his hands, he would have annoyed them, and put them in peril, first or last. The same policy will dictate to them the putting down of all the branches of his family; but, I must confess, that I did not expect *so soon* to have heard a hint thrown out against his ROYAL HIGHNESS, the CROWN PRINCE OF SWEDEN; that worthy personage, of whom our ministers used to speak so much in praise; and who, be it remembered, was amongst the very *first* to take our money for the purposes of carrying on the war,

which has ended in the putting down of Napoleon. The *Times*, of the 19th instant observes: "Among other news from the North, we learn, that the Danish Contingent is advancing, and that the Crown Prince of SWEDEN has reached Brussels. *His Royal Highness's activity is not at least premature*. Surely, he has *judged ill*, after the laurels which he so honourably reaped at Leipsic, to allow any *minor considerations to prevent his appearing equally prominent* in the last great scenes which consummated what was so well begun."

—This is only a *beginning*, I imagine: "His Royal Highness" will, probably, soon hear, that these gentry have a little more to say. They do not think, apparently, that the cause needs his Royal Highness's assistance; and "His Royal Highness" will, I am afraid, have to be contented with the high eulogiums that he has already received; for, it appears to me, that he is not likely to receive any more front that quarter. Whither he is to look for praises, in future, I cannot, I am sure, guess for the life of me; but, I will venture to say, that His Royal Highness is a personage not likely to give rise to any very violently interested feelings amongst any dozen of people on the habitable globe.

RECOLONIZATION OF THE AMERICAN STATES.—It was easy to believe, that the enemies of freedom would, upon this occasion, turn their baleful eyes towards the United States of America, and endeavour to stimulate our government, who, let us hope, however, has too much sense to be so worked on, to wage a war for the *destruction of liberty* in the western world. But, I, who fully expected to see this, am really astounded at the speed and the boldness, with which the project has been brought forward in some of our public prints, especially the *Times*, which, in plain terms, urges a war against the United States upon the *same principles* that the close of the war has been carried on against NAPOLEON; and, indeed, which aims at the subjugation, re-occupation, and *re-colonization of that country*.—Before I proceed any further, I shall insert the article, which has called forth these observations.—"It is understood that *part of our army in France will be immediately transferred to America*, to finish the war there with the same glory as in Europe, and to place the *peace on a foundation equally firm and lasting*. Now, that the tyrant BUONAPARTE has been consigned to in-

famy, there is no public feeling in this country stronger than that of indignation against the Americans. That a republic boasting of its freedom should have stooped to become the tool of that monster's ambition; that it should have attempted to plunge the parricidal weapon into the heart of that country from whence its own origin was derived; that it should have chosen the precise moment when it fancied that Russia was overwhelmed, to attempt to consummate the ruin of Britain—all this is conduct so black, so loathsome, so hateful, that it naturally stirs up the indignation that we have described. Nevertheless there is in this case the same popular error, that there was, not long since, when France was identified in the minds of most men, with the name of BUONAPARTE. The *American Government is in point of fact, as much a tyranny* (though we are far from saying it is so horrible a one) as was that of BUONAPARTE: and as we firmly urged the principle of *No Peace with BUONAPARTE*; so to be consistent with ourselves, we must in like manner maintain the doctrine of *NO PEACE WITH JAMES MADISON*. The reasons for this are twofold, as respecting this country, and as respecting America. A very little reflection will render them sufficiently manifest.—In the first place, hatred of England is the fundamental point in the policy of Mr. MADISON. He is the ostensible organ of a party, all whose thoughts, feelings, and sentiments are guided by this master key. Some of the statesmen of this school have not blushed to assert in full Senate, 'that the world ought to rejoice, if Britain were sunk in the sea;' if, where there are now raen, and wealth, and laws, and liberty, 'there were no more than a sandbank for the sea-monsters to fatten on, a space for the sterms of the ocean to mingle in conflict.' Such is the deep rooted antipathy which these wicked men have to the land of their forefathers! With such men Mr. MADISON acts; and he himself before the accession of his party to power, expressly laid it down as a principle (on the discussion of Mr. JAY's negotiation), 'that no treaty should be made with the enemy of France.' His love for the latter country, however, was but an adjunct of the hatred which he entertained towards us: and he hated us for the very same reason, that BUONAPARTE did—because we stand in the way of any state that aspires at universal dominion; for, young as is the transatlantic Republic, it has already indulged

in something more than dreams of the most unmeasured ambition. We need not here detail the long history of fraud and falsehood by which he at length succeeded in deluding his countrymen into war. Suffice it to say, he had two objects in that war:—first, to sap the foundations of our maritime greatness, by denying the allegiance of our sailors; and, secondly, to seize on our colonial possessions on the main land of America, leaving it to a future occasion to lay hands on our insular settlements in the West Indies. Perhaps, when he finds himself unexpectedly deprived of the buckler under which he aimed these stabs at our vital existence—the mighty NAPOLEON, the Protector *in petto* of the Columbian Confederacy—he may be willing to draw in his horns, and sneak away from his audacious undertakings. But shall we have the extreme folly to let him off thus? When we have wrested the dagger from the bravo's hand, shall we quietly return it to him to put up in its sheath? No. No. Mr. MADISON himself, in his very last public speech, has furnished us with a most apposite rule of conduct, which he cannot blame us for adopting, since he avowedly follows it himself—namely, that we should '*not only chastise the Savages into present peace, but make a lasting impression on their fears.*'—Hitherto we have considered the Americans as identified with Mr. MADISON's government; but is this the fact? So much the reverse, that it has been openly proposed in some of the States to treat for peace with Great Britain separately; and they would act wisely and justifiably in adopting this measure. The Eastern States, the most moral, the most cultivated, the most intelligent, the best in every respect, are at this instant reduced to a complete *thrall-drom* by the Southern States, under the forms of a constitution, which the prevailing faction violates at pleasure. 'The small States,' says FISHER AMES, 'are now in vassalage: they obey the nod of Virginia. The Constitution sleeps with WASHINGTON, having no mourners but the virtuous, and no monument but history. Our vote and influence (those of the Eastern States) avail no more than that of the Isle of Man in the politics of Great Britain.' If this was true before the annexation of Louisiana, how much more strikingly so now, that that addition has quite broken down all balance between the States, and poured an irresistible stream of corrupt influence into the channel of the

Executive! What is very remarkable is, that the preponderance of the Southern States is chiefly owing to the slaves they contain! The number of votes which each State has in the national government, is determined by the whole population.—Hence, though the slave has no political existence, he gives a weight to his master over a free man in a different State: and by another curious but not uncommon paradox in human nature, the slave owner there is generally a furious democrat, and the democrat has hitherto been the most servile of the tyrant's adherents. Clear, therefore, is it, that the free Constitution of the United States is either incompetent in itself to afford an equal protection to the wisest and best part of the Union; or else that Constitution has been violated and overthrown by the faction of which Mr. MADISON is the ostensible head; and, in either case, the oppressed States would act justly to themselves, *to separate their interests from those of the incapable and treacherous individual who has dragged them reluctantly into a war no less inglorious than unjust.* When we speak of these and the like crimes as perpetrated by Mr. MADISON individually, we only mean to use his name in the common way, in which persons in eminent stations are generally spoken of. He stands at the head of the list, not but that Mr. GALLATIN may be more artful, Mr. CLAY more furious, Mr. JEFFERSON more malignant, and so on; and besides, there is a ferocious banditti belonging to his party, of whom, perhaps, he himself stands in awe, and who, as they consist of Irish traitors, and fugitive bankrupts and swindlers, from all parts of the United Kingdom, may easily be conceived to exceed even the native Americans in rancour against Great Britain: but the more shameless and abandoned are the individuals who compose this faction, the greater odium must be cast on Mr. MADISON himself, in the eyes of the moral and reflecting part of the American population. It is a great mistake to suppose that the United States are wholly deficient in characters of this latter description. They have had many wise and many eloquent men, whose words yet live in the hearts and in the meditations of their countrymen. Mr. WALSH, the accomplished editor of the American Review, has attained a high literary reputation even in this country; and though the late FISHER AMES (the *Buak of the western hemisphere*), is not so much known in this country, he de-

servedly enjoys a much greater popularity in America. These, and many more such writers as these, have kept alive the fire of *genuine British liberty* in the United States: Whilst, on the other hand, the miserable blunders of the DEARBORN'S, and HOPKINS'S, and WILKINSON'S, and HAMPTON'S, and all the long list of defeated generals, have thrown a ridicule on that invasion of Canada which was one of the great baits of the war. Lastly comes the fall of Mr. MADISON's grand patron attended with the execration and scorn of all Europe. Can we doubt, *that a vigorous effort on our part will annihilate the power of a faction alike hostile to Britain, and fatal to America? Is not the time propitious for winning at least the sounder and better part of the Americans to an union of interests with the country from whence they sprung?*—It is impossible to read this article, without being convinced, that there are men, who seriously entertain the wish to see America recolonized; who wish to see our king restored in America, as the Bourbons have been in France; for, Mr. MADISON is the chosen President of the Union; he does nothing of himself; it is the President, the Congress, and the People, all acting in concert. Yet, he is to be *put down*; no peace is to be made with him *any more than with NAPOLEON*; the government of the States is a *tyranny*; the constitution is *violated*, or is *inefficient*; its existence is *inimical to lasting peace*; the time is propitious for *winning the sounder part of the States*, at least, to an union of interests with the country whence they sprang. These are sentiments and declarations to begin with; but, in fact, they go the whole length of recolonization; and that is the project now on foot amongst the foes of freedom, who seem to be resolved to prove to us, that those friends of liberty in America, who did not wish for the extinguishment of NAPOLEON, despot as he was, were not without sound reasons for their sentiments. They saw, that, though he had betrayed the Republican cause, if he were put down there would be men ready to urge projects of the description of that of which we are now speaking. This language towards the United States was never made use of; sentiments like these were never hazarded, while NAPOLEON was in power; but, the moment he is *down*, these men turn their hostile eyes towards America, the only republic left upon the face of the earth!—Our quarrel with America ceases with the

war. There being peace in Europe, the quarrel is at an end without any discussions. But this writer passes over all the subject of quarrel. The American *President and Government are bad*. That is now, according to him, to be the ground of the war; and, we are to have *no peace* with them. I will pass over the impudent falsehoods, which this writer utters as to the conduct of Mr. Madison and the nature and effects of the American Government; and come at once to what is most interesting to us now; namely, *FIRST*, whether a war for the recovery of the American States as colonies would be *popular in England*; and *SECOND*, whether it would be *likely to succeed*.—As to the first, I have no hesitation in expressing my belief, that it would be, for a while at least, the *most popular* war in which England was ever engaged, the reasons for which opinion I will now state.—In the *first* place, *peace*, real and lasting peace, and a vast reduction of our forces, would be total ruin to a great number of persons and families. All these will wish for ever, no matter with whom, or upon what grounds. They will be for the war for the same reason that undertakers are for deaths, and without being, any more than these, chargeable with any malicious motive.—The farmers will be for war, upon much about the same principles; they being of opinion, no matter whether erroneously or not, that war makes corn dear.—Here are *two* very numerous classes of persons. A *third* is the land-owners in general, who believe, that peace will lower their rents, without lowering their taxes.—The ship-owners and builders fear America, who can build and sail much *cheaper* than they can, and who, if left at quiet, would cover the sea with their ships.—The great manufacturers ever will be for a war, likely, as they think, to tear up, root and branch, those establishments which are not only supplying America herself, but must, in a few years, especially with the emigration of artisans to America, become our rival, and supplant us, all over the world. Besides, if America were to be recovered, we should, they think, have a monopoly of supplying her.—Even the stock-holders, though they might, generally wish for peace, might probably be persuaded, that the recolonization of America would afford the means of *lessening the national debt*; that America might be made to bear a share of the debt; that the lands there might be sold for our

account; and, in short, that this might be made an immense source of income, and an infallible security to the paper-system.—Of politicians there will be two descriptions for the war: one will see in America a dangerous maritime rival; a maritime power which grows, like her own Indian corn, almost visibly to the eye. They will mix this apprehension with the feelings of mortification and revenge arising from the naval victories of America, which are not to be washed away by the fall of NAPOLEON, nor of fifty Napoleons at his heels. These are honourable-minded men, loving their country; not able to endure the idea of her *ever*, at any time, ceasing to be mistress of the ocean, and so terrified at that idea as to lose sight, in the pursuit of a *preventive* remedy, all notion of justice, humanity and freedom.—Another description of politicians, animated solely by their *hatred* of whatever gives liberty to man, will see in America, what, indeed, they have always seen, and for which they have always hated her, an asylum for the oppressed; a dwelling for real liberty; an example of a people, enjoying the height of prosperity and the greatest safety of person and property, without any hereditary titles, without any army, and almost without taxes; a country, where the *law* knows nothing about religion or its ministers; where every man pursues his own notions in religious matters; where there are no sinecures, no pensions, no grants of public money to individuals; where the people at large choose their representatives in the legislature, their presidents, governors, and sheriffs, where bribery and corruption are unknown, and where the putting of a criminal to death is nearly as rare as an eclipse of the Sun or Moon. This description of politicians look at America as *Satan* is said to have eyed our first parents in the Garden of Eden; not with feelings of envy, but with those of deadly malice. They would exterminate the people and burn up the country. The example of such a people “sears the eye-balls.” They will tell us, that, while that example exists, nothing is done; nothing is secured; nothing is safe: they will endeavour to terrify the government and the nation by describing the emigrations which will take place from Europe; the numbers of artisans and of people of enterprise that will crowd to America, adding to her population, extending her knowledge, increasing her means of all sorts, and enabling her, in a short

time, to spread far and wide what they call her *disorganizing principles*.—This last description of politicians have the press greatly in their hands; the press is the most powerful instrument; and it will, in this case, have prejudice, supposed private interest, passion, and all in favour of its efforts.—These are the reasons, on which I found my opinion as to the popularity of such a war; but, yet, I hope and trust, that the Ministers and the Prince Regent will not be carried away by such notions. It is for them to consider, what is best for the country, and permanently best; and not to suffer their judgment to be warped by an out-cry, proceeding from the selfishness of some and the rage of others.—With regard to the second question: whether a war for the recolonization of America would be *likely to succeed*? I think it would not. I must, however, confess, that I agree with the author of the above article, that “the time is propitious” in the highest degree. Not only have we an army ready organized; composed of the best stuff; best commanded; best appointed and provided; best disciplined, in the world, but we do not know what to do with it in the way of employment, and it would be, for a year, at least, as expensive in peace as in war. We have more than a sufficiency of ships of war to carry this army across the Atlantic, without crowding and without the aid of a single transport. In Europe we have nothing to fear. France will, for some years, have enough to do at home. It is the same in Spain and Holland; and, besides, what are any of them to do without fleets, and where, in the whole world is there a fleet but in England?—Now, then, what are the Americans to do against this army and this fleet? I have no doubt, that our army would waste the sea-coast; that it would, at first, beat the Americans wherever they met them; that it would, if it chose, demolish some towns and occupy others; that it would make the Congress change its place of sitting; but, unless the States divided, I have no idea, that such a war would finally succeed, and it appears to me, that the fall of Napoleon, especially coupled with what will be deemed the ruinous language of the *Times* news-paper, will infallibly silence the voice of faction in America, and will make the whole of the people of one mind as to the necessity of providing for resistance.—The *Times* seems to suppose, that the people of America, or, at least, a part of them, and especially in the

Eastern States, will heartily participate in our joy at the fall of NAPOLEON and the restoration of the Bourbons. Will they not, on the contrary, be terribly alarmed? And will not those, who have cried out against the government for aiding NAPOLEON, as they called it, begin to fear the consequences of his fall, when the project of the *Times* reaches their ears, and when they find that there are writers in England, who already openly propose to make war upon them for the express purpose of subverting their government and effecting in America what has been effected in France, namely a restoration? Mr. AMES is complimented by this writer as the BURKE of America, and I dare say, that Mr. AMES would have liked very well to get a pension of three thousand pounds a year; but, in that respect he was not so lucky as his great prototype. Mr. AMES was a poor drivelling hankerer after aristocracy. His party wished to establish a sort of petty noblesse: they wanted to make some honorary distinctions. The people took the alarm; put them out of power, and they have ever since been endeavouring to tear out the vitals of their country. The fall of NAPOLEON, however, will leave them wholly without support from the people, when that people hears that the first consequence of that fall is a proposition, in the English public prints, to treat THEIR government as that of NAPOLEON has been treated, and upon precisely the same principle, namely, that it is a despotism.—As I said before, I trust, that our government is too wise to be led to the adoption of any such project; but, if they were, what could our friends in America say? They have been asserting, for years past, that ours was the cause of freedom against a despot. What will they say if we make war upon them upon the same principle, and for the same end, that we have been making war against NAPOLEON? By Mr. Jefferson and his party it was always concluded, that there was no danger to be apprehended from France; under any circumstances; and that if France, if the new order of things was subdued in France, America would be in great danger. Therefore they always wished, and they acted as if they wished, that France should not be defeated in the result of the war. It is in our power, by making peace with them at once, and waving all dispute about differences that cannot arise during peace, to show them that their fears were groundless; but will

they met, when they see the project of the *Times* news-paper, hold it up to the teeth of their political adversaries, and say, "look here! Here is the first fruits of the fall of the man whose destruction you told us we ought to assist in producing, and to do any thing in the upholding of whom you represented as impolitic and base." This will be their language to those adversaries, who will hang their heads with shame, unless the author of the *Times* can make a shift, some how or other, to convey to them a small portion of his impudence.—I think it is clear, then, that the people of America would, in case such a war were to be made upon them, be united in a spirit of resistance; and, if they were, I have no idea, that ten such armies as all that we could send, well-disciplined and brave as our army is, would finally succeed in subduing and recolonizing the country. We might make inroads from Canada; we might demolish towns upon the coast; we might destroy manufactories; we might lay waste the corn-fields, and burn many of the mills; we might destroy all the shipping; we might tear the country a good deal to pieces; but, I do not believe that we should, even by adding *another eight hundred millions to our debt*, secure one single colony in the territory now called the United States of America.—Yet, it is really true, that the enemies of Freedom, while America remains what she now is, have gained nothing. NAPOLEON has been put down; but, then he was an enemy of freedom. He was not owned by any friend of freedom. France was not a republic, nor had she a *representative* government under him. The war against him was in the name, at least, of the people. The example, so hateful to the enemies of liberty, of a people happy and free, without distinction of ranks, without an established church, without hereditary power or privilege of any sort, with a press now perfectly free, with legislators and chief-magistrates periodically elected by the people at large; this example still exists, and this country is yet open to all the world; and, to put down this example would, I am of opinion, cost us more blood and more money than it has cost us to put down NAPOLEON. The enemies of freedom promised us *peace, durable peace*, if we got rid of NAPOLEON; but, scarcely is he down, when they propose to us a *new war*, more, if possible, expensive in its nature, and, probably, longer in its duration. To be sure, America holds out an

alluring bait: it presents employment for Governors of Provinces, Commanders, Post-masters, Attorneys and Solicitors-General, Secretaries, Councilors of State, Taxing People, Pay-masters, Judges, and a long and nameless list of hangers-on; but, again, I say, I hope and trust, that the Prince Regent and his Ministers will have too much wisdom to listen to any such mad and wicked project. It is impossible, however, for the people of America not to feel some alarm, and not to make preparations accordingly. This language of our news-papers is quite enough to excite apprehension; and for this, amongst the rest, we have to curse a *lapse and degenerate press*.

NEW FRENCH CONSTITUTION.

Whenever I find the *Courier* and other hiring prints *praising* any public measure; whenever I read an eulogium in these servile journals on any legislative act of our own, or another government, I immediately suspect something wrong; I am then convinced that some design is in contemplation, to abridge the liberties of the people; that there is a snake in the grass which, if not strangled in time, will sooner or later strangle those by whose sufferance it exists, and is permitted to become a dangerous and formidable enemy. It is true, that whether the new Constitution, which France is about to receive, be acted upon or not, the situation of the French people will be better than it was *before* the Revolution, and perhaps better, for some time at least, than our own condition under our present "glorious and happy establishment." But if this is all that the inhabitants of France are to gain by the change; if, after the oceans of blood which have been shed, during a revolutionary struggle of more than twenty years to obtain a recognition of their just rights, under a free and representative government; they should now revert to that system which put it in the power of their ancient monarchs, to render them the dupes and slaves of their caprice, or of that of an insolent minister, or a haughty mistress: if, I say, the French nation is to be placed in circumstances, in which there is a probability, or even a chance of the former tyranny and despotism of the Capets being restored, it appears to me that the return of the Bourbons, instead of being a blessing to France, will be the greatest of all the curses with which she has been visited. Better, a thousand times better, would she have

been, had she continued under the *military* sway of Napoleon; for, in the former case, she will receive nothing in return for the sacrifice of her rights; while, in the latter, even although no other benefit attended it, her passion for warlike fame; her thirst for military glory, would have continued to be gratified to the fullest extent. In the language of the *Courier*, the new Constitution about to be established in France, ought to be a source of gratulation to this nation.—“It is,” says that journal “a proud tribute indeed to this country, that, after trying all modes, France acknowledges *at last* that the only real security for public and private happiness, is to be found in fashioning her Constitutional Charter as closely as possible after the model of the British”—Indeed!—It is the first time I ever heard of a people *acknowledging* the blessings of a Constitution, which had been forced upon them at the *point of the bayonet*. If even the Senate had been disposed to get rid of the Code Napoleon, and to adopt the English Code, as the *only* real security for public and private happiness, why did they not declare themselves *before* the sword was pointed to their breasts; *before* two hundred thousand muskets invironed the hall where they were assembled to legislate for the French people?—The Senate must have known the actual strength of Napoleon; they must have been aware, that his resources would not long enable him to continue the contest. If, therefore, they were in reality attached to the Bourbons, as, it is now said, they are to a man, why were they so long in avowing their sentiments? How can they excuse themselves, or where can any man find an excuse for the conduct of men who *hated* Napoleon, who knew their own strength, who were perfectly acquainted with public feeling, and yet, who not only permitted Napoleon, in these circumstances, to sacrifice the best blood of France in a useless struggle, but, in truth, employed their own power and importance in the State, to second, according to the new received opinion, his vain and foolish projects?—It is idle to talk of Napoleon having caused this immense flow of blood, if the Senate, knowing his weakness stood by and did nothing to prevent it.—But if, on the other hand, Bonaparte’s Senate was *attached* to his dynasty; if the people entertained the same views; and if, jointly, they preferred a continuance of his reign to the restoration of the Bourbons, (a position which has not yet, as far as appears to me,

been fully negatived) how then can it be said that a Constitution, framed under the immediate influence of, if not actually dictated by, foreign powers, who are in possession of the capital, and whose authority is backed by a formidable army:—How, I ask, can this be considered the *spontaneous* act of the French nation? How can it be said, that a code of laws, adopted in such degrading circumstances, is, in any sense of the word, correspondent “to the wishes, the habits, and the customs,” of a people so civilized as that of France? We are told that the Emperor of Russia is an *enlightened* politician; that his *great* mind will not allow him to interrupt the people’s choice. I am willing to believe all this, and even more of our magnanimous ally; but may not his Imperial ear be polluted, like that of many other great Sovereigns, by some vile parasite, who, obtaining access to him by base and servile means, may employ the advantage he has thus obtained, to impose on Alexander’s unsuspecting mind, and to counteract, by his machinations, the benevolent intentions of his sovereign? Why is it that that liberty which this great Monarch is now conferring upon France, has not been granted to any portion of his own subjects? Why is it that this “Liberator of Nations;” this “Champion of the People’s rights,” has not hitherto thought it expedient to acquire these admirable titles in his own extensive dominions?—I shall be told that the state of society there, does not justify this. At least then let us see that something has been done towards the *improvement* of that society; let us be told of the numerous schools and other seminaries which have been established in Russia, for the cultivation of the mind; let us learn that it has been the chief study and pride of his Imperial Majesty, to adapt the habits and manners of his people to that liberty which, we are assured, is so congenial with his own sentiments, and to establish which, in Germany and in France, he has made so many sacrifices. When I am well informed of all this; when I find that the Emperor Alexander has made arrangements in his own empire for the introduction of universal freedom, I shall then, but not till then, subscribe to the opinion, which has now become so general, that France is about to receive, at the hands of her invaders and conquerors, a Constitution “the best calculated of any other to secure public and private happiness.”—Much as has been, and is still said, about the extraordinary

patriotism of the Allied Sovereigns; of their regard for the rights of the people; and of their determination to subvert the thrones of all despots; I confess I do not feel myself disposed to place implicit reliance in these novel professions. I do not mean to say that any of these Sovereigns have professed an attachment to liberty, in which they are not sincere. What I doubt is, that they have at all uttered the many fine patriotic sentiments which have been ascribed to them. At one period of the French revolution, we find Louis the XVI. in a speech which he read to the National Assembly, declaring that for ten years previous, he had desired that the Provincial Assemblies "should be elected by the free suffrages of their fellow citizens;" and in the same speech he was made to say:—"Continue then your labours, without any passion but the love of your country; let the welfare of the people, and the security of civil liberty be the first objects of your attention." Now it is well known, that this speech of the unfortunate Louis, was written by his minister Necker; who, it is more than probable, did not consult his master about one word of it, and merely put in his mouth a language which was called for, at the moment, by the peculiar circumstances in which the King was placed. That his personal safety, and the rights of the throne, were not the secondary objects with Louis himself, and the welfare of the people, and the security of civil liberty the first, is sufficiently clear from the events which followed shortly after he had been advised to utter these sentiments. At least, we find the French people accusing him of insincerity, and leading him to the scaffold because, as they asserted, "he had betrayed the liberties of the people which he had not only promised, but had sworn to protect." We cannot, therefore, be too careful in our discrimination of the language as to liberty, and the rights of the people, said to have been used by the Allied Sovereigns.—They may, and I trust, they are the sincere friends of freedom; but if, from mistaking what they say on this subject, we should be too forward in ascribing to the Emperor Alexander, or to any one of them, views and intentions which never had a place in their minds, we would be doing these Sovereigns an injustice, should we afterwards blame them for not carrying these supposed views and intentions into effect. It would certainly be the safest way not to believe too much on this head;

to wait the course of events; and to suspend our opinion as to popular feeling in France, until it shall seem meet to the Allies to withdraw their immense legions from that country. The people will then have room to breathe, to think, perhaps to speak, and to compare notes together; they will then, with the sword no longer suspended over their heads, and the bayonet removed from their throats, have no apprehension of personal danger, which, at times, has a surprising effect in determining public opinion; they will then be able to examine, with coolness and deliberation, the merits of that "wonderful effort of human genius," the British Constitution; which, they are told, is alone capable of giving "real security" and of insuring "public and private happiness." They will be able, on this examination, to contrast it with the *Code Napoleon* under which they have lived so long; and if, after such examination and comparison, they should come to the resolution of giving the former a fair trial, they may, at the end of a few years, be able to say which of them deserves the preference—whether the military government of Napoleon, by which the national vanity has been so much flattered, and the Empire so greatly extended; or the commercial and peaceable reign of a Louis, with a circumscribed territory. Until some such occurrences take place and some such effects as these are produced, I do not see how the Constitution about to be established in France, can be said to be the constitution of the people; unless, indeed, the Senate, under the direction of their Imperial Majesties, the Sovereign of Prussia and the Crown Prince of Sweden, who has at last made his appearance at Paris, give orders, as Bonaparte did, when he assumed the purple, to take the voice of the French people respecting the proposed alterations. This, in truth, would be recognising "the sovereignty of the people" and giving a practical proof, that the allied powers were, in sincerity, as much devoted to the cause of the people as they are represented to be. But this is an event which, I am afraid, is not to be looked for at present. Even what, in other circumstances, might be held worthy of imitation—the example of Napoleon—must, in this instance, prove fatal to the measure, even supposing it had been in contemplation; for it is not the least prominent feature in this counter-revolution, that the provisional government, as was done when Louis XVI. was dethroned, has enjoined

the destruction of every thing that has a tendency to keep alive in the public mind, the recollection of what France had previously been. The republicans, or jacobins, as they were afterwards called, extinguished every vestige of royalty; less can now be expected of the partizans of the Bourbons, towards a man whom they always regarded as a tyrant and an usurper of the throne of their legitimate kings. — As to what is said by the *Courier*, about the French acknowledging "at last" that the British Constitution was the best in the world, if the writer intended by this that it was the first time any Frenchman had proposed our constitution as a model, he was either ignorant of the history of the revolution, or willingly misrepresented the fact; for, during the deliberations of the National Assembly, in the year 1789, respecting that very code which Louis XVI. had sworn to support, there was frequent allusion to the English constitution, and repeated attempts made to obtain its introduction into France. When the question was under discussion, whether the legislative power should be formed into one or two chambers? it was stated, by Lally, that three powers were necessary to form a balance. "England (said he) affords an example of this since the national act in 1688: no where are liberty, property, and political equality more respected. The second chamber should have a separate interest, otherwise it would be animated by the same spirit. The legislative body should be composed of, the representatives of the nation, a Senate, and a King. The first chamber will be more calm in its deliberations; the second will correct its errors; and the King reciprocally keep both the Senate and Representative Body in proper bounds by means of each other." — To this plausible theory, it was answered, by Villeneuve; — "We hear of nothing but boastings of the English government; but its enthusiastic admirers conceal from you its defects. You are perpetually told of the wonderful machinery of its two chambers, and three powers; but under this general eulogium, they hide from you the faults of the House of Peers, the manner of composing it, the monstrous inequality of the popular representation, the absolute veto of the Monarch, and other errors seen and lamented by every good Englishman." — This answer, even at this day, will be regarded as sufficient to overthrow the vain boasting, and fulsome panegyric of those who are unceasingly praising the British

Constitution, and officiously endeavoring to thrust it upon the notice of all other nations as a model of perfection; as the only political system calculated to secure public happiness and prosperity. — But I have been told by some, that I am somewhat capricious; that when all the world are congratulating the French nation on the great blessing of having been delivered from a military despotism, I, being but a solitary individual, ought to give way to the general impulse; ought to join in the fervent exclamations, piously uttered by the *Courier*, of "God save the King — God prosper the reign of Louis the XVIII, and of the Prince Regent," — Others again have demanded, what will satisfy me? where can I find a constitution so well adapted to the condition of man, as that which is now offered to the French people? — With regard to my ideas being at variance with those of the great mass of mankind, I shall only say, that there is no novelty in this, for the opinions of the many have hitherto seldom corresponded with my opinions, and, I am afraid, this will always be the case. As to the constitution which I consider best calculated to promote human happiness, I have no hesitation in stating, that the one promulgated by the National Convention of France; on the 22d. of August 1795, appears to me entitled to the preference over all other constitutions that I have yet seen. It was not the work of a day; nor were those who framed it under the impulse of fear, while deliberating on its important articles. Although the transfer of two-thirds of the convention into the legislative body, without first obtaining the consent of the people, and which afterwards led to much serious abuse, was a feature in this constitution, which no real friend of liberty can approve; still, it was founded upon principles so consonant with sound reason, so conformable to the present improved state of society, and so well adapted to the wants, customs, and habits of an enlightened people, that I never turn my attention to it but with feelings of admiration and regret: — admiration of the splendid talents displayed in its formation; and regret that it should have so soon owed its subversion to the crimes of any set of men to whom France had unsuspectingly given in charge so sacred a trust. — The Constitution of 1795, however, though it gave way, in the first instance, to an unjustifiable ambition, was afterwards greatly defaced by the establishment of a military government, and has

finally received its death blow from the hands of invaders, will live in the remembrance of all who respect the freedom and independence of nations. I should have willingly endeavoured to assist in preserving this recollection, by inserting it in the Register; but its great length precludes the giving of it in detail, at least in one number.—I shall therefore, conclude this article with the introductory part of it, which will enable the reader, by a comparison with the outline of the new French Constitution already published, to determine which of them deserves the preference; and, if it is afterwards thought expedient, I shall give the concluding articles in subsequent numbers:—

The French Constitution, adopted by the Convention, August 22, 1795.

New Declaration of the rights and duties of man, and of a citizen.—The French People proclaim, in the presence of the Supreme Being, the following declaration of the rights and duties of man, and of a citizen: **RIGHTS.**—I. The rights of man in society are—liberty, equality, security, property.—II. Liberty consists in the power of doing that which does not injure the rights of another.—III. Equality consists in this—that the law is the same for all, whether it protect or punish; Equality admits no distinction of birth, no hereditary power.—IV. Security results from the concurrence of all to secure the rights of each.—V. Property is the right of enjoying and disposing of a man's own goods, his revenues, the fruit of his labour, and his industry.—VI. The law is the general will expressed by the majority, either of the citizens, or of their representatives.—VII. That which is not forbidden by the law cannot be hindered.—No man can be constrained to that which the law ordains not.—VIII. No one can be cited, accused, arrested, or detained, but in the cases determined by the law, and according to the forms it has prescribed.—IX. Those who solicit, expedite, sign, execute, or cause to be executed, arbitrary acts, are culpable, and ought to be punished.—X. All rigour not necessary to secure the person of a man under charge, ought to be severely repressed by the law.—XI. No man can be judged until he has been heard, or legally summoned.—XII. The law ought not to decree any punishment but such as is strictly necessary, and proportioned to the offence.—XIII. All treatment that aggravates the punishment determined by the law is a

crime.—XIV. No law, criminal or civil, can have a retroactive effect.—XV. Every man may engage his time and his services; but he cannot sell himself or be sold: his person is not an alienable property.—XVI. All contribution is established for general utility: it ought to be assessed upon the contributors in proportion to their means.—XVII. The sovereignty resides essentially in the universality of citizens.—XVIII. No individual, and no partial union of citizens, can arrogate the sovereignty.—XIX. No man can, without a legal delegation, exercise any authority, nor fill any public function.—XX. Each citizen has an equal right to concur immediately or mediately in the formation of the law, the nomination of the representatives of the people, and the public functionaries.—XXI. Public functions cannot become the property of those who exercise them.—XXII. The social guarantee cannot exist, if the division of powers is not established, if their limits are not fixed, and if the responsibility of the public functionaries is not assured.—**DUTIES.** I. The declaration of rights contains the obligations of legislators: the maintenance of society demands that those who compose it should equally know, and fulfil their duties.—II. All the duties of man, and of a citizen, spring from these two principles, engraved by nature in every heart:—"Do not to another that which you would not another should do to you."—"Do constantly to others the good you would receive from them."—III. The obligations of every one in society consist in defending it, in serving it, in living obedient to the laws, and in respecting those who are the organs of them.—IV. No man is a good citizen, if he is not a good son, a good father, a good brother, a good friend, a good husband.—V. No man is a good man, if he is not frankly and religiously an observer of the laws.—VI. He who openly violates the laws, declares himself in a state of war with society.—VII. He who, without openly infringing the laws, eludes them by craft or by address, hurts the interests of all: he renders himself unworthy of their benevolence and of their esteem.—VIII. Upon the maintenance of property rest the cultivation of the earth, all produce, all means of labour, and all social order.—IX. Every citizen owes his service to his country, and to the maintenance of liberty, of equality, and of property, as often as the law calls upon him to defend them.

THE WHITE COCKADE.—The streets of London must, on Wednesday last, have appeared to a stranger quite cheerful, giving him, by the innumerable white cockades parading up and down, the idea of a great number of weddings, according to the good old English custom of servants wearing these favours, or emblems of joy on those occasions. But to the well informed and reflecting mind, it suggested very different ideas: every cockade he met, recalled to his memory the *eight hundred millions* it has cost the nation to restore the Bourbons; who may, perhaps, feel themselves highly affronted should we ever give them the least hint about the *expence*, and be apt to say, they have done us *great honour*, by submitting to accept our assistance to regain the crown of France; thereby plainly intimating, that we have done *less* for the sake of re-establishing the ancient dynasty, than for the purpose of making our own government *more secure*. Nay, it would not be at all extraordinary, if Louis XVIII. should insist upon the restitution of such French men of war, as were seized by us at the commencement of the revolution, under the pretence of keeping them for his family, should they afterwards regain the crown; or alledge, that we could have taken possession of the French West India islands with no other view, and, therefore, demand their restoration also.—However, if peace is to ensue, there will be no great harm in giving back to the Bourbons, the fleet and islands we took from their nation; for, I apprehend, we, good Englishmen, are to resume our old *natural enmity* to France;* and, however highly we may think of the royal race, we are still bound to consider the nation, excepting the *noblesse* and all the emigrants, what we used to consider them, frog-eaters and slaves. But, taking it in another point of view; in counting the vast number of white cockades that have made their appearance, we may give a pretty accurate guess at the *sums* expended in supporting the wearers of them, and think it a happy deliverance to the nation, that we shall no longer have to pay these hangers-on their respective pensions; at least, we may hope, that these will be put a stop to when the receivers of them ob-

* It is therefore proper they should again have a fleet to fight us as usual; and it is proper they should have West India islands, that we may seize upon them again if it were but to keep up our marine, and to accustom our hands to the noble trade of war.

tain permission to depart.—Like the children of Israel coming out of Egypt, none of these will go away empty handed: what they may have acquired by arts, and industry, or by favour, they will take with them. This, unquestionably, will be a real public loss. Bank notes will, no doubt, remain, but they will take with them gold and valuables. Of the amount we can form no just estimate. The French emigrants, French prisoners, and Englishmen who will emigrate, cannot however, be supposed to take less than what the law allows—namely—five guineas each person. This much then will add to the difficulty felt by the great scarcity of gold. Their departure will likewise thin the metropolis and the country of inhabitants; thus making room, before winter sets in, for the admission of an equal number of Hungarians, Prussians, Russians, and Cossacks, to the very great delight and satisfaction of our shop-keepers, inn-keepers, and farmers, as also of their charming wives and daughters.

COUNTER REVOLUTION IN FRANCE! Since the publication of last number of the Register, accounts have been received, that the Senate has dissolved the Provisional Government, and that MONSIEUR has taken upon him the executive power until Louis the XVIII. arrives in his capital. Prior to the suspension of the Provisional Government, a decree was published, declaring the *white cockade* to be the "national cockade, and the only rallying sign of the French;" and another, liberating all prisoners in France belonging to the allied powers. On their dissolution they closed their labours, which had continued only about ten days, with the following address to the army:—"Soldiers, you no longer serve NAPOLEON, but you belong always to the country. Your first oath of fidelity was to it—that oath is irrevocable and sacred.—The new Constitution secures to you your honours, your ranks, and your pensions. The Senate and the Provisional Government have recognized your rights. They are confident that you will never forget your duties. From this moment your sufferings and your fatigues cease; but your glory remains entire. Peace will assure to you the reward of your labours.—What was your fate under the government which is now no more? Dragged from the banks of the Tagus to those of the Danube—from the Nile to the Dnieper—by turns scorched by the heat of the desert, or frozen by the cold of the North, you raised—na-

lessly for France,—a monstrous greatness, the weight of which fell back upon you, as upon the rest of the world. So many thousand brave men have been but the instruments and the victims of a force without prudence, which wanted to found an empire without proportion. How many have died unknown to increase the renown of one man! They did not even enjoy that which was their due. Their families, at the end of a campaign, could not obtain the certainty of their glorious end, and do themselves honour by their deeds in arms. —All is changed; you will no more perish 500 leagues from your country for a cause which is not her's. Princes born Frenchmen will spare your blood, for their blood is yours. Their ancestors governed yours. Time perpetuated between them, and as a long inheritance of recollections, of interests and reciprocal services, this ancient race has produced Kings, who were named the fathers of the people. It gave us Henry IV. whom warriors still call the valiant King, and whom the country people will always call the good King.—It is to his descendants that your fate is confided. Can you entertain any alarm for it? They admired in a foreign land the prodigies of French valour; they admired while they lamented their return was delayed by many useless exploits. These Princes are at length in the midst of you; they have been unfortunate like Henry IV.; they will reign like him. They are not ignorant that the most distinguished portion of their great family, is that which compose the army; they will watch over their first children.—Remain then faithful to your standards.—Good cantonnments shall be allotted to you. There are among you young warriors who are already veterans in glory; their wounds have doubled their age. These may, if they please, return and grow old in the places of their nativity with honourable rewards; the others will continue to follow the profession of arms, with all the hopes of advancement and stability which it can offer.—Soldiers of France! let French sentiments animate you—open your hearts to all family affections—keep your heroism for the defence of your country, not to invade foreign territories; keep your heroism, but let not ambition render it fatal to yourselves: let it no longer be a source of uneasiness to the rest of Europe."

In the *Moniteur* of the 14th inst. the following detail is given of what took place that day in the Senate:—"PARIS, APRIL

14.—Monsieur has received to-day, at eight in the evening, the Senate and the Legislative Body.—The Senate was presented to his Royal Highness by the Prince of Benevento, its President, who said — "Monseigneur—The Senate brings to your Royal Highness the offer of its most respectful submission.—It has invited the return of your august House to the throne of France. Too well instructed by the present and the past, it desires, in common with the nation, for ever to found the Royal authority on a just division of power and on public liberty, which are the only securities of the happiness and liberty of all. —Monseigneur—the Senate, in the moments of public joy, obliged to remain apparently more calm in the limits of its duties, is not less a partaker in the universal sentiments of the people.—Your Royal Highness will read in our hearts, through the reserve of our language—each of us, as a Frenchman, has joined in those of feeling and profound emotions, which have accompanied you ever since your entrance into the capital of your ancestors, and which are still more lively under the roof of this palace, to which hope and joy are at length returned with a descendant of St. Louis and Henry IV.—For myself, my Lord, allow me to congratulate myself on being the organ of the Senate which has chosen me to be the interpreter of its sentiments to your Royal Highness. The Senate, knowing my attachment to its members, has been pleased to reserve for me a delightful and honourable moment. The most delightful, in fact, are those in which we approach your Royal Highness, to renew to you the expressions of our respect and our love."—The following is the decree of the Senate:—The Senate commits the Provisional Government of France to his Royal Highness the Count D'Artois, under the title of Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, until Louis Stanislaus Xavier de France, called to the throne of the French, shall have accepted the Constitutional Charter. The Senate resolves, that the decree of this day, concerning the Provisional Government of France, shall be presented this evening by the Senate, in a body, to his Royal Highness the Count d'Artois.—The President and Secretaries, The Prince of BENEVENTO. Count DE VALENCE. Count DE PASTORET."—His Royal Highness answered—"Gentlemen—I have acquainted myself with the Constitutional Act, which recalls to the throne of France the King, my august pre-

ther. I have not received from him the power to accept the Constitution; but I know his sentiments and his principles, and I do not fear to be disavowed by him, when I assure you, in his name, that he will admit the basis of it.—The King, in declaring that he would maintain the actual form of Government, has then acknowledged that the Monarchy ought to be balanced by a Representative Government, divided into two Houses. These two Houses (*Chambres*) are the Senate and the House of the Deputies of the Departments; that the taxes shall be freely granted by the Representatives of the Nation; public and private liberty secured; the freedom of the press respected, under the restrictions necessary for public order and tranquillity; the liberty of worship guaranteed; that property shall be inviolable and sacred; the ministers responsible, liable to be accused and prosecuted by the Representatives of the nation; that the judges shall be for life; the judicial power independent, no one being liable to be tried by any other than his natural judges; that the public debt shall be guaranteed; that pensions, dignities, military honours, shall be preserved, as well as the new and the ancient nobility; the legion of honour maintained, the King will fix its insignia; that every Frenchman shall be capable of military and civil employments; that no individual can be called to account for his opinions and his votes; and that the sale of national estates shall be irrevocable.—These, Gentlemen, are, it seems to me, the basis which are essential and necessary to ensure all rights, trace all duties, secure the continuation of all existing institutions, and guarantee our future situation.”

After this discourse his Royal Highness added—“I thank you in the name of the King, my brother, for the share you have had in the return of our legitimate Sovereign, and for having thus secured the happiness of France, for which the King and all his family are ready to sacrifice their blood.—There can be no longer any difference of sentiments among us; we must no more recede the past; we must from henceforward be a nation of brothers.” During the time that I shall have the power in my hands, which time I hope will be very short, I shall employ all my efforts in labouring for the public happiness.—One of the members of the Senate crying out, “He is a true descendant of Henry IV.”—“His blood,” said Monsieur, “really flows in my veins: I should wish to have

his talents, but I am sure of having his heart and love for the French.”—After the Senate, the members of the Legislative Body who were at Paris at the time of the happy event which restores us our King, and the deputies of the neighbouring departments, who have eagerly repaired to Paris, were admitted to an audience of his Royal Highness. Mr. Felix Faulcon, the Vice-President, spoke as follows,—“My Lord—The long misfortunes which have oppressed France, have at last reached their period; the throne will now again be filled with the descendants of that good Henry, whom the French people are proud and delighted to call their own; and the Legislative Body is happy in expressing this day to your Royal Highness, the joy and the hopes of the nation; the deep wounds of our country cannot be healed but by the tutelary concurrence of the will of all. No more divisions, your Royal Highness has said, at the first step you took in this capital; it was worthy of your Highness to pronounce these sweet words, which have already re-echoed in every heart.”—Monsieur expressed his happiness at being in the midst of the Representatives of the French people. “We are all Frenchmen,” said his Royal Highness; “we are all brothers. The King will soon arrive among us; his only happiness will be to secure the happiness of France, and to make its past misfortunes forgotten. Let us think only on the future. I congratulate you, Gentlemen of the Legislative Body, on your courageous resistance to tyranny, while there was great danger in it. At length we are all Frenchmen.”—The speech of his Royal Highness was followed by universal acclamations. The Deputies of the departments will relate to their fellow-citizens the lively impressions which they have experienced in addressing, for the first time, the wishes of France to a descendant of our Kings, in the Palace of Louis XIV.” After Monsieur had taken upon himself the exercise of the Royal Authority, the *Moniteur* of the 17th gives the following particulars “Paris, April 16.—Monsieur, Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, has appointed the following persons to be members of the Provisional Council of State; ‘Messieurs to Prince of Benevento, the Duke of Cornegiano, Marshal of France; the Duke of Reggio, ditto; the Duke of Dalberg; the Count de Jaucourt, Senator; General Count Bournoville, Senator; L’Abbe de Montesquiou; General Dessolles—General Virolles, Provisional

Secretary of State, will perform the functions of Secretary to the Council.—The Members comprising the Sections of the Council of State, have had to day an audience of Monsieur.—Count Bergin addressed his Royal Highness as follows:—“My Lord.—The Council of State is happy at seeing the return of your Royal Highness to the capital, and the palace of your ancestors.—At length the descendants of St. Louis and Henry IV. are restored to us. Our hearts belong to the King and his august family, and our thoughts, our zeal, our homage, are his due.—Our decrees, my Lord, are to be serviceable to the Sovereign and the country, to see the wounds of France healed, which is at last become the common country of its Monarch and his subjects; and to behold our august Monarch happy in the happiness of his people.” Monsieur was pleased to make a most gracious reply to this speech in which, among other expressions, he declared that he partook of the sentiments which the members of the Sections of the Council of State had just expressed to him, and that the King and his Royal Highness had never doubted of their attachment and their zeal for the service of the State.—On the same day, the following act of the government was announced:—“We, Charles Philip, of France, Son of France Monsieur, brother to the King, Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom, make known;—The circumstances which have passed, had made it requisite that we should give in the name of the King our august brother, commissions more or less extensive. Those who were charged with them have fulfilled them honourably; they all tended to the re-establishment of the monarchy, of order—and of peace.—This re-establishment is happily effected by the union of all hearts, all rights, all interests. The Government has assumed a regular course: all kinds of business must be henceforward done by the Magistrates, or others to whose departments they belong. The particular commissions are therefore become useless—they are revoked, and those who were invested will abstain from making any further use of them.—Given and sealed at Paris, at the Palace of the Thuilleries, April 16.—(Signed)—CHARLES PHILIP. MONSIEUR.—Lieut. Gen. of the Kingdom.—The Provisional Secretary of State,—(Signed)—Baron VITROLLES.”

THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.—If the following article, which appeared in the *Courier* of the 21st instant, is correct,

Bonaparte is not only to retain his title of Emperor, but, it would seem, that there has been some misunderstanding between the Allied Powers and us respecting the final arrangements with Napoleon.—“It is said, that on the 11th instant, the date assigned by the Paris Papers to BONAPARTE’S act of abdication, a treaty was actually signed between him and the Allied Powers, *England excepted*, by which he is to keep, notwithstanding his abdication, the title of Emperor.”—I am inclined to think there is some truth in this statement, which is only a repetition of what appeared a few days ago in a morning paper. Well, then; the Emperor Napoleon, as we are again permitted to call him, has at last set out for the island of Elba. The Empress, had an interview with her father at Little Triannon on the 16th, but whether she is, or is not, to accompany her husband in his exile, has not yet transpired. It is said that she is to retire to the Duchy of Parma, which she is to receive as a patrimony, and to which the young king is to succeed on her decease. But if, as I have been informed, she really entertains a *sincere attachment* for Napoleon, I do not suppose that any consideration will induce her to give him up.

OCCURRENCES OF THE WAR.—I did not expect to be again obliged to adopt this title; but some circumstances have occurred which still render it necessary. At Thoulouse and Bayonne several serious affairs have taken place between our troops and those under the command of Marshal Soult, and, although the official accounts have not arrived, the loss on both sides seems to have been very great. A good deal is said, in our newspapers, about these contests having been occasioned by treachery; but few or none of them are willing to admit, that the determined manner in which the French troops have so recently fought in this and other quarters, affords a proof that Napoleon might have succeeded in rallying another powerful army, and perhaps have overcome his opponents, had he not preferred the interests of France to the glory of continuing to reign over her, acquired at the expence of a civil war.

NOTICE.—Several Gentlemen having complained that they are not regularly served with the *Register*, the Public are again respectfully informed, that it is published every Saturday Morning at 10 o’clock, and that all unnecessary delay in the delivery, may, in future, be prevented, by ordering the *Register* from Mr. MORTON, the Publisher, No. 94, Strand.

ADDRESS

TO THE KING OF FRANCE.

After twenty two years of exile, of slight, of abandonment, your Majesty is, I perceive, receiving congratulations, applause, shouts of joy at your approach; your way is strewed with garlands and with laurels, and your smile and your nod sought after as amongst the choicest of blessings; and all this in a country, where you have been suffered, for many years, to live in obscurity as if you had been no more than an unfortunate manufacturer or merchant. Your Majesty's late entry into, and departure from, the capital of this kingdom, must have given rise, in your mind, to reflections and sensations to possess which upon paper, and in an authentic form, would be a treasure to the world. Your procession in the royal carriage, drawn by our King's eight cream-coloured horses; your being accompanied by the Prince Regent and his great officers of state; the splendid guard of honour attending and surrounding you, the numerous and gallant nobility and gentry on horseback, who thought it an honour to be permitted to move in the cavalcade; the thousands of carriages, and the hundreds of thousands of people, assembled in and near London, the object of which assemblages was to hail and congratulate you; the white cockades and white flags and *fleur de lis*, which, as it were, in forests, met your eye in all directions; your entrance into the palace of our Queen, the embrace, *à la française*, of our Regent, and the truly kind and cordial reception by his royal mother; all these must have produced upon your Majesty's mind an effect proportioned to the astonishing greatness of the contrast between these circumstances, and those which have attended your existence so many years last past. But, your Majesty, who have now had a great deal of experience in the world; who have had an opportunity of appreciating the real value of congratulations and applauses, will not need to be reminded of what has passed. It will not, therefore, be necessary for me to relate how the people of

this same metropolis rejoiced at the arrival of the ambassador of Napoleon at the peace of Amiens; with what delight they attended his steps; how cheerfully they drew him in his carriage, supplanting his horses in their functions; how they entwined his tri-coloured flag with the flag of Great Britain; how they exhibited his portrait in the attitude of shaking hands with our King; how the Lord Mayor of that very City of London, who has lately addressed you in terms of such ardent friendship, had, at his grand annual festival, the flags of Napoleon and of Great Britain waving over his head, while "Napoleon" was the second toast at the festive board. It will not be necessary to remind your Majesty of these things, nor, surely, of the circumstances, more closely affecting yourself and family, arising out of that treaty of *amity* with Napoleon. Your Majesty will not want to be reminded, neither, of the treaties of Campo Formio; Vienna; Berlin; Tilsit, and others. Your many journeys from country to country; your observations on the actions, motives, and characters of men, and of women too, must have rendered unnecessary any endeavour to awaken your recollection to the past. It is, as to the *future*, upon which I am about to address you. Addresses of congratulation you have received, and will receive, in abundance. It is my object to offer you my *advice*; and, especially to caution you against being led into measures, which would produce misery amongst the numerous and brave people, whom you are now called to govern, and who deserve well of all the nations of the earth for the sacrifices which they have made in the cause of freedom. A great soldier has been conquered; the most skilful and brave captain that ever lived has had a crown torn from his brow; he has been bereft of his power; but, the principles of freedom have not been extinguished, and have undergone no alteration or change. If your Majesty resolves to govern upon those principles, your restoration will be a blessing to the world; if you do not, it will be still a greater mis-

fortune to yourself and your family than to the world; for sooner or later, those principles must triumph.—The mind of man knows nothing of retrograde motion. What men have learned they cannot unlearn; and, there exists now not a single well-informed man in Europe, who believes that nations were made for their rulers. It is now a maxim, settled in the minds of all people, that rulers, be their title what it may, derive their authority solely from those, over whom, and for whose benefit, that authority is exercised. You return to a people, in whose minds these principles are deeply implanted. It is, in fact, a new mind in France that you have to manage; and history will tell your Majesty, that *restorations* are not, any more than revolutions, unassailable by the workings of the popular mind.—Your Majesty will not, I fear, want men to counsel you to endeavour to make your restoration the restoration of all those things, which were the efficient causes of the tragical end of your brother, and the long exile of yourself and the other members of your House. They will tell you, that the *ancient regime* existed for many centuries without being shaken by popular commotion; that this, therefore, is the regime proper to prevent another revolution; that to govern upon the principles of freedom, would be to give your countenance and approbation to the acts of the republicans and regicides; that your only true friends are the unqualified royalists; the preachers of divine right; and that it would be ingratitude towards those who have never deserted your cause, to act as if you freely forgave those who have fulminated, or approved of, decrees levelled at the authority and the lives of your family.—If your Majesty had the means and the heart to destroy, utterly to kill, and put an end to, thirty millions of people, there might be some reason in this advice. But, not supposing you to have the will, I know you have not the power to do this terrible deed; yet, without such power, the counsel of these inveterate and malignant foes of freedom must be destitute of sense; and, to act upon it, must produce new convulsions, and, in all likelihood, bring new miseries upon yourself or your descendants.—You return to a people very different in disposition and character from that people whom you formerly knew in France. Before the revolution, the French people were an object of our scorn and mockery. If we wanted to represent in human shape

any thing the most cowardly and contemptible, we always chose a Frenchman. We called them slaves; it was proverbial amongst us, that they were a starved, shirtless, feeble, cowardly race of beings. They have wiped away this stigma. They, without kings or nobles to guide them, have *forced* us to respect and fear them. It was worth a revolution to produce this change in the opinions of the world. When our authors, who live by flattering the vain glory of the ignorant part of the people, *now* want to depict feebleness and cowardice, they do not choose Frenchmen for their subjects.—The French people might, while under the awe of a foreign force, seem to acquiesce in the re-establishment of the ancient order of things; but, that awe, if you be really a Sovereign, cannot last long, and, the moment it is removed, the people will resume their rights. It is not the same people who, so long, submitted to the old regime. It is a different people; a people who have tasted of the sweets of liberty; a people who have long been accustomed to discussion; a people who have seen what they are able to perform; a people who have imbibed a contempt, a most profound contempt, for all the pretensions of *birth* and rank; a people who have before them the most ample experience of their being able to defend themselves against all Europe, without the aid of *hereditary* valour or wisdom.—As to giving your countenance to the acts of the republicans, you must give these acts your countenance, if you agree to what the Senate has proposed; for, in that proposition is contained a *ratification* of the laws of Napoleon, and those laws, as far as they are good, are little more than a confirmation of the republican decrees. You must give your countenance to the republican acts, therefore, or you must reject the proposition of the Senate; you must remount the throne, not in consequence of the invitation of the Senate, but under the mere influence of a foreign force in possession of the capital of France, and in defiance of the people of France, upon whose good will you and your family must, after all, depend for your continuance in power.—We are told of the extreme joy, which prevails, in all parts of France, upon the subject of your restoration. We are told, that this feeling is the universal feeling. We are told, that the people evidently love you and your family. We are told, in authentic documents too, that there is not a dissenting voice.—But, is it not rather

wonderful, that this feeling should have lain dormant for so many years? That, while Napoleon and his army were in Spain, at Vienna, at Berlin, and even at Moscow; that when such fair opportunities offered, when there was nothing apparently to prevent the people of France from expressing their wishes in your favour; that, upon none of these occasions, no part of that populous nation should, amongst all their love of changes, have thought of expressing a wish for the return of the ancient family? If I am reminded of the spies, the police, the *gens d'armes* of Napoleon, I answer that all these were still *Frenchmen*. They made a part of the French people at any rate; and, some how or other, it has happened, that this people, taken all together, have, until now, been quite silent as to any wish for the restoration of your House. They are now, we are told, lost in their feelings of joy at your return; but, when was there a nation, the populace of which did not shout for the strongest; did not shout for him who had the power for the time being? Loud as the shouts may be, they have not, and will not, surpass those which were wont to be set up for Napoleon, who, according to the accounts we received, was hailed at Rome, Amsterdam, Berlin, and Vienna, with joy as great as your Majesty is said to have been hailed with at Paris.—This noise, therefore, is no circumstance to judge by of the real sentiments of the nation; and, if your Majesty has a true friend about you, he will caution you, every hour in the day, not to build any hopes upon that of which these shouts appear to be the evidence. He will remind you, as I have, that the French people never spoke of you and your family, till the foreign armies got possession of their country; and that, so reluctant were they to do it at last, that the white cockade did not travel so fast as the invaders, until Paris itself was taken, and Napoleon was unable to afford them any chance of successful resistance.—These are facts, which a faithful adviser will keep constantly before you, as the strongest of all possible reasons for your acting in such a way as shall reconcile the people to your return.—Either, says common sense, the people of France did really wish for your restoration, or they did not: either it is true that they have received you with sincere joy, or it is false: either you are the object of their love and their free choice, or you are not. If you are, there can cer-

tainly be no occasion for the presence of 300,000 foreign soldiers upon the soil of France, garrisoning all her strong and great towns and her capital. It will, therefore, be to the world, a pretty good criterion, when it is informed of the movements of these troops and of the period of their departure from France. If it be necessary for these troops to remain for any length of time; if they are to occupy Paris, and, in fact, France, until your Majesty be seated in the exercise of your authority; if this be found necessary, it will take a great deal more than the Senate and our newspapers have yet said to convince the rational part of mankind, that the genuine feeling in France is what it has recently been described to be. Napoleon is now out of the way. He has not only lost his power; but, his person is removed. Fear of *him*, therefore, is quite out of the question. Fear of *whom*, then, can it be, that shall render the presence of such an immense foreign force necessary? If the presence of this force be found necessary, it will behove your Majesty well to consider of the means of gaining the real affections of the people.—The Senate, after accusing Napoleon of violating the *liberty of the press* by his imprimatur, have themselves imposed an imprimatur, under pretence of preventing inflammatory placards and other dangerous publications. On *what* could this their apprehension be grounded? If the people really be of one mind as to your restoration; if they have hailed your return with sincere joy; if they do thirst for their ancient nobility and clergy; if the work of counter-revolution be really *their work*, why these fears of the press?—In short, every thing tends to prove, that your Majesty has much to do to gain the good will of the people of France; that your object ought to be to convince them by your measures, that they will not lose by the change; that they are not going to return to that state from which they emerged in 1789; that they are to enjoy the fruit of their labour and genius; that their country is still to be great; and, in short, that they are to suffer neither in interest nor in character by your restoration.—You have the disadvantage of succeeding to the power of a man, who, notwithstanding all that has been, or can be, said of him, will for ever live in the highest ranks of fame. He carried the French arms farther than any other man; he made France greater than she ever was before; the splendour of his achievements appeared

him to a people enamoured of military glory; he was a liberal protector of the arts and the sciences; he invariably showed that the glory of France was the object constantly in his view: and, it will be borne in mind, that, even at last, if he would have consented to a treaty which would have rendered France a contemptible State, he might have been still an Emperor. Though he became an enemy of freedom, feeling that the friends of freedom could not be reconciled to him, he established, or, at least, confirmed, a wise code of laws; he caused justice to be duly, impartially, and punctually administered; and, the people of France, if what is called the New Constitution be accepted by you and preserved, will not fail to recollect, that its chief merit is, that it *retains* what he had established; that it is, in fact, the work of *his* hands; that *he* made the Senate and the Legislative Body; and that, by whatever name his code may now be called, it is, in fact, the *Code Napoleon*.—Therefore, it will require, on your part, no common degree of prudence and firmness to satisfy a people, who have lived under such a ruler. The old regime will not suit such a people. They have been spoiled for the old regime. Those who are still attached to that regime are about to quit life. The scene is filled with new actors with feelings and minds fitted only to a new and more free and active state of things.—The picture of France, *previous* to the revolution,* as given us by Mr. Young, the Secretary to our Board of Agriculture, who travelled all over France, who made the most minute inquiries, who observed accurately, and who, in writing, always cited his authorities; this picture was such, that the man who did not wish to see a total change in the government, must have been a fiend in human shape. There were, however, such men, and in England too; but, their wishes were defeated; they had the mortification to see the French people become free; and they are now endeavouring to stimulate your Majesty again to make them slaves. Their hatred is partly to France and partly to freedom; but, the latter predominates in their mind. This class of men, and this class alone, would recommend an attempt to restore the ancient regime. They are crucified at the thought of the revolution having ended with a *gain* to the cause of freedom. So much has

not been gained as the friends of liberty could have wished; but, if your Majesty ascend the throne upon the conditions prescribed, France, at any rate, will enjoy as much freedom as we, who formerly reproached the French nation with being slaves; and your subjects will have the advantage of having something like a *specific compact* to refer to. The French people have carried on a war for twenty-two years; they have made great sacrifices; they have lost much of their best blood; but, they have given an example to the world of what people are able to do when the obtaining of freedom is their object, and they have secured many advantages, any one of which would have been worth a life of war. The principle of representative government they have caused to be recognized, they have a specific compact with their King, who is called, not in virtue of his *right*, but of a decree, to supply the place of another who had been deposed by a decree. They have made *conditions* with their new Sovereign; they have imposed an oath on him to observe the compact; and they have made such a compact as will give them, at least, as much freedom as the English, amongst whom they formerly passed for contemptible slaves. —Taxes are to be levied *impartially*; equality of proportion in taxes is *of right*, and no tax is to be imposed without the free consent of the Legislative Body. No taxes are to be laid for more than *one year*, except the land-tax.—These are most important points. It is all that the republicans ever wished for upon this head; and thus, by the new compact, which I trust your Majesty will faithfully observe, all those odious and detestable drains upon the people, under names of *Corvées, gabelles, tailles, and feudal imposts*, are for ever done away. The *partiality* in the imposition, so strongly dwelt upon by Mr. Young, is provided against; the odious and intolerable *exemptions* are abolished by your own consent; men are to contribute *according to their means*, and not according to the caprice of any subaltern ruler; and thus, in this respect, the people of France have gained and secured all that ever the republicans ever had in contemplation.—The “independence of the judicial power is *guaranteed*.” That is to say, it is to remain as Napoleon left it. There is to be one and the same system and set of principles for deciding as to the property and crimes of all men, without any exception.—Thus are swept away

* I subjoin it to this address, the republication having been so often called for.

all the *saleable justice*, of which Mr. Young so loudly complains; all those persecuting tribunals the *seigneurial courts*; all the parliaments, in which, as he tells us, the judges themselves were often parties; all these divans of death and devastation, such as that of *Toulouse*, by whom Calas was sent to the rack under the influence of remorseless bigotry and superstition.—To have got rid of this terrible curse alone, would have been worth a century of war. A civil war, raging through a whole country, is less horrible to contemplate than the existence of the tribunals described by Mr. Young; and, indeed, he was merely the translator, in this respect, of the complaints of the French people themselves.—“The sale of the national domains is *irrevocable*.”—These include the real property of the Church, which went to the support of some hundreds of thousands of persons, who, under the pretext of devoting their times and persons solely to God, wallowed in wealth, luxury, and pleasure, and insulted the people by whose labours they lived. Their property paid little or no share of the imposts; they enjoyed all the benefits and performed none of the duties, of civil society. They were not, in general, amenable to the laws; they committed crimes with impunity; and the only way in which they exerted their talents, was in keeping alive that accursed superstition, which served to preserve their own power at the expense of public happiness.—“The freedom of *worship* and *conscience* is *guaranteed*; and, the ministers of worship are *treated* and protected alike.”—This is again a mere confirmation of the laws and regulations of Napoleon. But, the word *traitement* has a meaning of great importance, which is not contained in the translation. The word, in French, means *salary*, or *pay*: and, the compact with your Majesty is, that the ministers of all religions, shall be *paid in the same manner*, or, from similar sources. Thus, then, the *tithes* are *not to be revived*. This is a most important point; not only as it affects *property*, but as it affects the power and influence of the Romish Church. In fact, if this article of the compact be adhered to, there will be no *established church* in France; and, I think, that your Majesty, during your long exile, must have been enough to convince you, that a predominant hierarchy has its inconveniences. To *put down* an established Church, is a very different thing from *refraining to raise up one* that has already been put down.

This matter of titles may be looked upon as the touch-stone of the counter-revolution. It is a land-mark for a great part of the world to go by; and, there will be nine hundred and ninety-nine out of every thousand in England, who will say, that, in this one thing, the French people are amply paid for all their sacrifices.—Here it is that your Majesty will stand in need of all your firmness and resolution. The priests will assail you with the artillery of their terrors and all the mining-tools of their endless and ever-varying intrigue. To rob the Church of her patrimony will be laid before you as the worst of crimes; to do justice to her will be represented as necessary at the risk of losing a crown and life; and, as for *oaths*, they will be termed trash, when in opposition to the interests of all that is valuable in the world to come.—Nevertheless, you must resist, if you wish to reign in peace; for, to revive the tithes; to bring back a claimant to a share in every man's crop, and that, too, after the lapse of twenty-two years; to give a fifth, or, perhaps, a fourth, of the annual worth of every man's land to another, when, in many cases, the land has been purchased being free from any such charge, would be an act that could hardly fail of exciting commotions leading towards, if not to, another revolution.—Your Majesty will not want for advisers, though the press, in *this country*, urge you to adopt this odious measure. There are men here, who, caring nothing about you or your family, are filled with dread at the idea of the people of France being free and happy. They dread to see the people of France gain any benefits at all. They would, above all things, dread the consequences of their being, under a government acknowledged to be legitimate, freed from the charge of *tithes*. They would be terrified at so dangerous an example, as they would deem it; and, I have little doubt, that, if you conform strictly to this part of the compact, they will soon be found amongst the bitterest of your enemies.—This point is not like any thing relating to the *legion of honour*, or to any mode of proceeding in the Legislative Body. It touches the property of every man who has property. To revive the tithes would be directly sending a stranger to take away the tenth part of every man's produce. What a change! What a contrast with the government of Napoleon! It would rouse every pitch-fork in your Kingdom. And yet, if done at all it must be done at once

It is not a work that can be effected by *time*, or by partial acts; for, to seize the tenth of a man's crop cannot be done *im-perceptibly*; the people cannot be deprived of this, as they sometimes are of their political rights, by slow and imperceptible degrees. It is not like a *tax*, which, at worst, is only for a *time*, and is paid in *money*. It is a seizure upon the real property itself. The act is visible, and touches every man in the tenderest part.—Your Majesty may have perceived, that, amongst our great agriculturists, including some of the most violent enemies of the French revolution, there are persons who are very eager for the *abolition of the tithes even here*. They speak of them as a monstrous *national evil*; they have no scruple of attributing every scarcity to them, though they forget that they now and then complain, that corn is *too cheap*; though this cause of scarcity is existing all the while. These worthy gentlemen are deceived; but, the error is general; and, one of our noblemen, not long ago, cited the *happiness, of our neighbours* in being freed from tithes. —But, to *impose* tithes is very different from preserving them, especially when, in the former case, the land has been purchased *tithe-free*.—This is the case presented to your Majesty, whose advisers must be your worst foes, if they counsel you to depart one jot from this condition of your restoration. Yet, here again it must be confessed, that the French people will have been *gainers* by the revolution. This their gain will excite envy in their neighbours, and will tend, it may be hoped to strengthen, rather than weaken, the cause of freedom.—The liberty of conscience and of public worship which is provided for, or, rather, *retained*, will give great satisfaction to the friends of freedom, especially to those who have read of the horrid persecutions of the Protestants, under the ancient regime. But, it is said, that, in *this* country, there are Protestants who *protest* against this condition of your recall! They wish you to re-establish the Catholic hierarchy in all its plenitude. The truth is, that they care nothing about your interests or the interests of religion. They hate freedom; they look upon an exclusive church-establishment as the means of holding men in abject subjection; and, therefore, whether Catholic or Protestant, they wish for an establishment.—Your Majesty will hardly have failed to be amused with observing the conduct of those persons. Before the revolution in France,

they reviled the Catholic religion and the Catholic priest. They represented your predecessors as tyrants; your clergy as subtle and cruel knaves; and the people of France as superstitious and degraded slaves. But, the revolution having alarmed them, your family became a race of paternal sovereigns, and, as to the Catholic priests, they were the most pious and most virtuous set of men in existence. The repeal of the edict of Nantes was no longer thought of; the judicial murders of Languedoc and Provence at the dictation of bloody bigotry, might have been necessary to prevent "*disorganization*;" the Pope, from being called Anti-Christ, became "*a venerable old man*;" and, even the inquisition with its cells and its flames, tended, at least, to preserve "*social order*." Your Majesty must have been amused with all this. The shyness of the world gave you time to observe and reflect; and I dare say, that you concluded these people to be the very basest of all mankind.—From the same motive that hugged the Capuchins to their bosom, and that their wives and daughters decorated themselves with rosaries and crosses, they would stimulate you to extirpate, or, at least, degrade, all the Protestants in France; namely, because liberty of conscience there, perfect equality as to religious matters, would be an acquisition to the cause of freedom.—The remaining condition, relating to religion, is of great consequence too; that is, "*that all Frenchmen are equally admissible to all civil and military employments*." This is a very wise and just provision, or, rather, retention of what Napoleon had established. You, like him, will act wisely in availing yourself of all the talents you can reach, without regard to the religious opinions of the possessor. The belief or disbelief in the doctrine of transubstantiation has nothing to do with the making of a treaty, or the pointing of a cannon, or the deciding of a question in law or equity. France, under your sway, if you adhere impartially to this condition, will set a bright example to the European nations. You will call down on your head the curses of superstition and priest-craft, of corruption, and of every oligarchy on earth; but, you will be faithfully served, and France will always be able to chastise any envious aggressor.—Your only real enemies are those, who will endeavour to stimulate you to acts of despotism and revenge. I perceive with great satisfaction, that the *republican* generals are likely to be the commanders under

you. You have seen, that there was no dependence on the frivolous offspring of what was called *high blood*. There were enough of these in France to have saved the life of your brother, or to have raised his son to the throne after his death. They made no effect in his defence. They fled from their homes and their country, seeking the aid of foreign troops to do what they themselves might have done. They hated freedom, but, fortunately, they wanted the courage and the mind to oppose its progress. They have been severely punished; and they will now seek to avenge themselves by urging you on to acts hostile to the freedom of the nation. They will incessantly whisper in your ear the necessity of straining the bonds tighter. They will tell you, that your brother fell by his *lenity*, and that, therefore you ought to be severe. They will never remind you of the *real* causes that produced his tragical end; namely, their pernicious advice first, and then, their base desertion.——If your Majesty has the firmness to resist these advisers; to turn a deaf ear to the priests, and to adhere steadily to the social contract, which you have made with the people of France, there is no treaty that you may consent to, there is no combination of any sort from without, that can prevent your being the most powerful sovereign in the world.——You will be surrounded with skilful generals, and have, beyond what history gives any account of, men whose very *names* will inspire a desire to live in peace with you, and to treat you with respect. The very prisoners of war, who will return to you, will form an army sufficient to defend France against all the world. The nation is enlightened; agriculture and all the arts flourish in your dominions: you have no *Debt* to plunge you and the country into embarrassments and confusion. Your bank pays its notes in specie. There will be no exclusive privileges to impede knowledge and improvement. The soil, the climate, of France are the finest in the world, and her people the most brave and most ingenious. Monks have been driven out of the sciences as well as out of the convents. All the causes of the former decrepitude of France are removed ready to your hand; and it depends wholly on the counsels which you shall adopt, whether the French people are now to enjoy the fruits of their immense sacrifices and their unparralleled exploits of valour; or, whether they be yet destined to renew those sacrifices and those exploits;

for, as to putting them back into the state in which they were before the revolution, it is as impossible as it would be to form again the image of the Lady of Loretto out of the ashes, into which it was reduced by the people of Paris.——The people of France, by their valiant excursions, have set Europe into a commotion which will not soon subside. Spain, Portugal, Italy, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Naples, Sicily; all these countries are yet in an agitated state. It will be your Majesty's true policy to leave them all to arrange their disputes in their own way. Let France now sit down quietly in peace; let her people enjoy the blessings, which they so well deserve; let other nations now struggle for their freedom, or remain in a state of slavery. Let those who have had in view the humiliation of France, the tearing of her to pieces, the throwing of her back for a century; let those who hate and who envy her, now settle their disputes in their own way. Only let the people of France be free and happy, and the rest of Europe will soon follow her example.——I have seen with infinite satisfaction, that the republican generals appear the most prominent in the new order of things. They are the men, in whom your Majesty ought to confide. An old decrepid, rotten nobility, who have fled, in all parts of Europe, at the approach of the republicans, of France, are not fitted for times like these. Let them wear their old cordons and their ruffles; let them muster up their parchments and their armorial bearings; but trust them not with your armies. Let military officers continue to rise by their merit. Ask no questions as to who is their father or their mother. The bravest and most skilful alone are able to give you support, and those only you ought to promote. One great cause of the wonderful success of Napoleon was, that he took all his commanders from the *ranks*. Every soldier had a fair chance of promotion. He had not the mortification to see the son of some noble, the bastard of a mistress, or the stupid off-cast of some family of *interest*, put over his head. The commissions in the army were not the wages of *corruption* or of *prostitution*. They were not the perquisites of prostitutes or the valets-de-chambre of battered rakes in power. They were not amongst the compensations of political villainy; they were not given in part payment for acts destructive of all civil and religious liberty. Say the world what it will of your renowned predecessor in

power, it will always be remembered, that *real merit* was the object of his rewards and praises; and, that, though he did assail the liberties of France, he assailed them openly, and not by a hypocritical and base system of corruption, calculated at once, to ruin freedom and to secure himself. His attacks were manly, at any rate. He was a soldier, and he governed too much like a soldier; but, his rod was a feather, compared to what he might have made it, if he had chosen the base means of *corruption*; covering his tyranny by an eternal clatter about liberty and his constitution, and making the Corps Legislatif the channel of his frauds, and the partaker in his power and plunder. Happily for France, he proceeded by *storm* and not by *sap*. I hope your Majesty will shun both. You are luckily freed from all apprehensions of any combinations of an *oligarchy*. The new nobility have no families; no deep-rooted and wide-spreading connections; no hold upon the soil and population; no accursed influence over the actions of men by means of their purses. The old nobility are in the same state. Time has so dispersed them, that they are no longer a body capable of acting in concert. They will have no influence over the minds of the people, who are, in general, placed quite out of their reach. Your Majesty, therefore, may, if you choose, be a *real* Sovereign, hearing and listening to the free voice of your people; for, though the mode of electing representatives is not quite what I could have wished, the people will, at any rate, have *something* to say; they will have *some* weight in the choosing of those who are to have the holding of their purses. The elections, as far as they go, *may* be free. The thing will not be a mere sham; a mere delusion of the ignorant; a mere *show* of freedom for the purpose of more securely practising a real despotism.—Your Majesty is happily relieved from the existence of the great source of corrupt influence, and, it ought to be an object of your special care to prevent the arising of such a source; for, the moment it arises, the miseries of your Majesty and of your brave and excellent people will begin. They may still *call* themselves free; but, they will not only be, in reality, slaves, but will become mean and dastardly, each endeavouring to seek, by obtaining a share in the public plunder, a compensative for his losses and his disgrace. Your Majesty, while you keep your people clear of corrupt influence, while you govern by virtu-

ous means; will have the whole of your people out of whom to choose persons for your service; but, if once you were to be persuaded to rule by means of corruption, *you* yourself would become a slave. You must then take the instruments that corruption would offer you; you must submit to the impudence, the insolence, the ignorance, the imbecility; that an oligarchy of corruption would impose upon you; and you must agree with that oligarchy in plundering your people, in order to obtain a sufficiency to support your splendor and that of your family.—In such a state of things, the French people would be made to labour for the support of persons as lazy as monks, and much more insolent and numerous. The monks, at any rate, lived upon what they called their own property; they did not live upon the taxes. But, a swarm, hatched by corruption, would fall immediately upon the public revenues, as the foulest of vermin fall upon a diseased human or other carcase: and, besides, monks were single men, whereas corruption hatches whole broods at a time, female as well as male: father and mother, sons and daughters, uncles and aunts, and cousins too numerous to be counted, would fall, all together upon your poor devoted people; fasten upon them for life; mount them, as the weazel does the hare, ride them and suck their blood at the same time, and, in answer to their piteous cries, insult them, perhaps, by telling them, that they ought not to grudge the sacrifice, seeing that it was the price of their *freedom*!—Nevertheless, I am far from being certain, that your Majesty will not find persons to advise you to slide, as soon as possible, into a system of this sort. But, you will, I hope, perceive the danger as well as the wickedness of such advice, and that you will be even more resolute in rejecting it, than you would in rejecting the advice to establish an open and undisguised tyranny; the latter being far less injurious to the morals and interests of the people, as well as less disgraceful to the ruler. Under an open and avowed despotism, men are not hypocrites. They submit to force, and do not attempt to disguise their submission. What is the lot of one is the lot of all. The ruler has no need of subaltern despots. He insults nobody, because he does not affect to consider any one as free. But, if you were to govern by corruption, the unhappy people of France would become a race of dissimulating knaves; each would be seeking to undermine the other; every

one would be working to sell himself at the highest possible price; there would be an universal struggle for a share in the general plunder, whence must arise a baseness of national character too odious to be endured.—Your Majesty's restoration forces upon one's mind the recollection of the elevation of SIXTUS V. to the Papedom. He, who had before been suffered to live almost wholly unnoticed, became, all of a sudden, surrounded with flatterers and admirers. The "old ass of Ancona," as the Cardinals used to call him, but who was, in fact, a very wise man, became, in a moment, an object of fulsome eulogium with the haughty family of Medici, and of others not less haughty or less unworthy of the name of noble. Your Majesty is now an object of flattery, and with some from motives similar to those of the family of Medici, upon the occasion referred to. Those who gathered themselves round Sixtus V. congratulated him on his elevation; told him of his mended health and his fair prospect of long life; and who even went so far in their officiousness as to intrude their aid in adjusting, with their own hands, his newly assumed robes, were soon assured, from his own lips, that he stood in no need of their assistance. If your Majesty be wise, your conduct will, in this respect, resemble that of this celebrated Pope, whose congratulators, whose flatterers, whose officious new friends, thought, by such means, to become the masters of his mind, or, at least, to obtain and secure great influence in the directing of his measures, and who were so far from succeeding in their views, that they very soon became objects of his censure, and had, in various ways, to feel the effect of his power. The consequence was, that they, when too late, cursed the hour that they lent a hand to his exaltation. This will, I am quite certain, if you act wisely, happen in your case. If you act with justice and moderation; if you take care not to sacrifice the honour and interests of France; if you return to your people with a mind free from all thoughts of revenge and resentment; and especially if you show that you are resolved to maintain the rights and liberties of the people; if you act thus, I am quite certain, that, in a very few months, you will see yourself vilified in those very prints which have been the forwardest in hailing your restoration. Those who promulgate their views, or effect their purposes, through the channel of these prints, have no regard for you, your

family, or your interests. They see you, about to be at the head of a nation, which will be great, because it cannot be made little. These low-minded and malignant men (I mean the mere writers and such like people, of course) have renewed their old hope of "*clipping the wings of France*," as one of our North British worthies called it in the year 1791. They hope, that your Majesty will attempt the restoration of every abuse of power that ever existed in France; that you will make the scaffold groan with severed heads and quartered carcasses; that you will involve your people in bloody and long civil wars; that you will so cripple the power of France, that she will be unable to look abroad for centuries; that you will accept of peace with other powers upon the most injurious and degrading terms; that you will debase, lacerate, devastate, France, making her a country for a man to be ashamed to live in; but, above all things, they hope, that you will extinguish the very name and idea of *freedom*, thereby destroying a gem that might, at one time or another, spread itself over the world.—In some of these their fiend-like hopes, I know that they will be disappointed, and I trust, that they will be disappointed in them all. The French people, under a wise and just system of government, will be an example to all nations; their language is the most general; their science the greatest; they possess the arts in the highest degree; they have the finest climate and soil; their natural productions are the most various and most relished; their temper is the most gay; and their renown in arms surpassing that of all the other nations of the earth put together. Whatever such a people does, must necessarily be of great weight in the world; and, what that people will do, depends, in a great degree, upon your Majesty, whose interest is inseparable from that of your people, and who cannot be truly *great*, unless they be truly *free*.—The fact, as stated in the public prints; that the *Statue of Liberty* has been placed on the pedestal, from which that of Napoleon had been hurled, is, I hope, an undecieving sign of what is to take place under your Majesty. At any rate, it is strikingly expressive of the sentiments of the nation; and, it has this great merit, that it proclaims to the world at large, that the principles of *liberty*, after all the storms of revolution, have prevailed in the fairest part of Europe. There is much for your Majesty to lament in what

has passed during your exile; but, you find France much better than you left her. Clear of all debts, calculated to corrupt and degrade her; a circulating medium that the whole world receives; manufactures ready to start into activity; information every where possessed; a great diminution in the distress and number of paupers; an augmentation of the number of proprietors; industry instead of monkish laziness; all exclusive privileges abolished; the road of preferment open to talent and virtue; an army that wants no training, a people capable of defending their country against all Europe combined. To restore a *sufficiency of trade* to such a nation is the work of a month. Indeed, it is no work at all. Trade will come of itself.—Your Majesty will not be, it is hoped, easily inveigled to sacrifice the interests of your people to those of foreign States for the purpose of preserving the friendship of those States. You have had abundant experience of the value of that friendship; and you will, I trust, want nothing to convince you, that your best friends, and the only friends you have on earth are your own subjects. One of our base and malignant journalists calls on you NOT TO FORGET the deeds of certain of the republican generals. And, has your Majesty nobody else to remember? Are there no other persons, who ought to wish that your Majesty had lost your memory? Have the last twenty-two years furnished your Majesty with no acts worthy of recollection but those which have been committed by the valiant leaders of the armies of France? Have you observed no *baseness* any where but in France? Have you, in your several journeys and solitudes, cast your eyes upon nothing worthy of your contempt and execration? In short, how many times must you and every member of your family have vowed, that, if you were ever reconciled to your people, nothing on earth should again separate you from them! The republican generals possess the love and admiration of your people; they are adored by the armies; they alone are able to give countenance to your authority and stability to your throne. As towards your external enemies they are a tower of strength. Their very names is a host in your favour; and, in proportion as they are hated and calumniated by foreign writers, they ought to be esteemed and caressed by you. Your Majesty will now see a great number of faces from foreign countries, which

you never saw while you resided in those countries. Your entrance into this country, for instance, must have appeared to you quite wonderful when you come to witness the crowds at your departure. I dare say, that your Majesty must have philosophised on this sudden burst of feeling for your long sufferings; and, I will venture to say, that it was so pleasing to you, that you will take care to do nothing that shall put you in a situation to deprive you of the chance of witnessing such scenes in future in your own country. You have now seen, that it is to the power and not to the person that the herd of mankind pay respect; and, in order to preserve power, in your case, you must, and I trust you will, endeavour to make your people happy and contented.—In conclusion, I cannot refrain from observing, what seems to have been wholly overlooked, that your Majesty, in accepting the title of King of France from the hands of your revolutionizing subjects, will *now* have no nominal rival in that title. The title of *King of France* was, before the revolution, amongst the proudest distinctions of our own gracious and beloved Sovereign, who bore the *flour de lis* also in his arms. These were discontinued previous to, and just before, the memorable *treaty of Amiens*, upon the ground, as some said, that it was a disgrace to our benevolent ruler to associate with his titles that of Sovereign of so wicked a people as the French were then considered. This objection is, indeed, now removed; but, I much question whether any alteration will take place in consequence of it; so that your Majesty will now be the *only* person in the world called *King of France*. This, amongst numerous other great advantages, you will owe to that revolution, which, though in its progress, attended with much suffering and many crimes, has improved the lot of mankind in general, and particularly that of the people and even the Sovereign of France.

ON THE

REVOLUTION OF FRANCE.

“The gross infamy which attended *lettres de cachet* and the Bastille, during the whole reign of Louis XV. made them esteemed in England, by people not well informed, as the most prominent features of the despotism of France. They were certainly carried to an excess hardly credible; to the

length of being sold, with blanks, to be filled up with names at the pleasure of the purchaser; who was thus able, in the gratification of private revenge, to tear a man from the bosom of his family, and bury him in a dungeon, where he would exist forgotten, and die unknown!—But such excesses could not be common in any country; and they were reduced almost to nothing, from the accession of the present King. The great mass of the people, by which I mean the lower and middle ranks, could suffer very little from such engines, and as few of them are objects of jealousy, had there been nothing else to complain of, it is not probable they would ever have been brought to take arms. The abuses attending the levy of taxes were heavy and universal. The kingdom was parcelled into generalities, with an intendant at the

head of each, into whose hands the whole power of the crown was delegated for every thing except the military authority; but particularly for all affairs of finance. The generalities were subdivided into elections, at the head of which was a *sub-delegué*, appointed by the intendant. The rolls of the *taille*, *capitation*, *vingtièmes*, and other taxes, were distributed among districts, parishes, and individuals, at the pleasure of the intendant, who could exempt, change, add, or diminish, at pleasure. Such an enormous power, constantly acting, and from which no man was free, must, in the nature of things, degenerate in many cases into absolute tyranny. It must be obvious, that the friends, acquaintances, and dependants of the intendant, and of all his *sub-delegués*, and the friends of these friends, to a long chain of dependance, might be favoured in taxation at the expense of their miserable neighbours; and that noblemen, in favour at court, to whose protection the intendant himself would naturally look up, could find little difficulty in throwing much of the weight of their taxes on others, without a similar support. Instances, and even gross ones, have been reported to me in many parts of the kingdom, that made me shudder at the oppression to which numbers must have been condemned, by the undue favours granted to such crooked influence. But, without recurring to such cases, what must have been the state of the poor people paying heavy taxes, from which the nobility and clergy were exempted? A cruel aggravation of their misery, to see those who could best afford to pay, exempted because able!—The enrolments for the militia, which the *cahiers* call an *injustice without example*,^b were another dreadful scourge on the peasantry; and, as married men were exempted from it, occasioned in some de-

* An anecdote, which I have from an authority to be depended on, will explain the profligacy of government, in respect to these arbitrary imprisonments. Lord Albemarle, when ambassador in France, about the year 1763, negotiating the fixing of the limits of the American colonies, which, three years after, produced the war, calling one day on the minister for foreign affairs, was introduced, for a few minutes, into his cabinet, while he finished a short conversation in the apartment in which he usually received those who conferred with him. As his lordship walked backwards and forwards, in a very small room (a French cabinet is never a large one,) he could not help seeing a paper lying on the table, written in a large legible hand, and containing a list of the prisoners in the Bastille, in which the first name was Gordon. When the minister entered, Lord Albemarle apologized for his involuntarily remarking the paper; the other replied, that it was not of the least consequence, for they made no secret of the names. Lord A. then said, that he had seen the name of Gordon first in the list, and he begged to know, as in all probability the person of this name was a British subject, on what account he had been put into the Bastille. The minister told him, that he knew nothing of the matter, but would make the proper inquiries. The next time he saw Lord Albemarle, he informed him, that, on inquiring into the case of Gordon, he could find no person who could give him the least information; on which he had had Gordon himself interrogated, who solemnly affirmed, that he had not the smallest knowledge, or even suspicion, of the cause of his imprisonment, but that he had been confined thirty years; however, added the minister, I ordered him to be immediately released, and he is now at large. Such a case waits no comment.

^b *Nob. Brit.* p 6, &c &c.

gree that mischievous population, which brought beings into the world, in order for little else than to be starved. The *corvées*, or police of the roads, were annually the ruin of many hundreds of farmers; more than 300 were reduced to beggary in filling up one vale in Lorraine: all these oppressions fell on the *tiérs état* only; the nobility and clergy having been equally exempted from *tailles*, militia, and *corvées*. The penal code of finance makes one shudder at the horrors of punishment inadequate to the crime.* A few features will sufficiently characterize the old government of France.

1. Smugglers of salt, armed and assembled to the number of five, in Provence, *a fine of 500 liv. and nine years galleys*;—in all the rest of the kingdom, *death*.

2. Smugglers armed, assembled, but in number under five, *a fine of 300 liv. and three years galleys*. Second offence, *death*.

3. Smugglers, without arms, but with horses, carts, or boats; *a fine of 300 liv. if not paid, three years galleys*. Second offence, 400 liv. and *nine years galleys*.—In Dauphiné, second offence, *galleys for life*. In Provence, *five years galleys*.

4. Smugglers, who carry the salt on their backs, and without arms, *a fine of 200 liv. and if not paid, are flogged and branded*. Second offence, *a fine of 300 liv. and six years galleys*.

5. Women, married and single, smug-

glers, first offence, *a fine of 100 liv*. Second, 300 liv. Third, *flogged, and banished the kingdom for life*. Husbands *responsible both in fine and body*.

6. Children smugglers, the same as women.—*Fathers and mothers responsible; and for defect of payment flogged*.

7. Nobles, if smugglers, *deprived of their nobility; and their houses razed to the ground*.

8. Any persons in employments (I suppose employed in the salt-works or the revenue), if smugglers, *death*. And such as assist in the theft of salt in the transport, *hanged*.

9. Soldiers smuggling, with arms, are *hanged*; without arms, *galleys for life*.

10. Buying smuggled salt to resell it, *the same punishments as for smuggling*.

11. Persons in the salt employments, *empowered if two, or one with two witnesses, to enter and examine houses even of the privileged orders*.

12. All families, and persons liable to the *taille*, in the provinces of the *Grandes Gabelles* inrolled, and their consumption of salt for the *pot and salière* (that is, the daily consumption, exclusive of salting meat, &c. &c.) estimated at 7lb. a head, per annum, which quantity they are forced to buy whether they want it or not, under the pain of various fines according to the case.

The *Capitaineries* were a dreadful scourge on all the occupiers of land. By this term, is to be understood the paramountship of certain districts, granted by the king, to princes of the blood, by which they were put in possession of the property of all game, even on lands not belonging to them; and, what is very singular, on manors granted long before to individuals; so that the erecting of a district into a *capitainerie*, was an annihilation of all manorial rights to game within it. This was a trifling business, in comparison of other circumstances; for, in speaking of the preserva-

* It is calculated by a writer (*Recherches et Consid. par M. le Baron de Cormeré*, tom. ii. p. 187.) very well informed on every subject of finance, that, upon an average, there were annually taken up and sent to prison or the galleys, Men, 2,340; Women, 896; Children, 201. Total, 3,437. 300 of these to the galleys (tom. i. p. 112). The salt confiscated from these miscreants amounted to 12,633 quintals, which, at the mean price of 8 liv. are - - - 101,064 liv.

2,772lb. of salted f. - - - at 10s. 1,386

1,086 horses, at 50 liv. - - - 54,300

52 carts, at 150 liv. - - - 7,800

Fines - - - - - 53,207

Seized in houses - - - - 105,530

323,387

tion of the game in these *capitaineries*, it must be observed, that by game must be understood whole droves of wild boars, and herds of deer not confined by any wall or pale, but wandering, at pleasure, over the whole country, to the destruction of crops; and to the peopling of the gallies by the wretched peasants, who presumed to kill them, in order to save that food which was to support their helpless children. The game in the *capitainerie* of Montceau, in four parishes only, did mischief to the amount of 184,263 liv. per annum.^d No wonder then that we should find the people asking, “*Nous demandons à grand cris la destruction des capitaineries & celle de toute sorte de gibier.*”^e And what are we to think of demanding, as a favour, the permission—“*De Nettoyer ses grains de faucher les prés artificiels, & d’enlever ses chaumes sans égard pour la perdrix on tout autre gibier.*”^f Now, an English reader will scarcely understand it without being told, that there are numerous edicts for preserving the game which prohibited weeding and hoeing, lest the young partridges should be disturbed; steeping seed, lest it should injure the game; manuring with night soils, lest the flavour of the partridges should be injured by feeding on the corn so produced; mowing hay, &c. before a certain time, so late as to spoil many crops; and taking away the stubble, which would deprive the birds of shelter. The tyranny exercised in these *capitaineries*, which extended over 400 leagues of country, was so great, that many *cahiers* demanded the utter suppression of them.^g

^d *Cahier du tiers état de Meaux*, p. 49.

^e *De Mantes and Meulan*, p. 40.—Also, *Nob. & Tier Etat de Peronne*, p. 42. *De Trois ordres de Montfort*, p. 28.—That is: “We most earnestly pray for the suppression of the *Capitaineries*, and that of all the game laws.”

^f *De Mantes and Meulan*, p. 38.—That is to say, “the favour to weed their corn, to mow their upland grass, and to take off their stubble, without consulting the convenience of the partridges, or any other sort of game.”

^g *Clergé de Provins & Montceau*, p. 35.—*Clergé*

Such were the exertions of arbitrary power which the lower orders felt directly from the royal authority; but, heavy as they were, it is a question whether the others, suffered circuitously through the nobility and the clergy, were not yet more oppressive? Nothing can exceed the complaints made in the *cahiers* under this head. They speak of the dispensation of justice in the manorial courts, as comprising every species of despotism: the districts indeterminate—appeals endless—irreconcilable to liberty and prosperity—and irrevocably proscribed in the opinions of the public^h—augmenting litigations—favouring every species of chicane—ruining the parties—not only by enormous expenses on the most petty objects, but by a dreadful loss of time. The judges commonly ignorant pretenders, who hold their courts in *cabarets*, and are absolutely dependant on the seigneurs.ⁱ Nothing can exceed the force of expression used in painting the oppressions of the seigneurs, in consequence of their feudal powers. They are “*vexations qui sont le plus grand fléau des peuples.*”^j—*Esclavage affligeant.*—*Ce régime désastreux.*”^k—That the *feodalité* be for ever abolished. The countryman is tyrannically enslaved by it. Fixed and heavy rents; vexatious processes to secure them; appreciated unjustly to augment them: rents, *solidaires*, and *reventables*; rents, *chéantes*, and *levantes*; *fumages*. Fines at every change of the property, in the direct as well as collateral line; feudal redemption

de Paris, p. 25.—*Clergé de Mantes & Meulan*, p. 45, 46.—*Clergé de Laon*, p. 11.—*Nob. de Nemours*, p. 17.—*Nob. de Paris*, p. 22.—*Nob. d’Arras*, p. 29.

^h *Reunee*, art. 12.

ⁱ *Necornois*, art. 43.

^j *Tiers Etat de Vannes*, p. 21.—That is: “Vexations which are the greatest scourge of the people.”

^k *T. Etat Clermont Ferrand*, p. 52.—That is: “Cruel Slavery.”

^l *T. Etat Auxerre*, art. 6.—That is: “This ruinous system of governing.”

(*retraite*); fines on sale, to the 8th and even the 6th penny; redemptions (*rachats*) injurious in their origin, and still more so in their extension. *banalité* of the mill,^a of the oven, and of the wine and cyder-press; *corvées* by custom; *corvées* by usage of the fief; *corvées* established by unjust decrees; *corvées* arbitrary, and even phantastical; servitudes; *prestations*, extravagant and burthensome; collections by assessments incollectible; *aveux, minus, impunissements*; litigations ruinous and without end: the rod of seigneurial finance for ever shaken over our heads; vexation, ruin, outrage, violence, and destructive servitude, under which the peasants, almost on a level with Polish slaves, can never but be miserable, vile, and oppressed.^b They demand also, that the use of hand-mills be free; and hope that posterity if possible, may be ignorant that feudal tyranny in Bretagne, armed with the judicial power, has not blushed even in these times at breaking hand-mills, and at selling annually to the miserable, the faculty of bruising between two stones a measure of buck-wheat or barley.^c The very terms of these complaints are unknown in England, and consequently untranslatable: they have probably arisen long since the feudal system ceased in this kingdom. What are these tortures of the peasantry in Bretagne, which they call *chevanchés, quintaines, soule, saut de poisson, baiser de mariées, chansons; transporte d'œuf sur un charrette; silence des grenouilles*;^d *corvée a mi-*

^a By this horrible law, the people are bound to grind their corn at the mill of the seigneur only; to press their grapes at his press only; and to bake their bread in his oven; by which means the bread is often spoiled, and more especially wine, since in Champagne those grapes which, pressed immediately, would make white wine, by waiting for the press, which often happens, make red wine only.

^b *Tierce Etat Rennes*, p. 159.

^c *Rennes*, p. 57.

^d This is a curious article: when the lady of the seigneur lies in, the people are obliged to beat the waters in marshy districts, to keep the frogs silent, that she may not be disturbed; this

sericorde; milods; leide; couponage; cartelage; barage; fouage; marechaussée; ban vin; ban d'aout; trousses; gelinage; cloverage; taillabilité; vingtain; sterlage; bordelage; minage; ban de vendanges; droit d'accapte. In passing through many of the French provinces, I was struck with the various and heavy complaints of the farmers and little proprietors of the feudal grievances, with the weight of which their industry was burthened; but I could not then conceive the multiplicity of the shackles which kept them poor and depressed. I understood it better afterwards, from the conversation and complaints of some grand seigneurs, as the revolution advanced; and I then learned, that the principal rental of many estates consisted in services and feudal tenures; by the baneful influence of which, the industry of the people was almost exterminated. In regard to the oppressions of the clergy, as to tithes, I must do that body a justice, to which a claim cannot be laid in England. Though the ecclesiastical tenth was levied in France more severely than usual in Italy, yet was it never exacted with such horrid greediness as is at present the disgrace of England. When taken in kind, no such thing was known in any part of France, where I made inquiries, as a tenth: it was always a twelfth, or a thirteenth, or even a twentieth of the produce. And in no part of the kingdom did a new article of culture pay any thing: thus turnips, cabbages, clover, chicoree, potatoes, &c. &c. paid nothing. In many parts, meadows were exempted. Silk worms nothing. Olives in some places paid—in more they did not. Cows nothing. Lambs from the 12th to the 21st Wool nothing.—Such mildness, in the levy of this odious tax, is absolutely unknown in England. But mild as it was, the

duty, a very oppressive one, is commuted into a pecuniary fine.

^e *Recueil des cahiers*, tom. iii. p. 316, 317.

burden to people groaning under so many other oppressions, united to render their situation so bad that no change could be for the worse. But these were not all the evils with which the people struggled. The administration of justice was partial, venal, infamous. I have, in conversation with many very sensible men, in different parts of the kingdom, met with something of content with their government, in all other respects than this; but upon the question of expecting justice to be really and fairly administered, every one confessed there was no such thing to be looked for. The conduct of the parliaments was profligate and atrocious. Upon almost every cause that came before them, interest was openly made with the judges: and wo betided the man who, with a cause to support, had no means of conciliating favour, either by the beauty of a handsome wife, or by other methods. It has been said, by many writers, that property was as secure under the old government of France as it is in England; and the assertion might possibly be true, as far as any violence from the King, his ministers, or the great was concerned: but for all that mass of property, which comes in every country to be litigated in courts of justice, there was not even the shadow of security, unless the parties were totally and equally unknown, and totally and equally honest; in every other case, he who had the best interest with the judges, was sure to be the winner. To reflecting minds, the cruelty and abominable practice attending such courts are sufficiently apparent. There was also a circumstance in the constitution of these parliaments, but little known in England, and which, under such a government as that of France, must be considered as very singular. They had the power, and were in the constant practice of issuing decrees, without the consent of the crown, and which had the force of laws through the

whole of their jurisdiction; and of all other laws, these were sure to be the best obeyed; for as all infringements of them were brought before sovereign courts, composed of the same persons who had enacted these laws (a horrible system of tyranny!) they were certain of being punished with the last severity. It must appear strange, in a government so despotic in some respects as that of France, to see the parliaments in every part of the kingdom making laws without the King's consent, and even in defiance of his authority. The English, whom I met in France in 1789, were surprised to see some of these bodies issuing arrets against the export of corn out of the provinces subject to their jurisdiction, into the neighbouring provinces, at the same time that the King, through the organ of so popular a minister as Mons. Necker, was decreeing an absolutely free transport of corn throughout the kingdom, and even at the requisition of the National Assembly itself. But this was nothing new; it was their common practice. The parliament of Rouen passed an arret against killing of calves: it was a preposterous one, and opposed by administration; but it had its full force; and had a butcher dared to offend against it, he would have found, by the rigour of his punishment, who was his master. Inoculation was favoured by the court in Louis XV.'s time; but the parliament of Paris passed an arret against it, much more effective in prohibiting, than the favour of the court in encouraging that practice. Instances are innumerable, and I may remark, that the bigotry, ignorance, false principles, and tyranny of these bodies were generally conspicuous; and that the court (taxation excepted), never had a dispute with a parliament, but the parliament was sure to be wrong. Their constitution, in respect to the administration of justice, was so truly rotten, that the members sat as judges, even in causes of private property, in which they were themselves the parties, and have, in this capacity, been guilty of oppressions and cruelties, which the crown has rarely dared to attempt.

It is impossible to justify the excesses of the people on their taking up arms; they were certainly guilty of cruelties; it is idle to deny the facts, for they have been proved too clearly to admit of a doubt. But is it really the people to whom we are to impute the whole?—Or to their oppressors, who had kept them so long in a state of bondage? He who chooses to be served by

slaves, and by ill-treated slaves, must know that he holds both his property and life by a tenure far different from those who prefer the service of well treated freemen; and he who dines to the music of groaning sufferers, must not, in the moment of insurrection, complain that his daughters are ravished, and then destroyed; and that his sons' throats are cut. When such evils happen, they surely are more imputable to the tyranny of the master, than to the cruelty of the servant. The analogy holds with the French peasants—the murder of a seigneur, or a chateau in flames, is recorded in every news-paper; the rank of the person who suffers, attracts notice; but where do we find the register of that seigneur's oppressions of his peasantry, and his exactions of feudal services, from those whose children were dying around them for want of bread? Where do we find the minutes that assigned these starving wretches to some vile petty-fogger, to be fleeced by impositions, and a mockery of justice, in the seignorial courts? Who gives us the awards of the intendant and his *sub-delegués*, which took off the taxes of a man of fashion, and laid them with accumulated weight, on the poor, who were so unfortunate as to be his neighbours? Who has dwelt sufficiently upon explaining all the ramifications of depotisms, regal, aristocratic, and ecclesiastical, pervading the whole mass of the people: reaching, like a circulating fluid, the most distant capillary tubes of poverty and wretchedness? In these cases, the sufferers are too ignoble to be known; and the mass too indiscriminate to be pitied. But should a philosopher feel and reason thus? should he mistake the cause for the effect? and giving all his pity to the few, feel no compassion for the many, because they suffer in his eyes not individually, but by millions? The excesses of the people cannot, I repeat, be justified: it would undoubtedly have done them credit, both as men and christians, if they had possessed their new acquired power with moderation. But let it be remembered, that the populace in no country ever use power with moderation; excess is inherent in their aggregate constitution: and as every government in the world knows, that violence infallibly attends power in such hands, it is doubly bound in common sense, and for common safety so to conduct itself, that the people

may not find an interest in public confusions. They will always suffer much and long, before they are effectually roused; nothing, therefore, can kindle the same, but such oppressions of some classes or order in the society, as give able men the opportunity of accending the general mass; discontent will soon diffuse itself around; and if the government take not warning in time, it is alone answerable for all the burnings, and plunderings, and devastation, and blood that follow. The true judgment to be formed of the French revolution, must surely be gained, from an attentive consideration of the evils of the old government: when these are well understood—and when the extent and universality of the oppression under which the people groaned—oppression which bore upon them from every quarter, it will scarcely be attempted to be urged, that a revolution was not absolutely necessary to the welfare of the kingdom. Not one opposing voice^a can, with reason, be raised against this assertion: abuses ought certainly to be corrected, and corrected effectually: this could not be done without the establishment of a new form of government; whether the form that has been adopted were the best, is another question absolutely distinct. But that the above-mentioned detail of enormities practised on the people required some great change is sufficiently apparent."

^a Many opposing voices have been raised; but so little to their credit, that I leave the passage as it was written long ago. The abuses that are rooted in all the old governments of Europe, give such numbers of men a direct interest in supporting, cherishing, and defending abuses, that no wonder advocates for tyranny, of every species, are found in every country, and almost in every company. What a mass of people, in every part of England, are some way or other interested in the present representation of the people, tithes, charters, corporations, monopolies, and taxation! and not merely to the things themselves, but to all the abuses attending them; and how many are there who derive their profit or their consideration in life, not merely from such institutions, but from the evils they engender! The great mass of the people, however, is free from such influence, and will be enlightened by degrees; assuredly they will find out, in every country of Europe, that by combinations, on the principles of liberty and property, aimed equally against regal aristocratical, and mobbish tyranny, they will be able to resist successfully, that variety of combination, which, on principles of plunder and despotism, is every where at work to enslave them.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

AFFAIRS OF FRANCE.—CITY ADDRESS.—Every day something of importance transpires as to the affairs of this great nation, which must necessarily be, for a while, the chief object of our attention.—It is of great consequence to observe the feeling, which the late change in France has produced, and is daily producing in England.—So general as was the wish for the fall of Napoleon, and so strong the apparent conviction, that it was he, and only he, that stood between us and political happiness, that one would naturally have expected to see a corresponding satisfaction at the so long prayed-for event. But, somehow or other, there prevails an astonishing coldness and indifference. The honey-moon has passed away as quickly as in cases where the bride is a piece of patch-work and paint, and where the lately anxiously expecting lover has sufficiently recovered his senses to be able to estimate the real value of his prize.—Must it not appear wonderful, that this event should have excited no impression of joy to last for ten days? Indeed, there were reasons, as I stated before, why it should not. I observed, that all those who had been the loudest at former rejoicings, were persons *profiting by the war*, who, of course, would not long rejoice at an event which promised them, or, rather, the country, *real peace*. But, still, one would have thought, that, for mere *decency's* sake, they would have put on the outward appearance of joy, a sham satisfaction at the accomplishment of their so-long professed wishes. They have not, however, been able to get the better of inward and real chagrin at the result of the war with France. They preserve a sulkily silence; they come forward with none of their *addresses* to the Government, as they have been accustomed to at events, tending to prolong the war and to extinguish freedom. They resort to none of their old tricks of delusion. They are chop-fallen, and, at first blush of the matter, it seems difficult to explain *why* they

are so.—The conduct of the City of London, I mean of the Lord Mayor and Corporation, exhibits an object well worthy of our attention. Not a *county* has moved in the way of *addressing* the Prince. Not a city, or town, besides London. Not even one of those commodious and easily-managed little bodies, called loyal and *ancient Boroughs*. There seems to be a general coldness upon the occasion; the bride has no sooner been enjoyed than cast away.—Say, ye sons and daughters of war, what is the cause of this? but, lest you should not, I will say it for you.—I have before observed, and I now repeat it upon the conviction of experience, that those who *profited directly by the war*, regret its discontinuance; but, there is another class, who, not wishing for war in the abstract, regret that the war has terminated in the manner that it has terminated. I allude to that class of persons, who are the enemies of liberty in all cases; who, not without a selfish motive, however, dread the triumph of freedom, in any part of the world; and who think nothing gained so long as any one principle of the rights of the people remain not rooted out.—It has been observed, that the endless crowds of contractors, professors of military tactics, pursers, paymasters, barrack-masters, doctors, proctors, agents, commissaries, inspectors, commissioners, &c. &c. together with all their deputies, clerks, &c. having *become rich* by the war, will now retire and enjoy their riches in peace. But those who make this observation, seem to forget, that there is a *succession* of beings, who feed on war, as well as of all the other descriptions of animated nature. Granted, that the *full-plumed PURSER*, for instance, will not only be content to retire upon his gains and enjoy the shade of trees formerly the property of some ancient house, but that his moderation and modesty may induce him to use all the means in his power to efface the recollection of the source, whence those gains were derived. But, it should be recollected

ed, that there are numerous pursers not yet full-plumed; some that yet want their hind and tail feathers; some that are yet covered with down; others that have but just broken the shell; some yet in the egg; nay, and a long, long chain of embryon pursers whose employments are enjoyed nowly in contemplation and calculation by their borough-bred progenitors.—All this promising brood, or, rather, these numerous broods of pursers in succession or expectancy must, at once, be swept away by *real peace*.—It is the same with all the other descriptions of persons who are fed by war, except with the private soldier and sailor, whose pay, though sufficient, barely suffices for his support.—Think, then, reader of the numbers, of the countless numbers, who would be sent to seek, in new scenes, their bread, by a real and solid peace! And, when you so think, you will cease to wonder at the coldness with which the present great event has been received.—To place the matter before you in a new light, I will state what was expended by the Government in war.—The sum expended last year, on account of the army, navy, and ordnance, without reckoning money sent to foreign powers, was upwards of *forty-nine millions of pounds sterling*.—Before the war against the French, the department did not cost the nation more than about *ten millions a-year*.—The annual expenditure to war-people has, therefore, increased *forty-seven millions in a year*.—Judge, then, what must be the number of those who feed upon war! Supposing the whole number of soldiers and sailors to be 400,000, and that each man receives a *shilling a day*, that will absorb only about *one seventh* part of the sum. Consequently there will be *forty-seven millions of pounds* to be absorbed by other causes than the pay of the soldiers and sailors. By the pay of commissioned officers, by the cost of provisions, by that of barracks, by that of clothing, by that of powder, shot, arms, horses, tents, waggon, and the like, all necessary, but all leaving some *profit*, something beyond the amount of the mere labour of the parties concerned in the supply; and, only think of the effect of the aggregate of the profits of such immense transactions! Who, therefore, if he thinks at all of these things, can wonder at the present coldness of those who used to be the most forward and most zealous in addressing the crown upon every

lucky event of the war! An event has come, at last, *too* lucky for them; an event little short of a political revolution; an event that promises to put an end to this expenditure, this annual distribution of forty-two millions of pounds in the year; that blasts all the bright prospects, dissipates all the golden dreams, makes the world a blank, to all those who were before the most active, the most zealous, the very heart and soul of all the shoutings and addressings on occasions relating to military and naval successes.—The nation was screwed up to a war pitch. As long as war continued, it went steadily on its course. Gain in some, dread in others, enthusiasm in others, hope of a beneficial result in others, ignorance in a still more numerous class; these kept the system along with steady pace. But, now, when all these powers of motion begin to be withdrawn, or appear to be on the eve of being withdrawn, it is natural that languor should succeed to such great and long-continued exertion. It is in vain to endeavour to feed the hope of the sons and daughters of war with the prospect of a long and bloody contest with America, as the *Times* newspaper is doing. For, though they would like it well, they see little to be gained in a war, which will require, as the *Times* assures us, so small a force. The enthusiasm and ignorance, which have been so powerful of late, will no longer exist in the same degree; and above all things, though for divers reasons, such a war would for a while, be very *popular*; the main prop of the war against the French, the great blinder of the people, is gone not to revive; namely, the *fear of losing their property*.—After this preface I come to the *City Address* and the *Regent's answer*, both of which I shall insert, as being well worthy of being put upon record, as strongly illustrative of the feeling prevailing in England, relative to the recent most important and memorable event.—Who was there that did not expect, that the whole nation, all the counties, all the cities, all the boroughs, all bodies of men of all sorts and sizes, even down to the Freemasons Lodges, would, headed by the City of London, throwing aside all ceremony, rush into the Regent's presence with their congratulations on that event, which surpassed in the reality what the most sanguine had ventured to make an object of their supplications and prayers,

and which had formed the subject of none but madmen's dreams? Yet, the City of London itself waits coolly for three long weeks; and then, *who* brings forward the Address? Not those who had been most loud in exulting at events which favoured the "*obscure prosecution of the war*;" not those who had, for twenty-two years, been expressing their hatred of the French people, and of Napoleon; but those who had invariably opposed them and their inflammatory doctrines and endeavours. It was reserved for Mr. VAITHMAN to propose this Address of congratulation.—The cause of this has been already pretty clearly shown. When I have inserted the Address, and answer, I shall, amongst other things, notice the cause of such an Address being entered in the City of London. I must request the reader to go through these documents with attention.

THE ADDRESS.

"*May it Please your Royal Highness.*—We, His Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Commons of the City of London, in Common Council assembled, humbly approach your Royal Highness, to offer our warmest congratulations upon the brilliant successes of the Allied Armies; and on those glorious and most important events which have unfolded to the British nation, and all Europe, the most cheering and animating prospects. We had never ceased to feel and to fore, with the suffering nations of the Continent, the *dreadful calamities attendant upon a bloody and devastating war*. We had also long contemplated with the deepest regret, the want of an union of object in its prosecution, and had ardently desired to witness the adoption of those just, liberal, and enlightened principles, which have recently been so honourably avowed, and so ably and successfully pursued. We, therefore, received with the highest admiration the firm, temperate, and unanimous Declaration issued by the Allied Powers, upon entering the French territory, wherein they declared—that they did not make war upon France, but against that preponderance which, to the misfortune of Europe and France, the Emperor Napoleon had too long exercised beyond the limits of his Empire; and expressed their desire, *that France should be great, powerful, and happy*; because the French power, in a state of greatness

"and strength, is one of the foundations of the social edifice of Europe;" a declaration so perfectly consonant with that made by his Royal Highness to Parliament, 'that no disposition to require from France sacrifices inconsistent with her honour or just pretensions as a nation, would ever, on the part of your Royal Highness, or that of his Majesty's Allies, be an obstacle to peace.' The promulgation of these pure and generous principles, and the union, fidelity, and energy with which they have been acted upon, dissipated the apprehensions, and called for the esteem and confidence of the French nation, who, with a coolness, promptitude, and decision suitable to the great emergency, declared the tyranny at an end, and proceeded to *form a plan of a future Government, on the model of our own excellent Constitution*; and which, we trust, by placing just limits to the Executive Authority, and by securing the civil and religious rights of the subject, the prerogative of the Crown and the privileges of the people, will be clearly ascertained and permanently established. We congratulate your Royal Highness on the spontaneous invitation given by the French People to the head of the ancient dynasty to ascend the Throne, presenting a happy omen, that by this event internal union will be established, and a termination at length put to those convulsions which have agitated Europe; and we doubt not, that that illustrious house, deeply penetrated with its restoration to the confidence of the French people, will, by its mild and paternal sway, consult its lasting honour and happiness, by respecting the rights, promoting the interests, and conciliating the afflictions of the nation.—The more we contemplate the progress of the war, and the means by which its termination has been effected, the greater cause do we derive for satisfaction in the reflection, that, aided by the achievements of our brave Countrymen, under the able direction of Field Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, and the admirable skill and intrepidity of the Commanders and Armies of the Allied Powers, it is to the just and able pledge given by the Allies to the people of France, we are, under the blessings of Divine Providence, principally indebted for those glorious results, which armed legions, when accompanied by such a

"pledge, and unsupported by such principles in vain attempted to accomplish.—In thus recording our approbation of the motives and principles which have guided the Allied Powers, and in congratulating your Royal Highness on the glorious effects produced by the downfall of an individual who had concentrated in his own person power hitherto unparalleled in the annals of history, we are more forcibly impressed with this additional proof of the instability of power, however great and extended, when the Monarch ceases to regard that immutable truth—that the happiness and security of the Crown depends upon the preservation of the rights and liberties of the subject; and we cannot but again recur, with increased veneration, to the dignified and constitutional declaration of your Royal Highness, 'that the Crown is held in trust for the benefit of the People.'—The general prospects which these happy events have afforded us, are no less a subject for congratulation; and we sincerely trust a period having now been put to that odious and revolting system of military despotism, and attempt at universal sway, so incompatible with the rights and interests of nations, and destructive of the happiness of mankind, that with it also a period is put to the ravages of war, and that we may henceforth participate in the advantages of a general and friendly uninterrupted intercourse with the nations of the world; and that, no longer distracted by external danger, the national energies may be directed to the improvement of our internal resources, the cultivation of the arts, the extension of commerce, the diminution of our burthens, and the correction and prevention of any inroads and abuses which may impair our excellent Constitution, whereby we may transmit the inestimable blessing, pure and unsullied, to posterity; and may your Royal Highness long live in the hearts and affections of a free and grateful people.—Signed, by Order of Court, HENRY WOODTHORPE."

THE ANSWER.

"I thank you for your congratulations on the splendid and signal victories which have so eminently distinguished the arms of his Majesty, and those of his magnanimous Allies. I acknowledge, with devout gratitude, the hand of a gracious Providence, not only in these unexam-

pled events, but in the important consequences to which they have led; and, under these impressions, it is an inexpressible gratification to me to reflect, that, after having suffered, in succession, all the calamities of anarchy and military despotism, the people of France are at length restored to the paternal authority of their Hereditary Sovereign, in the person of his Majesty Louis XVIII. and that the fairest prospect is thus afforded of happiness and prosperity to themselves, and of security and repose to the other nations of Europe."

Answers are generally short compared with Addresses; but this answer appears not to have echoed, even in substance, those parts of the address, best calculated, as I should have thought, to call forth an expression of corresponding sentiments. The City of London deplore the calamities of war; they approve of the sentiment, that France should be powerful and happy; they feel pleasure that the French people have obtained a constitution that will secure them the enjoyment of civil and religious liberty; they hope that kings will see, that armed legions are nothing when opposed to the principles of liberty, and that the safety of the throne depends upon the preservation of the subject's rights; they express a confident hope, that war will now, at last, end; that we shall live at peace with the world; that our taxes will be diminished; and that we shall now go to work to correct or prevent abuses in our own government.—To all this his Royal Highness might not be expected to be advised to give any specific answer; and he was, it appears, advised not to give any specific answer to any part of it. He only talks of the splendid successes of his Majesty and his magnanimous Allies; acknowledges the assistance they received from Divine Providence; and says, that it is an inexpressible gratification to him to reflect, that, after the French have suffered from anarchy and military despotism, they are restored to the paternal government of their hereditary sovereign.—The meaning here, doubtless, is, that Louis XVIII. has been put upon the throne. He could not be restored, never having been king in France 'till now. But, the people are said to be restored to his paternal government. This differs very widely from the idea of the Address upon this point; for the Address appears to look upon the people of France as having established a government, every dif-

ferent indeed from that which existed in France before the Revolution; the people of which country, the addressers seem to think, cannot, therefore, be looked upon as having been *restored* to any thing, possessing, as they do now, nothing, in the way of government, which they were blessed with twenty-four years ago.—The exact meaning of the word *paternal*, as applied to government, I do not profess to understand; but, if *paternal government* means a government such as that which existed before the Revolution; a government imposing *corvées*, *gabelles*, and *tailles*; supporting Seigneurial Courts, an exclusive dominant church, monasteries and tithes, and excluding even the semblance of any representation of the people; most assuredly the people of France are *not* restored to a paternal government.—It is true, and we must all lament it with his Royal Highness, that the French people have, during the course of the last twenty-four years, suffered much from *anarchy* as well as from *military despotism*; but, we must bear in mind, as, I dare say, his Royal Highness does, that, in the end, they have secured very great advantages. It is a sort of suffering to take nauseous medicine; but it is sometimes necessary, in order to restore health and to save life. And, though the brevity of his Royal Highness's answer precluded him from introducing this fact, I'll engage, that he perceived it as clearly as the reader can perceive it, and that it forms no unimportant place in the serious cogitations of his ministers.—I could wish much to have from some able pen of the social order school, a clear definition of the phrase, "*military despotism*," from which, as we are told, France has recently been delivered. By *military despotism* I have always understood to be meant a state of things, in which the ruling party relies upon soldiers for keeping the people in order and making them obey. It is no matter, according to my notion of the thing, who, or what is, or what sort of name or title is given to the ruling party. It is the substance that I have always had in view. A people kept in awe and compelled to obedience by a military force, constantly present among them, I have always regarded as a people living under a military despotism. This must, from his Royal Highness's observation, have been the case in France, and I do most sincerely hope that it will no longer be so. But the reader should be caution-

ed against believing, that a military despotism cannot exist without the ruler being a great soldier and a conqueror; for, the most sneaking coward, the meanest reptile, in existence might, by the means of an army judiciously employed and well paid for the purpose, subdue, in time, the very souls and senses of a nation.—Nor, would it seem, is the existence of laws and the regular administration of justice, incompatible with a military despotism; for, as we have seen, Napoleon established laws, and such good laws too, that the people have contracted with their new sovereign for the preservation of those very laws; aye, for the maintenance of that very code, which the military despot framed, promulgated, and put into full and entire execution. Therefore, we learn, that there may be regular courts of justice, and all the other things of a like nature going on, and that a real military despotism may, in fact, be the sort of government under which the degraded people live.—There is one part of the Address, in which it was impossible for his Royal Highness to agree in sentiment with the City of London. I allude to that passage, where the Lord Mayor and his fellow-addressers observe, that the French people have formed "a plan of Government on the model of our own: "*excellent Constitution*."—This was a great mistake, at least, if we are, as the Whigs call it, to look at the *practice* of the Constitution: No two things can be more DIFFERENT than the French Constitution and our's, in its present practice; a proposition which I think myself able to prove to the satisfaction of every one who will read, and which I shall endeavour to do in the next Number of the *Register*. Mind, reader, I am not saying, or going to say, which of the two is the BEST, or which is the WORST. I will not even offer an *opinion* upon this point. This is above my flight. I shall leave my readers to judge, and to say, whether what we have preserved is as good, or better, than what the French people have gained; but I pledge myself to shew, that the two things bear not the least resemblance to each other.—Upon the subject of correction of abuses in our own Government, it was hardly necessary for his Royal Highness to say any thing, seeing that he must have been satisfied, that the Addressers could not doubt of his readiness to concur in any measure having that important object in view, now that peace will

have completely removed the great obstacle to the undertaking, it always having been alledged that a time of war was *not* the proper time. We shall now, without all doubt, have the Whigs amongst the most forward for a *Reform of the Parliament*, their aid having been withheld, for years past, upon the ground, that the time was too stormy to set about repairing the fabric of the Constitution. We shall all have the leisure now to contribute our best efforts in this great undertaking, freed from the jargon about *Jacobinism* and *Napoleon's partisans*. After this storm we have much to repair. We have a great many laws to look at, which were called forth avowedly by the French Revolution. These will, I should suppose, not be held to be necessary in future; for, if they be, it will not be very consistent to contend, that we have triumphed over the revolutionary principles. The pecuniary COST of the war is another thing. That subject will demand a whole *Register* to itself. In about three weeks John Bull will be settled down into his regular habits, and may be induced to look his affairs in the face, and they shall then be laid before him with as much perspicuity as I am master of.—It seems, at first sight, surprising, that this Address of the City should have passed; and some have even expressed their wonder, that the Aristocrats did not muster all their forces and oppose so *Jacobinical* a piece. But, the truth is, that already has a great change taken place in the feelings of men as to politics. They have now no fear as they had before. That bug-bear, with which artful knaves used to frighten honest men out of their love of the liberties of their country, does not exist any longer. They used to think, and to say, that the Reformers were certainly right; that abuses ought to be corrected; that sinecures of thirty or forty thousand a year ought not to exist; but, they said, at the same time, if we give our support to these Reformers and begin a reformation, that formidable enemy, Napoleon, may step in and eat us all up. This was their persuasion. They have now lost this fear, and are returning to their senses. Though they cannot be expected to be *zealots* in the cause of freedom, they will no longer be enemies to it. These people do not feed on war, nor have they titles to lose. They would be very well to see a *reduction of taxes*, a *cancellation of loans*, and a *system of economy* that would tend to make the funds

more secure. These they know that they cannot have without a *reform of abuses* in the representation. They would, therefore, wish it; and, though they may not be *forward* in endeavouring to bring it about, they will not now oppose it, as they have done, for fear of the loss of their property by a Revolution.—The hobgoblin is destroyed. The object of their fear is no more. The crafty knaves will no longer be able to persuade them, that they must sacrifice great part of their money and their liberties, or lose the whole of the former.—It will be in vain to cry *wolf* to them now.—This is the true cause of the passing of this Address. MR. WATBMAN found perhaps no new friends; but he found his old opponents *keep away*.

AMERICA.—An article, which appeared in the *Times* newspaper of Monday last, makes me regret exceedingly, that the Regent did not answer that part of the City Address, which expresses a hope that “a period is put to the ravages of war, and that we may henceforth participate in the advantages of a friendly and uninterrupted intercourse with all the nations of the world.” I regret, that his Royal Highness did not speak to, and echo this sentiment, because the article, above alluded to, states, that there is to be a stipulation, in the *definitive Treaty of Peace*, by which all the allied powers and France are to *bind themselves NOT TO INTERFERE in the war which England may now carry on against the United States of America*.—This article is published as dated at, and as having been published at *Vienna*.—It is, doubtless, wholly *false*, though it is very difficult to account for its being published in the capital of the Austrian government, where intelligence of this sort seems so unlikely to be fabricated.—Perhaps the *Times* newspaper, which has cried out so loudly for *no peace with James Madison*, and which has openly proposed to detach part of the States from the Confederation, has fabricated the article itself, by way of feeling the public pulse.—Be this as it may, the *idea exists*, and the promulgation of it must have a very bad effect; for, though it is impossible to believe, that the Prince Regent would propose any such stipulation, there can be no doubt, that the very mention of it in our prints will tend to make the Americans more exasperated than they were before.—The effect of this mischievous article would have been,

by anticipation, completely destroyed by a single word from the Regent, echoing the wish for *universal peace*, expressed by the City of London.—I am aware, that his Royal Highness, by a speedy adjustment of all differences with America, which, indeed, do themselves away by the existence of peace in Europe, will greatly disappoint the feeders on war and the enemies of freedom. As to the former, they might be satisfied with profits equal to the profits of war; but the latter, nothing short of the extermination of the very name of *Republic* will ever satisfy. They see, in the existence of the Republic of America, danger little short of what they saw in the Republic of France. They see in it a receptacle for the oppressed and enterprising of all nations. They see in it an example of freedom, morality, and happiness, the bare thought of which puts them to the torture. If they could consolidate all the people of America into one carcass, they would, having an arm sufficiently strong, and an arm sufficiently long, cut their throat at a single gash.—Such men, if men we ought to call such monsters, talk with delight of the *sending of Lord Wellington's army to the United States*; they revel in the idea of *burning* the cities and towns, the mills and manufactories of that country; at the very least, they talk of forcing Mr. Madison from his seat, and new modelling the government.—They endeavour to excite all the hostile passions here. They are always ripping up our *defeated and captured frigates*, without appearing to recollect, that we, at any rate, *defeated and took one frigate from the Americans*. Why then urge us on to *revenge*? Can any revenge that we can take do away these pages of history, any more than the dethronement of Napoleon can do away the history of the battles of Austerlitz, Jena, and Eylau?—At other times, they tell us of the danger, which, as manufacturers, we have to apprehend from America, who is now, in her turn, becoming an *exporter of woollen and of cotton goods*. And why should they not export woollens and cottons as well as we? What reason is there, that they should not become a commercial nation as well as we or the Dutch? These latter used to have, exclusively, the making of *Gods* for the Portuguese and Spaniards; but for my part, I see no harm that would arise from it, if the Americans, who have such abundance of wood, were to supply this article to all the Catholic countries of Europe, as, doubtless, there will now be a

great call for it, seeing that the Pope (to the great joy of this *protestant country*) is now restored to his See.—But, in spite of the justice and reasonableness of these sentiments, they do not, and will not, prevail amongst the manufacturers in England, who will look with jealousy and hatred towards America; and, perceiving no other way of arresting her astonishing progress in the manufacturing line than that of tearing her to pieces by war, they will be for war with her, at any expence, and at any risk.—The ship-owners know well, that they have no chance in a *fair competition* with the Americans. They know, that the latter can build, sail, and carry at half the price necessary to English ships. This class, therefore, will be for war. The mercantile marine will breed ships of war. This is an object of terror with those who look far forward, and who are unable to support the idea of England *ever*, at any time, becoming the second maritime nation in the world, as, in twenty years time, she must, unless the growth of the American naval power can be checked.—When we look back to what America was in the year 1784, that is, thirty years ago, and see what progress she has made, and how that progress has gone on increasing in its velocity, it is impossible not to perceive, that, unless she receive some very severe check, she must be equal, at least, to England, in naval power, even in the course of ten years. This opinion is general with those who reflect upon the subject; and, therefore, it is not astonishing that some, even good men, who do not hate freedom in the abstract, should be anxious to see her growth checked, either by demolishing her towns, her ships, her means of strength of all sorts; or by *dividing her States*.—There are those, too, who, looking at the fearful magnitude of our debt, and in despair of seeing it reduced by any system of economy, have an idea, that it would be as well to venture upon a war of *conquest* with America, in order to obtain the means of paying off part, at least, of this debt. They see in that boundless country, lands to sell and a great population to tax. They imagine, that they will find means as boundless as the debt itself; and mad as the notion of a war upon such grounds may seem to the Americans, they may be assured, that there are numerous persons in England who entertain it.—Then, think of the delightful prospect, which seventeen or eighteen provinces hold out to the hunters after places! Such

cargoes of Governors, Commanders-in-Chief, Staffs, Port-Admirals and Officers, Custom-house and Excise people, Attorneys and Solicitors-General, Judges, Doctors, Proctors, Paymasters, Commissaries, and, though last not least, Bishops, Priests, and Deacons!—Only think of this, and wonder not, that there are persons to wish for the recolonization of America.—But, as the subjects of dispute with that country cease of themselves with the war in Europe, let us hope, that all these wild notions will be soon dissipated by the Regent's Ministers, who will, doubtless, lose, now, not a moment in giving real peace to the nation.—I must confess, however, that I should like to see the ugly paragraph, to which I have alluded, plainly contradicted by something like *official authority*. It appeared in the *Times* newspaper of the 2d of May, in the following words: The *treaty of Chaumont* is published in the same print of the same day, from the *Vienna Gazette*; and, after the treaty, there follows, as also taken from the *Vienna Paper*, this paragraph.—“It is affirmed, that besides the “Conventions which England has concluded “with the other allied powers, it has also “made a *secret agreement relative to* “*North America*. By this agreement England has procured from all the other European powers the assurance, that, after “the re-establishment of Peace in Europe, “*none of them will interfere in the disputes between his Britannic Majesty and* “*North America*, and France is also to engage, in the peace to be concluded, to *subscribe to the same conditions*.”—This, as the reader will observe well, was first published at *Vienna* on the 9th of April, and accompanied the publication of the Treaty of Chaumont. If the paragraph be not a fabrication *here*, it is very strange indeed, it being well known, that, at *Vienna*, the press is under such a rigid inspection and controul.—*Why* any such stipulation as this? What *need* was there of any, seeing that we have *now* no dispute with America, the very subjects of dispute having ceased to exist with the war in Europe.—The dispute related to the taking of people out of American ships upon the high seas, upon the ground of their being English subjects, and also to the extent of the right of blockade and other matters touching neutrals *during war*.—Peace with all other nations, of course, takes away the very subjects of dispute; and, **WHY**, therefore, should England have made a

secret agreement in order to prevent any of the other powers, France included, from taking part in this dispute, “*after the re-establishment of peace in Europe?*”—If I could believe, as I yet cannot, in the existence of such an agreement, I should begin to fear, that the Regent and his Ministers were bent upon a war of *re-colonization*, or, at least, of *devastation*, in the United States; that they had listened to the suggestions of those who, for the several reasons that I have stated, desire the destruction or the conquest of these States; and that we were doomed now to be engaged in a most expensive and bloody war, while all the rest of Europe enjoyed profound peace;—that the time was yet not to arrive when our burdens were to be lightened, when guineas were to return, and when we were, once before we died, to say that our country was living in friendship with all the world.—If this war were to be resolved on by our Government (which God forbid!), it must be confessed, that there would not be wanting the ready means for carrying it on with deadly effect. We have more soldiers, more sailors, more ships, more horses, more arms and ammunition; more, in short, of all the instruments of war, than we know what to do with. Our army is well disciplined; abundantly supplied with good officers; brave in its nature; accustomed to victory! Our Navy is in the same state. The European war has ended so suddenly, and was upon so large a scale, that there are provisions and stores in hand more than sufficient, perhaps, for a year's war in America.—The undertaking, therefore, would be by no means chimerical, though, in the end, I think it would fail.—If such a war, and for the purpose urged in our public prints, should be entered on, it is probable, that the German Legion, being subjects of our king, might be amongst the troops sent out. This is no contemptible army of itself: horse, foot, artillery, engineers; all well appointed, provided, and commanded. In short, there will be no difficulty in sending out an army, during the present Summer, of 50 or 80 thousand men, besides sailors and marines.—To prevent their *landing* would be impossible; and, it is hardly necessary to say, that *the whole of the ships of the States, and all the maritime towns*, must fall upon the approach of only a fourth part of such an army; unless the Americans should, previous to its landing, be cured of their self-confidence, and lay by the plough, for a

while, for the use of the musket.—I trust in the justice of his Royal Highness, the Regent, for the rejection of such a project ; but, if it were to be adopted, I know it would be popular ; and I also see, as every man must, that the powers of Europe, if inclined to aid America, are *unable* to do it. They have, all put together, not fleets enough to face six English men of war. The maritime strength of the whole world now centres in these islands. The Americans, I hear, rely upon the *friendship* of Russia. Alas ! what have *they* to offer the Emperor of Russia in return for his friendship ? This is nonsense. The Emperor of Russia has other objects of his attention ; and besides, if we really were to give credit to the article from Vienna, that point is settled at once.—So that, if this war were to be resolved on, it would soon be seen, that the politics of the *Federalists*, as they are called, have been wrong from the beginning ; and that Mr. Madison, so often accused of being the tool of Napoleon, will have to remind his antagonists, that if America had, in good earnest, taken the side of France, a few years ago, she would not now in all probability have to tremble, lest the advice of the *Times* newspaper should be acted upon. Luckily for the power of England, and for the family of Bourbon, Mr. Madison and his party kept aloof from Napoleon for the sake of a political principle, united with the fear of being reproached with plunging their country into a war on the side of a despot and a conqueror. But, it would, if the *Times's* project were adopted, become evident to all the world, that such policy had been the ruin of the United States.—I repeat, however, my confident hope, that the Regent and his Ministers are *too just* and *too moderate* in their views to listen, for one moment, to any such ambitious and sanguinary project, against which it is my duty to endeavour to guard them, as I know that there will not be wanting numbers, through the press and otherwise, to urge its adoption. The whole world besides does not, perhaps, contain so many deadly enemies of freedom as England alone. It is here alone where we see it recommended to keep the allied armies longer in France ; it is here alone where we hear it said, and see it promulgated, that Napoleon ought to be *hanged* with his code of laws about his neck ; it is here alone where we see publications recommending to the King of

France to *punish* the late republicans ; it is here alone where the press openly expresses its dread of the King of France being too lenient. This description of persons will never be at heart's ease, while the people of America are free, and while America is a receptacle for the oppressed. And, indeed, upon their principle, they are right. If they will insist upon regarding the result of the war in Europe as valuable only on account of its having destroyed republicanism in Europe, they are perfectly consistent in urging a war against America, and even a war of re-colonization ; for, unless that object be accomplished ; unless the cradle of the Revolution became also its grave, little or nothing has been gained over the principle of republicanism. America, now holding out her hand to manufacturers, as well as cultivators of the soil, cannot, *if she remain what she is*, fail to attract prodigious numbers of Europeans, of all nations, to her prolific and happy shores. Discontent at the changes which have now taken place ; despair of ever seeing that which they before had hopes of living to see ; shame to remain on the spot where their hopes have been baffled, and their endeavours frustrated ; unsurmountable hatred of power to which they are compelled to submit, and to the support of which they are compelled to contribute ; the weight of taxation ; the spirit of enterprise ; the hope of bettering their lot in all : these will, if America be at peace, and the road free and clear, carry hundreds of thousands of Europeans to her shores. Artizans, manufacturers of all descriptions, and especially of the most clever and most enterprising men. The augmentation of her population will be hastened ; her maritime and all other means will increase ; and, it will be not at all surprising to see her, in ten years, in a situation to send forth 50 ships of the line, manned and commanded as well as our own.—I confess, that this will be the natural consequence of *leaving her what she now is*, and that, in any war, at ten years hence, she will be able almost to dictate to us both the time and the conditions of peace, there being a limit to our growth of power, and none to her's.—But, for all this, I am decidedly for leaving her to herself. Her States may divide of themselves. That will make her comparatively weak ; whereas by a war, we should *unite them* much closer than they now are. We may, too, *fail* in

the object of the war. After expending two or three hundred millions of money, we may be compelled to make peace with her as an Independent Republic, having greatly weakened ourselves by the attempt to subdue her, tarnished our own military reputation, fixed her fame for ever in the minds of men, and what, in the eyes of some persons, would be worse than all the rest, established upon a rock, never to be shaken, the principles of freedom and of Republican Government.—I have thus taken a rather extensive view of this subject; but to those who are for a war with America, in order, as the *Times* calls it, *to finish the good work so happily begun in France*, it might have been sufficient to observe, in very few words, that our choice lies between these two things:—either to suffer America to remain the nurse of freedom, the receptacle of the oppressed of all nations, an example of liberty, security and happiness, enjoyed under an elective government, without hereditary rights or established church; or, to continue to pay the property tax, and to see our debt yearly increased by loans.—Here, Johnny Bull, you have your choice. Which of the two you may take, I really cannot pretend to say; and so, upon this subject, I must wait patiently the result of your profound cogitations.—As to the state of opinions in America, it appears, that, having heard of the low state of Napoleon's affairs, the people there were counting, with confidence, on an *immediate peace*. They had not then heard of the actual *dethronement* of Napoleon, and of the consequent language of our public prints, accompanied with statements relative to *troops* immediately to be sent off to America. What effect these will produce in the minds of the people and of the government there, I know not; but, so slowly do they generally move, it is not probable, that the troops will meet with any thing like *an army* to oppose them. The Americans have no experienced officers. They have no discipline. They will, too, I dare say, think, that, because they beat England in the last war, they can do it again, and much easier, having now five times as numerous a population. But, in the first place, they will not have to contend against such *Generals* as they had to contend against before, nor such officers and soldiers. They will, if our troops really should land in their country, have to contend with those who have defeated *French* armies; with skill of

all sorts; experience in the men as well as the officers; with courage, discipline, and the habit of victory. All these will require something more than the Americans have yet thought of.—Then, in the last war, America had three great maritime powers on her side, and one power to send her aid in officers and men. Do they now look for assistance from the friendship of *Ferdinand*, or of *Louis*, or of the *Swedish Prince of the United Netherlands*? Which of the three do they intend to apply to? Or, do they expect that the Emperor of Russia, who is shortly to come on a visit to England, will, in order to preserve their liberties, send an army of cossacks to their assistance round by the way of Kamskatika? Verily, Jonathan, if you repose in vain hopes, you are upon your last legs, if the project of our public writers be adopted by the Government.—It appears, that you have negociators in Europe; and, I have heard, that they have a great opinion of *their powers of speech*. They, or, rather you, will, in due time, feel the consequence of this error, if it be persevered in long. We, here, do not make such long speeches in our diplomatic discussions. We are more laconic; but we use arguments of much greater force than yours. Whether it be owing to our European climate, which, by making the stage of maturity more tardy in arriving, communicates more vigour to the mind as well as the body, from causes similar to those which render the oak more solid and durable than the poplar; or, to that necessity of industry which habituates us to dispatch, I cannot tell; but, certain it is, that our negociators have a much *shorter* way of going to work than yours, and that they seldom fail to be much more successful. You have recently seen what a shilly-shally state the Powers of the Continent were in, till our Lord Castle-reagh got amongst their counsellors. They were talking about leaving to the *Emperor Napoleon* a much greater extent of territory than France, under her *kings*, ever knew. You have seen how soon matters changed after the arrival of his Lordship. You have seen the *result*; and, having seen that, rely, if you will, on the superior powers of *talking*, possessed by *your* negociators'.—Perhaps you may take it into your head, that negociators, chosen from amongst our friends, the *Federalists*; that two or three of those "*Burkes of the Western Hemisphere*," of whom the *Times* newspaper speaks; perhaps, it may come

into your noddle, that negociators, picked out from amongst these friends of "social order and regular government," will be likely to succeed better than those, who were not for open war against Napoleon. Try, then, Jonathan; and be sure to fix upon gentlemen, who think themselves very clever, and love, of all things, to hear themselves *talk*. Be sure to send men, deeply read in Vattel and Puffendorf, and who will write volumes in folio in answer to six lines from our Secretary of State.—I think, that, in order to *conciliate*, your best way will be to send negociators, who, in following up the sentiments of Mr. Randolph, will lay all the blame of your hostility upon the *Democrats*, or *Jacobins*, who have emigrated to you from England and Ireland; and, if you were to propose to give them up to their natural sovereign, it might, perhaps, as Mr. Randolph would think, obtain you peace upon better terms. Try it, Jonathan, and see what effect it will have! In short, try, in all manner of ways, the powers of *talk*ing.—Alas! to be serious with you, your safety lies now in the forbearance, the magnanimity, the compassion, of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of England; and, I trust, especially for the sake of the Quakers in Pennsylvania, that you will find this a safe reliance. While the Emperor Napoleon wielded the arms of France, you thought yourselves in no danger. But him you did not like. He did not dress to your fancy. One party amongst you abused him, and the other disclaimed all desire to aid his views. Volumes did your negociators write to convince us, that you did nothing to favour him. You got into a nice, snug, little, war of your own. Still *independent*, you were at war with one of the great belligerents, and so far from allying yourself with the other, you contrived to keep up your quarrel with him, and could hardly be said to be at peace with your powerful enemy's only powerful enemy. Luckily for us, you adopted this policy, and persevered in it to the last.—You appear to have put your little *independent* war as a sort of episode into the grand drama; but it was acting contrary to all the rules of composition, not to close the episode before the end of the piece.—You may, I hope, safely rely upon the moderation and magnanimity of our Prince Regent, acting in the name and behalf of his Majesty; but I do assure you, that that is your *only* reliance; for if you were rooted out to the last

man, your fate would excite very little commiseration in Europe. You thought, that you would *hold the balance* between England and France. What folly and presumption! But it is in vain to *talk*. This is a disease of the mind, of which nations are never cured but at the cannon's mouth; and, though I could wish much to see you cured, I cannot bring myself to approve of the application of the remedy.—Since writing the above, the following important *Declaration* from our Admiralty has come to hand.—The Americans will, I dare say, not think it altogether a *joke*.
 "ADMIRALTY-OFFICE, APRIL 30, 1814.
 "The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty cannot announce to the Fleet the termination of hostilities with France, without expressing to the petty officers, seamen, and royal marines of his Majesty's ships, the high sense which their Lordships entertain of their gallant and glorious services during the late war.—The patience, perseverance, and discipline; the skill, courage, and devotion, with which the seamen and marines have upheld the best interests, and achieved the noblest triumphs of the country, entitled them to the gratitude, not only of their native land, which they have preserved inviolate, but of the other nations of Europe, of whose ultimate deliverance their successes maintained the hope, and accelerated the accomplishment.—Their Lordships regret that the unjust and unprovoked aggression of the American GOVERNMENT, in declaring war upon this Country, after *all the causes of its original complaint had been removed*, does not permit them to reduce the fleet at once to a Peace establishment; but as the question now at issue in this war is *the maintenance of those maritime rights, which are the sure foundations of our naval glory*, their Lordships look with confidence to that part of the fleet which it may be still necessary to keep in commission, for a continuance of that spirit of discipline and gallantry, which has raised the British Navy to its present pre-eminence.—In reducing the fleet to the establishment necessary for the American war, the seamen and marines will find their Lordships attentive to the claims of their respective services.—The reduction will be first made in the crews of those ships which it may be found expedient to pay off, and from them the petty officers and seamen will be successively dis-

"charged, according to the length of their services; beginning in the first instance with all those who were in his Majesty's service previous to the 7th of March, 1803, and have since continued in it.—When the reduction shall have been thus made, as to the ships paid off, their Lordships will direct their attention to those which it may be found necessary to keep in commission, and as soon as the circumstances of the war will admit, will bring home and discharge all persons having the same standing and periods of service, as those before discharged from the ships paid off; so that, in a few months, the situation of individuals will be equalized; all men of a certain period of service will be at liberty to return home to their families; and the number which it may be still necessary to retain, will be composed of those who have been the shortest time in the service.—An arrangement in itself so just, cannot, in their Lordships' opinion, fail to give universal satisfaction; and they are induced to make this communication to the fleet, because they think that the exemplary good conduct of all the petty officers, seamen, and marines, entitle them to every confidence, and to this full and candid explanation of their Lordships' intentions. —Their Lordships cannot conclude without expressing their hope, that the valour of his Majesty's fleets and armies, will speedily bring the American contest to a conclusion honourable to the British arms, safe for British interests, and *conducive to the lasting repose of the civilized world.*—By command of their Lordships, —J. W. CROKER."—Thus, then, we have it explicitly declared, that there is to be an "AN AMERICAN WAR." Now, we shall see, then, whether our Ministers are to be talked out of their views, whatever these views may be.—The grounds of the war, on the part of America, were the invasion, as they insisted, of their *neutral rights.* The peace in Europe, I should have thought, put an end to the dispute, it being impossible that neutral rights should any longer be claimed.—But, it seems, that I was deceived; and, I must confess, that the cry for war with America is general in this country, now that we have no other Powers to fight with, and the resentment of no one to fear.—From America we learn, the not a surprising fact, that a law has actually been passed to prevent the importation of either woollen or cotton

goods from any part of the world! These are eight millions of people, who only fourteen years ago, had not a coat or a gown that was not carried from England, able to supply themselves; and must, of course, be, in a short time, able to export those commodities, and at a much cheaper rate than we possibly can.—Even *ten years* ago, America did not possess the sheep to grow a tenth part of the wool sufficient for making her woollens.—What a wonderful increase of means! To what must such a country arrive in *another ten years*, if left as she is!—But, my fear is, that, even here will be found, with some persons, a cause to make them wish for war.

THE POPE.—The *restoration* of his Holiness is not amongst the least interesting of the changes, which have, and which are about to take place, especially when we reflect on the numerous publications which have been made, since his fall, all shewing, *as clear as day-light*, that in this the *prophecies were punctually fulfilled*, and building thereon an unanswerable argument in support of the divine origin of the Scriptures. What will the far-seeing authors of these publications, who, I dare say, thought themselves inspired, say *now*? I should like to take a copy of his book to each of them, and, cramming it into his hand, thump him upon the back, and bid him tell me, what he has to say *now*! What is now become of the *light* of these wise-acres; these expounders of prophecies? What is now become of all their visionary trash? Where do they now see the supernatural causes, into which they before penetrated as easily as my knife penetrates a piece of toasted cheese? If these concited men; the solemn impostors, were now assembled together, and shut up in a mad-house, would it not be better than to let them ramble about bewildering the minds and debasing the spirit of the people?—But, it is curious enough, that, amongst the foulest abuses of the Emperor Napoleon were those fanatical and intolerant wretches, who were formerly continually calling the Pope *Anti-Christ* and the *Whore of Babylon.* They abused the Pope; they said his fall was foretold in the Scriptures, and yet they abused the man that pulled him out of his chair. To complete their impudence; to claim the title of the most impudent of all the human species, they have now only to abuse those who have restored him to his See and his temporal power. For my part, I am pleased

at this restoration of the Most Holy Father, because it so completely falsifies all the elaborate expoundings of these impudent empirics, who are a million times worse than the worst of Catholic Priests.—I shall be obliged to any bookseller, or other gentleman, that will furnish me with a complete list of all the publications, to which I have alluded. They are very numerous, but they ought to be known, and an account of them *sent to Rome*.—If the Lancasterian Society were to make a sort of summary of these writings, and send them forth with notes, exposing their falsehood and folly, they might prevent many of their scholars from becoming the dupes of fanaticism.—There can be very little doubt but every thing will be done, that can be done without violence, to restore the Roman Catholic religion wherever it has given way to any other persuasion. And, really, when I look at the divers sects in and about London; when I hear the crazy rant and whining cant of their preachers, and see the people such admirers of their trash, I cannot think it of much consequence, whether the French be Catholics or Protestants, and more especially when I see, that Catholics are by far the most gay and agreeable of the two. As for the principles of *freedom*, where do you find them amongst the *populous* sects in England? There are a few Unitarians and Independents, who have sense; but, the rest, with the exception of the Quakers, are a rabble of senseless fanatics; and, what is still more degrading than all the rest, rant and cant are making their way into the Church itself, where a preacher, especially about London, is popular in proportion as he departs from the use of simple morality and sound reason.—I think that any country is more likely to be happy, and *free* too, with *one* religion, be it what it may, than with all this crowd of varying sects. There is no such thing as walking out of an evening near London without being stunned, at almost every hundred yards, by the bawling of some of these fanatical preachers, and the groaning or squalling of their flocks. Every house and every hovel is occupied with readings and explainings and expoundings of writings, of which not one in ten thousand understands any part of the meaning.—Long live the Holy Father! say I, who relieves the people from all this gloomy work, and leaves them to frolic and dance.—It would be greatly to be desired, that all mankind should

think *rightly* upon the subject of religion; but, so long as religion has no influence in *politics* and *government*, I really can see no difference in the value of *different superstitions*. Nay, there is a manifest evil in the multiplicity; for it tends to *divide the people*; to occupy and amuse their minds, and to draw their attention from things of real consequence, appertaining to their liberty and happiness. The gloomy superstition prevalent in England, is the most odious that ever was heard of, and I should be very sorry to hear that it had found its way into any other part of the world.—However, let those, who so clearly saw the fulfilment of the Scriptures in the fall of the Pope, now come forward and let us hear what they have to say. The Pope knew very well that their opinions were false, and waited with great patience and constancy for his restoration. The time is certainly a time of triumph for the Catholic Church; and, it would not be at all wonderful if we were to see *conversion* to her become one of the *fashions* of the day. I have no scruple in saying, that I would rather see my neighbourhood Catholic than what it is. I would rather see the people dancing, and hear them singing to the sound of a fiddle, than see them kneeling and hear them groaning to the rant of a methodist preacher. *Hypocrisy* is the vice of the age, and of this vice the meeting-house is the mother and the nurse.—I hope the Most Holy Father's toe is in prime condition, for it will have an abundance of kisses. The Lady of Loretto was carried to Paris and sold for fire-wood: amongst other lumber. Will she be formed again by the good priests out of the ashes; or will a new one be got from Holland? I beg the reader to watch the event of this; for it is a matter of deep concern.—People, I think, will never again cut one another's throats for religion's sake. The axe and the fire are, I hope, laid aside for ever; and, as to the different falsehoods that men may be induced to believe, one, perhaps, is just as harmless, or as little mischievous, as the other, providing that no one of them has, in any way, a connection with politics and government.

HOAX ON THE STOCK-EXCHANGE.—

The managers of the affairs of the Stock-Exchange, who, I suppose, are the same Committee that were acting and publishing of late, have preferred a *bill of indictment*, in which they have lumped Mr. De Brien-

ger, Lord Cochrane, Mr. Cochrane Johnstone, and Mr. Butt, along with several other persons. The bill has been found by the Grand Jury at the *Old Bailey*, and, in due course, the trial would have taken place there in about a fortnight.—This has been prevented, as it is stated in the public prints, by a removal of the matter into the Court of King's-Bench, which will cause considerable delay. I did not know that our laws allowed of this, and certainly always thought, that (except in the proceedings of the Attorney General indeed), when a bill of indictment was found against any man, his trial must come on in the same Court, and that, too, as quickly as possible.—I have been reading the *Code Napoleon* so much of late, that I am quite lost when I come to the operation of our own laws.—But, what I took up my pen to notice, is, the infamous conduct of those newspaper writers, who have published to the world, that the removal was THE ACT OF THE ACCUSED. This falsehood has been exposed, in the public prints, by letters under the hands of Lord Cochrane, Mr. C. Johnstone and Mr. Butt, who have all declared, that they sought *not a moment's delay*; that they wished the trial to *come on immediately*; and that they were quite satisfied with the same ordinary sort of jury and of trial as other indicted persons. The public will not fail to perceive the venomous spirit, by which the above-mentioned falsehood must have been dictated. The object of it manifestly was to cause it to be believed, that the accused parties had put off the day of their punishment as long as they could, as it is very natural for men conscious of approaching punishment to do!—Is not this the excess of prostitution of the press? Is such a press the protector of innocence? Is such a press the "palladium of free men"; or is it not the greatest curse that ever afflicted a people?—To have put off the trial; voluntarily to have existed with a *true bill* hanging over their heads, for several weeks longer than was necessary, would have been a presumptive proof that they feared the result of the trial. No one will deny this; and, therefore, to promulgate that they had done this was, in direct terms, to tell the world, that they were conscious of guilt, than which it is scarcely possible to imagine any thing more base and detestable.—After the trial, there will be plenty of time to comment on the treatment of Mr. De Berenger and on all the

other transactions by which it will have been preceded. At present it would be improper to do this; and the public will be just enough, notwithstanding all the shameful efforts above mentioned, to suspend its judgment, till it has heard that trial.

MORE STOCK-JOBGING.

SIR—I perceive by the Public Papers, that my worthy brethren of the Stock-Exchange have removed the indictment against Berenger and others into the Court of King's Bench, and consequently the trial cannot come on for some time. They surely cannot give any satisfactory reason for this removal, or for the delay; their witnesses must be all ready, as they are near at hand; probably it proceeds from their anxious desire not to suffer Lord Cochrane and the others, to experience the indignity of being tried at the *Old Bailey*; and as Lord Ellenborough never allows political motives to mix with his charges to a jury, that, therefore, the parties will experience from him the most upright and impartial conduct. But, Mr. Editor, I am an old retired broker, and am well acquainted with the tricks and views of my brethren; they wish to defer this trial as long as possible, and particularly until after the new year has been taken, in order that they may, in the mean time, profit by the fluctuations; for, after the trial, adieu to all the sweet profits of 'Change Alley. The persons who were the brokers of Lord Cochrane and the other parties, upon the 21st of February, must give evidence at the trial, not only from whom the stock possessed by the above persons was purchased, but also to whom it was sold. This disclosure must implicate hundreds of persons, besides the brokers, whose books must be produced at the trial. The public will then have an opportunity of knowing who were the greatest winners on that celebrated day. This developement will be fine food for the *Qui Tam* actions. I have observed in a daily Paper, that my worthy friends, Messrs. WAKEFIELD, CHAUMETTE, TERRY, and others, who were upon the Sub-Committee, have already been served with writs, and that the same kind attentions have been experienced by Messrs. ANTONIUS, HANCOCK, GOLDSMID, SPICKER, RICARDO, and hundreds of other brokers, all of whom have done an immense amount of TIME BUSINESS. No person is now safe in doing this sort of business with any

broker. The penalties by the Act of 7th George II. are very severe, and every one who has not a copy of that Act ought to purchase one immediately, and he will, by the perusal of it, be convinced of the impropriety of continuing these transactions for TIME, which are not only illegal, but subjects all parties to ENORMOUS PENALTIES. The actions now pending must be the ruin of thousands: the penalties, I hear, upon those already brought, will exceed two millions.—A RETIRED BROKER.

Pimlico, May 4, 1814.

THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.—The fact of Bonaparte's *title* being recognized by the Allied Sovereigns, is no longer disputable. He has also, in addition to his pension, had the entire sovereignty of the island of Elba confirmed to him for life; and the Empress, whose title seems likewise to be continued, is to have the full possession in property of the Duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, with the right of transmitting these States to the late King of Rome, who is immediately to assume the title of "Prince of Parma and Placentia."—Mr. Whitbread attempted, the other night, in the House of Commons, to obtain some explanation from Ministers on this subject; but he was defeated in his object, and the answer which he received tended very much to confirm the statement, which lately appeared in the *Courier*, that Great Britain was not a party to the treaty which had been concluded with Napoleon. The fact, however, of the existence of a treaty, such as I have mentioned, is established by the following official article:—"Vienna, April 22.—The Court Gazette of this day contains the following article:—Paris, April 23.—In virtue of a Convention between the Ministers of the Allied Courts and the Envoy of Napoleon furnished with powers, to which the Provisional Government accedes, the *ci-devant* Emperor renounces formally all kind of pretensions to the Crown of France and Italy, and shall enjoy, in exchange, during his life, the Isle of Elba, where a pension shall be paid to him and the members of his family. The Duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, shall, at the approaching peace, be ceded in full property, to the Empress Maria Louisa, who shall transmit them to her son, to whom the title of Prince of Parma and Placentia is granted from this time."—Whatever may

have been the motives which induced the Allies to allow Napoleon to retain even this semblance of authority in Europe; whether they have been actuated by *gratitude* to a man who, when he had it in his power, did not overturn their thrones, but, on the contrary, gave them strength and stability, at the expence of general liberty, it must be acknowledged that the bare circumstance of Napoleon stipulating for the empty title of *Emperor*, after the power was gone, affords a pretty decisive proof that his predominant passion is *vanity*; that vanity which occasioned all his misfortunes; that vanity which has arrested the progress of freedom, perhaps for a century to come; and which, in my opinion, will always prove an obstacle to his being again employed by the people of France, should the defence of their rights ever again lead them to unsheath the sword. But, in stating what I consider *reprehensible* in the conduct of Napoleon, it is but fair, at all times, to acknowledge, that he has done much for France in consolidating that admirable code of laws, which was lately distinguished by his name, and which, every friend of freedom must be happy to find, is still to be administered in France. It is also right to give place to a vindication of Napoleon from those charges brought against him by his enemies; the number of whom have increased, as they always do in similar cases, with the increase of his misfortunes. On turning to No. 16 of the *Register*, the reader will find, in page 504, a decree of the Senate of France, passed at a Sitting on the 3d ult. in which they attribute all sorts of crimes to Napoleon, and, on account of which, they declare, that he had forfeited the throne; that the hereditary right established in his family was abolished; and that the French people and the army were released from their oaths of fidelity to the Emperor. To the charges contained in this decree, Napoleon thought it necessary, on the day following, to publish an answer. This answer, however, was not allowed to be published at Paris, and we are now indebted for a copy of it to the Dutch papers. It appears to me to possess all the characteristics of being *genuine*, though, I dare say, it has been much curtailed. Its authenticity has not even been denied by our hireling journals; but although they have given it publicity, they have not ventured to make a single observation on its contents. Considering the class of men to whom it was addressed, and the nature

of the accusations which they preferred against Napoleon, it appears to me that he has, at least, completely exculpated himself from being the sole actor in the measures pursued during his reign; and that, if he had not been flattered, and his ambitious views so much encouraged by men equally vain and ambitious, he might perhaps have still been at the head of France, and the French people enjoying all the advantages of a republican government.—The following is Napoleon's answer:—

ORDER OF THE DAY.—Fontainebleau, April 4.—The Emperor thanks the army for the attachment it has shown to him, and, above all, because it acknowledges that France resides in him, and not in the people in the capital. The soldier follows the fortune of his General, his honour and conscience. The Duke of Ragusa has not inspired his brothers in arms with those feelings; he is gone over to the Allies. The Emperor cannot approve the conditions on which he has taken this step; he cannot accept his life and liberty as a boon from a subject. The Senate has allowed itself to dispose of the Government of France; it has forgotten that it is indebted for the power which it now abuses to the Emperor alone; that he saved a part of its members out of the storms of the revolution, raised another part from nothing to greatness, and protected them against the hatred of the nation. The Senate appealed to the Articles of the Constitution, in order to overthrow it. It does not blush to make reproaches to the Emperor, without reflecting, that the Senate itself, as the first body in the State, has had a share in every event. It has gone so far as to dare to reproach the Emperor with having falsified the official documents in the publication; the whole world knows he had no occasion for such artifices, a hint from him was a command for the Senate, which always did more than was required of it. The Emperor has ever been ready to attend to the well-founded advice of his Ministers, and he expected from them, under present circumstances, the fullest approbation and support of his measures. If, out of zeal, exaggeration has slipped into the public addresses and speeches, the Emperor may certainly have been deceived; but ought not those who have held such language to him, reproach themselves for the consequences of their own flattery?

—The Senate is not ashamed to speak of libels against foreign powers, and forgets that they were composed in its own bosom. As long as fortune remained faithful to their Sovereigns, these people never let a syllable of complaint about the abuse of power escape their lips. If the Emperor had despised mankind as he is upbraided with having done, the world must now acknowledge that he had some reason to despise them.—He has received his dignity from God and the nation; they alone can take it from him. He has always considered this dignity as a burthen, and when he took it upon himself, it was from the conviction that he alone was able to support it in a becoming manner. His fortune seemed to be his destiny. Now that fortune has declared against him, nothing but the express will of the nation could prevail upon him to remain any longer on the throne.—If he must consider himself as the only obstacle to peace, he most willingly makes to France his last sacrifice. He has accordingly sent the Prince of Moscow, and the Dukes of Vicenza and Tarentum, to Paris, to open a negotiation. The army may be assured that its honour and the happiness of France shall never be opposed to each other."

INDEMNITY FOR THE PAST.—The *Bremen Gazette* of the 28th ult. contains the following article:—"It is reckoned that Bonaparte has debts to the amount of two milliards. The Allies have laid upon France a contribution of 1500 millions [upwards of 62 millions sterling]; fifteen French fortresses remain as security in their hands, one of which is to be restored at each payment of 100 millions; so that the whole is to be paid and the fortresses restored in 15 years." The *Courier* adds, "that the distribution of this contribution will be among such of the Allies as have been exposed to contributions levied by Bonaparte." Is it intended by this that Great Britain should come in for a share of this immense requisition? It is true that no direct levy has been made upon the good people of England by Bonaparte; but I apprehend it will be no difficult matter for our political sophists to shew, as Napoleon has been the indirect cause of the greater part of the contributions raised here, during the war, that we ought to participate in the indemnity money to be paid by France.

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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ADDRESS

TO THE KING OF FRANCE.

No. II.

It is of the greatest importance, not only to France, but to mankind in general, that your Majesty should hear the *truth*. Perhaps, it is very improbable, that any thing which I write should reach your ear; but, at any rate, it will reach the ear of some persons; and, at the very least, there is a chance of its having some small degree of effect.—With this persuasion in my mind, I cannot resist the desire that I feel to contribute my utmost towards the cause of peace in Europe, and of liberty in France, whence, in the end, will, I trust, go forth a bright example to all oppressed and insulted nations.—It will be the duty of others, and they will be better able than I, to give you information of the sentiments, relative to you and your government, prevalent in other countries; but, it shall be my business, from time to time, to give you a true representation of these sentiments, as they prevail in England.—In my first Address to your Majesty, I had no hesitation to express my conviction, that, in a *short time*, those who had been the loudest in rejoicing at your being recalled to France, would be found the forwardest to express their disapprobation of your conduct, and to discover their unquenchable hatred of the French people. When, however, I said a *short time*, I meant *several months* at least. I little imagined, that you and your brave people would, even with the most malignant of these men, become objects of attack in so short a space of time as fourteen days, and in less than a month from the day of your departure from England; in less than a month from the date of those rejoicings and those memorable embracings, with which your recall to the throne of your forefathers was hailed in England, where you had been hospitably permitted to lead so quiet a life for many years before.—This has, nevertheless, happened. The writers, who professed to be your best and

most firm friends, are already beginning to carp at your proceedings; and are using their utmost endeavours to make your recall an event to be regretted by the people of France, and even by yourself. They now discover very clearly, that which we charged them with before, but which they constantly denied to be true; namely, that their hatred was to *France*, and not to the Emperor Napoleon, or any of his predecessors in power; and that, they wished for, and endeavoured to accomplish, your restoration, not as the means of making France great, free, and happy; but, as the means of destroying her power, by plunging her into civil war, and by making her people abject and miserable.—It is almost impossible for a mind, endued with the common feeling of humanity, to conceive that there are people in the world capable of entertaining such diabolical views; capable of coolly calculating on the profit to be derived from the degradation and misery of twenty-six millions of people, inhabiting the fairest part of the globe; capable even of using their utmost endeavours to cause such degradation and misery, and that, too, at the manifest risk of exposing to destruction a family, for whose restoration they have expressed the most anxious wish, and, upon the arrival of the event, the most enthusiastic joy.—I shall, however, show your Majesty, that such is really the case. I shall show you, that, in the minds of some people in England, the hatred towards France is not at all abated; that they are labouring with all their might to keep that hatred alive, not only in this country, but in all others; that they are endeavouring to excite fresh suspicions against France in the minds of the Allies; that they are exerting all their powers to make France a country to be pointed at with the finger of scorn for a century to come. And having shown this so clearly as I intend, I shall entertain little doubt, that my endeavours, which have in view the peace and happiness of both countries, will be attended with some good.—In a case like this, it will be

necessary for me to refer to, and to quote from, the particular publications to which I allude; and your Majesty, who have, of late years, had such ample opportunities of being informed as to the character of the prints, whence I shall make my extracts, will want no assistance from me to enable you to form a correct opinion with regard to the motives and the influence by which the publications have been produced.—

The two Prints, to which only I shall, upon this occasion, refer, are the *TIMES* and the *COURIER*. It is sufficient to name them to your Majesty, to enable you to perceive the precise degree of weight which they carry, and the attention which they are entitled to from you and your counsellors.—In order to place the matter in as clear a light as possible, I will state, under distinct heads, the several charges that I make against the malignant writers, who, as I shall show, are, even before you are seated on your throne, endeavouring to lay the train of a new war between England and France.—I charge them, then,

I. With endeavouring to produce a civil war in France, by the reviving and perpetuating of those political animosities, which the King has expressed his anxious wish to see buried in oblivion.

II. With endeavouring to blacken the character of the French Marshals and the French army; to induce the king to slight and discourage them; to prevail on the Allied Sovereigns to break the Convention, made for the release of prisoners of war, and that, too, for the purpose of preventing the French prisoners from returning home.

III. With suggesting to the Allies the necessity of keeping their armies in France (in violation of the said Convention), beyond the first day of June, and with proposing that England should pay the said troops, while so kept in France.

IV. With proposing to the Allies, to compel the king of France to reduce his army in such a manner as to render his kingdom perfectly defenceless against any foreign power; and, at the same time suggesting, that the treaty of alliance, made between Great Britain and the Allies, against France, when under Napoleon, should be continued in full force now, and for twenty years to come.

V. With suggesting to the Allies the idea, and, indeed, actually proposing to them

the measure, of stripping the Museums and Galleries of Paris of the Statues, Pictures, and other valuable curiosities, brought by the French armies from countries which they had conquered.

VI. With endeavouring to prevent, in the pending negotiations, the restoration of the old French Colonies to France.

VII. With inculcating the doctrine, that France, though Napoleon is overthrown, is still the same; that she is radically and systematically our enemy; and that suspicions and jealousies of France ought for ever to be awake in the breast of a Briton.

Such are the charges which I make against the malignant writers, who, I must repeat it, were amongst the very loudest in hailing the return of your Majesty to France; and, if I make these charges good, you will want nothing more to convince you of the truth of what I stated in my first Address; namely, that, in the whole world, you had not such bitter and such crafty enemies as some amongst those, who, all of a sudden, had become your flatterers in England. These men hoped, that your Majesty would carry back to France no feelings but those of resentment and revenge; that, at the instigation of incendiaries, you would plunge your country into a civil war; that you would turn your back upon that army, who alone are able to support your throne against foreign foes; that, in short, you would lay beautiful France prostrate at the feet of any petty potentate who should think proper to become her enemy. They have discovered, that your Majesty is not disposed to gratify their wishes and expectations; and, they have lost no time in seeking, *de longue main*, to collect the materials for revenge.—I now proceed to my charges in their regular order.

I.—I accuse these men, without pretending to know *who* or *what* they really are, of endeavouring to produce a civil war in France, by the reviving and perpetuating of political animosities.—It must be evident to all the world, that, after what has occurred in France, if an amnesty and an oblivion, as to the past, does not take place, there must be endless quarrels and feuds in that country. It must also be evident, that disputes as to opinions and political conduct and acts, must involve questions of property, and that, by a very natural progress, an attack upon the past political conduct of individuals would grow

into a general war of opinions and interests, ending, in all human probability, in another Revolution, after the nation had experienced all the evils of a civil war; or, in the parcelling of France out, and dividing it amongst the other Powers of Europe. These truths are so manifest, that they must be seen clearly by all the world. Yet (and now I come to my evidence) does the *TIMES* newspaper of the 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th of May, labour with all its might to inculcate the justice and necessity of exposing, by all manner of means, the conduct of Frenchmen, whom it accuses of acts of disloyalty.—On the 2d of May, this writer points out the injustice, as he insinuates, of taking into favour those who have been employed by Napoleon, or who have figured in the Revolution. He says, that “Marshals DAVOUST, MASSENA, and SOULT, and some others, pretty clearly show a lurking attachment to the cause of the deposed tyrant; or, rather, perhaps, their own wishes to succeed him as military despots.” He then goes on to say, that “a great proportion of the prisoners of war in this country are evidently inclined to support any such desperate measure.”—I need not point out to your Majesty, the baseness of these suggestions, especially against our own unfortunate prisoners of war. The crime of which they are here accused is that of fidelity to their commanders. But your Majesty will want no exposition of motives here, when you observe, that the malice of this writer is more particularly levelled against those, who have most distinguished themselves in fighting against England. It was the Prince of Essling who followed Lord Wellington to Lisbon; it was the Duke of Dalmatia who followed Sir John Moore to Corunna; and it was the Prince of Eckmühl who maintained possession of Hamburg, with so much valour and perseverance.—But, the charge against the prisoners of war is still the most base. These unfortunate men, who have suffered so much for the sake of their fidelity to France (for that is the true light in which to view it), are to be suspected by you, and are to be degraded, if the malicious suggestions of this writer be listened to.—On the 3d of May, this same writer points out by name, a Monsieur THIBEAudeau, who, as this writer says, “voted for the death of Louis XVI, and against the appeal to the nation, by which that unfor-

“tunate Monarch would, undoubtedly, have been preserved.” Thus setting a mark upon one public officer, to begin with, as a proper object of vengeance.—On the 4th of May, the same writer says, that “those who palliate the crimes of France, under the late government, are the real enemies of the House of Bourbon, and those who proclaim aloud the truth its surer friends,” amongst whom he gives the first place to an incendiary of the name of CHATEAUBRIAND, who seems to have formed the design of ingratiating himself with the vindictive, at the expense, if it must be so, of the peace and happiness of France.—On the 5th of May, the same writer insists upon the necessity of “branding” certain of the revolutionists “with perpetual abhorrence.”—On the 7th of May, the same writer insists on the necessity, that, upon some points, as to the past, “the French nation ought to institute formal inquiry;” and, as one of the results of which he proposes, that all those French officers, who have escaped from imprisonment in England, shall be declared infamous. He says, that they are very numerous, and kindly offers to furnish a list of their names.—I dare say, that the offer will not be of any use, and that your Majesty, as well as those officers, will be contented to take the will for the deed.—On the 6th May, the same Print observed, “That hypocritical wretch, MAURY, too, it is to be feared, will not have his Cardinal’s robe stripped off. His impious harangues still ring in our ears, and yet we are told he continues to inhabit the Archiepiscopal palace: and presently, perhaps, he will have the audacity to intrude himself into the presence of his Sovereign! If the forfeited lives of these wretches are spared, at least they ought to be exposed to public scorn, and driven to obscurity, and, if possible, to penitence.” I have taken this Print for only one week. It has been constantly labouring at the same point. Chateaubriand and the *Axe*, appears to be this writer’s motto. You must make the scaffold stream with democratic blood, or, it is evident, that you will not satisfy this man.—Your Majesty remembers what the Stuarts did, upon their return to the throne of England; you remember how they hanged, and beheaded, and ripped up; and, you also remember their fate, which followed at no very distant day from their vindictive measures. But, even to them,

it never was proposed to punish, or to suspect, officers who had served in the wars of Cromwell, and who had so gallantly upheld the English name in arms. So far from that, they were confided in, employed, rewarded, and honoured. Yet would this writer have you suspect such men as Massena, Soult, and Davoust, because they have distinguished themselves in fighting against that country, to the people of which he now says, that, though Napoleon be overthrown, "France is still the SAME;" "France is radically and systematically our enemy."—To be convinced of the wicked, the detestable wishes of these writers, your Majesty has only to look, for a moment, at the pretended reasons, upon which they ground their assertion, that *an ample exposure of the late government is necessary*. They tell us, that, unless this exposure be made, in all sorts of ways, "there is no knowing to what dangers the Monarch may be exposed." Now, it will be borne in mind, that these same writers, have a thousand times told us, that the tyranny of the late government weighed upon every living creature in France; that it had plunged every family into misery and mourning. What need, then, of exposure? Why should you be in any danger from the want of that exposure? What! is it necessary to go to the house of a man, whom the late government had plunged into ruin and despair, and expose to him the nature and the acts of that government, especially when he sees all his neighbours in the same condition?—The hypocrisy of this pretended reason, will, at once, show the malice of the advisers of persecution, and will convince your Majesty, that such advisers, when they say one thing, mean another.—What! they tell us to-day, that all France was bleeding at every pore, under Napoleon, and his officers of various descriptions; that every man, woman, and child, was in a state of misery; that all, that every soul, young and old, felt the weight of the despotism, and prayed without ceasing for your return; and, to-morrow, they tell us, that, unless prodigious efforts be made to expose the evils of the late government, your Majesty is in imminent danger!

II.—I charge these writers with endeavouring to blacken the character of the French Marshals and officers, and the French army; to induce the king to slight and discourage them; to prevail on the

Allied Sovereigns to break the Convention, recently entered into for the release of prisoners of war, and that, too, for the purpose of preventing the French prisoners of war from returning home.—We have seen above a specimen of the abuse of the French Marshals and officers. The TIMES of the 2d of May, calls Generals HULTIN and BARROIS villains, and points them out as objects of vengeance. You are told, in the same print of the 6th of May, that your throne is raised on moon-beams, if you entrust your army to such men as your Marshals.—You, indeed, have expressed a precisely contrary opinion. You have said, that you will lean upon those Marshals; and this it is which has enraged these writers, be they who they may. But the abuse, thrown out by these men upon the whole of the French army, is quite indecent. I shall here quote whole passages from these writers; and as they apply to the III^d and IVth charges, as well as to the II^d, I will here repeat those charges, before I proceed to my quotations.

III. *With suggesting to the Allies the necessity of keeping their armies in France (in violation of the said Convention), beyond the 1st day of June, and with proposing that England should pay the said troops, while so kept in France.*

IV. *With proposing to the Allies to compel the King of France to reduce his army, in such a manner as to render his kingdom perfectly defenceless against any foreign power; and, at the same time suggesting, that the treaty of alliance, made between Great Britain and the allies, against France, when under Napoleon, should be continued, in full force, now and for twenty years to come.*

In support of these charges, I offer the following passages from the TIMES newspaper. "They" (the French prisoners of war) "had, for years, lived the life of banditti, and that sort of life is not without its charms for uneducated and unsuited minds. These circumstances prove the necessity of circumspection and firmness in those to whom the welfare of Europe is committed, and who have, at the present moment, irresistible power in their hands. . . . Before their armies are withdrawn, they must, for their own security, ascertain that the king's wishes will be put into execution. The Conscription must be abolished.—France cries out against it. Europe

"has a right to insist on its suppression."
 "It is also matter of most serious consid-
 "eration, how the force is to be constituted
 "on which the king is henceforward to
 "rely for protection. It will be, *easy*
 "to learn who, amongst the prisoners of
 "war in this country, have declared for
 "the lawful sovereign, and who for the
 "usurper. The latter should be *marked*.
 "Indeed the approaching peace will not
 "require a *large regular force* to be kept
 "up in France. The *national guard* will
 "form the *best support to the government*.
 "The military mania is as much a subject
 "of precaution now, as the democratic
 "mania was some years ago."—TIMES,
 2d May.—I must stop here for a moment to
 surmise what must be the feelings of a
 king of France upon reading these insin-
 uations and remarks of his *friends*!—
 Base wretches! They would excite his
 suspicions of those whom we have so long
 had in captivity, and whom we are to have
 no longer! Poor fellows! Have they not
 yet suffered enough for their valour and
 fidelity! These wretches would, we see,
 become spies, in order to get the poor fel-
 lows *marked*. "It will be *easy to learn*."
 Yes; but your Majesty will not, I am sure,
 accept of the offer. You will know well,
 that fidelity to their country and their
 cause ought to entitle these brave men to
 admiration, rather than to expose them to
 vengeance.—Your Majesty must laugh
 at this extreme regard for your welfare,
 which would strip you of all force but the
 national guard, at a time when Great Bri-
 tain is advised, by the same kind friends of
 yours, to keep in full force, a treaty which
 provides for the support of 600,000 men
 in arms *against France*. And, as you will
 presently see, this plan of the National
 Guard comes from the very people, who re-
 commend the carrying away from Paris of
 all the pictures and statues taken in Italy!
 —Your Majesty will want nothing further
 to guide your judgment as to this kind ad-
 vice; this uncommon solicitude for your
 happiness.—But, to proceed: the same
 Paper of the 3d of May observes, that
 "France in her present *exhausted state*,"
 (who said she was exhausted?) "cannot
 "support a *large military establishment*,"
 (she best knows that) "and it is the boun-
 "den duty of the Allies to proceed with
 "caution. The additional expense of keep-
 "ing their forces in France a few months
 "longer, and of extending the term for the
 "payment of the subsidies on our part, is

"not to be put into the scale against the
 "risk of having **ALL OUR WORK TO**
 "**DO OVER AGAIN.**"—TIMES, 3d
 May.—Does not this sting your Majesty
 a little? How do you and your people feel
 upon reading publications like these? What
 is the feeling of those, who have carried the
 French arms to Vienna, Berlin, and Mos-
 cow?—What is the feeling of those, who
 have seen all Europe at their feet; and
 who have carried *light* and even *liberty* in-
 to the dungeons of the Inquisition?—The
 TIMES newspaper of the 6th of May con-
 tained the following paragraphs, with which
 I shall conclude the evidence on the 2d,
 3d, and 4th charges.—Speaking of the
 Congress to be held for settling the affairs
 of Europe, the writer proceeds thus:—"It
 "would be well, whilst the victorious So-
 "vereigns are casting their views so far
 "into futurity, that they would look a little
 "to the dangers that may without a mi-
 "nute occur immediately under their eyes,
 "and possibly within the space of a few
 "months. They have sorely rued that ac-
 "cursed invention of revolutionary craft
 "and wickedness, the CONSCRIPTION; and
 "yet we do not hear that that *infamous*
 "and *detestable* institution is *abolished*. As
 "long as it exists, France must be, in the
 "energetic language of CHATEAUBRIAND,
 "'a den of robbers.' Far from having
 "freed the world from this monstrous evil,
 "it seems that they are preparing to heap
 "new fuel on the flame, by pouring at once
 "*half a million of soldiers into France*.—
 "What are these men to do? They can-
 "not dig. To beg they will be ashamed.
 "Are they to be at once disbanded? This
 "would fill all France with a *most despe-
 "rate banditti*. Are they to be embodied
 "under the command of such mild and mo-
 "derate leaders as Marshal Soult, and Mar-
 "shal Davoust? If so, the throne of
 "Louis XVIII. is raised on moon-beams."
 (What tender anxiety is here expressed for
 your Majesty!)—"The allied troops are
 "all to be withdrawn from France, and
 "that *unhappy* country is to be visited
 "with the *plague* of half a million *mad-*
 "*men*, still thirsting for GLORY (as they
 "phrase it). Even the disbanding of a
 "disciplined army, when armies used to
 "be less than one tenth as numerous
 "as they are now, was, by our prudent
 "ancestors, considered to be a matter
 "of much caution and delicacy.—How
 "much more important is it, to the repose
 "of France, and through her, of all Eu-

"rope, that the vast *hordes* which have been poured out from her bosom to ravage all parts of the Continent, should be restored gradually and quietly to their country, under such regulations and restrictions as would ensure their return to the habits and pursuits of peaceful industry. We earnestly hope that these considerations will have their weight with the Allied Sovereigns, and induce them to adopt a cautious system in replacing France on a basis of social order. We read too much in the addresses to the French Sovereign of the GLORY of the armies. That glory has been in the majority of instances an indelible disgrace to the French name, and a source of misery to all that France possesses of virtuous or truly noble. What glory was there in the massacre of Madrid, in the destruction of Saragossa, in the cruel persecution of the brave Hamburgers? We do not wish to revert to these scenes of horror; but when we see them alluded to in so very different a light, IT IS TIME TO SPEAK OUT."—These are memorable words. When your Majesty considers whence they spring, they ought to make a deep impression upon your mind, and upon the minds of all Frenchmen.—If this man were asked why he has such an antipathy to the Conscription; why he is so uncommonly anxious to induce the Allies to compel you to abolish it, I wonder what his answer would be?—It is all out of pure regard for your Majesty!—Pure regard for you makes him so anxious about it! Pure regard for you will not let him rest, day or night, till he has got all your army quietly disbanded! Pure regard for you, too, as you are about to see; pure regard for the happiness of France, has induced him to press upon the Allies to remain with their armies in the French territory, and to take away with them your statues and pictures! If you doubt of the insincerity of such friends, your Majesty must be credulous indeed.

Thus have I produced proof of the truth of the 2d, 3d, and 4th charges; but, before I proceed to the others, I must offer a few remarks upon the passages which I have here quoted, in order more fully to expose the baseness of the writer, and the detestable motives whence his publications have sprung.

It is well known, and to this writer as well as to others, that there is a Convention, signed by our Minister and that of

France, according to which the allied armies are to evacuate the French territory by the 1st day of June; and, yet, in the face of this, this friend of your Majesty would fain have these armies remain longer, to harass and oppress the people of France. But, what are the alleged motives for this violation of a solemn compact, and that, too, while France has been fulfilling her part of it with all possible diligence? Why, to compel your Majesty to disband all your veteran soldiers; to lay down your army altogether, and to abolish the easy means of raising another! This measure, and upon such grounds, is openly recommended to the Allies, who entered France with a declaration, that France ought to be great and happy!

The writer says, that your soldiers, when they return, will be *banditti*. Who are these soldiers? The men raised by the Conscription. They will not dig, it is asserted, and to beg they will be ashamed.—Therefore, he recommends, that the Allies should, in the teeth of the Convention, keep them, and restore them gradually and quietly, and under such restrictions and regulations as shall ensure their return to the habits of peaceful industry.—In truth, he is afraid of them. He has witnessed their valour. He wishes them to rot in prison. He is not yet glutted with their unheard-of sufferings, which have all been unable to shake their fidelity to their country and its cause.

—But, mark the hypocrisy of this man. He has been ringing in our ears, for months and months, the cruelty of the Conscription; he has been, with Mr. Canning, giving us the most pathetic descriptions of the weepings of the mothers and fathers of these poor conscripts; he has been deploring the fate of unhappy France, left to be cultivated by old men, women, and children, though, by the bye, she has always had corn to sell us. And now, behold! when the happy moment is arrived for the return of these poor youths to their mothers, he will not let them go! He is afraid that they will become *banditti*! He has lost all recollection of the tender parting scenes, and looks upon them as in love with a roving fighting life! And he is willing still to leave poor France to be tilled by old men, women, and children! What is the world to think of such a man? The truth is, he knows how brave and faithful they have been; and he wishes to see them die in captivity. England, in proportion to her

population, has had more men in arms than France. What does this man mean to do with them? Are they made of such materials as not to make them at all dangerous? Then there are, perhaps, two millions of soldiers belonging to the Allies. Are they to be kept in prison; or what is to be done with them? Is there no *military mania* any where but in France? The French soldiers are, it seems, neither to be *disbanded* nor *kept* up. No; he would have them stifled: he would have them pine out their lives in prisons. I wonder he does not propose, at once, the cutting of all their throats.—Your Majesty will hear of such sentiments with indignation and horror.

And, what reason has this man to suppose, that the French prisoners of war will not, if disbanded, be ready to fall into the habits and pursuits of *industry*? Experience would tell him to draw a contrary conclusion. For, was there ever heard of in the world more industrious and ingenious people than the Frenchmen in our prisons? Sabots, list shoes, leather shoes, lace, straw hats. In short, what did they not make, as long as they were *permitted*, in their prisons? It was necessary to *restrain them from working*. I remember one instance wherein a man and his son too, I believe, *were punished for supplying them with straw for their manufactures*! As to the liberality of the nation where this took place, as to the wisdom and justice of the prevention, I have nothing to say. It might all be very wise, just, and liberal; but that does not disprove the fact, that the French prisoners discovered, while in our keeping, *industry* surpassed only by their fortitude and fidelity. What danger can there be, then, to their country; what danger can there be to France, to send such men out of our prisons, and from the wilds of Siberia, to their fathers and mothers in their own fruitful and pleasant country? Your Majesty and the French nation will not fail to call to mind, that, for many years past, these same writers have been railing against Napoleon, on account of his not consenting to an exchange of the prisoners of war. He was represented as a most cruel and ungrateful monster, who suffered to die in *prisons* and in *hulks*, those who had fought his battles. Means in abundance were employed, by these writers, to instil such sentiments into the minds of the French prisoners, who had free access to publica-

tions of the kind. They were not convinced, it seems. But, what are we to think of the *sincerity* of these writers? What are we to think of the compassion they expressed for the prisoners of war? What are we to think of their imputations against Napoleon, because he would not agree to our terms of exchange? What are we *now* to think of all these professions on the part of these writers and their associates, when we see them doing all they can to prolong the duration of the captivity of these unfortunate Frenchmen, even after peace has been made with France, and that, too, accompanied with the restoration of the ancient family? Is there in France; is there in England; is there in the whole world, one generous, one humane bosom, which will not swell with indignation at the suggestions of such inplacable and base malignity?

These writers, as your Majesty will perceive, are angry that Frenchmen should still talk of their *glory*. They find fault with the language that has passed between you and your Marshals, as calculated to flatter the *vanity* of the people. They call it *insolence* towards us and our Allies.—They say that such notions ought to be discouraged by you, because they tend to keep alive that *military mania*, which may be your ruin; and, lest this consideration should not have its weight with you, they appeal to the wisdom of the Allies, and call upon them to see your army reduced to National Guards, before they withdraw their troops from your territory. Now, what is the reason that you and your people are not to talk of the *glory* of the French army? Nothing that has happened can lessen the renown acquired by that army. Such prodigious feats of valour were never before performed by any nation in the world. No nation ever carried its arms to such an extent of conquest. All the capitals of the Continent have been in the hands of Frenchmen. No nation ever had the power to produce such wonderful changes in the state of society. The bare narrative of the *great* battles and victories of the French armies would fill many large volumes. *Why*, then, are the French not to be permitted to cherish the idea of their military *glory*? *Why* is your Majesty to be sneered at by these writers, because you rest upon those who have acquired this glory? Upon what ground is this language in France denominated *vanity* and *insolence*? What do these men

expect, that, because their eye-balls are seared at the sight of the pages which record, and which will for ever record, the valour of the French arms, in so many battles against *all* the nations of the Continent; do they expect, that you and your people are to burn this record, that you are to efface all the means of calling to mind the heroic deeds of Frenchmen; do they expect, that, because *we* very naturally wish to drown the recollection of Coruuna, the Helder, and of many other things, you and your people are to have the same wishes? Do they expect that you, above all others, are to act as if you thought your kingdom disgraced in the eyes of the world? Do they expect you to acknowledge yourself as the sovereign of a fallen people, and to endeavour to stifle in their bosoms that feeling, which alone can preserve your country from being parcelled out amongst invaders? This they do not *now* expect; and their rage proceeds from their disappointment. They blame your Majesty for preserving the *Legion of Honour*. They call it the creature of *crime*. They say, to maintain it is to sanction *immorality*. They forget, good moral souls, that our august and magnanimous Allies are *all* honorary members of that *Order*. Good moral souls, they forget, that the Emperors of Austria and Russia, the King of Prussia, the Crown Prince of Sweden, the King of Denmark, the Prince Regent of Portugal, the King of Bavaria, the King of Württemberg, the King of Saxony, the Grand Duke of Baden, together with the greater part of their principal Ministers, and Generals, belong to this *Legion of Honour*. The good moral souls surely forget this, or they would not blame your Majesty for maintaining it. They surely would not call it the creature of *crime*, and the symbol of immorality.

But, it will strike your Majesty as something worthy of attention, that, while these writers, who, it must be observed, are not so very *unlike* in their opinion as I could wish: it must strike you as worthy of attention, that, while these writers are so zealously endeavouring to dissuade your Majesty from giving the smallest degree of encouragement to the army of France; while they would even forbid you and your people to talk about *French* military glory; they discover no such dislike to the thing at *home*. We are permitted to talk about the *glory* that *we* have acquired in fighting

the French, and in our invasion of France. We make Dukes and Lords of those who have been fighting against France. We have made more Lords than France has made Marshals. And, even in our war, now to be carried on against the Americans, the fleets and armies are reminded of the *glory* they have gained in the war against France. Perhaps all the battles that we have been engaged in during this war of twenty years do not, in point of magnitude, amount to one battle like that of Austerlitz or of Marengo. And yet we are to talk of our military glory; we are to talk of it eternally; and the French, the poor insignificant French, are to be as silent as so many mice; *you* and *they* are to be accused of *vanity*, and even *insolence*, if you open your lips upon the subject of the achievements of the armies of France.—Whatever else your Majesty may think of these writers, you will certainly allow them to be the most *modest* of all mankind.

Your Majesty is called upon to look coldly upon your army of veterans. You are told, that their military notions are mischievous. You are assured that they are *banditti*, *vagabonds*, *robbers*; and that they ought by no means to be encouraged; that they, and even their *profession*, ought to be held in abhorrence, as tending to *national immorality*. You will not fail, however, to observe, that this opinion of these writers does not prevent them from approving of the honours and the pensions bestowed (I say not unjustly) on *our* fighters; and that they extol by anticipation the intention of our Government to make an addition to the *peace-pay* of our military and naval officers. These good moral men see *no danger* in all this. They see no danger in keeping alive, by all possible means, the love of a military life and of the military profession *here*. They can see no danger, indeed, of this being done in *any* country except France; a view of the subject, which would seem wholly irreconcilable to common sense, if we did not recollect, that the same persons have told us to look upon France as being radically and systematically *our enemy*; than which your Majesty will surely want no other explanation of this seeming inconsistency.

If, after what has been produced and observed, your Majesty could entertain the smallest doubt, that these writers and their associates wish you to adopt a line of conduct that would *cripple France*; make her a *feeble and contemptible nation*;

sink her for a century in the scale of power. If you could entertain the smallest doubt, that their first wish is the degradation of France, as the means of giving England a complete preponderance against her. If you could entertain the shadow of a doubt, that this is the main drift of all their present efforts, the proofs I am now about to produce, must remove even that shadow.

V.—I charge these writers with suggesting to the Allies the idea, and, indeed, actually recommending the measure, of stripping the Museums and Galleries of Paris of the statues, pictures, and other valuable curiosities brought by the French armies from countries which they had conquered.—My proof of the truth of this charge is in the following extract from the TIMES newspaper of the 2d of May.—After noticing, that the Emperor of Russia had expressed the intention of the Allies to be, to leave Paris in possession of all its curiosities; after censuring this, and adding a suitable quantity of observations on the “robberies,” the “rapacity,” and the “vanity” of the French nation, the writer proceeds thus:—“As the coalheaved Powers have fairly conquered all the armies of that nation, who had so long indulged themselves in every species of rapine throughout Europe—and since these victorious Powers, by the capture of Paris, have, at their absolute disposal, the whole magazine of revolutionary plunder, wrenched by fraud or violence from its just possessors, who can avoid asking, how that plunder is to be disposed of? Can any man doubt, that if the public and private property of France be respected by the conquerors, the same conquerors are bound, by a ten-fold obligation, so far as to respect the public and private property of Flanders and Venice, of Florence and Rome, as to demand it peremptorily from those who have stolen it, and give it back to those from whom it was so iniquitously stolen? Not even a statue, not a medal, not a picture capable of removal, ought to be left where it can only serve to reward the systematic robberies of the French Government, and to stand the glittering evidence of successful crime. It is as the advocate of consistency, that one might call upon the triumphant defenders of public justice and honour, not to leave their triumph incomplete, not to leave the downfall of oppression a dis-

puted fact with posterity, by leaving it robed in all its unprincipled acquisitions. Neither in liberality nor in policy, is it a matter of mean consideration, that the princes and nobles of the plundered kingdoms should be remitted to the bare walls of the ravaged temples and gutted palaces. What is modern Italy without her monuments? To the grave Italian, his country has no existence but in her annals. Why take from him the consolation of beholding the proofs of what he has been? Why break away the fine associations of every classic and cultivated mind, which connects the once inestimable treasures of the Vatican with the antiquity of letters and of arts, while in Florence it delights to meditate their revival? It may, to be sure, hurt somewhat of the Parisian vanity, to find the Louvre dissected by its emigrant Gods. The Hall of the Apollo may affect the French connoisseur and savant with sombre feelings, when the Belvidere palace has recovered its immortal guest. —The Hall ‘des Hommes illustres,’ the Hall ‘des Romains,’ the Hall ‘du Laccoon,’ the Hall of the Muses, may have fewer admirers, when these splendid appellations become terms of ridicule, as they now are of reproach. But let us hope that our Allies may not imitate our enemies, by confounding the good and bad passions of mankind. Let us hope that, for the sake of the French people themselves, an act of high and important justice may not be set aside from regard to their unworthy vanity to that sentiment, by pampering which, more mischief has resulted to France and to the world, than centuries of peace and penitence can repay; that sentiment to which we may fairly trace the paroxysms of their military ambition, their fever of empire, and prodigality of blood.”

Here there is no disguise. There is nothing crafty. The design and the motive are openly avowed. But, be the event what it may, what must be the envy, the hatred, the rancour; how inveterate, how diabolical, the malice of the minds, in which such advice to the Allies could originate? Your Majesty will, probably, not have forgotten the gloe of these same persons, when they saw a prospect of Paris being burnt to ashes. It is the same spirit that is at work here. It is a spirit of envy and of malice, that robs the mind of its reflecting powers. It

is a rancour against France and against Frenchmen, which knows no bounds; which loses sight of all consequences; which thinks nothing of wars, or of civil strife, in the pursuit of its gratification. Was there ever before heard of, in the whole world, such a thing as confounding *booty in war* with highway, or any other robbery? And, did ever any nation in the world make war for the recovery of such booty? The Allies, in their treaty concluded at Chaumont, no longer ago than the 1st of March last, stipulate in these words:—"The trophies and *booty* taken from the enemy, shall belong to the troops who take them." And yet have these malignant writers the impudence to advise the stripping of the Museums of Paris, upon the ground, that their contents were the fruit of robbery, though the terms of the capitulation of Paris expressly forbid any such act of spoliation.—However, it is not so much for the purpose of exposing the want of reason in these writers, and their associates and approvers, that I have noticed this part of their efforts, as for the purpose of clearly shewing, that the main object of this description of persons is to degrade, to beggar, to cripple France. They see in these famous Museums, and Libraries, and Galleries, the source of an immense and constant resort to Paris; they perceive that resort will tend to the advantage of France in a pecuniary way, at the same time that it cannot fail to extend and perpetuate the fame of the French armies. And, so bitter is their malice, that they would, I verily believe, plunge us into another long and bloody war, rather than leave this advantage to France. The exclusive possession of all the *trade* of the world is not sufficient for them. The means of paying all the armies in Europe to fight against France is not enough. A twenty years alliance against France, even that does not glut these men. They wish to leave her absolutely nothing but rags and dirt; and even of her soil we shall, I dare say, see, by and bye, that they wish to have all the fruit for nothing.—Your Majesty will surely admire their generosity, whatever you may think of their prudence.

We now come to my two last charges, namely:—

VI. Endeavouring to prevent, in the pending negotiations, the restoration of the old French Colonies to France. And,

VII. Inculcating the doctrine that France, though Napoleon is overthrown, is

STILL THE SAME; that she is radically and systematically our enemy; and that suspicions and jealousies of France ought FOR EVER to be awake in the breast of a Briton.

Ample proof of the truth of these will be found in the following article from the COURIER newspaper of the 6th of May, which article, from the whole of its appearance, became worthy of particular notice. It is written in a style above that of the ordinary style of the Paper. It had a distinct and conspicuous place allotted to it. Its tone is such as to induce one to believe, that it was intended to give a decided direction to public opinion upon the important subjects of which it treats. It would seem that the writer was afraid, that, in the hurry of the late scenes, public feeling had carried people away too far, and had led them, in their joy at the fall of Napoleon, to forget that antipathy which he wished to see kept alive against France, at all times, and under any dynasty, or any possible order of things.—"Most of our contemporaries are talking of the preparations for the celebration of the general peace. That a general peace is indeed a subject for congratulation we do not of course mean to deny; but let us first have an insight into the terms. We know enough to be able to state that they will be founded upon the bases of the ancient limits of France, so far as they relate to France upon the Continent; France as she was in 1789 or 1792. But is this principle meant to be extended to her Colonies? This is what concerns us. Russia will get an extension of territory, Prussia get back her own with additions, so will Austria—But what are we to have? It may perhaps appear somewhat ungracious to suggest a single thought which might damp the general joy, or awaken a single fear, where the reins are so fully given to hope. The line of discussion we have pursued, does, however, on this occasion, require us to express some fears that the glow of generous feeling which has been excited by so many important, and, as to many of the circumstances, unlooked-for occurrences; the satisfaction which a virtuous people feels on the fall of elevated villainy, and the pleasure which the restoration of a legitimate and respectable sovereign to his throne could not fail in this country to excite, may have tended to lull those suspicions and

"jealousies of France, which ought ever
 "to awake in the breast of a Briton, and to
 "dispose both the public and the ministry
 "to a false and mischievous principle;
 "which has been sanctified under the name
 "of generosity. We have no objection to
 "all for which that is the term, when properly
 "understood, and we have certainly
 "no wish to perpetuate feelings of enmity
 "or revenge towards France. It is per-
 "haps the best political reason which can
 "be given for our joy at the restoration of
 "the Bourbons; that we can be at peace
 "with France under the ancient family,
 "more in the spirit of peace than when under
 "a base and unprincipled usurpation.
 "But let us not ignorantly forget that tho'
 "Bonaparte be overthrown, France is still
 "the same; that she is radically and
 "systematically our enemy; and let us not,
 "in the folly of our good nature, pour those
 "gifts and offerings into the hands of
 "France, because she has been compelled
 "by her sufferings to ease herself of the
 "load of an oppressor, which may strengthen
 "her for future aggressions. France is
 "to be placed as before the war; this
 "seems to have been the principle of the
 "Allies, when negotiating with Bonaparte.
 "We then heard it echoed from one to
 "another, that England was the only
 "Power who had sacrifices to make, and
 "that she was willing to make them. If
 "she was presumed to possess this degree
 "of good nature when Bonaparte was the
 "person proposed to remain on the Throne
 "of France, at least she is not expected to
 "narrow her generosity; now it is filled by
 "a Bourbon. Now, it may be very mag-
 "nanimous in the Allies to propose that
 "England should give back to France
 "all her conquered Colonies; but for our-
 "selves we see not why a British Statesman
 "should admire this magnanimity of mak-
 "ing free with other people's property; or
 "what justice to the nation there is in
 "such proposals. It is easy enough for
 "those Powers who have nothing to sur-
 "render, in order to accomplish the object,
 "to speak of placing France as before the
 "Revolution; but it must be shown why
 "all the Allied Powers shall depart from
 "the contest with the fruit of success
 "in their pockets, and Great Britain
 "should go away rather stripped and
 "muled than rewarded for her honour-
 "able perseverance, or rather suffered to
 "enjoy the fair acquisitions of her own
 "insulated valour and exertions. Why,

"when Russia gets Finland. Sweden,
 "Norway; and Austria and Prussia old
 "territories, which they had for ever given
 "up for lost, England, whilst all others
 "gain, should lose? Why, when they in-
 "crease their power, she should diminish
 "her's? We have seen no reason given
 "which is not too absurd to answer. Eng-
 "land has made sacrifices, she has been
 "for twenty years making sacrifices for
 "the independence of Europe; why then
 "should she be required to make additional
 "ones? Her vast national debt shows the
 "sacrifices she has made; and if Austria,
 "Russia, and Prussia, can plead pecuniary
 "sacrifices also, we shall demand why they
 "are to be allowed to balance them with
 "an extension of territory, whilst Great
 "Britain is to retain her debt, and at the
 "same time diminish her possessions? The
 "gross injustice of the requisition, and the
 "gross folly of countenancing it by the
 "cant of not being behind in magnanimity,
 "is most apparent from the consideration,
 "that there is no reciprocity implied in
 "such an arrangement as shall restore the
 "conquered Colonies to France. The other
 "Allies gain independence and territory
 "by the defeat of the French; but Great
 "Britain gains neither. She was inde-
 "pendent before, and would have remain-
 "ed so; she had lost no territory, and
 "therefore had none to recover. All she
 "gains is the liberty of trading with the
 "Continent; and in that trade the Allies
 "are as much interested as she; and are
 "we then to purchase from France this
 "liberty by the cession of Colonies, when
 "France has no right, and now no power,
 "to prevent us from enjoying it? In every
 "view the idea of such surrenders is pre-
 "posterous."

Upon the subject of Colonies I might
 first address myself to the English nation,
 and ask them what benefit they could pro-
 mise to themselves by such an extension of
 dominion, and that too, of a kind not at all
 contributing to our security or happiness.
 I much question, whether the restoration
 of Colonies to France would be any real
 benefit to her. We have seen, that she
 has not wanted the aid of Colonies in her
 late wars: and, perhaps, it might be well
 for her, if we must consider her as radically
 the enemy of Great Britain, that the latter
 should expand her wings of conquest and
 dominion over all the Colonies in the known
 world, as the most likely means of produc-
 ing her final weakness and ruin, at the ex-

tension of dominion has now produced the want of the power of resistance in France. But, all that I, or any one else, might be able to urge on these topics; however clearly we might be able to shew, that inflated dominion, that external resources, that borrowed vigour, all tend to the final fall of States, and however numerous the instances by which we might illustrate and enforce this position, nothing that we could say would affect the object of this writer's observations and doctrines, which is manifestly to cause the people of England to believe, that, to give up Colonies to France would tend to give her *strength*, and that we ought to do all that we can to keep her in a state of *feebleness*; and, envy out of the question, for the present, we will now inquire upon what *grounds* the justice of this is endeavoured to be upheld.

It is alleged, that England ought to give nothing up to France, because the rest of the Allies *give nothing up to her*. This is not true; for the rest of the Allies give up all that part of France, of which they have possession; and it is notorious to all the world, that, without them, we could not remain in France for a single hour. *They*, we are told, *all get something*, and we nothing. They cannot *all* gain, seeing that Europe is no larger than it was before. If, upon the whole, they get no territory, why should we? But, if the King of Great Britain gets nothing, the Elector of Hanover does; for how has Hanover been recovered but by the exertions of the Allies? We are told, that they get territories which they had given up as gone for ever. And did not we look upon dear Hanover as gone for ever? Besides, we are told, that we get nothing but trade with the Continent. Do we not get, or see, *Antwerp* out of the hands of France, and also the ports at the mouth of the Scheldt? What prevents the Allies from suffering Antwerp to become a great maritime arsenal? What prevents them from erecting here a formidable enemy to our fleets? And, if they do not do that, do we gain nothing? Have we gained nothing in the fleet of Denmark; in the Dutch fleet; in the fleet of Spain; in the destruction of almost the whole of the maritime force of the House of Bourbon? What, after all this, will any reasonable man say, if we still cling to the Colonies of France, still hold them, lost France, which we represent as being in the lowest abyss of beggary, should become too powerful? But,

OUR VAST NATIONAL DEBT! Yes, may it please your Majesty, it is, indeed, a thumper. It requires thirty-eight millions of pounds sterling to pay the interest of it; or, in French livres, 912 millions; a sum, I believe, twice as great as Napoleon was ever able to get from his forty-four millions of people, to carry on all his undertakings and all his wars. This sum, this sum necessary to pay the interest of our debt alone, is enough to make one's head swim to think of. But these same writers are, at other times, continually assuring us, that this debt is nothing of serious import, and they even go so far as to assert, that it is an indisputable proof of our *prosperity*. At any rate, I hope that your Majesty will take care not to run the risk of such a debt, reflecting on the fatal consequences which a former debt produced to your family. But, this debt of ours. Have we not had the expending of the money? Have we not, in our wars, had the money's worth? If we have paid *money*, Europe has found *men*. Are we to have the services for the money in the first instance, and then demand dominions for the money at last? This is a sort of double-handed game, reduceable, I conceive, to no acknowledged, or even supposed, principle of equity. Besides, upon what ground are *you* (for you it is) to be called upon to leave in our hands any equivalent for this debt? You were not the cause of its being contracted; the war was never professed to be carried on for *you*. We made a treaty of peace and friendship with him, whom we now call the usurper of your throne. We carried on the war, as we professed, for "*truly British objects*." If we say, that we have taken the Colonies for ourselves, and that you and your interests are out of the question—that is fair; but, then, let us not be permitted to claim from you any *gratitude*, and to request you to *disarm* your people for *our sake*.

But, that all these pretexts are false appears from the context; for this same writer calls upon us to remember, that "though Napoleon be *overthrown*, France *is still the same*." What! Is there no difference? After all, is there nothing effected? Is France still as dangerous to us as she was before? Why, if she be "*radically and systematically our enemy*," what have we done? What have we gained? If there is to be "*war with Amalek*," "*from generation to generation*," what is become of the subject of our recent re-

joicings? Why have we wasted so many candles, such rivers of oil, and stripped the laurels off the few leaves which the winter had not turned brown? If France be "radically and systematically our enemy," to what end have we spent 800 millions of additional debt and 400 millions in taxes? To what end have we saddled our great great grand-children (if Bank-notes last) with such an enormous load? What! Have we done this to restore to France a *paternal government*? Have we incurred all this expence, and shed rivers of blood to give happiness, as we pretend, to our radical and systematic enemy?

From this mass of inconsistency, falsehood, vanity, envy, and malignity, I turn to conclude, in a few words addressed to your Majesty. You will now clearly see, that, in this country, no very small portion of that powerful instrument, the Press, is employed in endeavours to prevail upon the Allied Powers to impose hard and disgraceful terms upon you and your people; that this same press is beginning already to endeavour to revive and perpetuate deadly animosity in the breasts of Englishmen against France. When you have seen the clear proof of these facts, I only wish you, your ministers, and your people, to observe and to bear in mind, that it is this *same press* which is wearying the very air with their advice to you, to slight and degrade your army, to break your promised amnesty, and to adopt all those vindictive measures calculated to plunge France into long and bloody civil wars.

N. B. The King of France having put off the final arrangement of the Constitution, until the 31st of May, I shall postpone, till after that time, my proposed comparison between it and our happy thing of the same name.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

THE RECKONING.—This is a most copious subject, and I can only just notice here, that it is said, in the Parliamentary Debate Reports, that the *War Taxes*, except the trifling duty on goods going from one part of the coast to the other, are to be kept on for another year, at any rate; or, at least, there is no promise that any part of them shall be sooner taken off; nor, indeed, that they shall be taken off

even then.—But, how could a generous people expect it, after having approved of a treaty to pay for 600 thousand men to be kept on foot against France? We cannot eat the cake and have it too. We cannot expect to have all these services and all this glory without paying for it. "What!" exclaim the patriotic maidens of fixed incomes, "are we to still pay the Property Tax, now that the monster Bonaparte is overthrown?" But, my dear ladies, pray bear in mind, that you must expect to pay the *Reckoning*. There are 600,000 Austrians, Prussians and Russians, Croats and Cossacks, who have been fighting for us in defence of freedom, social order, and religion; and would you not pay for their return home to their own happy countries? Do you consider what might have been the consequence, if a French army had got into England? Reflect; pray reflect a little upon the terrible risk which you ran. And, if you do that, I will not believe, that you will grudge to pay the Property Tax for the rest of your lives. Besides, will not this tax go, in part, into the pockets of those, who, as officers, have been serving in our army, and whose half pay is now to be augmented? Have you not relations amongst these? And, how do you expect that they are to be supported without taxes? Have we not the Duke of Wellington, that "first captain of the age," as our newspapers call him; have we not him and his noble comrades to reward? And, would you not share in the expence of rewarding those, who, in all human probability, have contributed to the preservation of your lives; nay, more, your *honour*? Good Heaven! when you reflect upon the services rendered you, can you complain of the continuation of the Property Tax, which only takes from you one pound note out of every ten? O, fie, Ladies!

AMERICAN WAR.—Some mention has

been made of this in Parliament; but I must put off my remarks till my next.

JOHN BULL'S SECOND THOUGHT.

MR EDITOR—It is now said France is subjugated, and restored to the Bourbon family in a crippled state.—Norway, we are told, is bartered away to Sweden, whom we are to assist in securing possession of it. America, we are assured, is to be abandoned by the Allies for us to RECOLONIZE it! The Allies, our Allies, will have gloriously fought for, and obtained, the Liberties of Europe. Peace is to be universal and permanent. They boast that we shall all be *happy* under the paternal sway of our own legitimate Sovereigns!—and that discontent will not exist, or at least will be compelled to hide its head! But it has happened, before now, that a man, after struggling hard with a disease, has, even after the disease has been subdued, miserably fallen a victim to the medicines which have been administered!—We have seen a coalition of different Sovereigns overcome the most powerful nation, and the most skilful General in Europe. Whatever may be the ostensible pretence for this, the real cause will be found in the French having first made laws for their Monarch, and next having beheaded him—crimes most unpardonable in civilized Europe, and among regular Governments. In cases of murder, it is well known that length of time does not occasion prescription. If we look into our own history, then, it will be seen that we have been equally guilty as the French. Did we not behead Charles? did we not confiscate the church land? Did we not send James and his family a packing? How come we, then, to throw the first stone? By means of a *Coalition* we succeeded—aye, and another Coalition may speedily inflict a similar punishment on us.—Coalitions may now become the order of the day; and if *interest*, sometimes denominated public good by Princes, should step in, a Coalition against England would be full as practicable as one against France. It may be said that such Coalition would fail for want of money; that, in the present war, we had been the bankers of the Allies. Yes, with a vengeance, we have sent them our money and reserved only our bills; so that this very argument overturns itself; for if we have given the Allies money, they, or their subjects, are now in the actual possession of it, while we are compelled to substitute

paper for gold; a measure open also to any new Coalition that might be formed against us. If it be argued, that the nation is still very rich, it is answered, that the greater will be the incitement for plunder. The resources of the Allies in men are immense, and as we cannot prevent the increase of their shipping, they may shortly, and very shortly too, make the liberty of the seas their pretence, and prove equally successful as when fighting for the liberties of the land! perhaps even now the storm is gathering!—The expected arrival of the Allied Sovereigns in this country may tend to accelerate the event. They will be received with pomp, with ceremony, with acclamations, with illuminations, and with fêtes.—To them, as was done by Hezekiah to the ambassadors of Belodack Baladan, Prince of Babylon, will be shewn, in full display, *all our riches* and their sources. The very magnificence of their reception by their princely host; the luxury of a Lord Mayor's feast, and the splendid appearance which will be assumed by all those who will be permitted to approach the royal visitors, will give birth to reflections as to the *manner* in which such wealth was acquired, and the means employed for securing its immense influx.—Some deep-sighted politician may whisper, that it is *allowing to the sovereignty of the seas*. To the Sovereign of all the Russias, he may add, that this little Island might have room to dance in one of his Imperial Majesty's provinces. Why, then, he may ask, should not Russia have as extended a commerce, and an equal share of the sovereignty of the seas? It may also be hinted, that a certain portion may be granted the confederates, for their assistance in recovering the whole.—With the aid of England, might these confederates argue, we have just conquered a country containing thirty millions of inhabitants; with the aid of these we may easily subdue a population of ten millions, and of these ten millions a twentieth part, at the least, will gladly transplant themselves and their manufactures to the Continent. Thus we may free the seas and increase our commerce, &c. &c.—As the visit of the two Emperors, however, is unavoidable, it may, perhaps, be more to the profit of the country, if, in their reception, we display less of our luxury and more of our poverty. Let them be conducted to our prisons and our poor-houses, and to our decaying manufacturing towns; let them enter the peasant's half-ditched

cottage—let them be made acquainted with the magnitude of our National Debt—with the immense sums annually collected by Government, and the way in which it is distributed; let them inform themselves, *providing they do not divulge it in this country*, of the immense quantity of paper now in circulation; and thus, after dining at a luxurious board, and when retiring to rest on a splendid couch, they will naturally conclude, that however great the commercial resources are in England, want predominates; that, though luxury abounds at Court and among the great, nine-tenths of the people have misery to their share; and that, upon the whole, England is like a certain bird, which, having more feather than flesh, is not worth powder and shot.—Prudence will, however, suggest to us that we ought to keep up our large standing army and not disband our militia; that we ought to have recourse to a Conscription, a Landwehr, or a Landstrum; and, at all events, that we ought to send our foreign legions out of the country, lest, in the heat of battle, they should go over in a body to the enemy. Let us by the experience of others grow wise, and avoid the fate of Napoleon at Leipsic.—On the other hand, as the people are now content to bear heavy taxes, they will not murmur at their continuance. Government may, therefore, still subsidize, as usual, only changing the object, and instead of making them the cement of a coalition, let the subsidies be converted to the promotion of discord; for it is much better to *prevent* a coalesced invasion than to repel it: and it must be remembered this country has often been reduced by invaders, and that what has heretofore been effected by *one* invading nation may more assuredly be within the verge of possibility, when attempted by a COALITION OF ALL EUROPE.

ARISTIDES.

FRANCE.—The following are some additional articles of the new French Constitution, which have transpired since I last adverted to the progress of the revolution in that country:—

Civil List.—The Civil List (or the funds of the annual expenditure of the King) is fixed at *twenty-five millions of francs*, exclusive of his private demesnes and those of the Crown.—The King to support his civil and military household. The *maximum* in point of number for the latter is determined.—The annual expen-

diture of the brother of the King is calculated at one-fourth, exclusive of the private property and the appendages.—That of the nephews at the sixteenth part.—The maintenance of the children of France, in the direct line from the King, male and female, will be hereafter provided for.

The Conscription.—The continuance of the Conscription is *abolished*.—The Peace and War Establishments of the Army will be fixed by the law, which will in like manner determine the modes and extent of the recruiting service.—The military expenditure of each year.—The way in which advances shall be made.—Similar regulations with respect to the marine establishments.—The provision for the army retained in active service, and that for retired or pensioned officers, and soldiers, will be taken into serious consideration.—The marines will experience a similar attention.

Question of Peace and War.—The rights of Peace and of War shall appertain to the Legislative Bodies conjointly, subject to the following limitation:—War cannot be decided upon but by the special decree of the Two Chambers, upon the formal and necessary proposition of the King, and sanctioned by his Majesty.

Public Liberty.—The care of the external relations of the kingdom; the maintenance of the rights and possessions of the kingdom; the care of its political relations; the military preparations, with reference to those of neighbouring States; and the repelling imminent or incipient hostilities, is entrusted to the King. But in cases of extraordinary movements of the forces of the State, the King shall, without delay, give notice of the same to the Legislative Bodies, and make known the causes and objects thereof. And if the Legislature be not then sitting, the same shall be immediately evoked by his Majesty.—When the Legislative Bodies shall deem the causes and objects legitimate and admissible, *war shall be declared by the King in the name of the French nation*. It shall then be deemed national, and the necessary supplies shall be provided.—If the Two Chambers shall decide that war ought not to be made, the King shall order his Ministers, on their responsibility, to adopt, without delay, measures for the cessation or prevention of all hostility.—It appertains to the King to conclude and sign all treaties of peace, alliance, and commerce, and other conventions with Foreign Powers, which he shall deem ad-

vantageous for the State; but such treaties and conventions shall not take effect until they be ratified by the Legislative Bodies. With respect, however, to the general Peace about to be concluded in Paris, between the Emperors and Kings in person, and with the Minister Plenipotentiary of England, in case the Prince of Wales should not personally assist, as eagerly desired by the French.—This Peace, which is so nearly connected with our internal tranquillity, will be secured by Constitutional Institutions.—This Peace, in short, so long desired, concluded after too long an interval of tyranny, shall be definitively concluded and signed by the King, with the different Powers, without the necessity of any ratification by the Legislative Bodies.

Acceptance of the Constitution.—The Constitution shall be forwarded to the Departmental Authorities, for the Acceptance of the French people in the manner hereinafter prescribed:—The King will afterwards declare his acceptance to the Provisional Government in these terms:—“*I accept the Constitution, I swear to observe it, and to cause it to be observed.*”—The mode of its acceptance, on the part of the French people will be by the opening of the Registries in each Commune.—The suffrages will be received during fifteen days by the respective Mayors, and will be expressed after the games of individuals, by “*Oui*,” or “*Non*.”—Duplicates shall be made of the Registries, one copy of which shall be transmitted to the Provisional Government, or to Monsieur, Lieut.-General of the Kingdom, who will proclaim the general vote of the French in the following month.—The other duplicate shall be deposited in the archives of each Department. Neither Ireland or Italy shall participate in the votes.—The other countries united to Ancient France in 1789, or in 1792, shall not vote till after the pacification. Their acceptance shall not therefore be the less valid.—After the double acceptance shall consummate the social compact, the King shall issue a Proclamation as follows:—“*Louis XVIII. by the Grace of God, and the Constitutional Law of the State, King of the French (or of France, according to the majority of opinion in the acceptance), to all present and to come, &c.*”—The King will renew his Oath at the sacred solemnity of his Coronation. After which the Constituted Authorities shall enter upon the regular dis-

charge of their respective functions, according to the instructions of the Government.

PARIS, MAY 2.—*Declaration of the King.*—“*Louis, by the Grace of God, King of France and Navarre, to all those to whom these presents shall come, greeting:—Recalled by the love of our people to the Throne of our fathers—enlightened by the misfortunes of the nation which we are destined to govern, the first wish of our heart is to invoke that mutual confidence so necessary to our repose, to our happiness. After having carefully read the Plan of the Constitution proposed by the Senate, in the Sitting of the 6th of April last, we acknowledge that the bases of it were good; but that there being a great number of articles bearing the impression of the precipitancy with which they were drawn up, they cannot in their present form become fundamental laws of the State. Resolved to adopt a liberal Constitution, we wish that it should be wisely combined, and as we cannot accept of one which it is indispensable to correct, we convene for the 10th of June, in the present year, the Senate and Legislative Body, with intent to lay before them the business which we shall have prepared, with a Select Committee from the bosom of these two Bodies, and to give for a basis to this Constitution the following bases:—*

The Representative Government shall be maintained as it at present exists, divided into two Bodies, viz.—The Senate and the Chamber, composed of Deputies of the Departments.—Taxes shall be granted with consent.—Public and private liberty secured.—The Liberty of the Press respected, saving the precautions necessary to the public tranquillity.—Religious liberty secured.—Property shall be inviolable and sacred; the sale of national property shall be irrevocable.—The Ministers, responsible, may be prosecuted by one of the Legislative Bodies, and tried by the other.—The Judges are not removeable, and the judicial power is independent.—The public debt shall be guaranteed. Pensions, rank, and military honours shall be preserved; as also the old and the new Nobility.—The Legion of Honour, the decoration of which we will determine, shall be maintained.—Every Frenchman shall be admissible to civil and military employments.—Finally, no person shall be molested for his opinions and votes.—LOUIS.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

AFFAIRS OF FRANCE.—The *fear* and the *melice* (natural offspring of fear) which some persons, in this country, discover towards the French nation, and even towards the King of France, is truly wonderful. One would have thought, that common decency; that the ordinary feelings of men, would, for some months, at least, have restrained these persons from discovering their odious passions. When they, who have so long been bawling for the fall of Napoleon, and for the restoration of the Bourbons; when they saw the accomplishment of their wishes; when their very desires seem to have been outstripped by events, surely we had a right to expect, that they would not endeavour to throw obstacles in the way of peace. We, surely, had a right to expect, that, after having spent eight hundred millions of *debt*, and four hundred millions of *taxes*, upon the war, and for the sake of "social order," *real peace* with France would be the fruit of such enormous sacrifices. It was not peace with Holland, and the Germans and Russians, that we so much sighed for; but with France, that fighting nation; that nation so near to us; that nation, whose hatred we ought to dread, and whose friendship we ought to cultivate; that nation, which, in fact, is Europe in itself. But, behold! the King of France is not yet crowned, before these same people, these identical persons, begin to endeavour to excite all sorts of suspicions, not only against the French nation, but against the French Court. They appear to have discovered, that France, though her Ruler be changed, is still the same country, inhabited by the same people, endued with the same qualities and faculties. This was, indeed, a discovery, that it was very easy to make; facts easy to have foreseen. But these people were blinded by their dread of Napoleon, and their eagerness to upset his power. They have now opened their eyes, and, the *real* truth is, that, upon looking at the state of things altogether,

ther, they know not what to think of it, or what to do or say.—To their utter astonishment, they perceive, that a *re-establishment of the old order of things is impossible*. They perceive, that the Revolution, upon the whole, must end in great good to France. They perceive, that the result will not answer their expectations; no, nor *anyone* of their expectations. They see, that France will enjoy something like freedom, at least, and they dread the effect of such an example. Their first endeavour, therefore, is to prevent the King from keeping his promise with the nation; or, at least, to prepare, before hand, a justification for his so doing.—Relative to this subject, I am about to quote a passage from the COURIER newspaper of the 12th instant:—"Pamphlets (says that Journal) are published at Paris both for and against the Senate; in other words, whether a *Representative Government* shall be given to France; or whether the old Constitution shall be restored as nearly as possible? *The King*, we know, *has pledged himself to establish the former*. But we have little difficulty in saying, that *the people* of France, at present, are not in a condition to bear the *representative system*. If we may be allowed the expression, they are *not sober enough for legislative discussions*.—We have grown up with our Constitution, and our Constitution has grown up with us. We have been framed for it by our forefathers; but it were absurd to expect that the public mind in another nation should all at once be fitted for the same system. However, the experiment is to be tried again, and we have little doubt it *will fail again*. May its failure not be attended with the same disasters and miseries to which France has been subject for nearly a quarter of a century!" The first remark that offers itself here is, that there must, if this statement be true, be a great deal of *real* liberty of the press in France: not *sham*, not *humbug* liberty of the press; but *real* liberty of the press. For, unless

this were the case, there could not be such discussions. I like this; for discussion, *free discussion*, must do good. I do not object to any man's writing in favour of the *ancient regime*, provided, that other men are allowed *freely to answer him*.—But, it is a sad sham, when the *liberty* of the press is all on one side; when every one may write in favour of a system, however corrupt and essentially tyrannical, while no one dares to say a word to prove the *falseness* of what has been said in *favour* of such system. Discussion must do great good in France; and, in spite of all that fraud, and bribery, and force can do, some of the good must, in the end, extend itself to other countries.—We are told here, that, though the King has *pledged* himself to establish a *representative government*, the people of France are not in a *condition to bear the representative system*.—And, then, we are reminded, that WE have grown up with OUR Constitution, and that it has grown with us; but, that we are not to expect that the public mind, in another nation, should, all at once, be fitted for the SAME system. Very true. But this writer seems to labour under a very great error. He appears to suppose, that, if the King of France adheres to his promise, the French people will have the same system as we have; than which nothing can be farther from the truth. There will be no *boroughs* in France; no *counties*, where it will cost many hundreds of thousands of lives to obtain a seat in the Corps Legislative; no *Gattons*, no *Old Sarum*, no *St. Michels*, no *Corporations*. These, indeed, it would require time, and a long time, to make the minds of the people of France familiar with. A system like *this*, indeed, the French people may, very likely, not be “in a condition to bear.” It requires much time, and many measures, to convince a people of the excellence of such a system, and to induce them to look upon it as the best in the whole universe.—But, the system of representation about to be established, or, rather, *confirmed*, in France, the people there will easily understand, and as easily practise. For, what difficulty is there in the people who pay the taxes meeting, in their several districts, and there choosing Electors, who, again, are to choose the members of the Corps Legislative, by whose voice the taxes are to be granted? What difficulty can there be, either in understanding, or

in practising, a system like this? There will be no complexity in the thing. There will be no exclusions which are not bottomed upon some general principle. There will be no everlasting doubts, and scrutinies, and law suits, about old charters.—There will be no disputes about who has *boiled a pot*, and who has not boiled a pot. If, indeed, the system about to be confirmed in France included the existence of peculiar privileges in *pot-walloppers*, or any other persons, relative to elections, I should agree with this writer, that it must take time to fit the peoples' minds to it; but, amongst all the freaks of Napoleon, he never appears to have once thought of *pot-walloppers*.—Oh, no! there are to be no *burgage tenures* and *pot-walloppers* in France. If there were, it would, I agree, be very difficult to arrange the matter. It requires centuries of time, and the profoundest state of wisdom, to bring a constitution to this pitch. But, though the French people cannot be fitted for such a system as *ours*, all at once, it does not follow, that they are incapable of a system which is representative. They have *voices*, as well as other nations; and they are as capable of making use of them. What then, when called upon in their different Communes, is to prevent them from choosing men in whom they have confidence? And why is the attempt to confirm their liberty to *fail*?—But, it seems, that the representatives, if chosen properly, “are not *sober enough for legislative discussion*.” What does this writer mean? Are the French a *drunken* people? He will hardly say that. He means then, that they are *too hasty*, too apt to be *passionate*. In the first place, this has never appeared; and, whoever looks at the codes of Napoleon will agree, that more wisdom, more real political wisdom, a more profound knowledge of human nature, and a more minute acquaintance with human concerns, joined to a more solicitous and tender regard for human rights and happiness, were never discovered by any legislator, or legislators, in the whole world. Are the French an *ignorant* or a *frivolous* people? Let their works, whether philosophical or literary; let their sciences and arts; let these be compared with those of any other nation, and, it will be seen, I believe, that they take the lead in all those endowments which raise man in the scale of beings. Take their theatrical pieces; compare them with *our's*; put the

elegant language, the wit, the sentiment, the reasoning, the philosophy of the *Metro-manie*, the *Joueur*, or any one of a hundred pieces that might be named, and put them by the side of the grovelling style, the ranting palaver, and horse-laughter trash of our comedies, and then say, whether the French are a people without solidity of mind. The very circumstance that pieces, like those that I have named, are admired in France, and attract crowded audiences, is sufficient to characterize the mind of the nation; and, for the sake of my own country, I wish I could say, that the character of its mind was in no degree to be gathered from the circumstance, that play-actors in London find their account in uttering strings of dirty double-meanings and miserable puns from the lips of a person swelled out, by the means of pillows and bolsters, to the size of a sugar-boghead.—It is the impudent, the malignant observations of this writer, levelled, at bottom, against the *free tom* and happiness of France, that have called forth this comparison from me; though, perhaps, it would, at any time, be one's duty to have made it. I am not speaking of exhibitions, where people are admitted at two-pence a head. I am speaking of the *national theatres*, which are the criterion of the taste of a people, and of the character of the public mind. In that of France I see beautiful language, refined sentiment, brilliant wit, fine reasoning, sound philosophy, all displayed in the forming and the unravelling of fables the most interesting, never violating nature, and seldom probability. In ours, I see *magicians* calling forth thunder and lightening, and putting spells upon those who offend them; *witches*, foretelling the fall and rise of kings, and woods walking over the country to fulfil their predictions; *ghosts*, giving information of murders, and troubling people in their sleep; and *men and women* so much out of nature, as to make the whole of the representation a thing too monstrous to be endured by common sense. And, I see this, too, in those pieces which are *most admired* by fashionable people and grave critics. But, indeed, even this is not matter of surprise, when we see extolled, as *the first of Poems*, a mass of crabbed transpositions and inflated periods, narrating battles in heaven, in which the Devils fired cannon against the Angels, and during which a Devil, having been split down the middle by an Angel, the two halves instantly smacked up together, and restored

the said Devil to his former state. In the same Poem we are presented with familiar dialogues between God the Father, and God the Son; and are shown the latter taking a *pair of compasses* out of a celestial *drawer*, in order to describe the boundaries of the earth!—And this is what *we* admire. To honour and to perpetuate the works containing these marks of disordered imaginations, we lay out thousands and thousands of pounds upon splendaid printing and engraving.—And is it, then, for *us* to charge the French nation; is it for *us* to charge the admirers of Voltaire, Rousseau, Racine, Destouches, and Regnard; is it for *us* to charge them with ignorance, prejudice, and want of solidity of mind? And, if the charge, as applied to the whole nation, would be unjust, whence are we to infer, that the representatives of the people of France would not be sufficiently *sober* for legislative discussion? For my part, I care little about the *taste* of either country; but, it is necessary to meet, in all sorts of ways, every attempt to justify an endeavour to stifle freedom in France, and to introduce that regime, under which the French people groaned for so many centuries. Every thing belonging to France is interesting; because, whatever is done there will have a certain vogue in the world. The eyes of all the nations of Europe are fixed upon France: her acts must, therefore, be of the greatest consequence. And, who can express a sufficient degree of indignation against those, who, like this writer and his like, are endeavouring to cause the ancient regime to be re-established in that country? They express their decided opinion, that the representative government *will fail*. They are ready to din the public with their *fears*; but their real heart is, that it *will succeed* in establishing freedom in France under a constitutional king, and under a system which, being open and frank, will put *hypocrisy* and *shame*, and *the cheating* to shame. *Why*, I ask, should these people be so set against representative government in France? Why should they be so eager to decry it? It is notorious, that, for ages, previous to the French Revolution, we, in this country, were by all our speech-makers, and book-makers, and news-writers, bid to hold the French government in abhorrence. ADDISON, that famous partizan of the Hanoverian Succession, used this argument against the Pretender. "What," said he, "would Eng-

lishmen, free-born Englishmen, have to expect at the hands of a King, educated in such a country as France, where the Sovereign is absolute, and the people the most wretched of slaves? And yet we now want, or, at least, some of us want, to see re-established that very government! What are the French to think of such conduct?—But all this is explained, when we come to another part of the same paper. Not, indeed, the same article; but the same paper. There the hatred of France breaks forth in all its native odiousness; and, by putting the two together, we see clearly, and, I trust, that all Frenchmen will see, that it is *hatred* of them (growing out of base fear), which makes these persons desirous of seeing the promises of the King violated. If we find a man advising ourselves not to make a certain bargain, for instance, lest we should *lose* by it, and if we find the same man speaking to others, and endeavouring to excite *ill-will against us*, we may pretty safely conclude, that such bargain would be to our advantage.—The following is the article I allude to:—"To the principle of ceding the Colonies we have conquered; particularly to France, we have before stated our objections. To render France powerful by giving her colonies, enabling her to create an extensive marine, and fostering her political strength by the wealth of commerce, is a *dangerous experiment*. It is dangerous to us. France has the means of greatness within herself. Great Britain owes her political greatness, and even her independence, to her maritime power and to foreign trade. France, without trade and colonies, has been a match for combined Europe; and it will be well to reflect whether, by giving her these in addition to the combined powers, they are not endangering that equilibrium they have been so anxious to establish. Is it nothing to say, that France before the Revolution had the advantages in question? She had, and she used them for purposes of *gross aggression*. To raise that monarchy to unlimited power was for ages the unvarying aim of her *Court*. But France knows her power now better than she ever knew it. Her vast resources, her military endowments, her political influence have been displayed by the revolutionary governments in succession, on a scale large beyond the contemplation of her old politicians; and will not this be a strong in-

ducement to the *national vanity*, the military ardour of that people, again, to try their strength with their neighbours as soon as they have recovered from their disasters? They who depend much upon *the change which has taken place in their government* will do well to recollect, that *the disgraceful interference of France in the quarrel between us and our American colonies took place under a Bourbon* of the best character; yet, though Louis XVI. himself was averse to the American war, on the ground of its injustice, his voice was overruled by the majority of his Council."—This malignant writer could not help even to rip up the old subject of revenge, the *American War*!—What! now that the Bourbons are restored, we are to *recollect* the "disgraceful interference of France in the quarrel between us and America." And we are to bear in mind, too, that this took place under a *Bourbon*! Take the whole of this article together, and, I think, you see in it as much malice as can possibly discover itself in a like compass. The French nation is to be kept in a *low state*; the French nation is *mischievous*; the French nation is *perfidious*; she is the same under all sorts of *rulers*; and, therefore, we ought not to suffer her to get power by any means.—The Allies, indeed, before they got to Paris, told the French people that France ought to be *great* and happy; and that it was for the good of Europe that she should be so. Nay, they expressed their intention of extending her ancient limits; of leaving her an extent of territory, which, under her kings, she never knew.—How different is this language from that of our newspaper writers! They want even a part of the allied forces to be kept up in France for years!—But the truth is, that these detestable men think about nothing but the prospect of France being happy and free. The sworn foes of freedom, who WRITE these articles, and (by what *means* I need not say) cause them to be published; these supporters of every thing oppressive; the abettors of tyranny. These men, who thrive by what renders a people miserable. These men are, just at this moment, wonderfully puzzled. Napoleon has disconcerted them by his abdication, very nearly as much as he ever did before by his wonderful feats in arms. Greater at last than ever, he saved France from a *civil war*, and left her in a state to be great, and to be a thorn in the

side of tyranny, in spite of every thing that could be done. These enemies of the freedom and happiness of man are now strangely put to it to know what to wish for. If the King of France break his promise, there may yet arise a *Republic*. That would affright them out of their senses.—The two great Republics, France and America, taught by experience, might join their efforts. The consequences might be alarming indeed! If, on the other hand, the King of France keep his promise, there will be a *real* representative government in France, as to the commons, at any rate. It will not be a vile *sham*; not a gross and outrageous insult to the people amongst whom it exists. The King of France ought to bear in mind, that the same persons who recommend to the Allies to keep part of their armies in France in violation of the Convention; who protest against giving up any colonies to France; who advise the Allies to take away the pictures and statues from Paris; who bid the people of England bear in mind the conduct of the *Bourbons* in the American war; and who assert, that it is necessary for us always to recollect, that France is radically and systematically our enemy: that these same persons are the persons who are anxious that France should *not* have a representative government, and that the ancient regime *should* be restored.—This is what the King of France should have *always before his eyes*.—It is quite surprising what *envy* already discovers itself in some persons towards France. They have, for a long while, been representing her as in the lowest depths of misery; and yet they see what excites their envy, and they endeavour to communicate their feelings to us. How inconsistent is this? We are to envy those who are in misery: we are to envy those who are beggared. We are to dread the *power* of a nation, which, they tell us, is subdued and disgraced to the lowest degree! Does there not peep out, through all this mass of inconsistency, a consciousness of the vast stock of glory acquired by France? They tell us of the *vanity* of the French. Is it vanity in them to boast of a hundred great victories? Is it vanity in them to boast of their having captured Vienna, Rome, Naples, Berlin, Amsterdam, and Moscow; and that, too, against all Europe combined? Can any thing, can volumes of lies about the *fears* and *cowardice* of Napoleon; can all the efforts of an enslaved and hire-

ling press, ever extinguish the recollection of Jemappe, Marengo, the Helder, Corunna, Jena, Austerlitz, Lodi, Eylau, Moskwa, and a hundred other names; every one of which, upon the bare mention, reminds the world of the valour of Frenchmen? And, are such a people to be accused of vanity, because they *talk* of those things; or, rather, because the world do, and must talk of them? *We* do not seem to think it *vanity* in us to talk of *our* victories. God knows we talk of them enough. We are granting immense sums to build mansions, and provide estates for our commanders. I do not find fault with this; but, surely, if we find this right for such victories as *we* have gained, the French may be suffered to *talk* a little about Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, Eylau, and the Helder! *Talk* is very cheap, at any rate. It costs the people nothing. The French military glory has no *padding* attached to it. "*Honour and our Country*," inscribed upon a little medal, is all that a Frenchman gets for his deeds in arms. Our rewards are more *solid*. No harm in that; but, surely, those who have overrun all the countries of Europe; who have scattered the ill-gotten wealth of the Romish church, and who have opened the dungeon of the Inquisition, may be allowed to *talk* a little of what they have done! *Aye*, and *history* will *talk* of what they have done too. Spain, Italy, Portugal, all Germany, and even Russia, has felt the effect, I mean the *moral* as well as the military effect, of the marches of the French armies, who have borne, from one end of Europe to the other, the light of philosophy, though, perhaps, they did not intend it. These armies have been instruments in the hands of reason, of truth, and of liberty. They have given to superstition and tyranny a blow that those monsters will never recover. And in this sense, the valour and skill of the French have been the greatest of benefactors to the world. Are such a people to be called *vain*, because they *talk* of their deeds? But, indeed, I do not hear of their boasting at all. The fact, for aught I know, is false. The French are called vain, because they have gained renown, which nothing can destroy or diminish as long as letters remain. No: the charge is grounded in envy; base envy, and fear as base. These malignant writers cannot endure the idea of France having a Government, which shall secure the *freedom* of the

people. They are sick at the thought of the effects of an uninterrupted communication with a people living only across the Channel, whose happiness under a *real* representation in a Legislative Body may continually be cited. These malignant writers fancy, too, that, when great numbers of people are continually crossing from one country to the other, that odd remarks may be made, and disagreeable discussions take place, as to the strange difference in the *money* of the two countries. They imagine, that those who get at Paris but about 66 guineas for a hundred pound bank note, will be surprised and disappointed. They suppose, that many thousands of persons of fixed incomes will go to live in France, *where a shilling will buy as much as half a crown buys here*. They have all these, and more than all these whims in their heads. But, suppose these to be sound opinions, it is not the fault of the French nation, nor of their Government, that our paper-money exists in such quantities, and that provisions are cheap in France, any more than it is their fault, that the climate of France is finer and more healthy than ours. Besides, have we not had the advantage of our paper-money? Has it not enabled us to hire fighters in Germany, and elsewhere? Have not the bank-notes and the loans enabled us to put Bonaparte from his throne?—Have they not enabled us to pay Russians, and Prussians, and Danes, and Austrians, and Swedes, and Portuguese, and Spaniards, and Sicilians, and God knows who besides, to fight against France; to invade her at last; and to bring the contest to a *glorious* termination? And ought we now to grumble, because we have a paper-money, and the French have none? Ought we to accuse the French nation of being dangerous to us on account of this difference in our pecuniary circumstances? It is as clear as day-light, that the Old Lady of Threadneedle-street has enabled our Government to upset Napoleon, and to push on the Allies to Paris. Therefore, it is abominably unjust to reproach her with having inundated us with her coin. She was compelled to do this, in order to assist; and we ought to come now to her support. She is our military and political nurse; and to cast her off now, when we no longer stand in need of her breast, would be diabolical. Away with the cry of *Vive les Bourbons*, ought to go forth the cry of *Vive la vieille Maman de la rue de*

Threadneedle; for, certain it is, that she has been a most efficient personage in obtaining the triumph of “social order and “regular government.” The old Lady has defeated Napoleon. It remains to be seen how she will support herself; but, I must, at all times, put in my protest against any *grumbling* on account of the *debt* and the *paper-money*; unless, indeed, on the part of those, who did not wish to carry on war for the purpose of over-setting Napoleon. They may grumble very consistently; but, even they have no right to blame the French nation for the debt, the taxes, and the paper-money.—If a hundred pound bank-note exchanges against even fifty real pounds worth of French livres, what is that to the French? They have not been the cause of this. They, probably, wished us not to hire so many people to fight against them. It is, therefore, a perfect abomination to endeavour to excite hatred against them on this account.—I hope, after all, that we shall be at *real* peace with France. I hope, that the terms of the peace will be such, as to prevent the French for seeking revenge in a new war; but, really, I am afraid, that the constantly irritating and insulting language of our newspapers must have a tendency to obstruct all endeavours to attain so desirable an object.

MILITIA OFFICERS.—An article, in *all* the London Papers of the 12th and 13th of this month, prepares us for some attempt to secure to these Gentlemen a share of our incomes and earnings *during peace*. It is as follows:—“**REDUCTION OF THE “ARMY.**—At a time when every one is “looking to the *Break*—and bidding farewell to the ‘plumed troops and spirit-stirring drum,’ the situation of Captains “of the *embodied militia*, is deserving of “the most serious consideration. Formerly, only men of *great landed property*, “they returned to their estates after a return of peace, which no longer required “them to evince the activity of arms; but “the exigencies of the State have long “since placed them in a very different situation. Many are now men of *talents* “and *vigor*, but of *no fortune*, who “have joined the militia as a *profession*; “or who, during a long war, have estranged themselves from any other exercise of “their *talents*; in a *natural confidence*, “that the country, which has saved Europe “by its example in arms, could not but

"preserve its renovated character as a military nation; and, consequently, that they would not be *thrown on the world unregarded*. The liberality of a great government will not fail in this respect—and we have no doubt, that provision, in some form, will be made, at least, to preserve the credit of a military institution, which now so nearly approaches the regular army. We are assured, that several militia corps have already submitted their case to the Right Hon. the Secretary of State, through the medium of their Lord-Lieutenants." This is a proposition, the modesty of which must surprize, and, indeed, confound, the nation. What! militia officers paid in time of peace! We should, indeed, be a military nation! We should have got much by the dethronement of Napoleon. It was no longer ago than this very morning, that a neighbour of mine, who is also one of my many tax-gatherers, in asking me for my return for the Property Tax, congratulated me upon its being the last. I thought he was deceived; but I am sure of it, if the principles of this denunciation are to be acted upon. A denunciation it is, in the true sense of the word, against every man, who labours, or who has property.—We have, here, the curious distinction between men of *large fortune*, and men of *no fortune*, but of *talents and vigour*; no bad compliment to the Democracy at the expence of the Aristocracy! To what notions has this French Revolution given rise!—"Thrown on the wide world!" What, then, do these gentlemen call it being thrown on the wide world, when they are released from their military service? We were always told, during the war, that we were under amazing obligations to these gentlemen for their services in defence of the country; that they abandoned their homes, their peaceable professions, and their families, purely for their country's sake. But, now, behold! they *wish to be soldiers* all their lives! Mind, reader, they are persons of *no fortune*. So are the private soldiers who have escaped death in Spain, Portugal, France, Sicily, Canada, and the East and West Indies. But, are all *these*, too, to be paid during peace? They have a much more just claim than militia officers can possibly have.—I am amongst the last to grudge reward to military and naval merit; but, surely, one of the effects of peace ought to be, to lessen taxes, and

to send back to the arts of peace, those who have been employed in war. And this is what these gentlemen of *no fortune*, but of *talents and vigour*, call being *thrown upon the wide world*. If they have no fortune now, they had none before; and, therefore, they must have worked before, or starved; and so they ought now. When they entered the service, they knew that militia officers received no pay in peace. There is, therefore, no breach of faith with them. They can have no reason to complain of being neglected. They have lived in the way in which they chose to live, during the war. They were not compelled to serve as militia officers. If they have *talents and vigour*, what ground is there for their apprehensions of starving? Men of *talents and vigour* do not starve. If they be men of talents and vigour, how endless are the ways, in which those talents, and that vigour, may be employed with profit? In short, the claim is absurd, and will, I am certain, find not a single advocate in parliament.—Before I dismiss this article, I cannot help noticing a paragraph in the *Times* newspaper of the 17th inst. in these words:—"It is now pretty generally understood, that the reduction of the militia will not take place *all at once*, as was lately reported. Twenty regiments, it is said, will be disbanded on the 24th of July; a second reduction will take place on the 24th of September; and the last on the 24th of November. Several of the regiments are now on march to the quarters where the first reduction will take place."—This I cannot help regarding as a *hint* on the part of those who choose this vile Paper for the vehicle of *their wishes*. What is this militia army to be kept on foot *for*? Are not the men wanted in the fields and in the manufactures? Are not the parishes every where heavily burdened with the support of militia-men's wives and children? And, what can this evil be prolonged *for*? The regular army is coming home daily. By the 1st of June, we shall have several thousands of men home from France. Our army in Sicily cannot always remain. Why then, should, we be put to the expence of supporting the militia for another half year? Did we expect that this would have been amongst the consequences of the deliverance of Europe? I should like to hear some *reason* for keeping all this army on foot so long.

One thing, however, I am quite sure of, that the army and the navy too must be reduced very low, or that *loans* must be made even in time of *peace*. The nation has to choose between the two; and, really, for my part, I do not, for myself, care much about the matter. I shall never make an out-cry about the continuation of loans and the war taxes. I shall content myself with just observing, now and then, that the Anti-jacobins ought to pay the taxes very peaceably, seeing that they have always approved of the spending of them. It is not to be denied, that the great mass of the nation *approved of the war*; that they were quite willing that the Government should spend any sum in a war against the people of France first, and then against their Sovereign. The money was spent: that Sovereign has been dethroned. It is, therefore, just that the nation should pay the bill without grumbling. Nay, if all the depots, arsenals, barracks, fortresses, military and naval academies; if all are now to be kept up, I do not see what reason those can have to complain, who have approved of all these establishments. The walls, the ramparts, the buildings, the schools of exercise, it would be such a pity to *demolish*! And what is to become of all the masters of the different branches of the art military? Would these advocates for the war have them *dig or beg*?—Again, I say, that one of two things must take place: the army and navy must be *reduced very low*; or, the war-taxes and loans *must be continued*. And, really, I, for my own part, do not care which of them it is to be.—The *Times* newspaper talks of the *debts* of England, *France*, and other nations. Paper-money is the great evidence of debt. France has none of it.—Perhaps it is a good thing to have a debt, and the greater the better. That is a point which I am not now discussing. I am only speaking of the *fact*; and the *Times* has published a false fact in this respect. "It is in vain," says he, "for *France* or *England* to hope speedily to exonerate itself from the *burdens*, which that fatal revolution has entailed upon *future generations*."—This is intended to convey the notion, that France has a debt somewhat like ours. Nothing can be more false. The whole of the *principal* of the debt does not, I believe, equal *one year's interest* of ours. In short, the proof of the difference consists in these facts: first,

that ours is a *currency of paper*; that of France is a *currency of gold*; and, second, that a bank of England note for one *hundred pounds* will exchange for only about *seventy pounds* worth of French *livres*, to be paid in France in return for a bill purchased with that bank note.—These are facts, which speak a language not to be misunderstood by even the most ignorant of men. These facts shew the precise difference in the pecuniary state of the two countries.—Though a little foreign from the subject that I set out with, I will remark here, that while Napoleon was enforcing the *Continental System*, we were told, by this same newspaper, that that was the cause of the *scarcity of gold*, and of the great loss in the exchange of our paper against foreign bills, payable in gold in foreign countries. But the Continental System has long ceased. The author of it has been put down. France herself is become our close friend. All the ports of Europe are open to us; and there is not the least probability of their being again closed. But, yet, we do not find that gold becomes more plenty, or, that the exchange grows more favourable to us. The rate, which I have stated, is, I believe, the rate now with Paris; though, seeing the state of the relationships between the two countries, the exchange, according to the common course of things, ought to be in our favour. There is no accounting for this in any way, other than that of supposing, that our paper is become of less value than gold. Take a *guinea*, and it will exchange for a bill on Paris for twenty-five *livres*, two *sous*. But, take a pound bank note, and it will exchange for a bill on Paris for only about sixteen *livres*, three *sous*. This shows, at once, the real state of the case; and it shows also the folly of the hopes of those, who told us, that it was the Continental System, which caused the apparent depreciation in our bank-paper.—These important truths will now become more and more evident every day. The extensive intercourse with France; an intercourse which will not be confined to mere traders, but will reach to all manner of people. This intercourse, which will make hundreds of thousands see and *feel the diminution*, as they will call it, of their means in the transit of them only across the channel. This intercourse will do more towards removing the hitherto impenetrable film from the eyes of the people than a thousand Essays upon the subject.

CORN LAWS.—This subject would require a greater space than I am able here to allot to it. So much nonsense has been published about *protecting* the farmer; so much unparalleled trash, that I hardly know where to begin. I shall confine myself to a mere hint or two; first observing, that, speaking as a grower of wheat, I wish for none of this sort of *protection*.—It has been said, that the manufacturing interest will suffer by any measure tending to keep up the price of corn; and, that to give the farmer security for high prices, must injure the rest of the community.—Now, in the first place, I deny, that it is in the *power* even of a body of men, who have been called *omnipotent*, to cause the farmer to have a high price; the price depending upon the *crop*, and not upon any law or any regulation. But, supposing it possible to give the farmer a high price, how is that to injure the eaters of bread? If the corn be cheap, all other things will be cheap in proportion; and, amongst other things, the produce of the manufactories. The *fund-holder* seems to be the only person with reason to complain of high prices; because he has *nothing to sell*. He is an annuitant, whose nominal income is fixed, and therefore, when the loaf is at 1s. 6d. his annuity is worth to him only half as much as when the loaf is at 9d. But if the loaf were to be, and to continue at 9d. for any length of time, *whence is to come the money to pay him his annuity?* A wish has been expressed to *bring things round by degrees to the prices of 1792!* What profound *ignorance*; or, what profound *hypocrisy!* In 1792, or before the war preparations, the whole of the taxes (no loans) raised in the country did not exceed fourteen millions. The taxes raised last year, 1813, amounted (exclusive of loans) to sixty-nine millions. And yet, there are men so devoid of *sense*, or so devoid of *shame*, as to talk of bringing round prices to the state of 1792! The annual interest on the debt (which must *continue to be paid*) is now about forty millions. In 1792, it was nine millions. All the annual expences in 1792 amounted to less than five millions. Can they now amount to less, even in time of peace, than twenty millions? How, then, are prices to be *brought round* to the standard of 1792? To bring prices to the standard of 1792, you must first *bring round* the taxes to the standard of 1792, and next you must *bring round* gold in place of paper.—

So that these wise advocates of *low prices* are beginning their amiable endeavours at the wrong end.—If the wheat were at five shillings a bushel; beer at 2d. a quart; beef at 3d. a pound; it would make no difference to the farmer, except for the remainder of his lease. It would make no difference to Mr. Coke, or Sir Francis Burdett, or any other landholder, to whom 5,000l. a year would be as valuable as 20,000l. a year now is. It would give them the means of living just in the style that they now live. But, then, in both cases, the taxes must be diminished in the same proportion; and, in place of collecting 69 millions a year, you must collect only 23 millions at most, which would but little more than *HALF* suffice for the payment of the interest on the Debt, leaving the Civil List, the Army, the Navy, and every other out-going wholly unprovided for.—It has been observed, with most brazen impudence, or with more than idiot folly, that it is unjust thus to *put money into the pocket of the land-holder*, at the expence of the poor soul who *hardly earns his morsel of bread*. In the first place, Mr. Coke, for instance, if he let his land at 30s. an acre instead of 10s. must pay for servants, for horses, for carriages, for beer, for bread, for every thing on which he lays out his money, 3s. instead of 1s. How, then, can the high price of corn give him any advantage over the poorer people who serve him, or who administer to his wants or his pleasures? Besides, he must pay 3s. in taxes instead of 1s. So that, in fact, as far as this goes, it is the Government, or the public, or the debt, or the State, or, call it what you will, which in the end *receives the difference*.—Those who eat the loaf must, of course, pay the tax. We see very plainly how the tax upon *sugar*, or upon *spirits*, fall upon the *consumer*; but the tax upon bread being collected, not upon the *loaf*, or the *flour*, or the *wheat*, we lose sight of its march to our mouths. But, if it be collected upon the earth, in which the wheat grows; upon the house in which the grower lives; upon the horses that plough the land for the wheat; upon the iron and the leather that make up the harness for the horses that plough the land for the wheat; upon the gig that carries to church the wheat grower's wife; upon the nag that carries the wheat grower, the next day, to market to sell the wheat; upon the cloddy-heeled boy, who becomes a gentle-

man's servant, for his looking after the nag and brushing the shoes of the wheat grower; upon the dog, whose teeth are necessary to protect the wheat grower's barns; upon the stamps of the wheat-grower's lease, his receipts, and his notes of hand; upon the sugar, the coffee, the tea, the soap, the candles, the pepper, the salt, the very drugs, and a score of other things, used in the house of the wheat-grower; upon the malt that makes the beer necessary to keep his nerves steady amidst the bewildering of such an accumulation: if the tax be collected upon all these, must it not be paid, at last, by those who *eat the loaf*, made out of the wheat? And if the wheat-grower gets little money for his crop, is it not evident that he can have little money to pay to the Government in any shape whatever? Is it not, in other words, evident, that if wheat, (*generally* the regulator of all other commodities) continue to be of the present price, the interest of the debt cannot be paid?—Mind, reader, I am no advocate for *law* that is now pending. I know, that the thing will, and must, regulate itself. If, by importations from countries where the land is more fertile and less taxed than ours, wheat were to become too cheap to make it profitable to grow it here in the present average quantity, less would be grown here; the capital, the labour, the means of all sorts, now used for the raising of corn, would, in part, be used for other purposes; and some of those who are now farmers would turn their hands to other employments. I see no harm in this. But the thing is impossible. No such effort, it appears to me, can be produced by importations from abroad, the quantity being too small to be of any consequence. I think, that Mr. Coke, and the other advocates of the Bill, proceed upon erroneous notions of the effect of importation. But, at the same time, they are by no means chargeable with *injustice*. Their endeavours, in fact, tend to the protection, not of the *farmer* but of the *land-holder*, and of those who depend on the *Civil List*. Their endeavours, they being landholders, are very disinterested, seeing that their inevitable tendency is to enable the grower of wheat to draw money from the eaters of bread, and to pay it over to the Government.—I do not know how it has happened, but no one appears to me to have viewed the matter in this its natural light. Some persons

have talked of the *hardship* upon the farmer to pay such heaps of taxes. The hardship consists wholly in the trouble, and the torment, and the humiliation: for the farmer does, and *must* get the amount of the taxes back again from the *bread-eater*. He may not do it for one year, or for two years; but, upon an average, he *must*. The tax pursues the commodity to the *mouth*,—as necessarily rivers find their way to the sea. I view the wheat-grower as a collector of money to be paid over to the agents of the Government; and, if others did the same, I am of opinion that we should hear much less about the *grasping disposition* of the landholders and their tenants. I dislike the talk about that "*valuable class of men, the agriculturists*," as the farmers are now called. I do not see any peculiar claim that they have to such an appellation. They till the land for gain, just as a shoe-maker makes shoes for gain, and as a merchant, or manufacturer, carries on his business for gain. I see no *obligation* that the community is under to the growers of wheat, who sell it as dear as they can. They are entitled to no special mark of legislative favour; but, as they are the grand vehicle for the taxes, it is the height of stupidity to express wishes to make them an unproductive vehicle.—As very closely connected with this view of the corn subject, I will here notice what has been said about *bringing round our CURRENCY* to the standard of 1796; that is to say, when gold was in free and general circulation. How such an idea came into the head of any one accounted sane, I am at a loss to discover. We were told, that *peace*, upon a firm foundation, would do the thing of itself. It is notorious that a *light guinea* will sell now for 26 or 27 shillings in paper. But the worst, the most foolish part of the conduct of those who entertain the notion of restoring our currency to the standard of 1796, is, that they allow, at the same time, that the paper money is depreciated; and (*now observe*) that this depreciation has had the effect of *raising prices*.—Very well. It is *depreciated*, and it has *raised prices*.—Keep this in mind, and then ask these wise men, what would be the effect of "*restoring the currency to its former healthy state*."—These gentlemen, in their anxious desire to restore guineas, overlook the *interest of the debt*. But, is it not manifest, that they ought to have this object continually

in their view, when they are talking upon the subject of restoring guineas and *lowering prices*? And is it not also manifest, that, in whatever degree *prices be lowered* for a permanency, the interest of the debt must, in *reality*, though *not nominally*, be *augmented*?—Now, then, what is the annual interest of this debt? I will not plague the reader with any miserable detail about funded and unfunded, and redeemed and unredeemed; but will state, in round numbers, that the debt requires taxes to be paid to the amount of about forty millions a year.—Suppose then, that *wheat* (to take that article as an instance) be now upon an *average of years*, 27*l.* a load, of five quarters; the paper-money has, at the rate of exchange with Paris, depreciated *one third* below gold; and, of course, has *raised prices one-third*. Bring the currency back to the standard of 1796, and the consequence is, that wheat will be upon an average of years, 18*l.* a load. Well, then, farmer *Stiles*, whose share of payment of interest of the debt is 27*l.* a-year, and who, of course, used to pay a *load of wheat*, a-year, must, upon the restoration of guineas, pay a *load and a half of wheat* a-year. This would make the farmer scratch his head, I believe! It is as clear as daylight, that the restoration of guineas would, in reality, make the debt cost sixty millions a-year instead of forty millions a-year. But, this is not all. The Civil List, officers of all kinds, pay, pensions, annuities, fixed stipends of every sort, leases, ground-rents, rent-charges, must all become more expensive by one-third to those who have to pay them. What a revolution would be here? What smashing, what work for lawyers and bill-framers! Besides, as to the *justice* of the thing, I am so certain that it is impossible for it to take place without the utter destruction of the paper, and the debt along with the paper, that it does seem to me superfluous to talk about the justice or the policy of it; but, for the sake of those who may not be of my opinion as to this point, I will say a word or two as to the *justice* of such a measure, if it were practicable.—The greater part, or, at least, a very considerable part, of the debt has been contracted since 1796; that is to say, since the Bank ceased to pay their bills in specie. Of course, those who have lent the Government this part of the money, have lent them *paper-money* of the same, or nearly the same value, with

the present paper-money. To pay these people their interest, therefore, in specie, would be to give them one-third more than is really their due; and, in the same degree, it would be to do wrong to those who have to pay that interest.—The same may be said with regard to all offices, pensions, grants, rent-charges, &c. which have originated since 1796.—But, as I said before, the thing is impossible.—The Chancellor of the Exchequer is reported to have said, that it was *probable*, that the Government would *not* call upon the Bank to pay in specie in six months after the signature of the definitive treaty of peace. His answer was wise. It is really very probable indeed, that the Bank will *not* be so called upon.—Oh, dear! What curious things this glorious event in France will bring to light, and bring about! Very probable indeed, that the Bank will *not* be called upon to pay in specie! This peace will put many an one to his trumps!

DANGER SEEN IN TIME.

MR. COBBETT.—Thus, then, ends the *liberty* and *independence* of nations. Norway is to be *free* and *independent*, under the blessed domination of Bernadotte.—Poland is to be *free* and *independent*, under the happy auspices of Alexander, the liberator. The knowt will free the miserable peasants, as, by the wholesome exercise of dancing to it, their matted hair will be impelled to untwist. Italy is to be *free* and *independent*, under German legislation, the profundity of whose matchless regulations has long astonished the world. Saxony, the garden of Germany, is to be *free* and *independent*, under the measured discipline of Prussia and the sagacious policy of Austria. France is to be *free* and *independent*, under the hereditary rule of an erudite Bourbon, and the wholesome restraints of a Constitution, coming into life under the fostering auspices of 200,000 bayonets, wielded by congenial heroes, issuing from all the regions, from the Adour to the Rhine.—Spain is to be *free* and *independent*, under Ferdinand the Seventh and the Spanish Constitution, both enlightened by the wisdom of ages and experience. Every expectation is answered, at least, every reasonable expectation. The *people* of Europe, to whom the appeal has been so loudly made, are become all that they could expect to be; all that it was meant that they should be. "They are content."

—Be it so.—If they are, they *deserve* no more than is actually accorded to them.—The question is, however, are they content? It is very possible that it may be highly unreasonable in them not to rest satisfied, for all that they *could* hope for will be given them. If they hoped for *more*, they must have been void of common sense. Unless they were the merest children, it is for *this* they shed their blood; it is for *this* they must have known that they were shedding it. But, however that may be, they *may* have entertained unreasonable expectations, or they *may*, by this time, repent of their moderation. The moment is critical. They may conceive it not too late to retrace their steps, or to manifest their repentance. The purpose of this paper is to alarm the Allied Sovereigns, as to the posture of affairs, and to show them how auspicious the crisis is to that spirit of insubordination, formerly miscalled the spirit of freedom, should the madness of the people still lead them to dream of *liberty* and *independence*. In all the countries of Europe, from the Ural mountains to the Atlantic, there are no forces of any consequence to maintain the different regions in their happy possession of the *liberty* and *independence* for which they have so profusely shed their blood, except in the heart of France. Those troops which are left behind may not be depended upon, as the madness of misunderstood *liberty* and *independence* may, like a contagion, spread from the people into *their* ranks. A shoemaker in Germany may raise the cry, and it may be echoed from the Danube to the Dwina. An infuriate Jacobin in France may kindle the torch of discord, and occupation sufficient may be given to the 200,000 regenerators of Europe in that country, which, to render all things safe, they must not only conquer, *as they have done*, but finally crush. The cry of *union*, which infatuates the Italians, may lead them to chase the *forrestieres*, the strangers, over the Alps, to their Teutonic abodes. Alas! if such a moment as this were seized to *unite the German name*, to *amalgamate the Italian population*, to *rouse the French spirit of revenge*, what can be opposed to the mighty torrent that might thus inundate the States from the Baltic to the Mediterranean? Sovereigns, save the troops which you have assembled so successfully to restore *liberty* and *independence* to the world. See you not that Po-

land and Saxony, and all Germany and Italy, are behind you, who might, if they have foolishly expected any thing from you, that you have not granted, or any thing except your own paternal sway over them; if they have unreasonably looked for any thing that has been left unaccomplished—who might, in that case, form the diabolical design of *intercepting the return of your armies*, in the certainty that their unholy designs would have *no* military force, after that, to combat. I tremble for you. A start of the maddened people destroys your sacred authority in one moment, which would have nothing more left with which to support itself. Methinks I hear the cursed word *liberty* profaned by vulgar tongues, and darting like lightning from one end of the heaven to the other, and penetrating even *your consecrated legions*. Down, in a moment, are tumbled crowns, and coronets, and mitres, and a *sound* sweeps from the face of the earth all that ages have venerated and canonized. Such a moment never before existed! The work of the giants is accomplished by children! The force of Europe being concentrated in the heart of France, is shivered to atoms with a breath! Do not rely on the newly restored Monarch, for, either he may, which is not certainly very likely for a long while, identify himself with his country, and foolishly imagine what you well know is mere madness, that the interests of himself and of the French people are the same; or, which is more likely, and which may be expected from his wisdom, purchased by so much experience, he may more profoundly penetrate into the true nature of things, and clearly see that France is his own, and made for him, and for him to rule. But, in either case, he can do you little service. Of the first supposition it is idle to speak, as then his first wish and resolution must be to drive you out of his territories. The second supposition makes him indeed your's; but he enters your camp alone, and leaves France in array against you and himself, while the world behind you is ready to intercept your retreat. I tremble for you, august Potentates! Save yourselves before the mad project be conceived. Dispatch the instruments of your mild sovereignty to the several countries to which you have restored *liberty* and *independence*, by graciously conceding to them the boon of your parental sway. Restrain the madness of the people, who can be no judges of *liberty*

and independence, and who must be ignorant what is for their advantage, since you know well how extensive the sway of ignorance is over the face of this obstinate globe, whose inhabitants *will* know nothing in spite of every effort to instruct them. A wholesome vigour is necessary: break down their obstinacy; crush their madness; make them love and revere you by the seasonable severity of your primitive justice? Do not you see your danger? Is it not imminent? Flea to meet it, or you are undone! You are on a hideous precipice, and will not, I fear, see it in time. Your enemies will be quicker of sight, if you are not prompt to take advice. You will have no excuse for delay, as you are forewarned. See, the torch is going to be lighted! The cry is on the tip of the tongue of the misled people! You will not know whom to trust in your greatest need. The fire may seize your camp; the *whoop* may be raised by your practised battalions: people, refrain, refrain; take thankfully your *liberty* and *independence*. What do you want more? you have all that you deserve, if you expected more, or if you once had no further expectations. In the one case, how unreasonable not to be content with the completion of your hopes! In the other case, how could you be so idiotic? Expect more! Alas, alas, ye were mere beasts, and should be contented to be treated as such. Down on your marrow-bones to ask a blessing, or a pardon of the anointed of God.—HORTATOR.

PROGRESS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.—If we are to believe the prostituted press of this country, France is again on the eve of being involved in all those scenes of anarchy and blood, which afflicted her during the predominance of discordant factions—even while the Paris Journals are altogether *silent* as to the pretended convulsions in that and other cities, the public attention here is occupied with private letters from the French capital, in which are given minute details of alleged insurrections, of disturbances which ended in bloodshed, and of symptoms in the state of political opinion, which indicate the approach of some terrible revolutionary commotion. It is easy to divine the motives which give rise to these alarming reports. The newspapers engaged in propagating them, find, since the fever of war, and the fervor of political strife subsided, that there has been a dreadful fall-

ing off in their gains, which threatens very shortly to destroy the source which has so long afforded them an abundant harvest, from which they have for so many years derived the wages of prostitution. Their object, therefore, is to revive the system, to give life to the horrid and abominable traffic, by which they were enriched, at the expence of all that is dear to humanity.—It is gratifying, however, to observe, that the acts of the present government of France promise to secure to the French nation a long and uninterrupted repose; and that all the attempts which have been made to injure that gallant people, will have no other effect than to overwhelm with confusion those who have so basely and enviously attempted to destroy and to degrade them.—The following declaration of the King of France, recently published, sufficiently shews, that he considers his own interests inseparable from those of his people, and justifies the opinion, that the French, under his reign, may long enjoy a considerable portion of happiness.—“Louis, by the grace of God, King of France and Navarre, to all those to whom these presents shall come, greeting:—On ascending the Throne of our ancestors, we have found our rights in your love, and have given up our whole heart to that sentiment manifested of old by Louis XII. the father of his people, and by the good King Henry IV. Their incessant application to the happiness of France shall mark our reign also; and it is our most ardent wish that it may in its turn leave behind recollections worthy of being associated with the memory of those Sovereigns, whose first and noblest virtue was paternal affection.—Amidst acclamation, so unanimous and so soothing to our heart, with which we were accompanied from the frontiers of our Kingdom to the bosom of our capital, we have never ceased to consider the situation of our provinces and of our brave armies. The oppression which crushed France has left behind it many evils, by which we are keenly touched; our concern on account of them is profound, but their weight will be daily diminished; all our care shall be directed to this point, and our highest pleasure will increase with the felicity of our people. Already an armistice, concluded in conformity with the views of an enlightened and moderate policy, dispenses its benefits as the forerunners of peace; and the

"Treaty, which is to establish it in a durable manner, is the most constant, as well as the most important, object of our thoughts. In a short time, the olive, the pledge of the repose of Europe, will be displayed to the nations that require it. The allied armies are beginning to move towards our frontiers, and the august Sovereigns, whose principles have been so generous in regard to us, are nobly desirous of closely uniting themselves with us by the ties of a mutual friendship and confidence that shall never be broken. We know that some individual abuses have been committed, and that contributions have been levied upon the departments of our kingdom since the conclusion of the armistice, but the just and liberal declarations which the Allied Sovereigns have made to us respecting these abuses, authorise us to forbid our subjects to comply with such requisitions as are illegal and contrary to the Treaty, which has stipulated for the general suspension of hostilities. Nevertheless, our gratitude, and the usage of war, require us to order all the Civil and Military Authorities in our dominions to redouble their care and attention, that the valiant armies of the Allied Sovereigns may be regularly and abundantly supplied with all that is necessary for the subsistence and wants of the troops. All demands not comprehended in these objects shall therefore be of no effect, and the sacrifices of the people will be diminished. Frenchmen! you hear the King, and he wished, in his turn, that your voice may reach him, and express your wants and your desires; his shall always attest the love which he bears to his people. The largest cities, and the most obscure hamlets, all parts of his kingdom, are equally objects of his care, and he presses all his subjects at one and the same time to his heart. He does not think that he can indulge feelings too paternal for people whose valour, loyalty, and devotion to their Sovereigns, have for ages constituted their glory and prosperity."

LOUIS.

Several ordinances have likewise been published in France, all tending, like the above proclamation, to promote tranquillity, and to prepare the people for the enjoyment of the blessings of peace. Aware also, that France can never be great and powerful unless her troops are put upon a respectable footing, the King seems to have

directed his particular attention to the proper organization of the army, and to the just rewards which are due to men who have procured so much glory to their country. In furtherance of the intentions of his Majesty towards these brave soldiers, the following has been made public:

WAR DEPARTMENT.—ORDER OF THE DAY.—PARIS, MAY 15, 1814.—His Majesty has just determined on the organization of his army. After having heard the Council of War, he has issued an ordonnance of the most favourable nature possible, for establishing the new Military Constitution; and he has less consulted the finances of the State, than his justice, in rewarding honourable services, and his affection for his brave troops.—Inspectors-General, furnished with instructions from the Ministers of War, will depart to form the amalgamation of all the corps. It is important that all such officers, who have rights to claim or rewards to solicit, should appear under their respective banners: the absence of these officers, during this operation, will lead to serious and irreparable inconveniences. It is consequently necessary, that every military officer, of whatever rank, should appear without delay, with the corps to which he belongs, in order to lay the state of his services before the Inspectors-General, and to obtain either his continuation in active service, the preservation of his full appointments, the enjoyment of half-pay at home until replaced; or, finally, to be permitted to retire in consequence of the rights he may have acquired by new services since the month of January, 1814.—Those officers who do not belong to any corps, those of the staff without appointment, and those who wish to be placed in regiments, shall present themselves, according to their choice, in the chief places of the divisions or departments in which there are Inspectors-General, to make representations of their services; those who prefer half-pay may retire to their homes.—Every officer who, without express permission, shall remain at Paris eight days after the publication of the present order, shall be held to have renounced his right.—The soldiers who do not belong to the corps of the garrison of Paris shall be immediately marched, under the immediate direction of the Commander of the place, to their respective corps, or to one of the nearest

"corps, in order to be incorporated there—
 "with.—The Generals commanding the
 "military divisions shall enforce the strictest
 "execution of this order, and shall render
 "account thereof to the Minister for the
 "War Department.—General Count
 "DUPONT, Minister Secretary of State for
 "the War Department."

WESTMINSTER ADDRESS.—The independent inhabitants of this great city, are the only persons who have followed the example of the citizens of London, in voting an Address to the Prince Regent on the late termination of hostilities against France. I have subjoined a copy of this Address, upon which some useful remarks may probably occur after it has been presented, and an Answer given by the Regent. Meanwhile it may be stated, that the Address, which was read by J. Lochce, Esq. moved by Major Cartwright, and seconded by Peter Walker, Esq. was *unanimously* approved of by a very large and respectable Meeting of the Electors of Westminster. Several spirited Resolutions were also adopted without a dissenting voice, except as to one about America, to which an amendment was proposed by a person who said something about the great *wisdom* which Ministers had displayed in their conduct of the war, and talked loud about *punishing the American savages*. I could not learn the individual's name who proposed this amendment—but it was whispered that he was a *Contractor*; and his "full fledged plumage" shewed that, at least, he had not been a *loser* by the warlike mania. It was justly remarked by Sir Francis Burdett, that the proposed amendment had met its deserved fate, in being consigned to oblivion by the unanimous voice of the assembly.

ADDRESS TO THE REGENT.

THE DUTY OF ADDRESS OF THE HOUSEHOLDERS OF THE CITY AND LIBERTIES OF WESTMINSTER.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS. On a termination of the conflict with France, in which our country has so long been engaged—a termination as fortunate as it has been singular, we beg your Royal Highness to accept of our sincere congratulations.—In a war so sanguinary, it has been a spectacle as novel, as auspicious to humanity, to behold a coalition of Sovereigns, at the head of immense armies, on victoriously entering the capital of their enemy, inviting the People to choose the Constitution of Government under which they desired to live, expressing a wish that that People might

ever remain great and happy, and proclaiming a guarantee of their *Liberties*.—May, Sir, the Prince they recalled to reign over them hold those liberties sacred!—For the benefits of Peace, we ought to be truly thankful to Providence; as well as to those by whose valour and labours, or by whose virtue and wisdom they have, under Providence, been attained.—But, Sir, we should ill acquit ourselves of the duty we owe to our country, and to your Royal Highness, as the Representative of our Sovereign, did we not entreat you to couple with the praise-worthy conclusion of the war its blameable commencement.—Your Royal Highness would then see, that what we now contemplate as a happy result to France, namely, the government of a represented People by a limited King, might have continued as it then existed, without any war at all.—In that case, Sir, the world had not been disgusted by the atrocities of a Robespierre, nor terrified by the portentous power of a Bonaparte. In that case Europe had escaped a sacrifice of three millions of human lives and countless calamities. In that case, England had not seen degraded to paupers a million and a half of her industrious people, nor have felt the scourge of a Taxation for paying the annual interest of an incurred debt of eight hundred millions sterling.—As, however, Divine Providence brings good out of evil, and as it accords with experience, that a constant growth of knowledge is the effect of an ever-operating cause, and eminently beneficial to civilized man; so we cannot but attribute the moderation and wisdom, so eminently displayed by the Allied Sovereigns, to that growth of knowledge, to that diffusion of truth, which, in our age, is daily enlightening the civilized world.—If, Sir, the American and French Revolutions had their accompaniments of calamity, yet the innumerable discussions they generated, did also improve, in a high degree, the science of civil government—master science of Princes and Statesmen. The Monarchs who have as virtuously as wisely guaranteed Peace, Greatness, and Liberty to France, as well as their Ministers and Warriors, must carry home with them from Paris the seeds of amelioration, the scientific principles of amendment, by which the condition of their own subjects will be greatly bettered; and by which, without convulsion, their States may be rapidly made to enjoy that perfection of polity, that freedom and prosperity, which is equally the ornament and felicity of Princes and of People. In the political transactions of both hemispheres, those intelligent Monarchs must have seen a full confirmation of this important truth, that "*Representation was the happiest discovery of political wisdom.*" To this point, they must have observed, that all rational energies in pursuit of public freedom and happiness uniformly tend.—

Wherefore, Sir, we cannot doubt, that in all civilized countries Representation will in time attain perfection. When, Sir, your Royal Highness shall reflect, that after a war of more than twenty years continuance, originally undertaken for crushing the infant liberties of France, the existence of those very liberties is now found to afford the only hope of tranquillity to Europe, and has therefore been made the basis of Peace, we must, with additional earnestness, recur to the impression we endeavoured three years ago to make on the mind of your Royal Highness—an endeavour in which, we trust, we succeeded—in favour of such a radical Reform in the Commons House of Parliament of our own country, as shall afford us the full benefit of Representation. In our former Address to your Royal Highness, we spoke of that Borough Faction which alike tramples on the Rights of the Crown and People. Were, Sir, that Faction to continue its daring inroad on the Independence of the Throne,—were it to continue its deadly stabs to the Liberties of the People,—were it to continue its depredations on the property of the nation—were, in short, our Freedom to be no more, of what value Peace, or aught else on earth!—In proportion, Sir, as a constitutional Commons House must be an object of unbounded veneration, your Royal Highness will be sensible that the existence of a Faction, which should greatly impair its excellence, must to every loyal mind be exquisitely painful. The yoke of a Faction—a domestic Faction—that had feloniously broken into the citadel of the Constitution and stolen our Palladium, were even worse than foreign war itself. It were the tyranny of a few, who had no other claim to rule over their fellow subjects than that of having robbed them. It were to bow the head and bend the knee to an audacious corruption. It were the very lowest depth of dishonour. On the part, Sir, of an English Sovereign, or the part of an English People, to such a Faction there could be no submission. A truly patriot Representative stands, however, pledged to his constituents and his country, to bring before Parliament, at the first convenient opportunity, their great question. It is, Sir, impossible that Parliament should then be at war with England. It is impossible that it should not then imitate those Sovereigns who, even while at war with France, eagerly sought the opportunity of offering to her their guarantee of all she claimed as her Rights and Liberties. After contemplating,

with the highest admiration, the virtue and wisdom so conspicuous in the arrangements made on the first day of April at Paris, we are unable, Sir, to express the deep concern and the shame we feel, touching the hostile measure which your Royal Highness has been advised to sanction in respect of Norway. If it be just that any one Nation shall provide for its own welfare and happiness by the exercise of its own reason, and the freedom of its own will, it must be just that every Nation shall freely do the same. England, Sir, can have no right to force on Norway a sovereignty to which she is adverse. For such a purpose, to draw the sword were manifestly wicked; but to attempt to subdue Independence, Innocence and Patriotism, by the instrumentality of famine, were shockingly inhuman. We humbly, Sir, and most anxiously intreat your Royal Highness to save your country from this reproach; to avert from her this dishonour. And, Sir, among the many happy results of the pacification of Europe, we contemplate, with inexpressible satisfaction, the annihilation of the disputed points respecting the maritime rights of neutral nations, which have constituted the ground of the ever-lamentable hostility in which we are engaged with the United States of America. Hence, Sir, we confidently trust, that on both sides of the Atlantic the miseries and immoralities of war will shortly be at an end, and the whole civilized world repose under the peaceful olive; studying and practising only the social and moral duties, arts and accomplishments, for their general improvement and happiness.

§ The Friends of the Freedom of Election will be gratified to find that the *Seventh*. Anniversary of the Election of Sir FRANCIS BURDETT, to represent the City of Westminster in Parliament, is to be celebrated at the Crown and Anchor Tavern, Strand, on Monday next, by a public dinner. The chair will be filled by Sir FRANCIS.—The following, among other respectable Gentlemen, intend to be present:—E. B. Clive, Esq.; Sir John Throgmorton; Robert Knight, Esq.; J. Josling, Esq.; Thomas Northmore, Esq.; W. J. Burdett, Esq.; R. M. Biddulph, Esq.; Mr. Alderman Wood; Henry Brougham, Esq.; Hon. Thomas Brand; R. H. A. Bennet, Esq.; Thomas Creevey, Esq. Francis Canning, Esq.; — Gwynn, Esq.; Mr. Waithman.

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ADDRESS

TO THE KING OF FRANCE.

No. III.

In the first Number of these Papers, addressed to your Majesty, I assured you, that, if you discovered an inclination to act fairly towards your people, you would soon become an object of censure, if not of abuse, with those persons in England, who had been amongst the loudest in expressing their joy at your being called to the throne of France; and that your Majesty would, in that case, experience the curious change of having for defenders those who were not for your recall, fearing that it might prove injurious to the cause of freedom, not only in France, but throughout all Europe.—By this time those who have read these papers (amongst whom I am not vain enough to hope that your Majesty is one) will begin to perceive, that my opinion was but too well founded; for, from the moment that it was seen, in this country, that your Majesty discovered no intention to gratify the wishes of the enemies of France; that you did not intend to plunge your country into a civil war by reviving the animosities of past times; that you did not intend to degrade your country, to make her the prey of her neighbours and the scorn of the world; from that very moment the men, who, in this country, had been the forwardest in urging your recall, began to change their tone respecting you.—The point, aimed at, and, I think, clearly established, in my last Number, was this, that the same persons who recommended to your Majesty to break your promise, to re-establish the ancient regime, and, in short, to oppress your people; and who, at the same time, recommended to you most earnestly to slight and degrade the soldiers of the Revolution; that these same persons recommended to the Allies to strip your Galleries and Museums, to keep their armies in France, and to retain their prisoners contrary to agreement, to narrow your dominions, to suffer you to have no Colonies; and that, you, upon

the ground, that France, though she had changed her Ruler, was still the same, and was *radically and systematically the enemy of England*; and therefore, that it was the duty of every Briton to harbour a constant jealousy of her, and to endeavour, by all the means in his power, to keep France in a state of weakness.—Since the writing of that paper, these same persons, increasing daily in their hostility towards you and your family, as well as your people, have proclaimed, that we Englishmen ought to bear in mind “that the disgraceful interference of France in our quarrel with America, took place under a BOURBON;” and, inferring from that fact, that we ought to be as jealous of you, as we were of Napoleon.—It is impossible for malice to be discovered more clearly than it is discovered here. What reason was there for the reviving of this subject? It must be manifest to your Majesty, that the motive could have been no other than that of paving the way for a series of hostile conduct towards you.—But the cause of this hostility, so wholly unprovoked, ought to be exposed to the world. It is no other than this: that your Majesty has disappointed these people in not making lists of proscription; in not establishing a despotism; in not doing that, in short, which would have totally mined either your people or yourself; in not doing, in other words, that which would have made France the most feeble and despicable nation upon earth. If these men had found you a ready tool in their hands to raise the bloody flag of political revenge; if they had found you, upon your return, erecting scaffolds whereon to murder those who had survived the war and the intestine troubles of France; if they had seen you drive from your presence every man who has acquired glory in the armies of France; if they had seen you ready to agree to every proposition, tending to the degradation of your country; if, in short, they had seen in you a manifest disposition to be at once a tyrant and a traitor, you would have been, to this hour, as much an object of their praise as you were when you disembarked at Dover for

Calais. — Your Majesty will hardly believe, that the prints, which I am compelled to point out: by name, speak merely the sentiments of the owners or editors of those publications. You must be well aware, that, if these persons, obscure and contemptible as they are of themselves, did not know that their publications would be palatable to *others*, they would not send them forth. — You, indeed, must be well aware, that these owners and editors are little more than miserable tools in the hands of men of superior abilities and more weighty interests; and, therefore, what they publish becomes entitled to more attention than if they were to be considered as the mere offspring of the brain of these insignificant individuals. — Every article of news from France, relating to your measures, becomes an object of criticism, with the persons to whom I allude, who fail not to communicate regularly their observations to the public. Amongst the last of these there are some very well worthy of yourself and your people; for, in them, you will not fail to see a new proof of the fact, which ought constantly to be kept in view; namely, that those who are the enemies of a free and just government in France, are also the enemies of a due share of power being possessed by France; and, moreover, are *your* enemies, unless you will consent to be a foul traitor to your country. — It was not Napoleon that these persons hated so much as it was France! and this fact, which I formerly endeavoured to prove, they now, of their own accord, prove to a demonstration. They wish to see France despoiled of all power, of all greatness, and of all the means of becoming great. An observation of theirs, relative to the *military force* of France, to be kept up in time of peace, has made this a fact not to admit of dispute. — The publication, to which I here more particularly allude, was in the *Times* newspaper, of the 21st of May, in the following words: — “It is stated, but we imagine with no official grounds of accuracy, that the Peace Establishment of the French army is to be 220,000 men, exceeding by 68,000 the number of the army in 1792. Now, if the French Government had adopted any such unwise and extravagant resolution, we should think it the duty of all the other Sovereigns of Europe to say at once, and without the least ceremony, **THE THING SHALL NOT BE.**” We have all (British, Germans, Rus-

sians, Spaniards, or whatever we are) suffered too much from the enormous military force of France, to permit it to be accumulated again into so formidable a mass, threatening at every moment to break its bounds, and sweep away all before it. It would be madness in Great Britain to restore to France, Ships, Colonies, and Commerce; to pour wealth so profusely into her lap, as the mere price of peace, if the first use she made of it were to sharpen the sword for war. We perhaps pay too great a compliment to this loose and unauthenticated paragraph by noticing it; but if it be really true, we think it is quite sufficient to make us pause before we give up to France a single conquest, or even restore an individual prisoner.” — I will not attempt to describe the feelings which must agitate the breast of every Frenchman, upon the hearing of such impudence and profligacy as this. Here we, at once, see with what views it was that these persons wished for your restoration. Here it becomes manifest, that they only desired that event in the hope of degrading and crippling France, having conceived the notion, that your Majesty would be made a tool in the hands of the enemies of your country's greatness. — What would be said here, if the other Powers were to prescribe to *us* what army or what navy we should keep up in time of peace? — What an uproar such an idea would create here! And what insolence, then, must it be in these persons to hold forth the justice and propriety of France being dictated to in this respect! — The number of troops spoken of as the peace establishment of France, will be less than her proportion, compared with the numbers kept up by other Powers. We shall, in all probability, not come down so low as 100,000 men of all sorts, besides the half-pay list, amounting to many thousands. And France has more than three times our real population, we having no frontiers to guard, and she having many hundreds of miles of frontier. — But, these matters are unworthy of notice, when we think of the impudent and infamous proposition to the Allies to COMPEL your Majesty to fix on such a peace establishment as they, or, rather, as these vile men may choose to leave you; and, what is still more infamous, the proposition to retain our prisoners of war, unless you consent to strip your country of the means of defence; unless you consent to annihilate the power of France. It is

as well known to these vile men as it is to me, that there exists a Convention, according to which these prisoners are to be released forthwith; and yet, in the teeth of this solemn compact, these men would retain the French prisoners, unless you consent to leave your country in a state of feebleness, that would make her an easy prey to all her neighbours. They have the profligacy openly, and in plain terms, to recommend a violation of a treaty, which has been fulfilled on your part already; and that, too, upon the ground, that in the arrangement of your own domestic concerns you do not act as they could wish. We have, in England, the most profligate writers in the whole world; but, even from their pens, any thing so very profligate as this has seldom issued.—They now discover their real motives for wishing for the fall of Napoleon. They now discover, that their cheerings of your Majesty on the occasion of your recall, arose from the hope of France becoming degraded and crippled in your hands.—The treaty of peace now begins to be a subject of observation with them; and, it is worthy of your attention, how they here also shew their desire to see you and your country degraded. They take fire at the expression of the Paris journals, that the conditions are to be all *honourable to France*; and they particularly dwell upon a topic, well calculated to deceive the unthinking part of mankind; namely, that of the *Abolition of the Slave Trade*.—The *Courier*, of the 21st instant, observes, that “the King of France has assumed a tone, which the Allied Sovereigns were not prepared to expect.” By Allied Sovereigns these men mean themselves. They, indeed, expected you to be their slave; a vile tool in their hands.—There are two points, on which they begin to harp pretty loudly: the *commercial intercourse* and the *slave-trade*, in neither of which the Continental Sovereigns have, in fact, any interest.—As to these the *Times* says:—“As the negotiation branches out into detail, difficulties of various kinds must be expected to arise. It is said, and we cannot be surprised at it, that M. Talleyrand has started many objections against the introduction of English manufactures, on the footing of the treaty of 1786. All reasonable modifications ought to be acceded to on our part. It would not be a wise policy in us to hold up Louis XVIII. to his people, as a So-

vereign incapable of maintaining their just rights. On the other hand, as we are rich in conquests, the restitution of which France must owe solely to our liberality, we have both the right and the power to insist on her doing justice in return. We ought not to cede an inch of territory to her, until she has agreed to an equitable commercial treaty; to a reduction of her army within limits which would leave us nothing to fear for the peace of Europe; and, lastly, to an abandonment of the slave-trade.”—Thus, as your Majesty will see, they mean to have such terms as shall put the resources of France into hands not her own. They think, that you will be made to consent to reduce your kingdom to a sort of colony to England. If this were for the real benefit of England; if it would tend to our happiness and freedom, I am afraid, that I myself might be tempted to wish for it too. But, convinced that I am, that such a treaty as these men desire would be a real injury to us; that it would tend to make us, the people in general, worse off than we now are; and that it would be to lay the foundation of a new war, I wish for fair and equitable terms of peace. I wish to see France left in possession of great power; because I am of opinion, that her possessing great power will be for the good of the people of England. It is not necessary for me to state precisely how I think that power is to operate in favour of our liberties. It is sufficient for me, that I am convinced that it will so operate; and it is a strong presumption, that this opinion is correct, that we see all the most deadly enemies of our freedom anxiously labouring to prevent France from retaining any power at all.—The commercial treaty, existing before the Revolution, was very much complained of in France. It was certainly very advantageous to certain persons in England. But the Revolution has made great changes. France has now the means of manufacturing for herself. She has new resources. She will be able to feed a greater population. She will contain a greater mass of industry and enterprise. She is delivered of her load of debt. Her soil, climate, canals, rivers, and ports, offer abundant means for all sorts of commercial enterprises. But, indeed, all tariffs ought to be thrown aside.—French wine, oil, corn, and brandy, ought to come here freely and without duty; and France ought to be open to all our

wares and merchandizes, without duty. Then might we drink *Vin de Grave* at four pence a quart, and the French might have good sharp knives well-finished to cut their meat with, at a cheap rate. Why should they not be allowed to send us wine as well as cows, hogs, and poultry? If, indeed, a treaty like this were proposed on our part, I should call you illiberal for not agreeing to it. But, if it become a matter of custom-house rates, then these must be the best judges of the terms, who have to settle them after minute examination and discussion.—What however, I more particularly wish to point out, is, the language these enemies of freedom assume upon this occasion. They always, when speaking of our relationships with France, talk like *bullies*. They will give you no colonies, unless you give them a commercial treaty? That is to say, unless you give them the better part of the resources of France. That is their plain meaning. They wish to *force* a commercial treaty upon you; and yet they have the impudence to call it *an equitable commercial treaty*. If it be intended to be *equitable*; that is to say, if it be intended to give you as great advantages as it acquires from you, why do they talk of *compulsion*? If I have an article which I am about to exchange with my neighbour for an article of the *same value*, do I quarrel with him because he declines the offer? Much less do I attempt to *force* him to make the exchange. Any such attempt would betray a consciousness, on my part, that the exchange proposed by me was *not so very equitable*! We, it is said, propose to France a commercial treaty, equally advantageous to both nations. Either it is as advantageous to France as it is to us, or it is not. If the former, we can lose nothing by your Majesty's rejecting the offer; if the latter, it is your duty to reject it. A commercial treaty is a bargain between two dealers; and, it is something new in trade, that, because one dealer declines making a bargain with another, the former is to be attacked and treated as an enemy. One man offers another a price for his land, but the former, because the offer is declined, does not treat the latter as a foe. In short, these writers, and their like, looked upon your Majesty's return to France as the means of degrading and crippling France, and of making her, with her fine soil and climate, little less than a colony of England; which, if it were possible to accomplish, would be the very worst thing

that could happen for the *happiness* and *freedom* of the people of England themselves.—It has been said, that your ministers do not readily consent to any stipulation for the *abolition of the Slave Trade*; and, your Majesty will please to observe, that this is likely to become a very fruitful topic of abuse on you and the French nation.—It is my opinion, that France would be better, that she would be more powerful, more moral, more happy, and likely to continue more free, without any colonies at all. But,* if her rulers think otherwise, it is for *them* to decide upon the justice and the policy of abolishing the Slave Trade.—To dictate to them what they shall do in this respect is to interfere in *their* domestic concerns. It is, in fact, to take the government of the territory of France out of their hands.—Nevertheless this is to be made, I can see, the ground of much abuse on you and your people. Craft and *cant* come in here to the aid of a hatred of freedom; for, it is a notorious fact, that, amongst those who have been, in this country, the most busy in the work of *Black freedom*, we find the most determined in the work of ensuring *White Slavery*.—For my part, I wish that Europeans had no slaves, black or white. But, it must not be overlooked, that we have had *time* to do away this trade; and that France has not; and, it is very probable, that to give her back colonies without leaving her the trade, would be to give her the means of making her poor and weak.—I have, above, quoted what the *Times* newspaper has said upon the subject. I will now shew your Majesty what you have to expect at the hands of others.—The *Courier*, of the 23d of May, says:—"There have been, if there be not now, some obstacles in the negotiation, one of which we understand related to the Slave Trade. Great Britain demanded the abolition of the Slave Trade by France as one of the conditions of the treaty; and the King of France *demurred*; or, according to report, refused to accede to the demand. He called it, *absurdly enough*, interfering in the internal Government of the French Colonies. What! is preventing the *traffic with Africa in human blood* an interference in the internal administration of a French Island in the West Indies? If Louis XVIII. persist in this refusal, he will be far indeed from *having turned adversity to proper account*. We should have thought it would have made him anxious to soften as much as possible the miseries

“of the human race, and that he would have rendered any demand from us to abolish the Slave Trade wholly unnecessary. However, there is one way in which we trust our able Negotiator treated this refusal, supposing the report to be correct, which we hope it is not.—‘No abolition—No Colonies.’ We will not part with one of the French colonies—no, nor shall you have admission to the West Indies or the East, unless you distinctly accede to the demand which *God and Nature justify us* in insisting upon, the Abolition of the Slave Trade.”—The *Morning Chronicle*, of the same day, says:—“We must receive the various reports of the terms of the treaty of peace now negotiating at Paris with reserve, at least, because they are evidently not finally settled. That some impediment has occurred, we believe; and we lament to hear that it is of a nature to excite *the indignation of every enlightened man in Europe*. It is said that a disposition has manifested itself in the *French Court*, to resist the insertion of an article in the Treaty with respect to the Slave Trade. Will it be believed, after all that has happened, that the Bourbons hesitate to follow up that act of christian and moral beneficence which *England had the glory to begin*, and which even the most sanguinary members of Revolutionary France supported? A writer, in a paper of yesterday, says, with eloquent force—‘The *Status of Europe* are to be called upon by England to make a sacrifice, and great importance will hereafter be attached to this *single demand*, which is all she thinks it worth her while to make, on this occasion of almost universal acquirement. She is now about to name the reward she seeks for all she has done. Considering how highly her services are extolled, and how widely they are acknowledged, our Allies must be prepared to find it of immense value:—and so it is. She demands that a foul felony may be discontinued, of which a vast Continent is the perpetrator, and a vaster is the victim! She demands that Europe may be rescued from enormous guilt, and Africa from hideous misery; she demands the Abolition of the Slave Trade!’ And this, we are told, the French Court *hesitates* at least, if not *refuses*, to accede! The return of their Colonies is nothing, they say, without the horrible means of cultivating them by human degradation, torment,

“and slavery! We trust the rumour is false, and that the residence of the *Bourbon family* for so many years in this country, has ended their minds with wisdom, and their hearts with feeling, to withstand any advice that may be given them, so horrible and inhuman as the preservation of that traffic would be.”—This is the sort of language now to be used. The cant of the most cunning hypocrites on earth is now to be played off against your Majesty. A good way to meet the proposition would be to propose to extend the abolition to all the slavery of whites; to all vassals, or whatever else they be called, who are bought and sold in any, and every, part of Europe! For, why should you have more feeling for blacks than for whites? This proposition would be a ground for great and puzzling discussion.—For my part, I am much more anxious about the liberties of 30 millions of Frenchmen, than about those of, perhaps, 100,000 Blacks, though I wish not to see them in slavery. I shall be very well contented, if I find, that the brave and ingenious and amiable people of France are free; that they possess their property in security; that there is no hypocritical system of oppression either on their purses or their persons; that they are not cheated by a sham representation; that they are not made mere sponges, to be squeezed by the Government; that they are not mocked by the forms of liberty and law; that they are not insulted by being told that they are free, while they are, in effect, the most degraded of slaves; that they are not compelled to work like slaves at the oar, to pamper the sons and daughters of corruption; that they are not made the prey of an endless swarm of time cheaters.—In short, if I see the people of France *fairly represented in the Legislature*, I shall be quite content to leave to that Legislature and your Majesty, to fix the period of abolishing of the black slave trade.—But, I cannot conclude this Number of my Address to your Majesty, without pointing out to you the inconsistency of these writers, in respect of the Slave Trade. They now cry out against the slavery of the Blacks. The Blacks they find to be quite fit for the enjoyment of freedom. But, it was only six days ago, that they deprecated the attempt to establish a free government in France, because, said they, THE FRENCH ARE NOT FITTED FOR SUCH A GOVERNMENT! Aye, and they regretted,

"for the sake of HUMANITY," (vile hypocrites!) that your Majesty was pledged to make the experiment! They have only one step further to go: to recommend to the Allies, not to evacuate France, nor to release the French prisoners of war, unless you stipulate to make the people of France slaves.—From all this your Majesty, and every sensible Frenchman, will clearly perceive, that these writers have constantly in view the means of ruining your country; and that which is the great object of my Address, is, to impress upon the minds of Frenchmen, that those who are for using every possible means of weakening and degrading France, are also for using every possible means of preventing the establishment of a free constitution in that country. I have shown, that these persons are labouring to cause your Galleries and Museums to be stripped; to prevent you from having colonies; to narrow your ancient dominions; to cause the allied armies to remain in France in the pay of England; to inculcate the opinion, that France is the same under you as under Napoleon; and that it is the duty of Englishmen always to look on her as radically and systematically our enemy; to prevent the release of the French prisoners of war; to compel you to reduce your army so low as to leave your country without defence: and I have also shown, that it is these *same persons*, who express their *regret* that you have pledged yourself to the establishment of a government, in which the people shall be *really* represented in the Legislature.—Having shown this, I think that I may safely leave your Majesty and the French nation to draw the proper conclusion. I wish not to take credit for unusual liberality. My motives are, perhaps, full as *national* as those of my opponents; but, I hope, not chargeable with the baseness manifestly belonging to theirs. They would *exterminate* the French nation, in their fear of its becoming a bright example to the world. I am of opinion, that for France to be powerful, prosperous, and *really* free, would be a great blessing to the people of England. There is nothing which a friend of freedom in England ought to dread so much as the enfeebling and enslaving of France. Not only in Spain, and in Italy, and in Holland, are people waiting to see *what France will do*; but the eyes of all Europe are upon her; and her *example* must produce a great effect on the future lot of mankind.

When she has arranged her government, we shall be able to describe her situation; to examine and to show the effects of that government; to make comparisons between it and other governments; to look into things with our own eyes; to go to the spot, and report to those who cannot go. And, what have the *advocates* of our *own* system to fear from this?—Napoleon had the power of doing more good than any man that ever lived, and he certainly did a great deal, though he did some harm. But your Majesty stands next to him in point of power to do good, without the temptation to do harm. You are at the head of that people, whose example, in the course of a few years, *must* be followed; and, therefore, every act of yours becomes an object of anxious solicitude with every man who wishes well to his species. Napoleon often spoke of his *great plans* for the benefit of mankind, and I see no reason to doubt of his sincerity. But his means were of the wrong sort. They were suited only to the destroying of tyranny and corruption. They were necessary to that part of the great work. It remains for your Majesty to proceed in it by means of a more amiable kind. It is your happy lot to be able to spread freedom and happiness over Europe by the example of a people, who always have, and always will, give the fashion to the world.

TO MR. COKE.

On the Dispute about Corn.

SIR—It has surprised me very much to see that you have given yourself any trouble about the *Corn Laws*. The people, who thrive by spreading delusion, were sure to abuse you. They were sure to represent you, who are so liberal a man, in all your transactions in life, as a *grasping monopolizer*; as a man wishing to pinch those very poor, who are fed out of your fortune. They, who, by hook or by crook, pocket part of the money which you pay in taxes, were sure to hold you up as an oppressor. Had I been in your place, Sir, I would have left the passing of Corn Laws to those who are for raising great sums of taxes from the produce of the corn. It was not discreet in you, give me leave to say it, to expose yourself to the attacks of the herd of vulgar politicians, whose brains seem to be in their bellies. Only look at the trash which they are publishing upon this subject, and of which

the following, from *The Times* newspaper, of the 23d inst. is a pretty good specimen:—
 “In my former remarks, I predicted that
 “if the present measures for making a total
 “alteration in the Corn Laws were per-
 “sisted in, in the spirit then shown, a very
 “few days would see the tables of the two
 “Houses of Parliament covered with pe-
 “titions. My words have been fulfilled
 “and are fulfilling, and yet there are per-
 “sons so desperate that they would en-
 “deavour to force on the measures alluded to,
 “not only by precipitation, but by intimi-
 “dation. They would brand every oppo-
 “sition to an unreasonable monopoly of the
 “public food with the name of sedition.—
 “They have even dared to stigmatise as
 “seditious the conduct of a gentleman,
 “whose long and laborious public life
 “leaves us in doubt which most to admire,
 “the hardihood or the folly of the slan-
 “derer. This violent and factious cal-
 “louny, I trust, will not deter any upright
 “servant of the public from doing his duty.
 “The true sower of sedition is he, who,
 “stimulated by a spirit of rapacity and
 “extortion, urges the precipitate adoption
 “of measures, which must of necessity
 “throw the whole empire into confusion,
 “and render the landowners of the coun-
 “try objects of suspicion and hatred to the
 “manufacturing and mercantile interests,
 “without any real benefit to the great
 “body of the agricultural population.—
 “Sir, the return of peace, after so many
 “years of a war which has convulsed Eu-
 “rope to its centre, naturally presented to
 “people of all classes in this country the
 “cheering hope that the burthens which
 “they had borne with unexampled patience
 “should be fairly and equitably lightened.
 “None, but the wild and visionary,
 “thought, that all our evils were suddenly
 “to vanish; none but the gross selfish
 “and avaricious imagined, that in time of
 “peace they were to enjoy the exclusive
 “advantages which the war had thrown
 “into their hands. I have not heard that
 “the officers of the army and navy have
 “thought of petitioning Government to
 “continue their full pay and allowances,
 “or that the proctors and agents in the
 “prize courts have ventured to pray for a
 “supply of business at the public expence.
 “I suppose the dealers in Omnium must
 “be satisfied to see their golden harvest
 “pretty much curtailed; and the Con-
 “tractors for the supply of naval and mi-
 “litary stores must experience a consider-

able falling off in their profits. In short,
 “property will shift its channels. Go-
 “vernment cannot and ought not to em-
 “bank and keep up any particular species
 “far beyond its natural level. It may and
 “it ought to take care that the full should
 “not be too violent. *Motos componere*
 “*fluctus*. That is all it has to do. But
 “some greedy and avaricious individuals
 “have hit upon a plan to perpetuate, as
 “they foolishly think, their own extrava-
 “gant gains, at the expence of the com-
 “munity. Fools! not to see that they
 “will in vain strive to raise themselves on
 “the depression of their country. View-
 “ing this nefarious scheme in the light I
 “do, I must assume that its original in-
 “ventors were not among the national
 “representatives.”—Thus, you see, Sir,
 you have obtained the honour to be put
 upon a level with officers of the army and
 navy, proctors and bailiffs of prize courts,
 dealers in omnium, contractors, and the like.
 Well! It is just. It is really just. For
 to the country gentlemen of England, to
 their submission to the Minister of the day
 it is, that they owe what they now experi-
 ence. It is to this that they have to attri-
 bute, that every saucy placeman and pen-
 sioner now fronts them to their face. It is to
 them that we owe the want of a Reform,
 which would have protected them a great
 deal more effectually than all the Corn
 Laws that ever were invented. They were
 afraid of a *disorganizing spirit*, and they
 now feel the effects of their conduct.—Look,
 Sir, at the language of this man. He calls
 your efforts an endeavour to secure a *mono-
 poly* of the PUBLIC food! you are charged
 (for it is you who is meant) with calumny
 on an “upright servant of the PUBLIC!”
 When it suits their purpose, they call such
 people *servants* of the King; but, upon
 this occasion, they call them servants of the
public! You are accused of *rapacity* and
extortion. You! who, I dare say, never
 took so much rent as you might, without
 any difficulty, have obtained. You! who
 are known to be so generous a landlord and
 a master, and such a liberal encourager of
 industry and virtue, and who has spent
 so large a portion of your time in pur-
 suits tending to the benefit of others! And
 all this you are taunted with by a califf,
 perhaps, whose fortune is made up of a part
 of the taxes, collected from your own estate!
 But, again, I say, it is your own fault, and
 the fault of the other country gentlemen.—
 You must bear the grating sound of the

words, which tell you that you have been a *monopolizer*, and that you want to continue the monopoly. How it must please you. How soft it must sound to your ears, to hear yourself confounded with those, whom you have been *paying* out of your estate! To hear the amount of your rents, a large part of which go to pay the *contractors*, reckoned amongst the **BURDENS** of the people, which ought to diminish along with the gains of the contractors. The *burdens* which people expected to be lightened, we are here told, included the *price of the loaf*; and the landowner is here exhibited as more avaricious than the contractor, because he wishes to perpetuate his *extravagant gains* even *after the war is over*, at the expence of the *community*!—There is no *reasoning* with this. It is too outrageously impudent to reason with. It is, however, the popular talk of the day. This corrupt press and the Lancastrian schools, will, upon this subject at any rate, beat reason out of the field. The number who eat bread so far exceed those who grow wheat, or own lands, that the odds against you are fearful indeed; and that was a fact well known to the false and cunning loon who was making this attack, and who, while he was, perhaps, one of the causes of the *punishment* that covers the country, had the address to throw the blame upon *you*, whose income has gone to enrich him and to prevent the poor from actually starving.—No, Sir; had I been in *your* place, they never should have heard my voice in support of any law, the professed object of which is to protect the *farmer*, but the real tendency of which must be, if it has any effect at all, to *keep up the amount of the taxes*. In the last Number of the REGISTER I made this proposition as clear as day-light; or, at least, if I did not, it is out of my power to make it, or any thing else, clear. If I had been a landowner like you, I would have said nothing. It should, for me, have been the act of the Ministry and their majority. I should have viewed myself, in the question, not as the owner of property, but as a channel, or funnel, or conductor of taxes; and a very trifling portion of arithmetic would have enabled you to know, that low prices were as good for me as high prices. Perhaps, for I speak without book, there may be raised in England and Wales four millions of quarters of wheat. If it sell for twelve millions of money, the Government cannot have so much taxes out of it as if it sold for twenty-four millions of

money. Indeed they can have only half as much. It is the business of those, therefore, who want the taxes, to endeavour to keep up the price of corn, and not your business, who are merely a funnel for the taxes.—The wild notion of the writer, above quoted, is, that you have *profited* from the war! That you have been one of those, who *shared in the good things of the war*. And that now you wish to keep up your *full pay* after the war has ceased! Just as if you had not been paying wages and prices and taxes in due proportion to the price of corn; and just as if the paper-money, which actually exchanges at 30 per centum loss against the money of France, had made no difference in the thing.—However, Sir, all sorts of absurdities you will hear upon this subject; and we are not yet come to the period when the clamour will be loudest. If the harvest of this year should be bad; if blights should come very generally; if a mildew should, for our sins, pay us a visit. In short, if the crop should be remarkably unproductive, you must be sensible, that we shall see wheat again at eight pounds a quarter. Then! Then you will hear the out-cry about *monopoly*! Then you will hear the clamour about the *corn-laws*, especially if the American war should continue, and there should be a short crop on the Continent.—It appears to me, that Sir Francis Burdett takes the wise course in these matters. He knows very well, that it is not he who profits from high prices. He knows that he must pay in proportion to his rents and the price of corn. He knows, that he cannot stay, for one moment, the regular march of things. And he, therefore, always holds his tongue as to these matters of petty legislation. *Law* cannot give you price any more than it can give you sun-shine and showers. The whole quantity imported in a year makes so small an addition to the amount of the crop, that it is of no consequence worth notice; and that *peace* does not and cannot make any material difference permanently in the price of corn, is a proposition which experience has proved, and which reason would easily have proved, if experience had been wanting. If the Ministers thought, that, by passing a law, they could keep up the price of corn, they, upon that notion, acted wisely; because they, by keeping up the price of corn, kept up their taxes; and they discovered no little address in getting the landowners for their allies in the thing, because these, as being, according to the vulgar idea, the parties

most interested in the passing of the law, would naturally bear the greater portion of the blame. What I regret, is, though I never had the pleasure of even seeing you, that *you* should have so acted as to have come in for your share of the popular odium on this account. You! who *can* have no interest in the success of the law, supposing that success to be ever so complete.—Already, you see, Sir, the misled rabble have begun, and in your own country, too, to hang *bakers and millers in effigy*! This is the work of the base and prostituted press, whence the Lancasterian children are to imbibe their principles. The baker and miller gain nothing by the high price of corn, which, before they make into flour, they are compelled to buy. And yet they are hanged in effigy!—Now, Sir, the truth is, that the clamour arises, and will arise, with those, who, in one way or another, live upon the public money. They are always in fear of some *terrible change*, which, be it what it will, must oust them from their fattening stalls. They are always for keeping the poorer classes *quiet*.—Cheap bread is one of the most effectual means of doing this; and, therefore, they are always railing against monopolizers, grasping landlords and farmers, cheating millers and bakers. The cold sweat comes upon them when the quartern loaf mounts a pace. From this source comes all the clamour; and of this clamour you will never see an end, while there are so many persons who live upon the taxes.—*Peace* is a horrible object to many thousands, and, indeed, some hundreds of thousands, of these persons. They perceive that *their* allowance will be curtailed; but what must it be to them, then, if the loaf be still of the same price? They do not consider, or rather, they are incapable of perceiving, that (difference of *crops* aside) the price of the loaf must depend upon the amount of the taxes imposed on it through the funnel of the landowner and the farmer, and upon the value of the paper-money compared with that of specie. *Peace*, which has blessing in its sound to the rest of mankind, has quite upset this description of persons. They fear that the rabble, who have been expecting cheap bread (though it was *cheap before*), will be disappointed, and may make a noise.—What these people seem to want, therefore, is, that bread may become as cheap as it was *before the war*, and that all the *present taxes may still continue to be paid*!

Oh, no! thank you, gentlemen! The loaf pays the taxes, and, if you must have cheap bread, you must have less taxes.—But, Sir, why do I plague you with this, and why should you plague yourself with it?—Let those who live upon the taxes stand forward in the measures, intended to make them productive. You have none of the gain, and why should you share the odium?

MR. DE BERENGER.

I have no time to say much on what has passed in the House of Commons, relative to this gentleman. Two Members of Parliament, Messrs. Abercrombie and Barmham, who spoke in favour of a Committee to enquire into the conduct of the Secretary of State, touching this matter, are reported to have said, that they *felt no sympathy* for the Petitioner. I do; I feel greatly for him; and I hope, that there are many who feel abundant indignation at the efforts made, through the infamous newspapers of London, to cause him to be *pre-judged*; than which any thing more detestable never was committed, even by that prostituted press, the guide of the Lancasterian children.—I shall make no remark on the conduct of Lord Sidmouth and Mr. Becket; but I am alarmed at what dropped from some one in the debate about the **PROBABLE RENEWAL OF THE ALIEN ACT**. This never can be intended, to be sure! What! An Act like this; or, indeed, any Alien Act at all, to *exist in time of peace*? Is every foreigner who comes into the country to live here at the mere mercy of the Minister of the day, even now when the House of Bourbon is restored to the throne of France? Are we never to see an end to this sort of power? My eyes begin to grow dim; but, are they to be closed before England is rid of this species of power? Am I never more to see my country divested of its cowardly fears?—I trust there was no ground for the alarming hint; and will, for the present, say no more of it.—What was the *real* cause of the seizure of Mr. De Berenger has not been yet proved, and, of course, it remains to be proved that he is now really held in prison for an offence against the *Alien Act*. But, if what he states, as to his *parentage*, be correct (and I see no reason to doubt it), I am decidedly of opinion, that, by the law of England, he is *not an alien*. His father was a natural born subject of the King of England. Mr. De Berenger must be, therefore, a

subject of the King, though both out of the country, else my son, who was born in America, is not a subject of the King. But it is a point not to be doubted, that the children of English subjects, born abroad, are English subjects, and we have hundreds of them (Sir Home Popham for one) in offices, which they could not legally hold if divested of that character.—But, besides this, Mr. De Berenger held a commission in the King's service. To do that *legally* he must be an English subject, except he belonged to a *foreign* corps, which he did not. The Act of Settlement expressly forbids offices of trust, civil or *military*, to be given to any but subjects of the King, and Mr. De Berenger held an office of trust.—One of two things, therefore, must be: either the law was violated in putting him in an office of trust, or it has been violated in seizing him, and in keeping him in jail, as an alien.—Only think, however, of the situation of a man, who is thought worthy of being made a commander of Englishmen, enrolled for the defence of their country, and who is, every day of his life, liable to be seized by a warrant, confined without cause assigned, or sent out of the country!—I shall say no more on the subject at present. I wish to offer no opinion upon Mr. De Berenger's conduct or case; but common justice compels us to *suspend* our judgment, at any rate; yes, and even to consider him as innocent till he be *proved* to be guilty. It was quite a new thing to see a self-erected tribunal, publishing against persons by name, what they had the impudence to call *evidence*, and after the country had had time to read that *ex-parte* evidence, to prefer an indictment against the accused. This was something *new* in England. Much as we had seen before, we had, till now, seen nothing equal to this. Then, after the indictment had been preferred; after the bill had been found, and the accusing party put off the trial, the vile newspapers published to the world, that it was the *accused* who had put off the trial, and insinuated, that they had so done in order to shift the hour of their punishment! And is it to such information and principles from a press like this, that men are spending their money to teach poor children to read?

PUBLIC DEBTORS.

MR. COBBETT.—As you are a man not very timid in promulgating your knowledge

and opinions to your extensive readers, I have taken the liberty of asking your advice on a subject wherein every person who pays taxes is materially interested. You probably recollect, that about ten or twelve years ago, one of the present great deliverers of Europe, who are very soon expected in this kingdom, borrowed seven millions of pounds sterling, which you, and I, and every individual in the nation (those of the blood-royal only excepted), are bound to pay the interest of, till that debt is extinguished.—Now, as it is, I believe, pretty well ascertained, that both debt and interest are hitherto undischarged, I wish to know your opinion, whether the said high-contracting party is arrestable for such debt, as soon as he sets his foot on English ground.—If such a measure is both legal and practicable, I hope the worthy Ministers, who are entrusted with the moonshine-money concerns of the nation, will not be bashful in the exercise of their duty. We all know, Mr. Cobbett, that the Duke d'Artois, brother to the present King of France, secreted himself in the precincts of Holyrood House, to prevent the disgrace of being shut up in a prison, for a debt which he either could not, or would not, pay. In England, although our happy laws permit Royalty to run in debt, without personal restraint, yet I never heard of the same lenient exemptions being extended here to the inhabitants of any other nation. Be so good, then, as to give me your opinion on this subject; and should you be induced to dilate on the merits of these coalesced Kings and Emperors, you can hint, that two of these Potentates, after swearing solemnly on the tomb of the great Frederick, not to make peace with the Corsican upstart, till he had restored to them the various places which his superior courage and skill had wrested from them; yet, in the teeth of this most sacred assertion, they not only did enter into such a peace, but also conjointly engaged with him to act both defensively and offensively against the interests of this country. What you may be disposed to say of the morality, political conduct, and tender sympathies towards his offspring, of the Emperor of Austria, I shall leave entirely to your own superior discretion; and should you be led to speak of the birth, parentage, and habits of Alexander the Great, I beseech you to tread lightly on the ashes of his progenitors. You may say that he had a father, and a grandfather too, who are both perhaps gone to Heaven; but

that for his own manifold good deeds in this world, you hope the disease that sent them both so hastily thither, will not be extended to a third generation. I am extremely awkward, Mr. Cobbett, at descriptions of this nature, or I would not have troubled you to be the midwife of these perhaps ridiculous conceptions.

W. C.
Lynn, May 26th, 1814.

THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.—It is now ascertained that this extraordinary personage has reached the place of his destination in safety; and, instead of the inhabitants of Elba shewing any opposition to his landing on that island, they have given him, I think very properly, a most hearty and welcome reception. It was, indeed, absurd to suppose, that these islanders could be alarmed at the idea of the French Emperor burdening them with military conscriptions, for a moment's reflection must have satisfied them, that Napoleon, however fond he may be of warlike exploits, would in vain seek an enemy to encounter within the narrow circle to which he is now limited. Distinct from his military character, Bonaparte possesses talents calculated to promote, in a very high degree, the prosperity and happiness of the inhabitants of Elba; and, if no new political event should occur on the continent of Europe, to bring him again on the stage as the commander of an army, the Elbese may very soon have occasion to congratulate themselves on his choice of their country, in preference to all others, as the place of his retirement. Napoleon appears to have landed at Porto Ferrajo on the evening of the 3d instant, and next day the fact was announced in the following manner by the resident General of Brigade Dalesme, and by the Vice Prefect of Elba:—

"Inhabitants of the Isle of Elba!"—The vicissitudes of human life have conducted the Emperor Napoleon into the midst of you, and his choice gives him to you as Sovereign.—Before entering your interior, your august and new Monarch addressed to me the following words; and I hasten to communicate them to you, because they are the pledge of your future prosperity:—'General, I have sacrificed my rights to the interests of my country, and have reserved to myself the sovereignty and property of the Isle of Elba; which has been assented to by all the Powers. Be so good as to inform the inhabitants of this new state of things, and of the selection which I have made of

their Isle for my residence, in consideration of the mildness of their manners, and of their climate. Tell them, they shall be the constant objects of my most lively interests.'—Elbese! These words require no commentary; they fix your destiny. The Emperor has formed a proper judgment of you; it is my duty to render you this justice, and I willingly do so.—Inhabitants of the Isle of Elba, I am about to leave you; this separation will be painful to me, because I love you sincerely; but the idea of your happiness mitigates the bitterness of my departure, and whenever I may, I shall always cherish a recollection of the virtues of the inhabitants of this Isle, and the wishes which I feel for them.—DALESME, General of Brigade.—Porto Ferrajo, May 4, 1814.

"The Vice Prefect of the Isle of Elba, performing the Functions of Prefect, to the inhabitants of that Isle."—The most fortunate event which could illustrate the history of the Isle of Elba is realised before your eyes.—Our august Sovereign, the Emperor Napoleon, is come among us.—Give, then, free course to that joy which must overflow your hearts: your wishes are accomplished, and the felicity of the Isle is secured.—Listen to the first memorable words which he has condescended to address to you, through the medium of the public functionaries:—'*I will be to you a good father, be you to me good children.*' Let them be for ever impressed on your grateful hearts.—Let us all rally around his sacred person, emulous in zeal and fidelity to save him, this will be the sweetest recompense to his grateful heart, and thus shall we render ourselves worthy of that signal favour which Providence has conferred on us.—BALBIANI, Vice-Prefect.—Office of Prefecture, at Porto-Ferrajo, May 4, 1814.

On the 6th instant the Vicar General apprised the clergy of the island of the event by the following rescript:—

"Giuseppe Filippo Arrighi, Honorary Canon of the Cathedral of Pisa, and of the Metropolitan Church of Florence, and under the Bishop of Ajaccio, Vicar-General of the Isle of Elba, and Principality of Piombino, to the beloved in the Lord, our Brethren composing the Clergy and all the Faithful in the Isle, health and benediction!"—That high Providence which irresistibly and beneficently disposes of every thing, and assigns to nations their destiny, has determined that, amidst the political changes

of Europe, we should in future be the subjects of Napoleon the Great. The Isle of Elba, already celebrated for its natural productions, must now be more illustrious in the history of nations, because it renders homage to its new Prince of immortal fame. The Isle of Elba takes its place in the rank of nations; and the minuteness of its territory becomes ennobled by the name of its Ruler. Elevated to an honour so sublime, it receives into its bosom the anointed of the Lord, and those other distinguished personages who accompany him.—When his Imperial and Royal Majesty selected this Isle for his retreat, he announced to the world with what predilection he loved it. Opulence will inundate this country, and multitudes will flock from other parts to our territory to behold a hero. The first day he set foot upon our shore, he pronounced our destiny and our felicity. ‘I will be a good father,’ said he, ‘be you good children.’—Beloved Catholics, what words of tenderness! what expressions of benevolence! what hopes may we not cherish of our future felicity! Let these words then form the delight of your thoughts, and be impressed on your souls with transports of consolation; let fathers rehearse them to their children, and let the memory of the words which secure glory and prosperity to the Isle of Elba, be perpetual from generation to generation.—Fortunate citizens of Porto-Ferrajo! within your walls the sacred person of his Imperial and Royal Majesty is to dwell. Mild in character at all times, constant in affection to your Prince, NAPOLEON THE GREAT resides with you; never belie the favourable idea which he formed of you.—Beloved, faithful in Jesus Christ, act in correspondence to your fate; *Non sint schismata inter vos: idem supite, pacem habete, et Deus pacis et dilectionis erit vobiscum.* Let fidelity, gratitude, submission, reign in your hearts. Let all of you unite in a respectful sentiment of internal affection for your Prince, Father rather than Sovereign; and exult with sacred joy in the goodness of the Lord, who, from the ages of eternity, had destined for you this happy event. With this view we order that next Sunday, in all the churches, a solemn *Te Deum* be sung, in thanksgiving to the Almighty, for the precious gift which, in the abundance of his mercy, he has conferred upon us.—Given from the Ecclesiastical Court of Elba, 6th May. (Signed) GIUSEPPE FILIPPO ARRIGHI, Vicar-Gen. FRANCESCO ANGIOLETTI, Secretary.”

SPAIN.—This beautiful country, I am afraid, is on the eve of once more becoming the sport of a sanguinary Revolution. Ferdinand has reached the capital; but instead of swearing to the Constitution, which had been previously drawn up by the Cortes, who have been supposed to possess the character of representatives of the people, his Majesty has issued a Declaration, by which he not only dissolves that Body, but declares all their acts of government null and void. It is not easy, with the limited information possessed in this country, as to the real state of matters in Spain, to form a correct idea of the motives which could induce the King of Spain to take so decided a step; but if one were to judge from the torrent of abuse which has been heaped upon Ferdinand for this act, by the *Times* and the *Courier* newspapers, it might be supposed that his Spanish Majesty had committed some abominable act of aggression against this country or its Government. It is true, the Cortes owed their political existence, in a great measure, to Duke Wellington, and thence may arise the hatred which has been expressed as to the dissolution of that Body. It is even hinted in the *Times*, that the noble Duke should be sent back to Spain to support the cause of the Cortes against the King. Here indeed would be a new contest to justify the continuance of the income tax, and all war establishment. By and bye, we shall see what it will turn to. Meanwhile I have inserted the Declaration of the King of Spain, which the *Courier* has chosen to designate “a most paltry document—a document disgusting from its falsehood and hypocrisy, “and contemptible for its puny reasoning.”

STATE PAPER.

Since the period when Divine Providence, in consequence of the spontaneous and solemn resignation of my august father, placed me on the throne of my ancestors, of which the kingdom took the oaths to me, as heir by its procurators assembled in Cortes, according to the law and custom of the Spanish nation, practised from the most remote periods; and since that happy day on which I entered the capital, amidst the most sincere demonstrations of affection and loyalty, with which the people of Madrid came out to receive me, this display of love towards my royal person making a deep impression on the French hosts, who, under the cloak of friendship, had advanced as far as that city, being a pre-

age of what that heroic population would one day perform for their King and for their honour, and giving that example which the other parts of the kingdom have nobly followed: since that day, I determined in my royal mind to reply to sentiments so loyal, and to satisfy the great obligations which a king is under towards his subjects, to dedicate my whole time to the discharge of such august functions, and to repair the evils which the pernicious influence of a favourite had caused in the preceding reign.—My first labours were directed to the restoration of various magistrates and other persons, who had been arbitrarily removed from their functions; but the difficult state of affairs, and the perfidy of Bonaparte, from the cruel effects of which I wished, by proceeding to Bayonne, to preserve my people, scarcely allowed time for more. The royal family being assembled there, an atrocious attack was perpetrated on the whole of it, and particularly on my person, unequalled in the history of civilised nations, both in its circumstances and in the series of events which took place there; and the sacred law of nations being there violated in the highest degree, I was deprived of my liberty, stripped of the government of my kingdoms, and conveyed to a palace with my very dear brother and uncle, which served as a sort of honourable prison for about the space of six years. Amidst this affliction, I had always present to my mind the love and loyalty of my people, and the consideration of the endless calamities to which they were exposed formed a great part of my griefs; inundated as they were with enemies, nearly destitute of all means of resistance, without King, and without a government previously established, which might put in motion and unite at its voice the force of the nation, direct its impulse, and avail itself of the resources of the State, to combat the forces which simultaneously invaded the Peninsula, and had treacherously got possession of its principal fortresses. In this lamentable situation, as the only remedy that remained, I issued, as well as I could while surrounded by force, the Decree of the 5th of May, 1808, addressed to the Council of Castile, and in defect of it to any other Board of Audience that might bear liberty, in order that the Cortes might be convoked, who had only to employ themselves on the spur of the moment, in raising the taxes and supplies necessary for the defence of the kingdom, remaining permanent for

other events which might occur: but this my Royal Decree unfortunately was not known then; and although it was afterwards known, the provinces provided for the same object, as soon as the accounts reached them of the cruel tragedy perpetrated in Madrid on the memorable 2d of May, by the Chief of the French troops, through the instrumentality of the Juntas which they created. Next took place the glorious battle of Baylen: the French fled as far as Vittoria, and all the provinces, with the capital, proclaimed me, anew, King of Castile and Leon, in the metropolis, with the same formalities as the Kings my august predecessors. This is a recent fact, of which the medals struck in all parts afford demonstrative proof, and which the people through whom I have passed since my return from France have confirmed by the effusion of *vivas*, which moved the sensibility of my heart, where they are engraved never to be effaced. From the deputies nominated by the Juntas, the Central Junta was formed; who exercised in my Royal name all the powers of Sovereignty from Sept. 1808, till Jan. 1810; in which month was established the first Council of Regency, in whom the exercise of that power continued till the 24th of September of the same year: on which day were installed in the isle of Leon the Cortes called General and Extraordinary, when 104 Deputies took the oaths, in which they engaged to preserve for me my dominions as their Sovereign; all which appears from the act certified by the Secretary of State Don Nicolas Maria de Sierra. But these Cortes, assembled in a manner never used in Spain, even in the most arduous cases, and in the most turbulent times of the minorities of Kings, in which the Assembly of Procurators was wont to be more numerous than in the common and ordinary Cortes, were not called the States of the Nobility and Clergy, although the Central Junta had so ordered, this Decree having been artfully concealed from the Council of Regency, and also the fact that the Junta had assigned to it the Presidency of the Cortes, a prerogative of the Crown which the Regency would not have left to the decision of the Congress, if it had been acquainted therewith. In consequence of this, every thing remained at the disposal of the Cortes; who, on the very day of their installation, and by way of commencement to their acts, despoiled me of my sovereignty, which the same deputies had only a little

before acknowledged, ascribing it nominally to the nation, in order to appropriate it to themselves, and then, upon such usurpation, to dictate to the nation such laws as they pleased, imposing upon it the yoke by which it should receive them compulsorily, in a new Constitution, which the deputies established without authority of the provinces, people, or juntas, and without the knowledge of those provinces which were said to be represented by substitutes from Spain and the Indies. This Constitution they sanctioned and published in 1812. This first attack upon the prerogatives of the throne, abusing the name of the nation, became, as it were, the basis of many other attacks which followed it; and in spite of the repugnance of many deputies, perhaps of the majority, they were adopted and raised to the rank of laws, which they called fundamental, by means of the shouts, threats, and violence of those who attended in the galleries of the Cortes, with which they alarmed and terrified; and that which was in truth the work of a faction, was clothed with the specious mask of the general will, and for such will that of a few seditious persons, who in Cadiz, and afterwards in Madrid, occasioned affliction to all good citizens, made their own to pass. These facts are so notorious, that there is scarcely any one who is ignorant of them; and the very Diaries of the Cortes furnish ample proof of them. A mode of making laws so foreign to the Spanish nation, gave occasion to an alteration of the good laws under which, in other times, it was respected and happy. In truth, almost all the forms of the ancient constitution of the Monarchy were innovated upon; and copying the revolutionary and democratic principles of the French constitution of 1791, they sanctioned, not the fundamental laws of a moderate Monarchy, but those of a popular Government, with a chief, or magistrate, their mere delegated executor, and not a King, although they gave him that name, to deceive and seduce the unwary and the nation. Under the same want of liberty this same Constitution was signed and sworn to; and it is known to all, not only what passed with regard to the respectable Bishop of Orense, but also the punishment with which those were threatened who refused to sign and swear to it.—To prepare the public mind to receive such novelties, especially those regarding my royal person and the prerogatives of the Crown, the public newspa-

pers were resorted to as a means, some of which the Deputies of the Cortes conducted, and abused the liberty of the press established by them, to render the Royal power odious, giving to all the rights of Majesty the name of despotism—making King and Despot synonymous terms,—and calling Kings Tyrants, while at the same time they cruelly persecuted every one who had the firmness to contradict them, or to dissent from this revolutionary and seditious mode of thinking; and in every thing democracy was affected, the army and navy, and all other establishments which, from time immemorial, had been called Royal, being stripped of that name, and National substituted, with which they flattered the people; who, however, in spite of these perverse arts, retained, by their natural loyalty, the good feelings which always formed their character. Of all this, since I have happily entered the kingdom, I have been acquiring faithful information and knowledge, partly from my own observations, and partly from the public papers, in which, up to this very day, representations of my arrival and my character are impudently circulated, so gross and infamous in themselves, that even with regard to any other individual they would constitute very heavy offences, worthy of severe notice and punishment. Circumstances so unexpected have filled my heart with bitterness, which could only be alleviated by the demonstrations of affection from all those who hoped for my arrival, in order that by my presence an end might be put to these calamities, and to the oppression in which those were, who retained in their minds the remembrance of my person, and sighed for the true happiness of their country. I swear and promise to you, true and loyal Spaniards, at the same time that I sympathise with the evils which you have suffered, you shall not be disappointed of your noble expectations. Your Sovereign wishes to be so on your account, and in this he places his glory, that he is the Sovereign of an heroic nation, who by their immortal deeds have gained the admiration of the world, and preserved their liberty and honour. I abhor and detest despotism; neither the intelligence and cultivation of the nations of Europe could now endure it: nor in Spain were its kings ever despots. Neither its good laws, nor constitution, authorised despotism; although unfortunately, from time to time, as happens every where else, and in every thing human,

there may have been abuses of power which no possible Constitution can wholly guard against; nor were they the faults of the Constitution which the nation had, but of individuals, and the effects of unpleasant but very rare circumstances, which gave occasion to them. However, in order to avert them, as effectually as human foresight will allow, namely, by preserving the honour of the royal dignity, and its rights, since those appertaining to it and to the people are equally inviolable, I will treat with the procurators of Spain and of the Indies: and order being restored, together with the good usages under which the nation has lived, and which the Kings my predecessors established with its consent, every thing that relates to the good of my kingdoms shall be solidly and legitimately enacted, in Cortes legitimately assembled, as soon as it may be possible to do so, in order that my subjects may live prosperous and happy, in one religion, and under one government, strictly united by indissoluble ties. In this, and in this alone, consist the temporal felicity of a King and a kingdom, which enjoy the title of Catholic, by way of eminence; and immediately preparations shall be made for what may appear best towards the assembling of such a Cortes; in which, I trust, the bases of the prosperity of my subjects, in both hemispheres, may be confirmed. The liberty and security of persons and property shall be firmly secured by means of laws, which, guaranteeing public liberty and order, shall leave to all that salutary liberty, whose undisturbed enjoyment distinguishes a moderate from an arbitrary and despotic Government, and in which the citizens subject to the former ought to live. This just liberty all likewise shall enjoy, in order to communicate through the press their ideas and thoughts, within those limits, however, which sound reason imperiously prescribes to all, that it may not degenerate into licentiousness; for the respect which is due to religion and the government, and that which men mutually owe towards each other, can under no civilized government be reasonably permitted to be violated and trampled upon with impunity.—All suspicion, likewise, of any dissipation of the revenues of the State shall cease; those which are assigned for the expenses required by the honour of my royal person and family, and that of the nation whom I have the glory to govern, being separated from the revenues which, by the consent of the kingdom,

may be imposed and assigned for the maintenance of the State in all branches of the administration. The laws, which shall in future serve as a rule of action to my subjects, shall also be enacted in concert with the Cortes, inasmuch as these bases may serve as an authentic declaration of my royal intentions in the Government with which I am about to be vested, and will represent to all neither a despot nor a tyrant, but a King, and a father of his subjects; having in like manner heard from the unanimous declarations of persons respectable for their zeal and knowledge, and from representations made to me from various parts of the kingdom, in which are expressed the repugnance and disgust with which both the Constitution formed by the General and Extraordinary Cortes, as well as the other political establishments recently introduced, are regarded in the provinces; considering also the mischiefs which have sprung therefrom, and would increase, should I assent to and swear to the said Constitution; acting in conformity to such general and decided demonstrations of the wishes of my people, and also because they are just and well founded; I declare, that my royal intention is, not only not to swear nor accede to the said Constitution, nor to any Decree of the General and Extraordinary Cortes, and of the Ordinary at present sitting, those, to-wit, which derogate from the rights and prerogatives of my sovereignty, established by the constitution and the laws under which the nation has lived in times past, but to pronounce that Constitution and such Decrees null and of no effect, now, or at any other time, as if such acts had never passed, and that they are entirely abrogated, and without any obligation on my people and subjects, of whatever class and condition, to fulfil or observe them. And as he who should attempt to support them, and shall thus contradict my royal proclamation, adopted with the above agreement and assent, will attack the prerogatives of my sovereignty, and the happiness of the nation, and will cause discontent and disturbance in my kingdoms, I declare, whoever shall dare to attempt the same will be guilty of High Treason, and as such subject to capital punishment, whether he perform the same by deed, by writing, or by words, moving and exciting, or in any other way exhorting and persuading, that the said Constitution and Decrees be kept and observed.—And in order that, until public order be

restored, together with the system observed in the kingdom prior to the introduction of these novelties, for the attainment of which suitable measures shall be taken without delay, the administration of justice may not be interrupted, it is my will, that in the mean time, the ordinary magistracies of towns shall be continued as now established, the Courts of Law where there are such, and the Audiencias, Intendents, and other judicial tribunals; and in the political and administrative branches, the common councils of towns according to their present constitution, until the Cortes, who shall be summoned, being heard, the stable order of this part of the Government of the kingdom be assented to. And from the day on which this my Decree shall be published and communicated to the President for the time being of the Cortes, at present met, the said Cortes shall cease their sittings; and their acts with those of the preceding Cortes, together with whatever documents or dispatches shall be in their office of archives and secretarship, or in the possession of any other individual whatever, shall be collected by the person charged with the execution of this my Royal Decree; and shall be deposited for the present in the Guildhall of the city of Madrid, the room in which they are placed being locked and sealed up: the books of their library shall be conveyed to the royal library; and whosoever shall endeavour to obstruct the execution of this part of my Royal Decree, in any way whatever, I also declare him guilty of High Treason, and that as such the punishment of death shall be inflicted upon him. And from this day shall cease in every tribunal of the kingdom all proceedings in any cause, now pending for any infraction of the Constitution, and and those who, for such causes, have been imprisoned or arrested, shall be immediately at liberty. Such then is my will, because the welfare and happiness of the nation require it.—Given at Valencia, the 4th of May, 1814.—I, THE KING.—Pedro de Macanez, Secretary of Decrees.—As Captain General of New Castile, Political and Military Governor of the whole Province, and by order of his Majesty Don Ferdinand VII. whom God preserve, I cause it to be published.—FRANCISCO RAMON DE EGUILA Y LETONA.—Madrid, May 11, 1814.

NAPLES.—From the following Document, it appears that Murat is likely to have some trouble with Ferdinand the IV.

respecting the occupation of the throne of Naples:—*Declaration.*—“Ferdinand IV. by the Grace of God, King of the Two Sicilies, and of Jerusalem, Infant of Spain, &c. Profoundly indignant at the perfidious report spread by our enemies, that we have renounced, or that we are disposed to renounce, our rights to the Kingdom of Naples, we think it our duty to make known the falsehood of such reports to the powers, our Allies, to all nations, and particularly to our subjects, and very dear children of the kingdom of Naples, by declaring solemnly that we never have renounced, and that we are unalterably resolved never to renounce, our legitimate and incontestible rights to the kingdom of Naples, and that our fixed and unchangeable will is to accept of no offer of indemnity, nor any compensation whatsoever for the said kingdom, which we are determined to preserve for ourself, and to transmit to our immediate successor, in the same manner as it has been transmitted to us by our Father of highly glorious memory. All the measures which we have hitherto taken, and which we are now executing in the employment of our troops, and their union with the forces of our august and ancient Allies, have had, and have no other object but to co-operate with them, with a view to the triumph of the just and general cause, and of concurring in their magnanimous views, so often manifested for the overthrow of all usurpations, and for the re-establishment of justice and legitimate authority.—FERDINAND.”

“Palermo, April 24, 1814.”

PEACE.—The *Courier*, of last night, states on this subject, that “Accounts from Lord Castlereagh, dated on Tuesday last, have been received, which, it is reported, announce that the Peace was to be signed on Wednesday last—that the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia meant to set out for this country positively on Monday next. They may be expected on Wednesday or Thursday. They are to land at Dover, and a Telegraphic Message to that effect is understood to have been sent off this morning to his Royal Highness the Duke of Clarence. The Emperor of Germany proceeds almost immediately to Italy upon very important business.”

ERRATUM.—In the last REGISTER, page 643, line 24, from the bottom, for “many hundreds of thousands of lives,” read *lives*.

TO THE PEOPLE OF SOUTHAMPTON,
ON THE
CORN BILL.

MY WORTHY BUT DELUDED NEIGH-
BOURS.—Having read your RESOLUTIONS,
on the subject of the Corn Bill, signed by
Mr. JOHN ROWCLIFFE, the Mayor of your
town, upon which Resolutions, it appears,
you are now about to frame a Petition
against the said Bill; and being convinced,
that the views of the matter, taken in
those Resolutions, are extremely erroneous,
I think it right to endeavour to show you
that you are in error.

Before I proceed to this, however, I
must premise, that I myself *disapprove*,
not only of the proposed Corn Bill, but of
any and every Bill, or law, that has been,
or can be, passed upon the subject. I look
upon such laws as wholly useless, and as
always attended with a greater or less de-
gree of injury to the country. I am of
opinion, that the trade in corn should *al-
ways be perfectly free*, let its price be what
it may; and that the trade in all other
products should be the same. I, there-
fore, would have cheerfully signed your
Petition, had it simply prayed for the not
passing of the proposed law. But, if your
Petition had been handed to me, I would
not have signed it; because it seems to me
to be founded on, and to give sanction to,
wrong notions relative to the *causes* of high
price and public distress; because it seems
to me to be calculated (and was, perhaps,
by its chief promoters intended) to keep
the people of this country in a state of
blindness, as to the causes of their miseries,
in which state of blindness they have lived
for more than twenty years past. Your
Resolutions contain many propositions un-
supported by reason or fact; but my great
objection to them is, that they are calcu-
lated to withdraw the minds of the people
from the TRUE CAUSES of the distresses
and miseries, of which they speak, and to
direct them towards false objects; and, by
that means, to put off the period of the ap-
plication of an effectual remedy.

I shall be my endeavour, as it is my
duty, to shew, that this objection of mine
is well-founded; and, in order to do it in a
clear and satisfactory manner, I will, as
I proceed, quote the several Resolutions,
which you have caused to be published,
under the signature of your Mayor, who,
however, I am very far from regarding as
the *real mover* of the question in your town,
there being, manifestly, a stronger hand
behind the curtain, pushing the matter for-
ward.

“ RESOLUTION 1st.—That for several
“ years past the price of wheat and other
“ grain has been excessively high through-
“ out this kingdom, and that the conse-
“ quent distress has been considerably felt
“ by all classes of society; while the poorest
“ classes have occasionally been sorely and
“ severely tried with all the evils insepa-
“ rable from dearth and indigence.

“ RESOLUTION 2d.—That this Meeting
“ had earnestly hoped, in behalf of them-
“ selves and their poorer fellow-subjects,
“ who have in general borne the calamities
“ of the times with most laudable and
“ exemplary patience, *that the return of
“ Peace would have alleviated the distress
“ that has been so long experienced, and
“ would have carried comfort and plenty
“ into every part of his Majesty’s domi-
“ nions.*

“ RESOLUTION 3d.—That this Meeting
“ are struck with great apprehension as to
“ the effects which they conceive will in-
“ evitably follow from the enactment of a
“ Bill which is now depending in the House
“ of Commons, on the subject of the Corn
“ Laws; which must at once sweep away
“ all hope of a reduction in the price of the
“ most necessary article of human subsist-
“ ence: fearful lest the *disappointment of
“ expectations long cherished*, during a
“ most protracted and anxious contest with
“ foreign powers, should excite at home,
“ among the suffering classes of the com-
“ munity, *a spirit of discontent and disa-
“ tisfaction*, at a moment when it is most
“ fervently to be wished that this kingdom
“ should find rest from that tedious course

"of suspense and calamity, in which foreign ambition and tyranny have so long involved it."

I wonder why you should have introduced this latter sentiment, seeing that it could do no good, and seeing, that the point might be disputed with you. I, for instance, deny, that it was "foreign ambition and tyranny" that involved us in the war. But, I will, as far as it is possible, keep all extraneous matter out of the discussion. You assert here, at the outset, that the *high price of corn has been the cause of distress*; that you hoped, that the return of *peace* would have alleviated that distress; that *peace* would have carried *comfort and plenty* into every part of the king's dominions; and you fear, that, if the suffering classes should be disappointed in that hope, a spirit of discontent and dissatisfaction will arise throughout the country. From this it is manifest, you mean, **THAT CORN IS USUALLY AT A LOWER PRICE IN PEACE THAN IT IS IN WAR.** This is an error. It is, indeed, an error, into which others have fallen as well as you. The people at Portsmouth have promulgated the same sentiment. Mr. Waithman, in his speech to the Livery of London, is reported to have talked about "the *social connection between peace and plenty.*"

The error is, therefore, not confined to you. But, it is still an error; and certainly not less subject to exposure, or more entitled to respect, because it is a vulgar error. The "social connection," of which Mr. Waithman and you talk, has no existence in fact, and never can have such an existence, until there is a connection between *peace and fruitful seasons.* What does *plenty* mean? Why; *abundance proportioned to our wants*: And, what can possibly make one time more abundant than another, except the difference in the seasons? Will any one say, that the blights or the mildews pay any respect to peace or war? Was it peace which gave us the feeding showers, the hot suns, the fine harvest of last year? Or, is it war, which has given us the cold and dry winds of this last month of May, and the white frosts which we have had, until within these four days? Does peace give us greater quantities of apples and peaches than war does? Why, then, should it give us greater quantities of corn?

Under the very face of the thing, these absurdities too gross to error exists, and it is, first reminding

you, that the idea of an inseparable connection between *peace and plenty* is directly in the teeth of all those assertions, which the advocates of war have been maintaining for the last twenty years. They have always contended, that the *war was not the cause of distress*; that the people were better fed and better clad than they were ever before; that the nation was at the *height of prosperity*; and that veteran placeman, old Mr. GEORGE ROSE, whom you so highly compliment, has taken infinite pains to prove, that the *population has been increasing* during all this bloody war; a proof, according to him, of the increasing happiness of the people. But, now, all at once, he seems to have discovered, that *war* was a cause of distress and misery! So it has been, indeed, but not in the way that he would now have us believe.

There are two modes of meeting and controverting any proposition: by reference to *experience*; or by the arguments which the case offers. The former is an appeal to *facts*; the latter to *reason*. I shall appeal to both, and with full confidence, that the "social connection between *peace and plenty,*" will be proved to be the fruit of vulgar error—an error having no better foundation, perhaps, than the alliteration which two very pretty words offered to the author of some ancient popular ballad.

When these words were rung in our ears at, and soon after, the peace of Amiens, I took some pains to ascertain what *experience* said upon the point. Mr. ADDINGTON, who is now Lord Sidmouth, came into office, and made peace, in the year 1801. Bread, which had, owing to two bad crops and one bad harvest, in 1799 and 1800, become very dear in 1800, and in the first nine months of 1801, *became cheap the moment peace was made.* That was quite enough. Mr. Addington had given us **PEACE** and **PLENTY.** There needed nothing more. Bread had been dear in the two last years of the war; and, the moment peace was made, it became cheap. These two facts were put together, and the point was settled for ever. The vulgar notion was planted for the present generation. It was not considered *what moment* that was when peace was made. It was made in the end of September; that is to say, at the *end of harvest*; and that too, a very fine and most abundant harvest. This was wholly overlooked. This was too trifling a cir-

cumstance to be noticed. The belly was satisfied; and "peace and plenty" became the standing sentiment.

In my inquiry into the truth of this sentiment, I resorted to the actual weekly accounts of the price of the *quartern loaf*, as recorded in the *Gentleman's Magazine*; and the result of which inquiry I published, in detail, in an article in the *REGISTER*, which article I wrote, as it oddly enough happens, at *Southampton*, the first day that I ever saw that town, the 18th of August, 1804. The following is an abridged statement of that result. It will give you a view of the average price of the quartern loaf, in the several periods of *peace* and of *war* for a space of time exceeding half a century. The price is stated in *peace*, *farthings*, and *fractions of a farthing*. The years are stated inclusively.

From 1750	}	Peace.....	<i>d.</i> 5½ ⅔
To 1756			
From 1757	}	War.....	5½
To 1762			
From 1763	}	Peace.....	7
To 1775			
From 1776	}	War.....	6½
To 1782			
From 1783	}	Peace.....	7½
To 1792			
From 1793	}	War.....	11½
To 1801			
end of Sept.	}	Peace.....	10½
From 1801			
end of Dec.	}	War.....	9
To 1803			
end of April	}	Peace.....	10½
From 1803			
end of April	}	War.....	9
To 1804			
end of July	}	Peace.....	10½
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tween England and the Baltic the intercourse has been very seldom obstructed. Why, then, should more be imported *now* than before, when, into the bargain, the corn here is become *cheaper* than it was before?—The Portsmouth Resolutions state:—"That, at the present moment, the alteration is more particularly objectionable. Under the pressure of *Taxation*, necessarily occasioned by a long and expensive War, now happily about to be terminated, *the Country has been induced to look forward to the return of peace as the means of alleviating their burthens*; the disappointment of so reasonable an expectation, which must be experienced in the *increased price of the necessaries of life*, is an evil that cannot therefore be contemplated without alarm." What a jumble is here! What a strange confusion of ideas! They have here thrust together two things so wholly different, that one is at a loss to discover between them the smallest connection. Aye, indeed, it is reasonable enough to expect to pay *less taxes*; but what has that to do with the price of wheat? Or, if these sons of Neptune, who have really fattened upon the war, meant that the bread ought to be cheaper in consequence of the tax being taken from the land, they ought, in common conscience, to have waited to see the tax taken off the land first. If these gentlemen do really feel any alarm at the prospect of seeing bread continue to be dear, their best way would have been to petition to have the taxes taken from the land and the horses; for, they may be well assured, that, whoever eats bread must pay, in the price of the loaf, the amount of those taxes.

I will now insert the rest of your Resolutions, promising, that it is only on the 7th and 8th that it will be necessary for me to offer you any observations, the rest relating to the *detail* of a measure, which, I hope, will not be adopted, and which detail, if we really understood it, could be of no use except to some one in the situation of a Custom-House-Officer.

"4thly.—That the allowing at all times of the unrestrained exportation of wheat and flour, and the prohibiting of the importation thereof, at the low duty, until the average price of the aggregate quantity sold in England and Ireland reaches the exorbitant rate of 86 shillings per quarter, must necessarily be attended with most grievous consequences, and

"must effectually and permanently destroy every hope of returning cheapness.

"5thly.—That as the word 'aggregate' comprehends all sorts of wheat, how inferior soever in quality; and also wheat that has been injured by blights, smut, mildew, heat in the mow, or by damages on shipboard or otherwise; and also Irish wheat, which is altogether of an inferior quality, and which never bears the price of English wheat within from eight to fifteen shillings per quarter; the consequence must certainly be, that when 86 shillings per quarter is the average of the aggregate quantity, thus including all sorts of wheat, the actual average of good and uninjured wheat, such as is brought to the English market, will be from ten to fifteen shillings per quarter above that price, before relief can be obtained from any foreign market. That, thus, when this plan shall be felt in its operations, the actual importation price in England will be above 100 shillings per quarter: which sum is about 50 shillings per quarter higher than the price at which importation was allowed at three-pence per quarter duty under the Act of Parliament called Governor Pownall's Act; a law that had for its basis the benefit both of the landed interest and of the consumer: so that the absolute difference between the importation prices will exceed the entire price of wheat at the time when that Act passed.

"6thly.—That a graduated scale for imposing a duty on this most necessary article, must have a tendency to check, and even absolutely to prevent importation, in times of dearth and distress, when it should seem that every encouragement and facility should be afforded to the importers, in the laudable exercise of a branch of commerce, which at the best, is always subject to innumerable risks. That these risks will be so increased by the effects of the graduated scale, that it can scarcely be expected that any prudent man will venture to send orders abroad for wheat; because, as, at the end of every three months, new returns will regulate the duty on importation, and as various delays may cause cargoes to be four or even six months on their voyage, a declension of price at home in the mean time may actually subject the importer to a duty of 24s. per quarter, while he has also to bear other losses, that in such

"cases must arise from the late arrival of his cargo.

"7thly.—That since, for so many years, the *middling and lower classes of his Majesty's subjects* have borne the burthen and pressure of the times, in a manner that reflects the highest honour on their good sense, and just value of the blessings of good government and social order, they have a right to expect that, in the present state of things, the opulent landholders of this kingdom should be prepared to make some sacrifices; that, in consequence of the excessively high price of corn, hay, and butcher's meat, since the commencement of the war, the landholders of the United Kingdom, on the expiration of leases held under them, have from time to time raised their rents from one to two hundred per cent. and in many instances still higher, while rectors and *living-rectors* have also, with better reason, raised their tythes in like proportion; so that these classes have thus been in a great measure, if not wholly, indemnified against the taxes and consequences of the war: while gentlemen, (not being landholders,) men of slender fortunes, annuitants, tradesmen, and the poor at large, could have no indemnity nor relief whatever; but were obliged to bear the heavy burthen of the government and parochial taxes, both for themselves and for those exonerated as aforesaid.

"8thly.—That a Petition, grounded on these Resolutions, be presented to the House of Commons, praying that they will by no means sanction a plan that must inevitably fix the rent of land at a permanently extravagant rate, confirm the load of parochial burdens for the maintenance of the distressed poor, render the most necessary article of subsistence perpetually dear, bar the bounties of Providence from the majority of his Majesty's subjects, and hopelessly discover the pleasing association of peace with plenty and cheapness, that has so long been a source of consolation in the midst of extensive calamity."

Before people make assertions, they should take some pains to ascertain the truth of them. Almost the whole of these, which you have here made, are wholly untrue! and, it must be allowed, that Mr. ROWCLIFFE, who has put his name to them, is, in some measure, answerable for the falsehood.—What does he mean by asserting, that it is the *middling and lower*

classes, who have borne the burden and pressure of the times? Has not every landholder in the country borne his share? Have not his land, his house, his windows, his horses, his carriages, his dogs, his servants, his malt, his wine, his spirits, his sugar, his soap, his candles, his salt, his every thing, been taxed heavily? How, then, has he escaped the burden and pressure? By the *middling and lower classes*. Mr. ROWCLIFFE must mean the *Tradesmen* and the *Labourers*; for, he manifestly has no feeling for those who have been farmers: And how has the pressure been confined to those two classes? Tradesmen have raised their prices; labourers wages have nearly been doubled; servants wages have undergone the same change: And who has been paying this advance, but those who have employed those tradesmen and those labourers? How, then, have these classes suffered more than any other class? The common labourer, at Botley, did, until last Autumn, receive, upon an average, about 2s. 8d. a day. He now receives but 2s. even in the month of June; and his average pay for this year will not exceed 1s. 6d., for the crowds of labourers, who are out of work, it is quite surprising to see. A year and a half ago we were glad to employ any creature that we could find. We have now to pick and choose. It is surprising what an improver of manners this low price of corn is! In 1812, I gave twelve shillings an acre for hoeing, which I can now have done for six shillings, being in no sort of fear of giving offence, if I find fault with the execution of the work. Many men employed in that year, earned, before harvest, from six to eight shillings a day. None of them will earn, this summer, at the same sort of work, above three shillings. Farmers will judge of the state of our labourers, in 1812, when I tell them, that some men asked me a guinea an acre for hoeing out turnips, drilled in two feet ridges. I can now have the same work performed by men for about three shillings an acre. I did not give the guinea, to be sure; I had the work done by women, who worked by the day. But I notice it as an instance of our situation at that time. My harvest-men had eight pounds for the twenty-eight days of the harvest month, including four Sundays. They reaped and mowed, some of them, with pipes in their mouths, as the Hibernians, in America, used to march to

battle. They took the thing very coolly. I can *now* have more work done for three pounds. If my neighbours gave loss in *money*, they made it up in drink and food. What, then, has the labourer gained by the *low* price of corn, and how is he to gain by it? How did *he* bear the *burdens* of 1812? The fall in the price of corn has been a great injury to him. His cloaths have not fallen in price? his salt, his sugar, his candles, his soap will not fall, nor will his heavily-taxed beer fall in price. So that his lot is greatly worsted, and he is every where praying for the return of the prices of 1812. It is not only the farmer's labourer who feels this, but every labouring man, in whatever way he may be employed. The labourers of bricklayers, in gardens, in nurseries, in woods, on roads and canals: and it must be so; for, not being wanted in the fields, they must seek work elsewhere, and thus they must reduce the price of labour in other departments. The *lower* class, therefore, have felt nothing of the burden of the times. Their very manners have changed with the change in the price of corn. They are, all of a sudden, become humble as beggars. They surround our doors with cap in hand to obtain work. We were the beggars before; but, not now having the same motive to solicit their services, and to put up with their misbehaviour, we resume the tone and authority of masters; yet Mr. ROWCLIFFE asserts, that this is one of the classes who have borne the *burdens* and *pressure* of the times, and that the hour is now come, when *they* had a *right* to expect, that the *masters* would make *some sacrifices*! Mr. ROWCLIFFE seems to think, that the landholder and the farmer (as they go together), ought to pay the labourer the same wages when wheat is 15*l.* a load, as when it is 40*l.* a load. Does Mr. ROWCLIFFE happen to know any manufacturer, who acts thus? Let him consult that venerable old placeman, Mr. ROSE, or his son, GEORGE HENRY ROSE, who has the reversion of a 3,000*l.* a year sinecure, whether the manufacturing labourers are not paid in proportion to the price of, and demand for, the products of their labour? Those gentlemen will tell him, that the stocking-weavers' wages were, some time ago, lowered to one-half their former amount; that they rioted on that account; that many of them were shot; that laws were passed to punish them, in certain cases, with death. Why, then,

does Mr. ROWCLIFFE suppose, that other labourers are not to feel the effect of any fall of the price of the products of *their* labour? But, the truth is, that Mr. ROWCLIFFE does not reflect at all upon the subject. He takes up the matter upon the vulgar cry; and he puts forth notions which are perfectly absurd. With regard to *tradesmen*, too, does he suppose, that those who own, and those who till the land, will pay them at the same rate at which they paid them when wheat was 40*l.* a load? Will the man, who receives 15*l.* instead of 40*l.* have so much work done by smiths, carpenters, wheelwrights, bricklayers, collar-makers, saddlers, tinmen, plumbers and glaziers, as he had done before? He will not, because he *cannot*. The consequence *will* be, because it *must* be, that the workmanship in all those trades must fall in price, and that too, in proportion to the price of corn; and it will be still *worse* than it was before for tradesmen, because, not only must their prices come down, in proportion to the price of corn, but the *extent of their employment must be diminished*; and, as in the case of the labourers, many of them will have no work to do; or, which is the same upon the whole, they will be frequently *out of work*. Mr. ROWCLIFFE should propose a law to *compel* the owners and cultivators of the land to pay tradesmen and labourers as high prices now as they paid them in 1812, and to employ them in the same numbers. Then his conduct would, at any rate, have the merit of *consistency*; but, at present, he exhibits to the world a sad and barbarous jumble of nonsense.

It is asserted that the landowners and farmers (for they must go together) have *indemnified themselves* against the taxes and consequences of the war; that *gentlemen* (not landowners), men of *slender fortunes*, *annuitants*, *tradesmen*, and the *poor at large*, have been obliged to bear, not only their own share of the *Government and parochial taxes*, but have also borne the *share of the landowners and farmers*. I will not call it *impudence* to make an assertion like this. I will call it folly; incomprehensible emptiness, to assert, that the *poor at large* have paid the *Government and parochial taxes*; and I should not at all wonder, after this, to hear Mr. ROWCLIFFE boldly assert, that the poor-rates have been collected, in part, from the *paupers*, and even at the door of the poor-houses. Is it possible that this Mayor of

Southampton should be ignorant, that the poor-rates are assessed upon the *real* property of the country. Is it possible for him to be ignorant, that it is the *land*, and the *land only*, which is called upon to maintain the poor? Houses, in towns, indeed, bear their proportion, and why should they not? Why should not tradesmen pay their poor as well as the farmers their poor? But, it is notorious, that a considerable tradesman, in a country town, does not pay more to the poor than a little farmer, who rents land to the amount of 50*l.* a-year, and who and whose family very frequently work harder and live harder than the poor, whom the laws and the justices compel them to feed: And yet Mr. ROWCLIFFE is not ashamed to give it under his hand, that those whose property has been in land, and his produce, have borne no share in supporting the poor! This is no *particular* hardship upon the landowner or farmer; because what they pay in poor rates must finally fall upon the *consumer of the corn*; and they can, in the end, lose by the poor only in proportion to what is *consumed by themselves and families*. But, surely, they bear in that proportion. How, then, can it be said, that they have been indemnified against taxes by high prices of land and corn? I will suppose a case, in order to make this matter clear to Mr. ROWCLIFFE, who, though, I dare say, a very worthy man and magistrate, certainly does want leading-strings upon subjects of this sort.—The landowner, in fact, would lose all the taxes paid by himself and the farmer, if they did not fall upon the consumer. But, to get rid of all complexity here, we will suppose the case of a man *cultivating his own land*; for he is both landlord and tenant.—Now, suppose him to be relieved from the plague of those multifarious papers which are tendered to him by the tax-gatherer. Suppose him to know nothing about poor-rates. Suppose there to be no tax upon his leather, iron, hemp, salt, sugar, soap, candles, horses, dogs, or any thing but his land; and, suppose that land to be taxed at 3*l.* an acre, which is probably less than he now pays in one shape or another, directly and indirectly. Suppose his farm to be a hundred acres. Suppose him to grow upon it 300 quarters of wheat (and nothing else) at 4*l.* a quarter. His produce is worth 1200*l.* a-year. Take off the tax, and his wheat will sell for 3*l.* a quarter; because he can afford to raise it now at 3*l.* as well as he could

before at 4*l.*; and because, the cultivation of the land, like all other pursuits of gain, is, and must be, subject to the unerring and unchangeable laws of competition.—For, if his wheat continued to sell at as high a price after the tax was removed as it did before, his pursuit would become so profitable, that capital and talent and industry would crowd into it from all directions; and thus would competition reduce his gains to their former standard. It is manifest, then, that the tax falls upon the *consumer* of the wheat; and this is Mr. ROWCLIFFE's idea; but he seems to think, that the grower of the wheat *never eats any bread himself*. This would be a little too hard. The Jews (God's chosen people) were forbidden to muzzle the ox employed in treading out the corn. Would Mr. ROWCLIFFE not suffer those who grow the corn to fare as well as the beasts they use in growing it? Be this as it may, the fact is, that the growers of corn do eat some of it. They make a part of the *consumers* of their own crops; and, as in the case supposed, the grower would probably consume in his family about eight quarters of his wheat, he would, in fact, bear 8*l.* of the tax to his own share.—The notion of Mr. ROWCLIFFE is, that the cultivator ought, *some how or other*, to pay the tax, and *not charge it* in the price of his wheat! Does this happen in other trades? The rum, in Jamaica, is worth, perhaps, 2*s.* 6*d.* a gallon. But, by the time that it reaches the lips of those who drink it, it is worth 20*s.* or 30*s.* a gallon. Would Mr. ROWCLIFFE have the rum-grower pay out of his own pocket all the charges of cooperage, wharfage, freight, insurance, storage, brokerage, and tax, amounting to from 17*s.* to 27*s.* a gallon, and then sell his rum at 2*s.* 6*d.* a gallon to the nervous ladies, who give themselves the comfortable *comp-de-grace*, by drinking hot grog before they go to bed? I do not know what may be Mr. ROWCLIFFE's trade. Perhaps he is a tallow-chandler. Candles pay a pretty decent tax. I do not know what it is. Suppose it to be 6*d.* a pound, and the price of the candles 1*s.* a pound; why does not Mr. ROWCLIFFE sell his candles for 6*d.* a pound? Why does HE “*indemnify himself against the tax*?” And, if he does “*indemnify himself*” against the tax on his candles, why is not the grower of wheat to indemnify himself against the tax upon his corn? *Why?*

By this time, my good neighbours, you

will, I think, begin to fear, that you have promulgated something very much like nonsense, under the name of your worthy chief magistrate; but you have the consolation of not being singular; for your sentiments, if a set of crude self-contradictory ought to be called sentiments, are, it must be confessed, pretty general throughout this enlightened country; nor should I at all wonder if they were to become a set of axioms in those illuminating seminaries, the Lancasterian Schools.

We have, however, not done yet.—It is asserted, that the Corn Bill, if passed, would “confirm the load of *parochial burdens for the relief of the distressed poor*.” I have above stated, that I disapprove of the Bill; but, supposing it to have a tendency to keep up the price of corn, how is it to tend to keep up the amount of *parochial burdens*? The land keeps the poor; and, if what you said before was true, that the wheat growers will *gain* by the Bill, how is the Bill to *add to their burdens*?—That the high price do not make paupers is clear from the incontrovertible fact, that wages keep pace in price with food; and that high price of corn tends to cause employment, which, under low prices, would not, and now does not, exist. What, then, is the foundation of this assertion, that the Bill would “confirm the load of parochial burdens?” As it were for the express purpose of furnishing a suitable cap to this climax of absurdities, you charge the advocates of the Bill with an endeavour “to bar the bounties of Providence from a majority of his Majesty’s subjects.”—Why did you not, at once, charge them with a design to fix a blanket between the sun and the earth? Will the Bill, think you, prevent the crop from being abundant at the harvest time? Will it tend to impede the showers? Good Lord! What nonsense does the belly suggest to the tongue and the pen! Where, I pray you, is Providence to produce these bounties? In England, I suppose: and will the Bill keep the wheat from the mouths of you and Mr. ROWCLIFFE? If you mean, that it will keep *foreign* wheat from your mouths, do you suppose, that, if you were to live upon foreign wheat, that wheat would still be grown in England? Can you possibly imagine; have your bellies so far got the better of your brains, as to cause you to believe, that men will grow wheat here if you live upon foreign wheat and that the culture of wheat in England

will not diminish in an exact proportion to the quantity of wheat imported?—Suppose, for instance, that candles were to be allowed to be imported at 5d. a pound as good as Mr. ROWCLIFFE’S (who, for illustration sake, I suppose to be a tallow-chandler), which he sells at 1s. a pound, there being a tax of 6d. a pound, which he has to pay, do you think that Mr. ROWCLIFFE would make any more candles? Do you not think, that he would withdraw his capital from such a concern? Though the worthy Mayor does not seem to understand much about political economy, he has surely too much sense not to see that he must be ruined by continuing his trade. If Mr. ROWCLIFFE were to protest against such importation of candles, while the tax remained to be imposed upon his candles, would you charge him with the malicious design of keeping you in the dark? Why, then, do you charge the growers of wheat with the design of barring the bounties of Providence, because they are compelled to pay taxes, which keep their wheat at a higher price than foreign wheat can be imported at? I allow, that their fears are unfounded. I allow that importation would not have the effect which they dread; but, if their *fears* be groundless, they are justified by your *hopes* and *expectations*. You assume, that the importation of wheat would cause the wheat in England to sell at a lower price, and then you blame the English wheat-growers for objecting to the importation, until they be relieved from the tax and the currency which cause the necessity of a rise in the price of their commodity.

This expression, “the bounties of Providence,” is mere cant. Bread is no more a gift of Providence than shoes or stockings, or coats, or hats, or knives, or crockery-ware, or soap, or candles; and yet you say not a word about the laws which forbid — which *wholly exclude*, the importation of such articles? Why does not the farmer complain, that the ports are not open to bring him shoes and stockings, and his wife gowns and linen cheaper, than those of home produce? Why is a law of “protection,” as it is called, to be refused to those only who cultivate the earth? Mr. Waithman, too, must get into a puzzle-wit about the *landed interest* and the *trading interest*. He must talk, too, about intercepting the bounties of Providence; he must talk about withholding from the people the *blessings of a plentiful harvest*. What! does he think that the advocates of the Bill mean to

throw the corn into the rivers? How else are they to *withhold* these blessings? Does he think, that they will not sell their wheat? What, then, does he mean? What sense is there in the ground which he took?

There is one more assertion in your Resolutions, which I must notice, before I proceed to shew you the *real causes* of the dearth of which you complain. You say that the landlords have augmented their rents since the commencement of the war, and that the owners of *tythes* have, "*with better reason*," raised the price of their *tythes*.—As you do not condescend to give *reasons* for any thing you assert, it is not surprising that you should have omitted to give any here. I believe it would have puzzled Mr. ROWCLIFFE to assign even the shadow of a ground for this assertion. The clergy would, of course, raise their *tythes* in order to enable them to pay their taxes, and to purchase food and raiment of increased price: and pray, Mr. Mayor, *why* were not the landowners to do the same? What *better reason* had the parson than the squire? You may be a very enlightened and enlightening man; but if all your candles, and all the candles in Southampton, were lighted at once, I do not believe that they would enable you to discover any ground for such an assertion as this. The phrase is pre-emptive; and I cannot help thinking that it must have been put in at the suggestion of some *reverend* gentleman, who was amongst the framers of these celebrated Resolutions. The landlord receives money from the land in the name of *rent*, the parson, in the name of *tythe*. Say, then, Worshipful Sir, *why* the latter had "*better reason*" than the former to add to the amount of his former receipt.

The *real causes* of high price have, my worthy neighbours, been sedulously hidden from you. The causes are the *taxes*, and the *depreciation of our currency*. You of the town of Southampton, have no right, taking you as a body, to complain of either. You have all along been supporters of the war. You have all along supported a man who has been one of the greatest of sinecure placemen. You have supported all the measures relative to the Bank and the paper-money. You have decidedly approved of the causes of that enormous expenditure and debt, which must perpetuate the taxes, and continue in circulation the paper-money. You have been amongst the first to produce these high prices, of which you complain. Not a few of you have shared,

along with Mr. Rose and his family, in the profits of the debt and taxation. It is not, therefore, very wonderful that you should shun, with great care, any reference to the real causes of the high price, and seek to fix the blame upon land-owners, parsons, and farmers.

At the Portsmouth petitioning Meeting there was a Mr. GRANT, who is reported to have repeated the old saying of "*down corn down horn*," and who followed up this stroke of wit with gravely observing, that he hoped to see the time shortly, when *meat* as well as bread would be sold at the old prices. How far this witty gentleman, whose head was manifestly affected by the prospect of a full meal; how far he meant to go back, it would be hard to say; but, perhaps, his hopes extended no farther back than the peace preceding the war against the French Republic; the war for regular Government; and, as old George Rose called it, for "the blessed comforts of religion!" But this Mr. GRANT seems to have wholly overlooked the taxes imposed since 1792, up to which period, as we have seen before, the quartern loaf was sold at an average of 7d. If Mr. GRANT had looked over his shoulder at the Dock Yard, and then turned towards Spithead, he would have seen a cause for the quartern loaf's rise, and for its continuance at its present price, at least. If he had looked at the new buildings in and about Portsmouth; if he had thought of the millions of which Portsmouth had been the gulph, he would have hesitated before he railed against the growers of wheat, and the breeders and fatters of cattle.

During the peace from 1783 to 1792 inclusive, the quartern loaf sold at an average of 7d. and 5-10ths of a farthing. Call it 7d. During this last war, it has sold at an average of about 14d. The whole of the annual taxes, raised during the last peace, amounted to about fourteen millions. The whole of the annual taxes, raised during this war, has been, upon an average, about forty millions. We have seen that the taxes, that *all* the taxes of every sort, paid by the landholder and wheat-grower, must fall finally upon the eaters of the loaf, they themselves being loaf-eaters as well as other people: and, need we go any further for a cause of the average rise in price of the loaf? Suppose that *candles* had (I do not know that they have not) been taxed during the war 2d. a pound, would they not have risen 2d. a pound? And, would you

not look to the tax, as the cause of the rise in the price? And, if the wheat-grower has had to pay, and still has to pay, double, and more than double, the sum of taxes that he paid before 1792, will you not ascribe the rise in the price of his produce to the same cause? Or, has the profound belly discovered any rule of reason and of right, which distinguishes, in this respect, the farmer and his produce from all other men and all other things? Mr. WAITHMAN, who certainly had bestowed little reflection on this subject, got to floundering about this matter. The powerful cause, *taxation*, he could not wholly get out of his head, and yet he talked about the bounties of Providence being intercepted. He observed (I wish, with all my heart, he could have held his tongue!) that "a great deal had been said about *protecting* duties; but, when he saw, "that there was a duty of 17½ per cent. "upon land from the Property Tax alone, "were we to have no relief from THE "FALLING IN of that and other burdens?"—Yes, Sir, but let it fall in *first!* Take away the wheat-grower's taxes *before* you expect his produce to return to the prices of 1792. You begin at the wrong end, good citizens. Would you not begin by removing the tax from Mr. ROWCLIFFE's candles, *before* you called upon him to reduce the price of his candles? Would you not take off his tax, *before* you permitted an importation that would knock him up in his trade? The belly has no feeling for any thing but itself. It keeps crying stuff me! stuff me! without any regard to the means or the consequences. Say anatomists what they will, Mr. WAITHMAN, the belly has no howels. I'll shew you, says CONGREVE, "a soldier "with his heart in his head and his brains "in his belly." Have we not good reason to suppose, that this sort of organization is now become common throughout the country?

The taxes alone are sufficient, not only to account for the late average price of bread, but for its *continuance*. Reason, common sense, forbids us to expect, that peace, or any political event whatever, will, upon an *average of crops*, reduce the price of wheat, until the taxes, with which that article is loaded, shall be taken off; and when they are taken off, *how is the interest of the debt to be paid?* So that, my worthy neighbours of Southampton, when you see Mr. ROSE again, pray move him to make a hustle about taking the tax

from the loaf; and if he will be so good as to get the tax removed, and to cause guineas to circulate in place of Bank notes, or will put the paper at its former value, then I will pledge myself to sell you bread at the prices of the last peace. But, until then, you must expect to pay, upon an average, 14d. for your quartern loaf, whether the prayer of your Petition be heard or not.

Mr. GRANT, the "down corn down "horn" gentleman, talked of returning to *old* prices; but did he not mean to include, in articles of price, the *paper money*? A good golden guinea, such as was current at 21s. in 1792, will now sell for 27s. So that the guinea has *got up* as well as the corn. A guinea, in 1792, would exchange for no more than 21s. in paper; it will now exchange for 27s. in paper; and *paper* is the thing which regulates our prices. When, therefore, the loaf is at a shilling, as it is called, it is, in reality, at no more than 9d. of the money of 1792. This fact the people of Southampton have blinked. This fact has been kept out of sight. Mr. ROWCLIFFE talks about the enormous price of 86s. a quarter; but that is only about 57s. 6d. of the money of 1792! And yet this is wholly overlooked, and the landowners are abused and burnt in effigy for wanting to secure this price. They really deserve it, however, for at all interfering in a measure, the sole tendency of which is to *prevent the taxes from falling off*, and from leaving the interest of the debt unpaid. I have before stated it, but I will again state it to you, that the proposed Bill is A MEASURE OF THE GOVERNMENT; that its object is to keep the taxes from falling off; and that if certain gentlemen, zealous for what they think the good of agriculture, have become its advocates, they have not rightly understood what the real interests of the wheat-grower are. I shall suppose, now, that the Bill does not pass, and (though I am sure it cannot be) that wheat comes down to 5s. a bushel, or 40s. a quarter. The whole of the prices of the country must follow it. The labourer will get about 10d. a day; and this rate will run through all the trades in England. A horse, which now costs the farmer 40l. will cost him from 12 to 15l. consequently, the taxes must come down in the same proportion, *supposing none of them to be repealed* (which I do not believe they will be); for, if the taxes continue the same nominally, they must fall off in amount. The pro-

erty tax, for instance, is 17½ per centum upon land. Reduce the *wheat* from an average of 15s. to an average of 5s. the *rents* follow the price of wheat; and the Government will get only a *third part* of what it has lately gotten from the land.—Southampton “annuitants,” do you begin to smell your danger? Do you begin to see, that if you will not pay the taxes in the price of the loaf, and let others pay them quietly along with you, you will have to look sharp for the *dividends* on your annuities? You must be blind indeed, if you cannot see, without the aid of Mr. ROW-CLIFFE’s candles, that it is *you*, and not the wheat-growers, who would be ruined by the fulfilment of your wishes. It has been stated in those oracular instructors of the people, the London newspapers, that Sir Somebody CALL, in Cornwall, has lowered his *rents* in proportion to the price of corn; and the wise editors of these papers, by way of a hint to the landholders, say, that they hope the example will be generally followed. Well! now, suppose the thing done all over the country. Would not the property tax fall off immediately to the extent of one half of its amount? Who would be the losers? Not the tenants, clearly. Not the landowners; for wages, horses, food, all would come down to the reduced level. But, whence is to come the 40 millions a-year for the payment of the *dividends at the Bank*? I will tell you what, my good neighbours, you ought to have resolved to do. You ought to have resolved to petition the Parliament to pass a law to compel the landowners to lower their rents, and the renters to lower the price of the corn, and all of them to continue to pay the same taxes, every year to the same amount, that they now pay; for, I do positively assure you, that, if they do *not* continue to pay the same annual amount in taxes, the interest of the debt cannot be paid. There would have been something savouring of tyranny in this proposition; but, at any rate, it would not have been downright nonsense.

No, my worthy neighbours, you have had your *war*; you have had your frolic; you have had an expensive rout; and you must be contented to pay the reckoning. You, who have been open-mouthed for war for so many years, ought to be amongst the last people in the country to object to continue to pay a tax upon your loaf, in order to discharge regularly the interest of the money, borrowed for the purpose of carry-

ing on that war. Have you ever, upon any occasion, moved a tongue against the expensive measures of the last twenty-two dismal years? Have you ever endeavoured to check the enormous expenditure that has been going on? Have you ever set your faces against any act of profusion in the public concerns? Have you ever uttered a syllable disapproving of any of those measures which have produced the debt? Never. But, on the contrary, you were amongst the first to pledge your *lives* and *fortunes* for the carrying on of the war. You have always supported a placeman, and a sinecure placeman, too. You have been famous for the profits which many of you yourselves have derived from the war; and you have been amongst the most forward to bellow forth invectives against those who were anxious to prevent the enormous expenditure which produced the taxes and the debt. You ought, therefore, to have been the last to expect, or to hope, to be relieved from the natural and inevitable effects of taxation.

I *disapprove* of the Corn Bill, not because it is unjust, but because, in the end, it will do no good to the grower of corn and the landowner, while it will expose them to unfounded calumny. I dislike it more particularly (and, indeed, that is all that I really care about relating to it), because it will in case of future high prices of corn, which will assuredly come, *give the public mind a wrong direction*, and induce the deluded people to rail at millers, and farmers, and bakers, instead of looking to the *real causes* of what they complain of, and seeking a remedy in the removal of those causes by legal and constitutional means. This is my ground of dislike to the Bill, against which, upon that ground, I would gladly join in a petition; but I cannot put my name to a mass of heterogeneous matter, the offspring of ignorance and the source of delusion.

THE PRINCESS OF WALES.—It seems that this amiable and much injured female, notwithstanding the decisive proofs which have appeared of her *innocence*, and of the infamous conduct of her accusers, is still doomed to suffer all the contumely consequent only on guilt, and to undergo persecution, instead of that protection under which she would have found safety, had his Majesty’s illness not suspended the exercise of the royal functions in his own person.—Whoever has been the *direct* adviser of

the disgraceful treatment which the Princess of Wales is now suffering, will probably never be ascertained; for, after what has already passed in Parliament relative to this subject, it would be idle to expect an interference in that quarter any way favourable to her Royal Highness's claims. This is a topic, however, which cannot be passed over slightly, and to which I mean to return in a future REGISTER. With that intention I have given below the Correspondence which has passed between the parties; and I cannot omit noticing here a circumstance which, whatever may be thought of the Princess of Wales's conduct in another quarter, clearly demonstrates that the public not only hold her perfectly innocent, but deeply sympathise with her Royal Highness under her present unmerited wrongs.—It appears, that on the evening of the day when the Princess Charlotte was presented for the first time at Court, her Royal Mother, who had been excluded from this interesting scene, endeavoured to banish all recollection of what was going on at the Drawing-room, by the amusements of the Theatre. Here she was welcomed in a manner which, it is hoped, compensated her in some degree for the deprivation of that parental pleasure which had been so peremptorily denied her at Buckingham House, as appears from the following account which I have taken from the *Morning Chronicle* of yesterday.—

“THEATRE ROYAL, COVENT-GARDEN.—

“Last night her Royal Highness the Princess of Wales was present at the representation of *Artaxerxes*. She sat in a private box, and was not recognized till the beginning of the Farce. *The moment that she was known, the company rose, and she was greeted with a burst of enthusiastic applause.* The spectators called for *God save the King*. Mr. Hamerton came forward and said, the vocal performers had unfortunately left the house; but the audience persisted. They would have ‘*God save the King—the venerable King—the Protector of injured innocence—he who desired the Princess to come to Court—he who made the Queen receive her at Court—We will have God save the King.*’ Mr. Hamerton soon after came forward again, and calmed the tumult by announcing that the performers were sent for. Accordingly ‘*God save the King*’ was sung amidst repeated bursts of acclamations.”

LETTER OF THE PRINCESS OF WALES TO THE PRINCE REGENT.

SIR—I am once more reluctantly compelled to address your Royal Highness, and to enclose for your inspection, copies of a note which I have had the honour to receive from the Queen, and of the answer which I have thought it my duty to return to her Majesty. It would be in vain for me to inquire into the reasons of the alarming declaration made by your Royal Highness, that you have taken the fixed and unalterable determination never to meet me, upon any occasion, in either public or private. Of these your Royal Highness is pleased to state yourself to be the only judge. You will perceive by my answer to her Majesty, that I have only been restrained by motives of personal consideration towards her Majesty, from exercising my right of appearing before her Majesty, at the public Drawing Rooms, to be held in the ensuing month. But, Sir, lest it should be by possibility supposed, that the words of your Royal Highness can convey any insinuation from which I shrink, I am bound to demand of your Royal Highness—what circumstances can justify the proceeding you have thus thought fit to adopt?—I owe it to myself, to my Daughter, and to the nation, to which I am deeply indebted for the vindication of my honour, to remind your Royal Highness of what you know; that after open persecution and mysterious inquiries, upon undefined charges, the malice of my enemies fell entirely upon themselves; and that I was restored by the King, with the advice of his Ministers, to the full enjoyment of my rank in his Court, upon my complete acquittal. Since his Majesty's lamented illness, I have demanded, in the face of Parliament and the country, to be proved guilty, or to be treated as innocent. I have been declared innocent—I will not submit to be treated as guilty.—Sir, your Royal Highness may possibly refuse to read this letter. But the world must know that I have written it; and they will see my real motives for foregoing, in this instance, the rights of my rank. Occasions, however, may arise (one, I trust, is far distant) when I must appear in public, and your Royal Highness must be present also. Can your Royal Highness have contemplated the full extent of your declaration? Has your Royal Highness forgotten the approaching marriage of our daughter, and the possibility of our coro-

nation? I waive my rights in a case where I am not absolutely bound to assert them, in order to relieve the Queen, as far as I can, from the painful situation in which she is placed by your Royal Highness; not from any consciousness of blame, not from any doubt of the existence of those rights, or of my own worthiness to enjoy them.—Sir, the time you have selected for this proceeding is calculated to make it peculiarly galling. Many illustrious Strangers are already arrived in England; amongst others, as I am informed, the illustrious heir of the House of Orange, who has announced himself to me as my future son-in-law. From their society I am unjustly excluded. Others are expected, of rank equal to your own, to rejoice with your Royal Highness in the peace of Europe. My Daughter will, for the first time, appear in the splendour and publicity becoming the approaching nuptials of the presumptive Heiress of this Empire. This season your Royal Highness has chosen for treating me with fresh and unprovoked indignity; and of all his Majesty's subjects, I alone am prevented by your Royal Highness from appearing in my place, to partake of the general joy, and am deprived of the indulgence in those feelings of pride and affection, permitted to every Mother but me.—I am, Sir, your Royal Highness's faithful Wife, CAROLINE, P.—*Connaught House, May 25, 1814.*

(INCLOSURES.)

THE QUEEN TO THE PRINCESS OF WALES.

Windsor Castle, May 23, 1814.

The Queen considers it to be her duty to lose no time in acquainting the Princess of Wales, that she has received a communication from her son the Prince Regent, in which he states, that her Majesty's intention of holding two Drawing-rooms in the ensuing month, having been notified to the public, he must declare, that he considers that his own presence at her Court cannot be dispensed with; and that he desires it may be distinctly understood, for reasons of which he alone can be the judge, to be his fixed and unalterable determination not to meet the Princess of Wales upon any occasion, either in public or private. The Queen is thus placed under the painful necessity of intimating to the Princess of Wales, the impossibility of her Majesty's receiving her Royal Highness at her Drawing-rooms.—CHARLOTTE, R.

ANSWER OF THE PRINCESS OF WALES TO THE QUEEN.

MADAM—I have received the letter which your Majesty has done me the honour to address to me, prohibiting my appearance at the public drawing rooms which will be held by your Majesty in the ensuing month, with great surprise and regret. I will not presume to discuss with your Majesty, topics which must be as painful to your Majesty as to myself. Your Majesty is well acquainted with the affectionate regard with which the King was so kind as to honour me, up to the period of his Majesty's indisposition, which no one of his Majesty's subjects has so much cause to lament as myself: and that his Majesty was graciously pleased to bestow upon me the most unequivocal and gratifying proof of his attachment and approbation, by his public reception of me at his Court, at a season of severe and unmerited affliction, when his protection was most necessary to me. There I have since uninterruptedly paid my respects to your Majesty. I am now without appeal or protector. But I cannot so far forget my duty to the King and to myself, as to surrender my right to appear at any Public Drawing-room to be held by your Majesty. That I may not, however, add to the difficulty and uneasiness of your Majesty's situation, I yield in the present instance to the will of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, announced to me by your Majesty, and shall not present myself at the Drawing-rooms of the next month. It would be presumptuous in me to attempt to inquire of your Majesty the reasons of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent for this harsh proceeding, of which his Royal Highness can alone be the judge. I am unconscious of offence; and in that reflection, I must endeavour to find consolation for all the mortifications I experience; even for this, the last, the most unexpected and the most severe; the prohibition given to me alone, to appear before your Majesty, to offer my congratulations upon the happy termination of those calamities with which Europe has been so long afflicted, in the presence of the illustrious Personages who will in all probability be assembled at your Majesty's Court, with whom I am so closely connected by birth and marriage. I beseech your Majesty to do me an act of justice, to which, in the present circumstances, your Majesty is the only

person competent, by acquainting those illustrious strangers with the motives of personal consideration towards your Majesty, which alone induce me to abstain from the exercise of my right to appear before your Majesty: and that I do now, as I have done at all times, defy the malice of my enemies to fix upon me the shadow of any one imputation which could render me unworthy of their society or regard. Your Majesty will, I am sure, not be displeased that I should relieve myself from a suspicion of disrespect towards your Majesty, by making public the cause of my absence from Court at a time when the duties of my station would otherwise peculiarly demand my attendance. I have the honour to be, your Majesty's most obedient daughter-in-law and servant.—CAROLINE, P.—*Connaught-Place, May 24, 1814.*

THE QUEEN TO THE PRINCESS OF WALES.

Windsor Castle, May 25, 1814.

The Queen has received, this afternoon, the Princess of Wales's letter of yesterday, in reply to the communication which she was desired by the Prince Regent to make to her; and she is sensible of the disposition expressed by her Royal Highness not to discuss with her, topics which must be painful to both.—The Queen considers it incumbent upon her to send a copy of the Princess of Wales's letter to the Prince Regent; and her Majesty could have felt no hesitation in communicating to the illustrious strangers, who may possibly be present at her Court, the circumstances which will prevent the Princess of Wales from appearing there, if her Royal Highness had not rendered a compliance with her wish to this effect unnecessary, by intimating her intention of making public the cause of her absence. CHARLOTTE, R.

THE ANSWER OF THE PRINCESS OF WALES TO THE QUEEN.

The Princess of Wales has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of a note from the Queen, dated yesterday; and begs permission to return her best thanks to her Majesty, for her gracious condescension, in the willingness expressed by her Majesty, to have communicated to the illustrious strangers, who will in all probability be present at her Majesty's Court, the reasons which have induced her Royal Highness not to be present. Such communication, as it appears to her Royal Highness, cannot be the less necessary on account of any publicity which it may be in

the power of her Royal Highness to give to her motives; and the Princess of Wales therefore entreats the active good offices of her Majesty, upon an occasion wherein the Princess of Wales feels it so essential to her that she should not be misunderstood.—CAROLINE, P.—*Connaught-Place, May 26, 1814.*

THE QUEEN TO THE PRINCESS OF WALES.

The Queen cannot omit to acknowledge the receipt of the Princess of Wales's note, of yesterday, although it does not appear to her Majesty to require any other reply than that conveyed to her Royal Highness's preceding letter. CHARLOTTE, R.

THE IRISH EMIGRANT.

MR. CORRETT.—Joining as we universally have done in crying down the Conscription under Napoleon.—Labouring as we so earnestly do to abolish the Slave Trade; though practising upon so extended a scale the humane method of impressing men for the use of our Navy, and justifying the measure, by so many plausible arguments, still let us hearken to what may be said on the other side by an impartial observer, who had, at last, found an honourable and safe retreat from persecution in America.—Callous must be the heart of him who can, unmoved, read the following account of an *Irish Emigrant*, written by William Sampson, an Irish Barrister, of whom it may be truly asserted, that while, by his talents, he shed a lustre on his country, he, by the various persecutions he underwent, brought down shame upon its oppressors; and that all the cruelties with which they pursued him were but the expressions of the dread they entertained of his abilities.—The volume, containing this little specimen of Irish composition, being unique in this country, it may not have been seen by many of your readers, and it certainly will be no discredit to your REGISTER.

THE IRISH EMIGRANT.—Born in the country of affliction, his days were days of sorrow. He tilled the soil of his fathers, and was an alien in their land. He tasted not of the fruits which grew by the sweat of his brow. He fed a foreign landlord, whose face he never saw, and a minister of the gospel, whose name he hardly knew. An unfeeling bailiff was his tyrant, and the tax-gatherer his oppressor. Hunted by unrighteous magistrates, and punished by unjust judges: the soldier devoured his substance, and laughed his complaints to

scorn. He toiled the hopeless day, and at night lay down in weariness; yet noble he was of heart, though his estate lowly. His cottage was open to the poor. He brake his childrens' bread and ate of it sparingly, that the hungry might have a share. He welcomed the benighted traveller, and rose with the stars of the morning, to put him on his way. But his soul repined within him, and he sought relief in change. He had heard of a land where the poor were in peace, and the labourer thought worthy of his hire;—where the blood of his fathers had purchased an asylum. He leads the aged parent, whom love grappled to his heart: he bears his infants in his arms. His wife followed his weary steps; they escape from the barbarous laws that would make their country their prison; they cross the trackless ocean; they descry the promised land; and hope brightens the prospect to their view. But happiness is not for him. The ruthless spirit of persecution pursues him through the waste of the ocean. Shall his foot never find rest, nor his heart repose? No! The prowling bird of prey hovers on Columbia's coast. Wasted on eaglewings, the — pirate comes; ravishes the poor fugitive from the partner of his sorrows, and the tender pledges of their love. See the haggard eyes of a father, to which nature denies a tear! a stupid monument of living death. He would interpose his feeble arm, but it is motionless; he would bid adieu, but his voice refuses its office. The prop of his declining years torn remorselessly from before him, he stands like the blasted oak, dead to hope and every earthly joy!!! Was it not then enough, that this victim of oppression had left his native land to the rapacity of its invaders? Might he not have been permitted to seek a shelter in the gloom of the wilderness? No! the ruthless spirit of persecution is not yet sated with his sufferings. The torments of one element exhausted, those of another are now prepared for him. Enslaved to scornful masters, the authors of his misery, and forced to fight the battles of those his soul abhors. Death, that relieves the wretch, brings no relief to him; for he lived not for himself but for those more dear to him than life. Not for himself does he feel the winter's blast, but for those who are now unprotected, homeless and forlorn. Where shall his wife now wander, when maddened with despair? where shall his father lay his wearied bones? where shall his innocent

babes find food, unless the ravens feed them? Oh hard and cruel men! Oh worse than hellish fiends!—may not the poor find pity! what's he that now reviles them? beshrew his withered heart—Oh! Stewart! O West! children of genius! sons of Columbia! where are now your pencils? Will you profane the bounteous gifts of Nature, in flattering the mighty and the great? and withhold a nobler aid to the cause of the poor and the afflicted?

PEACE AND COMMERCE.—The Definitive Treaty of Peace with France being at last signed, people will now be expecting the realization of those innumerable blessings which they promised themselves on the termination of hostilities. Upon this subject the *Courier* says, that "In return for the *liberality* we have shewn to France, we think she ought to be willing to arrange forthwith a Commercial Treaty with us. We have not heard whether there is any stipulation to that effect in this Treaty, or whether any Commercial Arrangements have been or are likely to be settled." As to our *liberality* to France, I shall at present say nothing. It will be time enough to speak of it, when we are made fully acquainted with the terms of the treaty. But with regard to France being willing to arrange a Commercial Treaty with us, I do not see any thing to prevent this, providing we are willing to take off the high duties which we have imposed on her productions exported to this country. If we are prepared to do this, I have no doubt the French Government will "forthwith" remove all obstructions to the importation of our native and foreign products. If, however, we are not, we may then bid adieu to all those dreams of Commercial greatness in which we have been indulging; for whatever our newspapers may say about our pretended liberality to France, it will be seen from the following Regulation, that she has actually prohibited the introduction, into her territory, of all our staple articles of export; a measure, whatever its effects may be on this country, perfectly justifiable on the part of France, because without it she could not establish a fair and reciprocal competition as to the productions of her own soil.

PROVISIONAL REGULATION FOR THE ROYAL CUSTOM-HOUSES OF THE OLD FRONTIERS OF FRANCE.

Count Beugnet, Missionary Councillor of State in the Departments of the North,

makes known to the public:—That, in pursuance of the commands of the Commissioners of Finance, of the 30th of April 1814, a line of Provisional Custom-houses (*Douanes*) is to be established along the whole of the ancient frontiers of France, which divide that country from Belgium; that, in consequence of the said measure, the laws and regulations of the customs respecting export, import, and transit shall be put in immediate execution; and therefore the articles of merchandize imported from Belgium into France, or exported from the latter into the former, shall be subject to duties and prohibitions on exports and imports, as settled by Tariffs and Ordinances. Receiving offices shall be established along the whole of the aforesaid new line, into which goods of all kinds must be immediately brought and entered, as prescribed by Title 2, of the Law 22d August 1791. The articles of merchandize, the importation of which into the Kingdom is prohibited, are principally the following:—Bar silver and gold, lace, hosiery of all kinds, playing cards, tanned or prepared leather, cord, spun cotton, linen, woollen, cotton and mixed stuffs of any kind; brandies, excepting those distilled from English wines; earthenware, compound medicines, wrought metals, silk and cotton stuffs, figured and plain muslins, refined nitre, plate, gunpowder and saltpetre, fullers'-earth, ribbons, hats, and gauzes, known under the name of *English*; soap, sea and rock salt, Essence of Peruvian bark and rhubarb, refined candy or loaf sugars, tobacco in the leaf or manufactured, callicoes, glass and crystal, excepting what is used for spectacles and eye-glasses.—The export is prohibited of every kind, of arms, ashes of every kind, black cattle, wood, hemp, horses, corals, old cordage, cotton-wool, dried and wet hides, snappers, or rags, oak bark, manure of all kinds, thread for embroidery and lace-work, known under the name of *fil de mulginière*, fodder, empty vases, oil-seeds, corn and flour, and every thing relating to flour which is ranked under that class, seeds, indigo, unspun wool, materials for the manufacture of glue, and paper, marine wires, money in specie, and all gold and silver articles, unprepared hides, potatoes, gunpowder and saltpetre, rock-salt, bacon, and salted meat. The penalties, in case of transgression, are the forfeiture of the goods, with a fine of 200 francs in the case of defrauding the import or export duties; and the forfeiture of the

goods and means of transport, with a fine of 500 francs, whenever the prohibitory laws are violated. The prohibited goods which may have been confided to the good faith of the *Douaniers*, and deposited under their protection, shall not be confiscated; but those, the import of which is prohibited, shall be sent back, and those intended for export returned into the country. C. BERNARD, Delegated Councillor of the Prefecture for the Missionary Councillor of State, during his absence.—*Lisle*, May 12, 1814.

NORWAY.—From the following letter of Prince Christian to the King of Sweden, it would seem that the Norwegians are determined to resist all attempts to destroy their national independence:—"Your Majesty will not ascribe it to any want of respect in me, that what I now communicate to you has been delayed longer than might seem proper. I could wish that this communication might be able to clear up every doubt regarding my respectful sentiments towards you, and the motives of my actions. Though I am unable to employ for that purpose any other means than that which I now make use of, you will not wonder that my pen, the only organ of my feelings, expresses them with all the frankness which I owe, as well to your Majesty as to the cause which I defend. In communicating to your Majesty the proclamation of the 19th of February, I make you acquainted with the feelings which inspire the people of Norway, as well as with the principles which shall always guide my conduct. The Norwegian nation is not of a disposition calmly to sacrifice its liberty and independence; there is only one voice among these mountaineers, namely, to preserve their national honour. In vain should I have executed the treaty of Kiel, in vain attempted to give up the fortresses to your Majesty's troops; the inevitable consequences of such an attempt would have been a general insurrection, against the only authority which could preserve a people left to themselves from the incalculable evils of anarchy. By such a mode of proceeding, I should instantly have lost the authority requisite to maintain order, and should have deserved it by deceiving the people in the good opinion which they universally entertain of me, that I constantly aimed at their welfare; and as such a critical moment will prevent disorder, I had, therefore, no other choice than either the safety of abandoning a people whose whole confidence is placed in me, or the duty of remaining for their good the authority which I had till then exercised."—(*Netherlands Courant*, June 1.)

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

"GEORGE ROSE, *the Friend of the People*."—From a Report of a debate in the House of Commons, on the 3d instant, it appears that Mr. Whitbread made the following observations, in presenting a petition from his own constituents, the people of BEDFORD, against the CORN BILL. "Mr. Whitbread said, he had to present a petition from Bedford, signed by 4500 householders, which signatures had been all collected in two days, against the Corn Bill. He had hitherto been silent on this question; but he at this time thought, that the inflamed state of the public mind, which arose, perhaps, from the long time during which the measure had been pending in the House, should induce the House to put off the final consideration of it for the present Session. "There was a very extraordinary leaning of the public mind against the Bill, and this, whether erroneous, as he supposed it to be, or just, should have its weight with the House. In this strange state of things, the Right Hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Rose), who had always been esteemed a loyal man, had been called for the first time in his life a factious demagogue. Nay, he (Mr. W.) had seen written on the walls, '*Rose the friend of the people*'—[a laugh.] A friend of his, who had sometimes been deemed factious, was now accused of endeavouring to *stare the people*; threatening letters had been sent on all sides, and what was more he, himself (Mr. Whitbread), had been threatened to be *hanged for holding his tongue*—[much laughing.] He was a friend to the Bill, as a grower and consumer; but he thought that *two or three fine days in the present season would have more effect on the corn market than any Acts the Legislature could pass*. Notwithstanding his opinion in favour of the Bill he thought it would be most politic to postpone it, because if there happened to be a bad harvest in the present year, and the price of corn was consequently to be raised, this effect would be attributed to the duty on import-

ed corn."—It is very odd that these opinions, respecting the effect of the Bill, did not occur to Mr. Whitbread before. They did come from the out-set. I always said, that it was the *season*; the *crop*, that must (taxes and currency continuing the same) regulate the price. I knew, and I foretold, that the Bill, in case of *future high prices*, (which must come if the taxes and paper-money remain), would give that false direction to the public mind, of which Mr. Whitbread speaks. The Bill would have had a sort of mental effect, favourable to low price of corn upon an average. For it would have encouraged the *ignorant farmer to sow*; and, as ninety nine out of every hundred are of that description, it would in that way, have had an extensive effect. Mind, I do not mean to say, that the farmers in general are ignorant men; but, that they are, and without any imputation against their understandings, generally ignorant as to those causes, which produce cheapness and dearth. If the bill be not passed, as I hope it will not, the farmers will sow very sparingly. They will keep less horses and men. They will drain and clear less. Capital, in short, will begin to be looking another way. The consequence will be, that, in case of bad crops, or bad harvests, the scarcity will be greater, and the price higher upon an average of years, than if the bill had been passed.—But, what care I about this compared to the *political* effect of the Bill? What is to be put in competition with the *people's thinking* rightly as to the causes of their sufferings? What a lamentable thing would it have been to see Mr. Coke regarded as the cause of the *people's suffering*, while those who had fattened upon the taxes raised out of his estate were regarded as the *people's friends*!—Those who have brought forward the Bill had the *support of the government*, and yet, the farmers now bear all the reproach. The Government is happy in having an organ, who *says little*. The part for the landholders to act was that of *letting the thing work*. Leaving the Government to *carry the Bill through*, or not, just as it

pleased. If I had been one of them, in Parliament, I should not, however, have been *silent*. I should have told the people the real state of the case; how my land was taxed; what deduction the Government made from my rent; and how impossible it was for me to lower my rents, without a proportionate diminution of my taxes. I should have told the people, that if the Bill did tend to keep up the price of corn, its advantage would be to the Government and the fundholder, and not to me; and, I should clearly have shewn them, that the average high prices of late years, are to be ascribed to the *taxes* and the *currency*; and, of course, that I was not one of those to be blamed, unless I had *shared in the taxes*.—If Mr. Whitbread, Mr. Coke, and other great landholders had done this in their places in the House, the former would not now have had to express his vexation at seeing George Rose called "*the friend of the people*."—I shewed it in my last, but I will shew it again here, that the *average* high price of corn is occasioned by the *taxes* and the *paper money*. I say the *average* observed, because the difference in price between one year and another, is occasioned by the difference in the quantity and quality of the crop.—During the last peace, from 1783 to 1792 inclusive, the average price of the quartern loaf was 7d. During the war that has just been happily put an end to, the average price of the same loaf has been about 14d.—During the former period, the annual taxes raised in the country amounted to about 14 millions; during the latter period, to about forty millions. The currency of 1792 was 21s. to a guinea. It has of late years been 27s. to a guinea. Can there be any doubt as to the real causes, then, of the average rise in the price of corn?—Those who *eat the loaf* must pay the tax upon the land, and upon all the things used in its cultivation. It is well known, that the tax upon beer, salt, sugar, soap, candles, quack medicines, &c. is paid by the consumer. And must it not be the same with *bread*? Paper, for instance, was about 25s. a ream. A tax of two or three shillings was added to the old tax. Paper rose two or three shillings a ream immediately; and, who was fool enough to lay the blame upon the paper-maker, or the stationer? This Register, for another instance, pays a tax of 3d. but the tax is paid finally by the *reader*, and not by the proprietor. So is the tax on

land, horses, leather, iron, wood, hemp, &c. &c. paid back to the farmer by those who eat the loaf. Take off his land tax, property tax, horse tax, dog tax, window tax, gig tax, iron tax, wood tax, leather tax, soap tax, candle tax, salt tax, pepper tax, sugar tax, malt tax, house tax, painted cloth tax, and a hundred others that I cannot recollect. Take off all these from him, and put them, at once, fairly upon the *loaf itself*, so that people may see how the thing is, and he will not need more than about thirty shillings for a quarter of wheat. Bitt, if he must still pay them all, they must be paid back to him again; and, if they continue at their present amount, he must, upon an average of years, have one hundred shillings a quarter for his wheat, that price being necessary to enable him to pay the taxes.—This being so clear and indisputable, it follows, of course, that the increase of the taxes is the *cause* of the average high price of corn and of the loaf; and that, if any body is to be *blamed* for this high price, it must be *those who have occasioned the increase of the taxes*. Now, certainly, one of these is this very George Rose, who has, from 1792 to the present moment, been writing pamphlets (for it is a pamphleteer that I now consider him) to urge the continuance of war, and to justify the expenditure of public money and the imposition of taxes. Yet, he is called the *friend of the people*, while Mr. Coke is called their enemy! George Rose and his family are become *rich out of the taxes*. They have been, for many years, *sinicure placemen* and active *placemen* too. They have received immense sums out of the taxes imposed since 1792. Consequently *they* have helped to make corn high-priced; because the taxes are, in great part, drawn from the land. The taxes which they have received have helped to make *bread dear*. What they now receive, in various ways, out of the taxes, still helps to keep up the price of bread. And yet, George Rose is called the *friend of the people*.—He and his family contend, that they have received no more than their services merited. Let us, for arguments sake, grant them the assertion. But that does not alter the case. They have still helped to make *bread dear*. And, if they tell us, as he did once before, in a pamphlet, that we had to choose between paying enormous taxes, and losing "*the blessed comforts of a religion*," it comes to this, at last, that, having had to decide, whether we would

preserve those blessed comforts, at the expence of dear bread, or lose the blessed comforts; and, having made the former choice, we have no right to grumble at paying for dear bread, since, by the means of a long and bloody war, we have preserved the blessed comforts.—Thus, then, it comes home to the mass of the nation. The nation has suffered the war to go on; taxes were necessary to the war; and the high price of bread is necessary to the taxes. But the thing lies deeper yet. The *blame*, if any, is to be imputed to the want of a *Reform in the Parliament*. It was the want of that reform which occasioned the enormous taxes. The taxes have produced the high price of bread. We now see explained in practice what Sir Francis Burdett said of those lords and country gentlemen, who spent their time at agricultural meetings and cattle-shows. He told them, that while they thought of doing good in that way, they neglected the true means of making the people happy. We now see them reproached with those very high prices, which have been rendered indispensable by the taxes, which they so readily permitted to be imposed. While their favourite pursuits received no check, they joined in reviling every one who disapproved of the system; and now they must console themselves as they can for the natural consequences of their conduct. So long as the farmer flourished, they seemed to care very little about the burdens of the war. They were amongst the forwardest to support taxes. But a state of things having arrived, in which, as they think, their full share of the taxes will fall upon them, not perceiving how it fell upon them before, they begin to discover *symptoms of feeling*. This is good; and it may encourage us to hope, that they will extend their feeling to *others* by-and-by.—For my part, I have, I think, now done with this discussion. I shall be glad to see the Bill dropped, and so I leave it. But before I conclude, I cannot help expressing my pleasure at seeing, that the *City of Westminster* has taken no part in this silly clamour. That good sense, which has always distinguished that city, has made its inhabitants perceive that this was a subject beneath the notice of men, who set a proper value upon their rights; who consider the dictates of the mere belly as unworthy of being listened to. Thus their conduct shows, that they are good judges of the subjects that ought to engage their attention. **TAXES, and the CAUSE**

and **EFFECTS** of taxes, are fit objects of inquiry and discussion with the City of Westminster. To others they leave the babbling about petty regulations, and the spreading of false and ridiculous notions, and the exciting of prejudices and passions, tending to injure the cause of freedom, by ascribing public calamity and distress to causes other than the true one, which, if once rightly understood, and constantly kept before the public mind, could not fail to produce that *reform*, without which no event will ever make this country what it formerly was.

TREATY OF PEACE.—Peace is, at last, made with France; and FRANCE, after all her toils, is at peace. I wish I could say the same of our own country; but the day of *her* peace is, I fear, far distant yet.—The *terms* of the Peace will be best gathered from the document itself, a copy of which I have given below. But, it is material to observe, that the terms are very honourable to France. She retains the territories which the National Assembly took from the Pope, and which were always a thorn in her side. She keeps an extensive tract, not formerly hers. She retards her territory, and strengthens her defence against Belgium and Germany. She keeps all the precious spoil, which the Republicans took from the galleries in Belgium and Italy. She pays back no requisitions. She *gains* the loss of three Colonies; and, as if we had been resolved that she should not ruin herself in means as well as morals by a connection with the East Indies, she is to have no fortifications in that corrupting country. It would have been better for her if she had had no Colonies at all of any sort. She ought now to bend her attention to the settlement of her Government at home; to the cultivation of her soil upon the best principles; to the revival and introduction of useful manufactures; to the supplying of herself with all necessary articles; and to the establishing of a system of defence against her enemies, which will not endanger her own liberties. *for liberties*, it appears, she really is to have. Major Cartwright's work on National Defence, which makes *representation* and *arms-bearing* go hand in hand, would be very useful to her law-givers. Those who have *rights* to enjoy, ought to *defend* the country in which they have such enjoyment. Every man who has a vote in the choosing of representatives, ought to have

arms ready for the defence of the country. "*Arms in the hands of freemen,*" is the only safe defence of nations. Every man, who is a friend to freedom, must feel uncommonly anxious as to what will now be done in France. He must be extremely anxious to see the French nation enjoying prosperity and tranquillity, under a free and wise Government, because it is now that we are to see *what has been produced* by that grand Revolution, which has so long agitated the world. We are now to see what is the change which that event will have effected. We are now to see whether the *example* of France be, or be not, worth following by any enslaved and humbugged nation. We shall now, very soon, be able to draw a correct comparison between the state of France *before* the Revolution and *after* the Revolution. And, what is equally important, we shall be able to see what difference there is in OUR situation since the French Revolution began.—What will now be said by those malignant men, who, through the *Times* and *Courier* newspapers, pressed it upon the Allies not to leave a statue or a picture at Paris. Who urged them, tooth and nail, to compel the King of France to disband all his regular army; to keep back the French prisoners of war until he agreed to such terms? What will the malicious wretches say now? Why, they do say nothing. They receive the treaty with a sort of sulky reserve. They talk about the *generosity* of the Allies. The Allies could not do otherwise than they have done. If the Allies had attempted to extort degrading terms from France, they would have had no peace at all. The French nation is too great in itself to admit of any such terms. The Allied Sovereigns on the Continent stand in some fear of each other. France does, and always will, hold the balance of Europe in her hands. Any one power joined with her must be more than a match for all the rest of Europe. The same cannot be said of any other two powers. Therefore, it has been no act of *generosity* on the part of the Allies. It has been an act of expediency, and, indeed, of necessity. If they, with their bayonets in France, had joined together, and insisted upon degrading terms, the king would have been overthrown very soon by the people; and the *king*, as Pitt called it, would have burst forth again. But each of the Powers had its own private interests to take care of,

and this interest would not allow them to do that which our malignant writers wished them to do. The treaty, or rather treaties, have been the result of calculations of interest, and have proceeded from no sentiment of generosity.—Well, now; how comes peace to US?—It has been stated in the newspapers, that the news of the signature of the Treaty was received at Lloyd's Coffee-House with a sort of half-suppressed murmur! There is no *Treaty of Commerce*! Peace to us is not what it is to France. It gives us no hope of a reduction of taxes, while it opens the sea to all the world. Other nations will now enjoy each its share of commerce. A new and large *loan* accompanies our peace; while other nations, freed of their debts, offer security for that moveable property, of which England has so long been the sole depot. The weight of our taxes, bearing so heavily on the people of fixed income, or not partaking in the gains of trade and labour, will induce them to seek abroad those enjoyments, which they cannot have here. A person, who has no business by which to gain, knowing that he can live as well for a hundred pounds a year in France as he can here for four hundred pounds a year, will feel a strong desire to get rid of his present state. All this is felt now, and will be felt more and more daily; and, as this description of persons withdraw themselves from their share of the burden of our taxes, that burden must fall the heavier on those of us who remain. A man having funded property in England, pays to the Government ten pounds out of every hundred pounds of interest annually. In France he would pay nothing out of the hundred. Will he not seek to remove that property? Besides the dearness of living, occasioned by the taxes, is quite a sufficient inducement; and, as there is not only no prospect of any considerable part of the taxes being taken off, but a certainty that they *cannot*, must not the consequence be an alarming emigration? If, indeed, we could return to *old prices*; if we could come back to the *seven-penny loaf* of 1792, before Pitt's war against the French Republicans began; if we could shake off the taxes, or reduce them to fourteen millions a year; then people would stay at home, as they did before the French Revolution; but to this state we cannot return, as long as the interest shall continue to be paid upon the National Debt.—..... Just as I was finishing the *last* sentence, the newspaper,

containing Mr. Huskisson's speech of Monday last, on the CORN BILL, came in from the post-office. That speech, of which, perhaps, we have but a faint sketch, does the speaker great honour. Not on account of its originality, for I had said the same thing in the two or three preceding Registers, and especially in that of last Saturday; but, on account of its *manliness*. Mr. Huskisson is the only man, who, as far as I have observed, has had the sense to discern, and the courage to state in plain terms, the truth of the case. His speech appertains to the subject, upon which I am writing; for its truths are amongst those which are felt as to the effects of *peace*; as to our *prospects* in peace; as to the *disappointment* of the people; it came, at once, home to my notions about *old prices*.—I shall insert it here; for I look upon it as singularly valuable.—“Mr. Huskisson said, every subject alluded to by the Honourable Gentleman would, as the motion was shaped, come before the Committee; for the first reference to that Committee was that of all the Petitions on the Table on the subject of the Corn Laws. In some of these Petitions the freedom of trade was surely introduced. He hoped, therefore, that the Honourable Gentleman would give his vote for the Committee. He would state the reasons why he supported the present motion for a Committee, though he objected to the appointment of a Committee on a former occasion. He believed now, as he did then, that there was no probability of any importation of Corn into this country, before the next harvest. The only circumstances which varied his view, was, that of the number of Petitions which had been presented to the House. The views of these Petitioners, even if founded in misrepresentation, although they ought not to induce any Member to do that which he was not convinced was just and proper, were still entitled to the most respectful consideration of the House. Although the Petitions were in many instances the result of malevolent and mistaken appeals to the feelings of the people, they ought to be met by temperate inquiry and the fullest investigation. The circumstance of such a number of Petitions, therefore, afforded a ground for those who were favourable to the measure, to support the present inquiry; for the object of these Petitions was not to make any alteration in the Corn Laws, or to make

“no alteration in them without further inquiry. With respect to the encouragement which ought to be afforded to the farmer, it should be considered, that there was now a great diminution in the value of money; and that the capital necessary for carrying on of farming operations, must now be double to what it was before the war. The Noble Lord (Lord A. Hamilton) deceived himself, therefore, if he thought, that things could return to what they were before the war. This was one of the most dangerous errors which could be entertained. What was like to be the permanent charge of this country, now that the war was at an end? The whole expences of this country, including all our establishments before the war, only amounted to 16 millions. He could not anticipate what part of our present establishments would be now kept up; but whatever they might be, he believed that our peace establishment must entail on us a permanent charge of nearer 60 than 50 millions. Would this produce no alteration in the money value of articles? When Gentlemen talked of the increased price of bread, was not every thing else raised in proportion, and that not in consequence of the high price of bread, but the amount of taxation? It was impossible for the country to return to the prices before the war. It had been said that the obvious remedy was to lower the rents. He had not the good fortune to be a landholder, and he had no interest but that of the public in general in view. The proportion of the gross proceed of land, which now came to the landlord, however it might be represented in money, was now much less than what it was in 1792. Previous to the war, in a farm of moderate extent, the farmer considered himself requited if he made three rents from it. But it was necessary, in the case of such a farm now, that the farmer should make at least five rents to be enabled to go on. If even the whole rental of the country were remitted, it would be impossible to return to the prices before the war. He was not afraid to declare that the people of this country must not expect, be the law on the subject what it may, that, with our burthens, the price of bread can ever be LESS THAN DOUBLE TO WHAT IT WAS BEFORE THE WAR.”—There, my worthy neighbours of Southampton! There is comfort for you! Are

you now satisfied Mr. Grant, of Portsmouth, the "down corn down horn" orator? You, perhaps, did not believe me; but you will pay some attention to Mr. Huskisson, who must know something about what our *peace taxes* will be.—The thing is so plain, that is impossible that many members of the House should not have viewed it in the same light. It is impossible that they should not have seen it thus; but, except Mr. Huskisson, no one has plainly said what it was necessary to say. What I most wonder at is, that Mr. Coke should expose himself to be hanged in effigy on such an account.—Mr. Huskisson, however, seems to think, that the Bill, if it had passed [it is thrown out], would have *done good to the grower of wheat*. Here I differ from him. I grant that its effect, though in a very small degree, would have been to *cause more corn to be grown in the country*; to prevent *great fluctuations*; to prevent the *slothful and improvident farmer* from being ruined in certain cases; to make his trade a more *steady and uniform* thing. But what is all this to the calling generally? I have very well considered the tendencies of the proposed Bill; I am deeply interested in what is generally supposed to have been the object of it; in short, I have a great deal of wheat to sell, and wish to sell it for as much as I can get. And yet, I sincerely declare, that I think it will be *a good to me*, that the Bill *did not pass*.—If I am right, then, how wrong must my good neighbours of Southampton be? and how erroneous the sentiments of those numerous petitions, which the belly has belched forth upon this occasion!—To return to the subject of *peace* as it affects England, we now see that there are others besides myself, who say that the *seven-penny loaf* cannot return; that our taxes must continue, and that the high prices must continue along with them, *upon an average of years*. These truths, though not acknowledged, are *felt*; and hence it is, that with a Definitive Treaty of Peace on the tables of Parliament, *the public funds do not rise a single fraction*. This is what never was known before, since the system of funding began; and the reason is, that *peace* never before found the nation in so burdened a state. While the war lasted, men were blind to every thing but the events and chances of the war. The nation seems to have agreed to shut its eyes to consequences. A vague sort of hope existed, that *peace* would bring things back to the

state of 1792. Peace can no more do that, than it can bring my hair back to the colour of 1792, unless it can first bring back the taxes and the currency to the amount and the value of 1792.—This truth, though the reason on which it is founded, is, perhaps, seen clearly by few fundholders, is felt by them all. As cattle and sheep are guided by instinct to provide against the inclemency of the weather, and, in other respects, to take care of their health and their lives; so there is about man a sort of instinct, which guides him in the care of his interests, to which, generally speaking, he is, without knowing why, as true as the dial to the sun. The loan, about to be made, may have had some effect in depressing the funds; but still they would have risen *something* in price, had it not been for the circumstances, of which I have been speaking.

TREATY OF PEACE.

IN THE NAME OF THE MOST HOLY AND UNDIVIDED TRINITY.

His Majesty the King of France and Navarre on the one part, and his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, and his Allies on the other, being animated by an equal wish to put an end to the long agitations of Europe, and to the calamities of nations, by a solid Peace, founded on a just distribution of force between the Powers, and containing in its stipulations the guarantee of its duration; and his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, and his Allies, no longer wishing to exact from France at the present moment, when being replaced under the paternal government of her Kings, she thus offers to Europe a pledge of security and stability, conditions and guarantees which they had to demand with regret under her late Government; their said Majesties have appointed Plenipotentiaries to discuss, conclude, and sign a treaty of peace and friendship; that is to say:—His Majesty the King of France and Navarre, M. Charles Maurice Talleyrand Perigord, Prince of Benevento, Grand Eagle of the Legion of Honour, Grand Cross of the Order of Leopold of Austria, Knight of the Order of St. Andrew of Russia, of the Orders of the Black and Red Eagle of Prussia, &c. his Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; and his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, M. M. Prince Clement Wenceslas Lothaire, of Metternich Win-

neburgh Oelshausen, Knight of the Golden Fleece, Grand Cross of the Order of St. Stephen, Grand Eagle of the Legion of Honour, Knight of the Russian Orders of St. Andrew, St. Alexander Neusky, and St. Anne, of the 1st class, Knight Grand Cross of the Prussian Orders of the Black and Red Eagle, Grand Cross of the Order of St. Joseph of Wurtzburgh, Knight of the Order of St. Hubert of Bavaria, of that of the Gold Eagle of Wurtemberg, and of many others; Chamberlain, actual Privy Councillor, Minister of State, of Conferences, and for Foreign Affairs, of his Imperial, Royal, and Apostolic Majesty; and Count John Philippo de Stadion Thannhausen and Warthausen, Knight of the Golden Fleece, Grand Cross of the Order of St. Stephen, Knight of the Russian Orders of St. Andrew, St. Alexander Neusky, and St. Anne of the 1st class, Grand Cross of the Russian Orders of the Black and Red Eagle, Chamberlain, Privy Councillor, Minister of State and Conferences to his Imperial, Royal, and Apostolic Majesty; who, after exchanging their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:

Article I. There shall be, reckoning from this date, peace and friendship between his Majesty the King of France and Navarre, on the one part, and his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, and his Allies, on the other part, their heirs and successors, their respective States and subjects in perpetuity. — The high contracting parties shall apply all their cares to maintain, not only between themselves, but also as far as depends on them between all the States of Europe, the good agreement and understanding so necessary to its repose.

Article II. The Kingdom of France preserves the integrity of its limits, such as they existed at the period of the 1st of Jan. 1792. It shall receive besides an augmentation of territory comprised within the line of demarcation fixed by the following article: —

Art. III. On the side of Belgium, Germany, and Italy, the ancient frontier, such as it existed on the 1st Jan. 1792, shall be re-established, the same commencing from the North Sea, between Dunkirk and Newport, even unto the Mediterranean between Cognac and Nice, with the following ratifications: —

1. In the Department of Jemappes, the Canton of Dour Merches-le-Château, Beaumont and Chimay, shall remain to France the line of demarcation, where it touches the Canton of Dour, shall pass between that Canton and those of Biessu and Paternage, as well as, further on, between that of Mages-la-Chateau, and those of Binch and Thuin.

2. In the Department of the Sambre and Meuse, the Cantons of Valcourt, Florennes, Beuvigny, and Gedinne, shall belong to France; the demarcation, upon reaching this department, shall follow the line which separates the forementioned Cantons, from the department of Jemappes, and from the rest of that of the Sambre and Meuse.

3. In the Department of the Moselle, the new demarcation where it differs from the old, shall

be formed by a line to be drawn from Perle as far as Fremorsdorf, or by that which separates the Canton of Tholey, from the rest of the department of the Moselle.

4. In the Department of the Sarre, the Cantons of Saarbruck and Arnval shall remain to France, as well as that part of the Canton of Lebach, which is situated to the South of a line to be drawn along the confines of the villages of Herchenbach, Uebechusen, Hilsbach, and Hail (leaving these different places, without the French frontier) to the point where, (taken from Querselle, (which belongs to France) the line which separates the Cantons of Arnval and Ottweiler, reaches that which separates those of Arnval and Lebach; the frontier on this side shall be formed by the line above marked out, and then by that which separates the Canton of Arnval from that of Bliescastel.

5. The fortress of Landau having, prior to the year 1792, formed an insulated point in Germany, France retains beyond her frontiers a part of the departments of Mont Tonnerre and the Lower Rhine, in order to join the fortress of Landau and its district to the rest of the kingdom. The new demarcation proceeding from the point where, at Obersteinbach (which remains without the French frontier), the frontier enters the department of the Moselle, and that of Mont Tonnerre, joins the department of the Lower Rhine, shall follow the line which separates the Cantons of Weissenburgh and Bergzabern (on the side of France) from the Cantons of Pirmasens, Dalm, and Aweiler, (on the side of Germany) to the point where these limits, near the village of Wohnersheim, touch the ancient district of the fortress of Landau. Of this district, which remains as it was in 1792, the new frontier shall follow the arm of the river Quelch, which, leaving this district near Queichheim (which rests with France), passes near the villages of Merlenheim, Knüttelheim, and Brühl (also remaining French) to the Rhine, which thence continues the boundary between France and Germany. As to the Rhine, the Thaleg, or course of the river, shall form the boundary; the changes, however, which may occur in the course of the river, shall have no effect on the property of the isles which are found there. The possession of these isles shall be replaced under the same form as at the period of the Treaty of Lunéville.

6. In the Department of the Doubs, the frontier shall be drawn so as to commence above La Rancornière, near the Loch, and follow the crest of the Jura between Cernaux Pequignot and the village of Fontenelles, so far as that summit of the Jura which lies about seven or eight miles to the north-west of the village of La Brevine, where it will turn back within the ancient limits of France.

7. In the Department of the Lemán, the frontiers between the French territory, the Pais de Yaud, and the different portions of the territory of Geneva (which shall make a part of Switzerland), remain as they were before the incorporation of Geneva with France. But the Canton of Frangy, that of St. Julien (with exception of that part lying to the north of a line to be drawn from the point where the river of La Laine enters near Chussey into the Genevese territory, along the borders of Sesequin, Lacanex, and Sesepeuve, which shall remain without the limits of France), the Canton of Regnier (with exception of that portion which lies eastward of a line following the border of the Muzang, Busy, Pers, and Cornier, which shall be without the French limits), and the Canton of La Roche (with exception of the places named La Roche and Annanny, with their districts), shall rest with France. The frontier shall fol-

low the limits of those different Cantons, and the lines separating those portions which France retains from those which she gives up.

8. In the Department of Mont Blanc, France shall obtain the Subprefecture of Charnbery (with exception of the Cantonade l'Hospital, St. Pierre d'Abigny, La Rocheite and Montmellian), the Subprefecture of Annecy, with exception of that part of the Canton of Faverges, situated to the east of a line passing between Ourechat and Marlien on the French side, and Marthod and Ugine on the opposite side, and which then follows the crest of the mountains to the frontier of the Canton of Thones. This line, with the limits of the aforementioned Cantons, shall constitute the new frontier on this side.—On the side of the P. reneces, the frontiers remain as they were between the two kingdoms of France and Spain, on the 1st of January, 1792. There shall be appointed on the part of both, a mutual Commission to arrange their final demarkation.—France renounces all claims of sovereignty, supremacy, and possession over all countries, districts, towns and places whatever, situated without the above stated frontier. The principality of Monaco is replaced in the same situation as on the 1st of January, 1792.—The Allied Courts assure to France the possession of the principality of Avignon, the Vennissin, the county of Montebaird, and all the inclosed districts once belonging to Germany, comprised within the above indicated frontier, which had been incorporated with France before or after the 1st of January, 1792.—The Powers preserve mutually the full right to fortify whatever point of their States they may judge fitting for their safety.—To avoid all injury to private property, and to protect on the most liberal principles the possessions of individuals domiciliated on the frontiers, there shall be named by each of the States adjoining France, Commissioners, to proceed jointly with French Commissioners, to the demarkation of their respective boundaries. So soon as the office of these Commissioners shall be completed, instruments shall be drawn up, signed by them; and posts erected to mark the mutual limits.

Art. IV. To secure the communications of the town of Geneva with the other parts of the Swiss territory on the Lake, France consents that the roads by Versoy shall be common to the two countries. The respective Governments will have an amicable understanding on the means of preventing smuggling, the regulation of the posts, and the maintenance of the roads.

Art. V. The navigation of the Rhine, from the point where it becomes navigable to the sea and back, shall be free, so as to be interdicted to no person. Principles shall be laid down at a future Congress, for the collection of the duties by the States of the Banks, in the manner most equal and favourable to the commerce of all nations. It shall be also enquired and ascertained at the same Congress, in what mode, for the purposes of more facile communication, and rendering nations continually less strangers to each other, this donation may be extended to all rivers, that in their navigable course separate or traverse different States.

Art. VI. Holland, placed under the sovereignty of the House of Orange, shall receive an increase of territory. The title and the exercise of its sovereignty, cannot, under any circumstance, belong to a Prince wearing of a designated crown, or to a foreign crown.—The German States shall be independent, and united by a federal league.—Independent Switzerland shall continue under its own Government. Italy, without the limits of the countries which shall remain to Austria, shall be composed of Sovereign States.

Art. VII. The Island of Malta and its depen-

dencies shall belong, in full possession and sovereignty, to his Britannic Majesty.

Art. VIII. His Britannic Majesty, stipulating for himself and his Allies, engages to restore to his Most Christian Majesty, within periods afterwards to be fixed, the Colonies, Fisheries, Factories, and Establishments of every kind which France possessed on the 1st of January, 1793, in the seas, or on the continents of America, Africa, and Asia, with the exception, nevertheless, of the Islands of Tobago, St. Lucia, and the Isle of France and its dependencies, namely Rodrigue and the Sechelles, all which his most Christian Majesty cedes in full property and sovereignty to his Britannic Majesty, as also that part of St. Domingo ceded to France by the Peace of Basle, and which his most Christian Majesty retrocedes to his Catholic Majesty, in full property and sovereignty.

Art. IX. His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway, in consequence of arrangements entered into with his Allies, and for the execution of the preceding Article, consents that the Island of Guadalupe be restored to his Most Christian Majesty, and cedes all the rights which he might have to that Island.

Art. X. His most Faithful Majesty, in consequence of arrangements entered into with his Allies, engages to restore to his Most Christian Majesty, without a period hereafter fixed: French Guyana, such as it was on the 1st Jan. 1799. The effect of the above stipulation being to revive the dispute existing at that period as to limits, it is agreed that the said dispute should be terminated by an amicable arrangement, under the mediation of his Britannic Majesty.

Art. XI. The fortresses and forts existing in the colonies to be restored to his Most Christian Majesty, in virtue of Articles VIII. IX. and X. shall be given up in the state in which they shall be at the time of the signature of the present treaty.

Art. XII. His Britannic Majesty engages to cause the subjects of his Most Christian Majesty to enjoy, in regard to commerce, and the security of their persons and properties, within the limits of the British Sovereignty on the Continent of India, the same facilities, privileges, and protection, which are at present granted to the most favoured nations. On this side, his Most Christian Majesty having nothing more at heart than the perpetuity of the peace between the two Crowns of France and England, and wishing to contribute, as much as in him lies, to remove henceforward such points of contract between the two nations as might one day after a good mutual understanding, engage not to erect any work of fortification in the establishments to be restored to him, and which are situated within the limits of British sovereignty on the Continent of India, and to place in those establishments only the number of troops necessary for the maintenance of the police.

Art. XIII. As to the French right of fishery on the grand bank of Newfoundland, on the coasts of the Isle of that name and the adjacent Isles, and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, every thing shall be restored to the same footing as in 1792.

Art. XIV. The colonies, factories, and establishments to be restored to his Most Christian Majesty by his Britannic Majesty or his Allies, shall be given up, viz. those in the seas of the North, or in the seas and on the Continents of America and Africa, within three months, and those beyond the Cape of Good Hope within six months after the ratification of the present treaty.

Art. XV. The high contracting parties having reserved to themselves by the 4th Article of the Convention of April 23, the regulation in the

present Definitive Treaty of Peace, of the fate of the arsenal and vessels of war, armed and not armed, which are in maritime fortresses, surrendered by France in execution of Art. II. of the said Convention, it is agreed that the said vessels and ships of war, armed and not armed, as also the naval artillery, the naval stores, and all the materials of construction and armament, shall be divided between France and the country where the fortresses are situated, in the proportion of two-thirds to France, and one-third to the powers to whom such fortresses shall appertain. The vessels and ships which are building, and which shall not be ready for launching in six weeks after the present treaty, shall be considered as materials, and as such divided in the proportion above assigned, after being taken to pieces. Commissaries shall be mutually appointed to arrange the division, and draw up a statement thereof, and passports shall be given by the Allied Powers, to secure the return to France of the French workmen, seamen, and agents. The vessels and arsenals existing in the maritime fortresses which shall have fallen into the power of the Allies anterior to the 23d of April, are not included in the above stipulations, nor the vessels and arsenals which belonged to Holland, and in particular the Texel fleet. The French Government binds itself to withdraw, or cause to be sold, all that shall belong to it by the above stated stipulations, within the period of three months after the division has been effected. In future, the Port of Antwerp shall be solely a port of Commerce.

Art. XVI. The high contracting parties wishing to place and cause to be placed in entire oblivion the divisions which have agitated Europe, declare and promise, that in the countries restored and ceded by the present treaty, no individual of whatever class or condition shall be prosecuted, harassed, or disturbed in his person or property, under any pretext, or for his attachment either to any of the contracting parties, or to Governments which have ceased to exist, or from any other cause, unless for debts contracted to individuals, or for acts posterior to the present treaty.

Art. XVII. In all the countries which may or shall change masters, as well in virtue of the present treaty, as of arrangements to be made in consequence thereof, the inhabitants, both natives and foreigners, of whatever class or condition, shall be allowed a space of six years, reckoning from the exchange of the ratifications, in order to dispose, if they think proper, of their property, whether acquired before or during the present war, and to retire to whatever country they please.

Art. XVIII. The Allied Powers, wishing to give his most Christian Majesty a new proof of their desire to cause to disappear as much as lies in their power, the consequences of the period of calamity so happily terminated by the present peace, renounce, in toto, the sums which the Government had to re-demand of France, by reason of any contracts, supplies, or advances whatsoever, made to the French Government in the different wars which have taken place since 1792.—His Most Christian Majesty, on his side, renounces every claim which he might make on the Allied Powers on similar grounds. In execution of this Article, the high contracting parties engage mutually to give up all titles, bonds, and documents relating to debts which they have reciprocally renounced.

Art. XIX. The French Government engages to cause to be liquidated and paid all sums which it shall find itself bound in duty to pay in countries beyond its territories, in virtue of contracts or other formal engagements entered into between individuals or private establishments,

and the French authorities, both for supplies and legal obligations.

Art. XX. The High Contracting Powers, immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, will appoint Commissaries to regulate and execute the execution of the whole of the measures contained in Articles XVIII. and XIX. These Commissaries shall employ themselves in the examination of the claims mentioned in the preceding Article, of the liquidation of the sums claimed, and of the mode which the French Government shall propose for paying them. They shall also be charged with the giving up of the titles, obligations, and documents relative to the debts which the high contracting powers mutually renounce, in such way, that the ratification of the result of their labours shall complete this reciprocal renunciation.

Art. XXI. The debts specially hypothecated in their origin on the countries which cease to belong to France, or contracted for their internal administration, shall remain a charge on these same countries. An account shall in consequence be kept for the French Government, commencing with the 23d December, 1811, of such of those debts as have been converted into inscriptions in the great book of the public debt of France. The titles of all such as have not been prepared for the inscription, nor have been yet inscribed, shall be given up to the Governments of the respective countries. Statements of all these debts shall be drawn up by a mixed commission.

Art. XXII. The French Government, on its side, shall remain charged with the repayment of the sums paid by the subjects of the above-mentioned countries into the French chests, whether under the head of cautionnements, deposits, or consignments. In like manner French subjects, servants of the said countries, who have paid sums under the head of cautionnements, deposits, or consignments, into their respective treasuries, shall be faithfully reimbursed.

Art. XXIII. The titulars of places subjected to cautionment, who have not the handling of the money, shall be repaid with interest, until the full payment at Paris, by fifths and annually, commencing from the date of the present Treaty.—With regard to those who are accountable, the payment shall take place, at the latest, six months after the presentation of their accounts, the case of malversation alone excepted. A copy of the last account shall be transmitted to the Government of their country to serve it for information, and as a starting point.

Art. XXIV. The judicial deposits and consignments, made into the chest of the sinking fund in execution of the law of the 28th Nivose, year 19 (18th of January 1805), and which belong to the inhabitants of the countries which France ceases to possess, shall be restored within a year, dating from the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, into the hands of the authorities of the said countries, with the exception of such deposits and consignments as French subjects are interested in; in which case, they shall remain in the chest of the sinking fund, not to be restored but on proofs resulting from the decisions of the competent authorities.

Art. XXV. The funds deposited by the communes and public establishments in the chest of service and in the chest of the sinking fund, or any other government chest, shall be repaid to them by fifths from year to year, reckoning from the date of the present treaty, with the deduction of advances which shall have been made to them, and saving the regular claims made upon these funds by creditors of the said communes and public establishments.

Art. XXVI. Dating from the 1st of January, 1814, the French Government ceases to be charged with the payment of any pension, civil, military, or ecclesiastical, pension of retirement, or half-pay, to any individual, who is no longer a French subject.

Art. XXVII. The national domains acquired for a valuable consideration by French subjects, in the ci-devant departments of Belgium, the left bank of the Rhine and of the Alps, without the ancient limits of France, are and remain guaranteed to the purchasers.

Art. XXVIII. The abolition of the Arois, d'Aubaine, defraction, and others of the same nature, in the countries which reciprocally stipulated it with France, or which had been antecedently annexed to it, is expressly confirmed.

Art. XXIX. The French Government engages to cause to be restored the obligations and other titles which shall have been seized in the provinces occupied by the French armies or administrations; and in cases where restitution cannot be made, these obligations and titles are and remain annihilated.

Art. XXX. The sums which shall be due for all works of public utility not yet terminated, or terminated posterior to the 31st of December, 1812, on the Rhine, and in the departments detached from France, by the present treaty, shall pass to the charge of future possessors of the territory, and shall be liquidated by the commission charged with the liquidation of the debts of the district.

Art. XXXI. All archives, charts, plans, and documents whatsoever belonging to the countries ceded, and connected with their administration, shall be faithfully restored at the same time with the countries; or, if that be impracticable, within a period not more than six months after the surrender of the said countries. This stipulation is applicable to archives, charts, and plans, which may have been carried off in countries for the moment occupied by the different armies.

Art. XXXII. Within a period of two months, all the Powers who have been engaged in both sides in the present war, shall send Plenipotentiaries to Vienna, in order to regulate, in a General Congress, the arrangements necessary for completing the dispositions of the present Treaty.

Art. XXXIII. The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged within a fortnight, or sooner, if practicable.

In testimony whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

(L. S.) (Signed) The Prince of BENEVENT.

(L. S.) The Prince of METTERNICH.

(L. S.) J. P. Count STADION.

ADDITIONAL ARTICLE.

The High Contracting Parties, wishing to efface all traces of the unfortunate events which have weighed heavily on their people, have agreed explicitly to annul the effects of the Treaties of 1815 and 1809, in as far as they are not already actually annulled by the present Treaty. In consequence of this declaration, His Most Christian Majesty engages that the decrees issued against French, or reputed French subjects, being, or having been in the service of his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, shall remain without effect, as well as the judgments which may have been passed in execution of these decrees.—The present additional Article shall have the same force and effect as if it had been inserted in the present Treaty of this date. It shall be ratified, and the ratification shall be exchanged at the same time. In testimony whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed it, and

affixed thereto the seal of their arms. Done at Paris, this 30th May, 1814.

(L. S.) (Signed) The Prince of BENEVENT.

(L. S.) The Prince of METTERNICH.

(L. S.) Count STADION.

The same day, at the same time and place, the same Treaty of Definitive Peace was concluded—between France and Russia; between France and Great Britain; between France and Prussia; and signed, viz. The Treaty between France and Russia:

For France by M. Charles Maurice Talleyrand Perigord, Prince of Benevent (*ut supra*); and for Russia, by M. M. Count Rastoumofsky, Privy Counsellor of his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, Knight of the Orders of St. Andrew, St. Alexander Newsky, Grand Cross of that of St. Wolodimir of the 1st class; and Charles Robert Count Nesselrode, Privy Counsellor of his said Majesty, Chamberlain, Secretary of State, Knight of the Order of St. Alexander Newsky, Grand Cross of that of St. Wolodimir of the 2d class, Grand Cross of the Order of Leopold of Austria, of that of the Red Eagle of Prussia, of the Polar Star of Sweden, and of the Golden Eagle of Wittenberg.

The Treaty between France and Great Britain:—

For France, by Charles Maurice Talleyrand Perigord, Prince of Benevent (*ut supra*); and for Great Britain, by the Right Hon. Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, Privy Counsellor of his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Member of his Parliament, Colonel of the Regiment of Londonderry Militia, and his Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, &c.—George Gordon, Earl of Aberdeen, Viscount Formartin, Lord Haddo, Turvis, and Kellie, &c. one of the 16 Scotch Peers, Knight of the most ancient Order of the Thistle, and his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to his Imperial, Royal, and Apostolic Majesty; William Shaw Cathcart, Viscount Cathcart, Baron Cathcart and Greenock, Counsellor of his said Majesty, Knight of the Order of the Thistle, and of several Russian Orders, General in his Armies, and his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to his Majesty the Emperor of Russia; and the Hon. Charles William Stewart, Knight of the most Honourable Order of the Bath, Member of his Parliament, Knight of the Prussian Orders of the Black and Red Eagle, and of many others, and his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to his Majesty the King of Prussia.

The Treaty between France and Prussia:—

For France, by M. C. Talleyrand Perigord, Prince of Benevent, (*ut supra*).—And for Prussia by M. M. Charles Augustus Baron Hardenberg, Chancellor of State to his Majesty the King of Prussia, Knight of the Orders of the Black and Red Eagle, and of many other Orders, and Charles William Baron Humboldt, Minister of State of his said Majesty, and Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to his Imperial, Royal, and Apostolic Majesty.

With the following additional articles:—

ARTICLE ADDITIONAL TO THE TREATY WITH RUSSIA.

The Duchy of Warsaw having been under the administration of a provisional council established by Russia ever since that country was occupied by her arms, the two high contracting parties have agreed to appoint immediately a Special Com-

mission, composed on both sides of an equal number of Commissioners, who shall be charged with the examination and liquidation of their respective claims, and all the arrangements relative thereto.—The present additional article shall have the same force and effect, as if inserted verbatim in the patent treaty of this date. It shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged at the same time; In testimony whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed and same, and affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at Paris, this 30th day of May, 1814.

(L. S.) (Signed) The Prince of BENEVENT.

(L. S.) ANDREW Count RASUMOFFSKY.

(L. S.) CHAS. ROBERT Count NESSELRODE

ARTICLES ADDITIONAL TO THE TREATY WITH GREAT BRITAIN.

Article I. His Most Christian Majesty, participating without reserve in all the sentiments of his Britannic Majesty relative to a species of commerce, which is equally repugnant to the principles of natural justice, and the lights of the times in which we live, engages to unite, at a future Congress, all his efforts to those of his Britannic Majesty, in order to cause all the Powers of Christendom to proclaim the abolition of the Slave Trade, in such manner that the said trade may cease universally, as it shall cease definitively, and in all events on the part of France, within a period of five years, and that besides, pending the duration of this period, no trader in slaves shall be at liberty to import or sell them elsewhere, but in the colonies of the state to which he belongs.

Art. II. The British Government and the French Government will immediately appoint Commissioners to liquidate their respective expenses for the maintenance of prisoners of war, for the purpose of coming to an arrangement on the manner of paying off the balance which shall be found in favour of either of the two powers.

Art. III. The prisoners of war respectively shall be bound to discharge, before their departure from the place of their detention, the private debts which they may have there contracted, or at least to give satisfactory security.

Art. IV. There shall be on both sides, immediately after ratification of the present Treaty, a removal of the sequestration which, since the year 1792, may have been placed on the funds, revenues, debts, and all other effects whatever of the high contracting powers, or of their subjects.—The same Commissioners mentioned in Art. II. shall employ themselves in the examination and liquidation of the claims of his Britannic Majesty upon the French Government, for the value of property moveable or immovable unduly confiscated by the French authorities, as well as for the total or partial loss of their debts or other property, unduly detained under sequestration since the year 1792.—France engages to treat in this respect the subjects of England with the same justice that the subjects of France have experienced in England; and the English Government, wishing, on its part, to concur in this new testimony that the Allied Powers have given to his most Christian Majesty of their desire to remove entirely the consequences of the epoch of misfortune, so happily terminated by the present peace, engages on its side (as soon as complete justice shall be done to its subjects,) to renounce the whole amount of the excess which may be found in its favour, relative to the maintenance of the prisoners of war, so that the ratification of the result of the labours, of the undersigned Commissioners, and which shall be adjudged to belong to the subjects of his Britannic Majesty, shall render its renunciation complete.

Art. V. The two High Contracting Powers,

desirous to establish the most amicable relations between their respective subjects, reserve to themselves a promise to come to an understanding and arrangement as soon as possible, on their commercial interests, with the intention of encouraging and augmenting the prosperity of their respective States. The present additional articles shall have the same force and validity, as if they had been inserted in those words in the treaty of this day. They shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at the same time. In faith of which the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed them, and affixed the seal of their arms.

Dated and signed as above.

ADDITIONAL ARTICLE TO THE TREATY WITH PRUSSIA.

Though the Treaty of Peace concluded at Basle the 8th of April, 1795; that of Tilsit, of the 9th July, 1807; the Convention of Paris, of the 20th September 1808; as well as all the Convention and acts whatsoever, concluded since the peace of Basle between Prussia and France, are already virtually annulled by the present Treaty, the High Contracting Powers have nevertheless thought fit to declare expressly that the said Treaties cease to be obligatory for all their articles, both patent and secret, and that they mutually renounce all right, and release themselves from all obligation which might result from them.

His Most Christian Majesty promises that the decrees issued against French subjects, or reputed Frenchmen, being or having been in the service of his Prussian Majesty, shall be of no effect, as well as the judgments which may have been passed in execution of those decrees.

The present additional Article shall have the same force and effect, as if it were inserted, word for word, in the patent Treaty of this day. It shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged at the same time. In faith of which the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed it, and affixed their seals.

Dated and signed as above.

AMERICAN WAR.—But we are at war yet. It is the Continent only which has got peace. We have a finger in the pye in Portugal, a collation in Spain, a tid bit in Sicily, and a good thumping war with America as a standing dish.—This war promises to be to us, like the last labour of Hercules, the toughest of all. It does not appear to be very easy for us to get any foreign troops to fight for our money in that country. The distance to send horses, with their hay and straw, is pretty considerable. When I first heard of a camp of Russians being about to be formed in my neighbourhood, I destined them for America; but, it seems, from what I see in the newspapers, that they are merely coming as a guard to the Emperor, and are to go home in their own fleet. That the object of the American war is, however, become rather serious, would appear from the Report of a speech of Sir JOSEPH YORKE, in the House of Commons, Wednesday, the 1st instant, in the following words, as taken from the *Courier*

newspaper of Thursday, the 2d instant :—
 “ Sir J. YORKE observed, that although
 “ one great enemy of this country, Bona-
 “ parte, had been *deposed*, there was *another*
 “ *gentleman* whose *deposition* was also
 “ *necessary to our interest*, he meant Mr.
 “ *President Madison*, and with a view to
 “ **THAT DEPOSITION** a considerable
 “ naval force must be kept up, especially
 “ in the Atlantic. But as to his Hon.
 “ Friend’s opinion respecting the reduc-
 “ tion of the Navy, he wished it to be con-
 “ sidered that a number of shipping were
 “ employed in conveying French prisoners
 “ to France, and bringing home our own
 “ countrymen. So much for the occupa-
 “ tion of our navy on the home station.—
 “ But from the Mediterranean, for in-
 “ stance, several three deckers were order-
 “ ed home, and he could swear, that no
 “ practicable exertion would be remitted
 “ to reduce the expence of our Naval De-
 “ partment.”—Now, perhaps, this re-
 port of Sir Joseph Yorke’s speech might be
 an erroneous Report; but I take it word
 for word as I find it in the newspaper; and
 if it really was delivered by Sir Joseph
 Yorke, it is well calculated to excite most
 serious and anxious thoughts on both sides
 of the Atlantic; but especially on this side,
 where an already well-sweated purse had a
 prospect, as we hoped, of being spared a
 little in future.—Sir Joseph Yorke is
 one of the *Lords of the Admiralty*; and,
 therefore, must have spoken, in all proba-
 bility, not only with a thorough knowledge
 of the views of the Ministry, but with their
 privity and approbation; and it is through
 this official channel, that we learn, that
 the war has for its immediate object, **THE**
DEPOSITION OF THE PRESI-
DENT OF THE UNITED STATES!
 —Now, then, Jonathan, stand clear;
 for, in case the war goes on, the *ulti-*
mate object must be of a very serious
 character indeed.—I must confess, how-
 ever, that I am not quite so sanguine as
 Sir J. Yorke appears to be as to the *suc-*
cess of the enterprize. The Americans
 do not like taxes, and they are in the
 right; but they like something still less—
 and that is *slavery*, to which they would,
 of course, be reduced, if conquered by a
 foreign enemy. They are a rabble of
 armed men, compared with our troops;
 but they are *armed*, and they are *free*;
 and a nation of freemen in arms were
 never yet subdued. Besides, the Ame-
 ricans are brave; they are hardy; they

are adroit in the use of all warlike instru-
 ments; they possess as much courage as
 their assailants; are more sober, more
 cool, and would be animated by a thousand
 motives which have no place, and can have
 no place, in the breasts of those who would
 be sent to fight against them. They must
 be sensible of their *fate*, if defeated in a
 contest upon the ground said to have been
 stated by Sir Joseph Yorke. So that, if
 the speech he correctly reported, here is
 certainly a hopeful job cut out for us. I
 am disposed to believe, however, that if
 nothing else would prevent a war for such
 an object, a representation of the state of
 our *purse* will have that desirable effect;
 and that thus we shall, at last, once more
 see our country at peace with all the
 world. I shall not, however, be surprized
 if this is not the case. There are so
 many people who feel an interest in per-
 petuating war; the mad passions of the
 nation have been wound up to so high a
 pitch; the revenge on account of the de-
 feat of our frigates; the implacable, the
hereditary hatred of some persons against
 the Americans; the diabolical malice of
 many in this country against every people
 enjoying any portion of real, and not *sham*
 freedom; all these together are at work
 in favour of a long and bloody war with
 America; and, as to whether they will
 prevail, my fears really rather outweigh
 my hopes.

NEW CONSTITUTION OF FRANCE.—This
 important document, in which is involved
 the future welfare of so many millions of
 human beings, was submitted to the Legis-
 lative Body of France on the 4th instant.
 As it will form the subject of reference in
 future REGISTERS, I have given a copy of it
 here; together with the speech of the King
 of France addressed to the Assembly on
 this interesting occasion:—

“ GENTLEMEN—When, for the first time
 “ I came into this Assembly, surrounded by
 “ the great Bodies of the State, the repre-
 “ sentatives of a nation which does not
 “ cease to lavish upon me the most affecting
 “ marks of its love, I congratulate myself
 “ in having become the dispenser of those
 “ blessings which the Divine Providence
 “ deigns to grant to my people. I have made
 “ with Austria, Russia, England, and Prus-
 “ sia, a peace, in which are included their
 “ Allies, that is to say, all the Princes of
 “ Christendom. The war was universal.—
 “ The reconciliation is the same. The rank
 “ which France has always held among the
 “ nations, has not been transferred to any
 “ other, and remains to it without parti-

tion. Every thing which the other States have acquired of security, equally increases hers, and consequently adds to her real power. That, therefore, which she does not retain of her conquests, ought not to be regarded as a retrenchment of her real strength. The glory of the French arms has received no stain: the monuments of their valour subsist, and the *chef's d'œuvres* of the arts will belong to us in future, by rights more stable and more sacred than those of victory. The channels of commerce, so long closed, are going to be opened. The market of France will be no longer the only one open to the productions of its soil and its industry. Those for which habit has created a want, or which are necessary to the arts which it exercises, will be supplied to her by the Colonies which she recovers. She will no longer be obliged to deprive herself of them, or to obtain them only upon ruinous terms. Our manufactures are about to flourish, our maritime cities to revive, and every thing promises that a long peace abroad, and permanent felicity at home, will be the happy fruits of the peace. A melancholy recollection, nevertheless, disturbs my joy. I was born, I flattered myself that I should remain my whole life the most faithful subject of the best of Kings, and this day I occupy his place! But, however, he is not entirely dead; he lives again in this testament which he left for the instruction of the august and unfortunate child who ought to have reigned before me. It is with eyes fixed upon this immortal work—it is penetrated with the sentiments which dictated it; it is guided by the experience, and seconded by the counsels, of several among you that have drawn up the Constitutional Charter which is now going to be read, and which is founded upon the solid bases of the prosperity of the State. My Chancellor will acquaint you in detail with my paternal intentions."

PUBLIC RIGHTS OF FRANCE.

Art. I. The French are equal before the law, whatever may be their titles and ranks.

Art. II. They contribute, without distinction, in proportion to their fortune, to the expenses of the State.

Art. III. They are all equally admissible to civil and religious employments.

Art. IV. Their liberty is equally secured: no person can be arrested or prosecuted except in cases provided by the law, and in the form which it prescribes.

Art. V. Every one professes his own religion with an equal liberty, and obtains for his worship the same protection.

Art. VI. However, the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman religion, is the religion of the State.

Art. VII. The Ministers of the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman religion, and those of the other Christian religions, only, receive maintenance from the Royal Treasury.

Art. VIII. The French have a right to publish and print their opinions, conforming to the

laws intended to restrain the abuse of that liberty.

Art. IX. All kinds of property is inviolable, not excepting that which is called national, the law making no kind of difference between them.

Art. X. The State may require the sacrifice of property, on account of any public interest legally established; but with a previous indemnity.

Art. XI. All animadversions on opinions and votes given before the Restoration are forbidden. The same oblivion is enjoined the tribunals and the citizens.

Art. XII. The conscription is abolished. The mode of buying the land and sea forces is determined by the law.

FORMS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KING.

Art. XIII. The person of the King is inviolable and sacred. His Ministers are responsible. To the King belongs the Executive Power.

Art. XIV. The King is the Supreme Head of the State; commands the land and sea forces; declares war; concludes treaties of peace, alliance, and commerce; appoints to all offices of public administration, and issues the regulations and ordinances necessary for the execution of the laws, and the security of the State.

Art. XV. The Legislative Power is exercised collectively by the King, the House of Peers, and the House of the Deputies of the Departments.

Art. XVI. The King proposes the Law.

Art. XVII. The proposition of the law is carried at the pleasure of the King, either to the House of Peers or to that of the Deputies, excepting laws relative to taxes, which must be first addressed to the House of Deputies.

Art. XVIII. Every law shall be discussed and voted freely by the majority of each of the two Houses.

Art. XIX. The Houses have a right to petition the King to propose a law on any subject whatever, and to point out what, in their opinion, the law ought to contain.

Art. XX. Such petitions may be presented by each of the two Houses, but not till they have been discussed in Secret Committee. It shall not be sent to the other House by that which shall have proposed it till after the space of ten days.

Art. XXI. If the proposition is adopted by the other House, it shall be submitted to the King; if it be rejected, it cannot be presented again during the same session.

Art. XXII. The King exclusively sanctions and promulgates laws.

Art. XXIII. The civil list is fixed for the whole duration of the King's reign by the first legislature assembled since the King's accession.

OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS.

Art. XXIV. The House of Peers is an essential part of the legislative power.

Art. XXV. It is summoned by the King at the same time as the House of the Deputies of the Departments. The Session of the one commences, and finishes at the same time as that of the other.

Art. XXVI. Any meeting of the House of Peers held out of the time of the Session of the House of Deputies, or which shall not be ordered by the King, is illegal, and null and void.

Art. XXVII. The nomination of the Peers of France belongs to the King. Their number is not limited; he may change their dignities,

nominate them for life, or render them hereditary, at pleasure.

Art. XXVIII. The Peers are admitted into the House at 25 years of age, but have no deliberative voice till the age of 39.

Art. XXIX. The Chancellor of France presides in the House of Peers, and in his absence a Peer appointed by the King.

Art. XXX. The members of the Royal Family and Princes of the Blood are Peers in right of their birth; they take precedence immediately after the President, but have no deliberative voice till the age of 25 years.

Art. XXXI. The Princes take their places in the House except by the express order from the King for each session, by a message, upon pain of all that has been done in their presence being annulled.

Art. XXXII. All the deliberations of the House of Peers are private.

Art. XXXIII. The House of Peers takes cognizance of the crimes of high treason and attempts against the safety of the State, which shall be defined by the law.

Art. XXXIV. No Peer can be apprehended but by the authority of the House, and tried by it in criminal matters.

OF THE HOUSE OF THE DEPUTIES OF THE DEPARTMENTS.

Art. XXXV. The House of Deputies shall be composed of deputies chosen by the Electoral Colleges, the organization of which shall be determined by the laws.

Art. XXXVI. Each department shall have the same number of deputies as it has hitherto had.

Art. XXXVII. The deputies shall be elected for five years, and so that one-fifth of the House shall be annually received.

Art. XXXVIII. No Deputy can be admitted into the House, unless he be 40 years old, and pay a direct contribution of 1,000 francs.

Art. XXXIX. If, however, there should not be in the Department fifty persons of the age required, paying at least 1,000 francs in direct contribution, their number shall be completed by those rated the next highest, under 1,000 francs, and these shall not be capable of offering themselves as candidates against the former.

Art. XL. The Electors who concur in the nomination of the Deputies, cannot have the right of voting unless they pay a direct contribution of 300 francs, and be at least 30 years of age.

Art. XLI. The Presidents of the Electoral Colleges shall be named by the King, and of right members of the College.

Art. XLII. One half at least of the Deputies shall be chosen from among such persons eligible as have their political residence in the Department.

Art. XLIII. The President of the House of Deputies is appointed by the King, out of a list of five Members presented by the House.

Art. XLIV. The Sitzings of the House are public, but the requisition of five Members is sufficient to enable it to resolve itself into a Secret Committee.

Art. XLV. The House divides itself into Committees (*bureaux*) to discuss the projets presented to it on the part of the King.

Art. XLVI. No amendment can be made in any law, unless it has been proposed in Com-

mittee by the King, and unless it has been sent to and discussed in the *bureau*.

Art. XLVII. The House of Deputies receives all the propositions for taxes; and it is not till these propositions have been admitted, that they can be carried to the House of Peers.

Art. XLVIII. No tax can be imposed or levied unless it has been agreed to by the two Houses; and sanctioned by the King.

Art. XLIX. The land-tax is granted for a year only. The indirect taxes may be granted for several years.

Art. L. The King every year convokes the two Houses; he prorogues them, and may dissolve that of the Deputies of the Departments; but in this case, he must convoke a new one within the space of three months.

Art. LI. No personal restraint shall be laid upon any member of the House during the session, or within six weeks before and after it.

Art. LII. No member of the House can, during the session, be prosecuted or arrested for criminal matters, unless for a flagrant offence, till the House has permitted his prosecution.

Art. LIII. All petitions to either House must be presented in writing. The law forbids their being preferred in person, and at the bar.

OF THE MINISTERS

Art. LIV. The Ministers may be Members of the House of Peers or of the House of Deputies. They have, moreover, a right to admission into either House, and must be heard whenever they desire it.

Art. LV. The House of Deputies has a right to accuse the Ministers, and to impeach them before the House of Peers, which alone is competent to try them.

Art. LVI. They cannot be accused, except for high treason or peculation. Particular laws shall specify this kind of crime, and determine the mode of proceeding in respect to them.

OF THE JUDICIAL ORDER.

Art. LVII. All justice emanates from the King; it is administered in his name by Judges, whom he nominates and appoints.

Art. LVIII. The Judges nominated by the King cannot be removed.

Art. LIX. The ordinary courts and tribunals actually existing are retained. Nothing shall be changed in them but by virtue of a law.

Art. LX. The present institution of the Judges of Commerce is preserved.

Art. LXI. The office of Justice of the Peace is likewise retained. The Justices of the Peace, though nominated by the King, are removable.

Art. LXII. No man can be taken out of the hands of his natural judges.

Art. LXIII. There cannot, of course, be created any Extraordinary Commissions and Tribunals. Under this denomination the Provisos' jurisdictions are not comprehended, if their re-establishment should be judged necessary.

Art. LXIV. The pleadings in criminal matters shall be published, unless their publicity be dangerous to good order and morals; and in this case the tribunal shall declare it by a judgment.

Art. LXV. The institution of juries is retained; the changes which a longer experience may cause to be considered necessary, cannot be effected but by a law for the purpose.

Art. LXVI. The penalty of the confiscation

of property is abolished, and cannot be re-established.

Art. LXVII. The King has the right of pardon, and that of commuting punishments.

Art. LXVIII. The civil code and the laws actually existing, not contrary to the present charter, remain in force till they shall be legally abolished.

PARTICULAR RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE STATE.

Art. LXIX. The military in active service, the officers and soldiers who have retired, the widows, officers and soldiers, pensioned shall retain their ranks, honours and pensions.

Art. LXX. The public debt is guaranteed; all kinds of engagements contracted by the State, with its creditors, are inviolable.

Art. LXXI. The ancient Nobility resume their titles; the new retain theirs. The King creates Nobles at pleasure; but he confers on them only ranks and honours, without any exemption from the charges and duties of society.

Art. LXXII. The Legion of Honour is maintained. The King will fix its interior regulations and decorations.

Art. LXXIII. The Colonies shall be governed by particular laws and regulations.

Art. LXXIV. The King and his successors shall swear at the ceremony of their anointment to the faithful observance of the present constitutional Charter.

TEMPORARY ARTICLES.

Art. LXXV. The Deputies of the Departments of France, who sat in the Legislative Body at the time of the last adjournment, shall continue to sit in the House of Deputies till they are replaced.

Art. LXXVI. The first renewal of one-fifth of the House of Deputies shall take place, at the latest, in the year 1816, according to the order fixed between the classes. We order that the present constitutional charter submitted to the Senate and Legislative Body, agreeably to our proclamation of the 2d of May, be forthwith sent to the House of Peers and that of the Deputies.

Given at Paris, in the year of grace

1814, and of our reign the nine-

teenth. (Signed)

LOUIS.

(And underneath)

The Abbe de MONTESQUIOU.

CORN LAWS.

SIR—The encroaching ferment in the public mind, and the ill directed abuse of every species of agriculturist, induce me to send you the following Comparative Statement of the situation of farmers holding farms of 400 acres in the year 1792, previous to the war with France, and the time I am now writing. May I be indulged by its early insertion, as I am not without hope that those who give attention to its contents will no longer consider the farmer unreasonable and selfish, in wishing the price of corn to be high enough to remunerate him for his present encroachment of expences, and to meet with sufficient encouragement to continue its growth. It will appear also, that the landed interest

bear their full share of the burdens of their country, and if they cannot be relieved from them by diminution of taxes, inevitable ruin speedily awaits them upon any great or sudden reduction in the price of corn.

1792. *Expenditure before the War.*

Rent 10s. per acre.	£200
Poors Rate 2s. per pound.	20
Tythe 2s. 6d. per acre.	50
Church Rate and Surveyors	10
Rate 1s. per pound.	30
Land Tax.	£3.0

1814. *Expenditure at present time.*

Rent	£300
Poors Rate 5s. per pound.	125
Tythe 5s. per acre.	100
Church and Surveyors Rate	25
1s. per pound.	30
Land Tax.	37 10s
Tenants Property Tax.	208
Increased payments to Labourers.	80
Encroachment in Wheelwrights, Blacksmiths, Collar-makers and Repairs.	10
Horse Tax.	£1,115 10s.

On inquiring into the cause of the advance of rents, provisions, and other necessities, it will be found to be the opinion of most of our enlightened political economists, that, in exact proportion to the weight of taxation, these articles advance in price; but no Author has so clearly and effectually illustrated this as Soame Jennings, in his *Political Disquisitions*, by the following anecdote:—"A sand-man, during the American war, raising the price of his sand, was asked the reason for his so doing—"Because of the war," replied the sand-man. His customers scoffed at him for this answer, and eagerly enquired if he imported his sand from America. But, (says our Author) the sand-man was right; for the tax on leather, on hats, salt, porter, candles, and other articles necessary for his subsistence increased his weekly expenditure, and he had no other means of increasing his revenue but by advancing the price of the article in which he traded." This argument is equally applicable to every class of trader and farmer through these realms:—our list of half yearly taxes confirms the fact.—Those persons, therefore, who demand that landlords should abate their rents, begin at the wrong end of their route. As the cause of the evil is clearly pointed out to be an

overloaded taxation, there is no other remedy, than a speedy diminution of that taxation, in proportion as that decreases every necessary article of life will also diminish in price. If a landlord is asked why he cannot lower his rent, he replies, because his expenditure is increased by taxation, and he will hold up to our view, those badges of slavery, the accursed tax-papers. The parson will give the same reason for not lowering his tythe, and the landholder, who thinks a free importation of corn would suddenly and inevitably ruin him, is justified in applying to Parliament to prevent the importation of corn, and a sudden and consequent reduction to the price of 1792. The farmer, like the sand-man, has no means of paying his increased expenditure of 805*l.* 10*s.* a year, if a proportionate advance in the price of his corn will not enable him to do it; and presuming corn to be reduced to the price of 1792, the whole of the capital he employs on his farm (suppose 3000*l.*) will be wasted in four years by reduced prices and undiminished taxation.—Those, therefore, who clamour against agriculturists, and meet to pass inflammatory Resolutions, had better petition Parliament to keep their faith with the public, and let the Property Tax be reduced at the time specified, and that all the war taxes may immediately cease. Then may the landlord abate his rent, the parson his tythe, the labourer his wages, and the price of corn will be as cheap as the public might wish it.—It will be found upon examination that the landed interest is one of the chief sources of taxation; ruin or distress this interest, the taxes will fail, and the fundholder will be found involved in the national bankruptcy; convulsion, tumult, and anarchy, their constant accompaniments, must inevitably follow.—Of those, therefore, who petition Parliament against the Corn Bill, it may truly be said, “they know what they ask.”—There are those, however, who are of opinion that the evils I dread are only imaginary; that a free importation of corn would not reduce its price; that there are persons who hold this opinion, excites in me the utmost degree of surprise: it is no longer an affair of speculation or doubt, we have facts so recent before us, that nothing can overturn the position, that an importation of corn would reduce its price.—Is that memorable event, the death of the late Emperor of

Russia, already forgotten, when in less than a month after the news arrived, the price of corn was reduced 50*s.* per quar. or more, by the opening the trade of the Baltic. Is not the price of oats stated in our last week’s market return, sufficient to convince us of this undeniable fact, the certain and inevitable consequence, that importation lowers the price of any article imported? does not the eager and anxious look of every farmer of the kingdom at the weekly Market Herald, demonstrate the truth of this opinion? I think it does; and that the utter ruin of all agriculturists is most certain, if importation were freely allowed. The continental price of corn is such, I am assured, that importation would reduce it even below the price of 1792.—But I am calmly told, let things find their level; but in the finding this level, I feel destruction and ruin; the little account here stated, convinces me of this. There would be as much propriety in persuading the fen farmer to take down his banks and let the water find its level, and leave off interfering with the course of nature. It would only be asking him to inundate his farm, drown his cattle, and destroy his property, perhaps too his family into the bargain—a more painful sight even than this is requested of the agriculturists of this country, by the calm gentlemen who wish things to *find their level*—they only require that his innocent prattlers should surround their father, and inquire the reason why his cattle are seized, his farming stock and household furniture sold, and the earning of the industry of many years at once destroyed—the only answer to be given is, to satisfy the demands of the tax-gatherer; cruel necessity: and because he wishes to avert this evil, he is to be held up to the public as avaricious, wishing to deny to the people the bounty of Heaven—to be burnt in effigy, and treated with scorn, contumely and contempt. I conclude, therefore, with requesting all those towns, counties, and districts, who mean to petition Parliament against the regulations of the Corn Laws, to state, in their Resolutions and Petitions, that an overloaded taxation puts us in eminent danger, and praying their speedy reduction. This would be acting more like reasonable beings, than abusing the agriculturists, whose industry, economy, and ingenuity, nothing can surpass.

R. F.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

HOAX ON THE STOCK-EXCHANGE.

The issue of the trial, upon this subject, has grieved and disappointed me more a great deal than my own conviction and sentence for writing about the flogging of the Local Militia-men and the German troops. I was confident of a complete acquittal of my Lord Cochrane, his Uncle, and Mr. Butt; and, whenever, in conversation, I have had occasion to speak of the matter, I have expressed myself in the most confident terms. I was assured, that it could be clearly proved, that De Berenger was not the Hoaxer. I depended upon this; and I have been grievously disappointed. I never took, in my writings upon the subject, any other grounds than what were afforded by publications in other papers. From all that appeared, the parties seemed to me to stand acquitted, even upon the shewing of the accusers. But I always feared, that, if it was not clearly proved that De Berenger was not the man, my Lord Cochrane would be convicted; because, though he might be able to convince me of his innocence, he never would be able to produce a like conviction in the minds of men, who did not know him personally.—The bare fact of the Hoaxer going to Lord Cochrane's house would not have been much; and even the furnishing him with a disguise would not have been conclusive against my Lord Cochrane. Suppose, for instance, that a friend of mine were to commit a murder in one of the woods hercabouts, and were to come to me, telling me that he was pursued by bailiffs, and wished to keep out of their clutches. If I lent him clothes to disguise him in his retreat, would any one impute to me a participation in the murder? I might be reasonably suspected, and brought to trial; but I am sure that I should not be convicted on that ground alone. But, joined to the facts of refuge and disguise afforded, there was, unhappily, the fact of Lord Cochrane having profited from the Hoax. Yet, this might happen too, as he was in the almost daily habit of selling out,

in case of a rise, stock to as large an amount as he did sell on the day in question. These facts were all unfortunate, but they were all consistent with innocence as to the Hoax. Facts as unlikely to meet do meet every day; but, being of little importance, are unnoticed. And when I saw the affidavit of Lord Cochrane, in whose word I would have staked my life, always having observed him to be so scrupulous in making assertions, even as to the most trifling matters, all the unfavourable circumstances disappeared, or, at least, left very little impression on my mind; and, when to this was added, the most solemn verbal assurances that the charge was false, I could not possibly entertain any doubt.—The evidence, as published in the newspapers, is very different from what I hoped to see. My Lord Cochrane's servants all swore that De Berenger wore an under coat with a GREEN COLLAR. It is now proved, by numerous witnesses, that that collar was SCARLET; and I do not see any witness brought to prove that its collar was GREEN. Lord Cochrane is habitually careless in his private matters; but, when so much was at stake, how came the servants, who had deposed to the GREEN collar, not to have been brought to swear that fact before the Court? Instead of this, I see Mr. Serjeant Best endeavouring to account for the want of recollection in my Lord Cochrane as to this point. But if he did not recollect, could all his servants have forgotten too? They all deposed to a GREEN collar; and how was I to believe that De Berenger was the man, when the Kentish people swore, that the Hoaxer's coat was SCARLET? There were two swearings, directly in the teeth of each other; and I, of course, believed that which was made by a person, of whose word I could not entertain a doubt.—This single circumstance had naturally very great weight. But I was assured, in the most positive terms, that it would be proved that De Berenger was in London on the Sunday evening. This assurance I have given.

to all those who have talked with me on the subject. But I was, it now appears, misinformed. The proof of the *alibi* has failed. Indeed, had I been made acquainted with the sort of proof intended to be produced, I should have feared that it must fail, when opposed to the positive oaths of so many witnesses, whose veracity, in such a case, it is impossible to suspect; because there could have been no motive sufficiently powerful to induce them to run the fearful risk of wilful and corrupt perjury.—The affidavit of my Lord Cochrane was, from the moment I saw it, a subject of regret with me, and so I described it at the time. I agree with Mr. Gurney, that this sort of affidavits are a monstrous abuse, as well as contemptible in point of effect. No accused man ever bettered his cause with the public by making an oath, to which, in case of proved falsehood, no legal punishment is attached.—This affidavit, and the other solemn declarations, constitute, in my view of the matter, the whole of the *moral* offence. Whether it be a *legal* offence to spread false reports for the purpose of gaining in the funds, remains to be shown; but if it be a legal offence, it is one of which the newspaper people have been accusing each other almost every week, for twenty years past, and we have never yet heard of any suit, or trial, upon the subject before. For my part, I was so ignorant of the nature of those transactions, called *stock-jobbing*, that, not three months ago, it required a long while to make me understand how a man could sell a million's worth of stock, without being possessed of a million of money; and I was utterly astounded at the idea of a man's holding such immense sums in *name*, without any reality.—It is *gambling*; sheer gambling, to all intents and purposes; and it is, morally speaking, no more criminal than it is to play at cards, even for a penny a game. The object of the gambler at cards (no matter whether in a *parish* house, or at the *Cocoa Tree*) is to *win* by the *loss* of one's neighbour. And as to the taking of an *unfair advantage*, in the case of the funds, it is no more unfair to *contrive* the means of raising or depressing the funds, than it is to get one's self of real intelligence, which one takes the means of obtaining *sooner* than the rest of the fundholders; and we heard a man giving his evidence upon this very trial, stating, that his business at *Dover* was to *obtain* early intelligence to *sell* him in his *funding* spec-

ulations. Was not this to aim at an *unfair advantage*? A stock-jobber, when he comes to town with his early intelligence, will hardly communicate it to those with whom he deals for stock. Where, then, is the difference? The latter does not *tell a lie* to the person with whom he deals, but he *suppresses the truth*. He does not *cog* the die, but he *uses* the die already *cogged* to his hand. I must leave it to *casuists* to assign to these acts their different proportions of moral turpitude.—A Hoax upon the Stock-Exchange has been unjustly compared to the *cogging* of a die, or the marking of a card. It is not *common* to *cog* dice and mark cards. But it is notoriously common to devise stories to affect the funds. If one of the newspaper people were openly accused of *cogging* a die, or marking a card, for the purpose of winning his neighbour's money, he would resent the injury done to his character; he would bring his action for damages. But this never happens, though the newspaper people are continually accusing each other, in the plainest terms, of *publishing paragraphs* for *stock-jobbing* purposes.—Therefore, the stock-jobbing and the Hoax are, in themselves, nothing at all in a moral point of view, other than as *all* gambling, of all sorts, is *immoral*; but the *affidavits* and the *declarations* are a great deal; and, of those *declarations*, no one has more reason to complain than myself, upon the supposition of their being *untrue*, which, after all, I cannot bring myself to believe. Judges, jurors, advocates, all may be deceived by a combination of circumstances. Had I been a juror, never having heard any thing but what was produced in evidence, as *given in the newspapers*, I think I should have decided as the jury, upon this occasion, did decide. And, I allow, that, in many cases, *circumstantial evidence* must be admitted as *proof*, or, that the worst of crimes must go unpunished. But, on the other hand, circumstances may occur, such as do, and ought to, produce conviction, and yet the party accused may be innocent, and may suffer without any one being to blame. Of the many suspicious circumstances in this case, one, which had much weight with the public, was, that it was discovered that one of De Berenger's *bail* was a *Mr. Cochrane*. But how naturally was this explained, when it appeared, that it was a *Mr. Cochrane*, a *bookseller*, in no way related to, or acquainted with, my

Lord Cochrane or his uncle, but the brother-in-law of Mr. Dr Berenger's attorney? It has been said, that, if these parties be innocent, the combination of circumstances is almost miraculous. I agree to this; but still there is a possibility of such a combination. This is an idea that I shall with great reluctance abandon; for, if I were to give it up, my resentment against the parties would have no bounds. They all, from first to last, to me protested their innocence; and, with me, I could see no reason for disguise. Of course, I looked upon them as most foully calumniated; and with the share of ability that I had, I espoused their cause; never, however, in any case, endeavouring to give a false colouring to any one fact or circumstance that came under my notice. It is to be hoped, that the perilous situation of these gentlemen, whatever the final consequence may be, will operate as a warning to every body not to indulge in *gambling* speculations of any sort; and to parents, not to educate their children in gambling principles. He who suffers the use of cards, dice, and the like, to make part of the pastime of his fire-side, must not complain if his sons and daughters are ruined at the gaming-table, or in the Alley. If the habit of seeking to obtain gain by the loss of a brother or a cousin once gets hold of a boy, he is ready to go forth into the world a gambler, and utter ruin is more than half prepared to his hands. The excuse for playing at cards and dice is, that something is necessary to pass away the time. Amongst savages, or persons wholly illiterate, such an excuse might have something like reason to support it; but, is it not shocking to suppose that such a mode of passing the time, that such a mode of preventing weariness, amongst persons with houses full of books, and with all the arts and all the sciences as a field for conversation, should obtain. The deaf cannot want cards for amusement, nor can the dumb, while they have eyes to read with; and as to the blind, they cannot see the cards. So that there is no excuse for any person, who is able to hear, see, or speak, except, as I said before, for those who are in a state of savage ignorance. I am not to be told that it is a matter of *taste*; for the law makes gambling a crime, and it is, unquestionably, a moral offence to endeavour to obtain your neighbour's goods, without an equivalent rendered to him in return;

and it is the object of every game; it is the object of every person, engaged in any game, to obtain something from his neighbour without rendering him an equivalent. There is no taste in morals. As a moral act, the thing must be right or wrong; and, that gaming is not right, is evident, from its being a mode of obtaining from others their property without an equivalent of any sort: Wherever there has been a funding system, there has, indeed, always been gambling upon a large scale; but still, if the youth of the country were not taught by their parents to game, there would be much less of gambling in the funds than we now witness. In vain have laws been passed to make the *public* gaming-houses criminal, and to punish stock-jobbing, as an infamous offence. Still we see gaming-houses crowded with persons of the first rank, and stock-jobbing openly practised by hundreds and thousands of people, many of whom, I dare say, are subscribers to the Bible Societies, and who, indeed, are, in other respects, very worthy men! though daily engaged in a practice, which the law denominates *infamous*. It is in vain to pass such laws while cards and dice occupy, under his father's roof, a part of the time of almost every boy in the country. There it is that the pernicious seed is sown. There the desire of obtaining his neighbours goods without an equivalent is implanted in his breast. There it is that he first imbibes the dangerous idea of leaving his fortune to chance; of depending upon cunning and address rather than upon labour or mental acquirements. Gaming is also pernicious in another respect. It frequently supplants useful talent; or, at least, pre-occupies its place. There are few boys, who are not desirous to excel in something. Keep the cards and the dice, and the chess, and the draughts, and the dominoes, and the devil know what besides, from a boy, and he will, in all human probability, lay hold of something useful. It may, perhaps, according to the cast of his mind, and the strength of his body, be riding, shooting, hunting, bird-catching, rat-catching, or mouse-catching; perhaps he may spend his winter's evenings in hickering about with his whip or his gun, or his traps or his dogs; but, not to insist that there may be something useful arise out of this, and that the catching of a single mouse is to do more good than was ever done at card-playing since the creation of the world, &

boy so engaged does not, at any rate, contract the truly hateful habit of seeking to obtain the property of his neighbour without exchange or payment. It is said that the use of cards and dice and the like, tends to cheerfulness in society. Look at a group of card-players, watch the anxiety, the hopes, the fears, the exultation, the chagrin, the disappointment, the affectation, and the spite that alternately betray themselves by the countenances of the several players; and then turn to the fire-side of a quaker, who never suffers a card to come into his house, and you will soon be able to decide which is the scene of real cheerfulness.—Gaming, in many cases, becomes a disease of the mind, of which it would be full as difficult to cure a man as it would be to cure him of insanity. I remember a drum-boy who was afflicted of this disease to that degree, that he gamed away all his pay, his shirts, his stockings, and all his necessities, and who constantly, for many months, gamed away his loaf, which was served out to him twice a week; till, at last, to prevent him from begging about the streets of Chatham and Rochester, we were compelled to take his loaf from him, to serve it out to him a slice at a time, and to see that he eat it. If this boy had been in high life, what a brilliant figure might he not have cut in St. James's-street, or upon the Stock-Exchange! What a famous *Bull or Bear*, he would have made! He would have sold you half the National Debt of a morning, and the other half in the afternoon. People talk of an *innocent* game of cards. There is no such thing as an innocent game of cards. The very basis of gaming is morally wrong, and the smallness of the sum endeavoured to be obtained by it, cannot alter the nature of the act, any more than the amount of a bank-note can alter the nature of the act of forging it. The evil passion is as visible, and very often as powerful in a contention for small sums as for large sums. I have an hundred times seen men with their heavy accoutrements upon their back, and in a broiling hot sun (being forbidden to play in the guard room) playing, for hours together, for grains of Indian corn, or short bits of tobacco-pipe, and be as eager to over-reach one another, and as loud in their mutual accusations and reproaches, as any pair of stock-jobbers that ever bawled in Change Alley.—In short, gaming is always the same in the principle. It produces different effects in different

walks of life, and upon different persons in the same walk of life; but the hateful principle is always the same, and he who teaches his child to game, in any manner whatever, is, if ever the child be ruined by gaming of any sort, the author of that ruin.

Since writing the above, Lord Cochrane has appeared personally in Court to demand a *new trial*, offering affidavits to clear up the matter, and to prove his innocence, which, it appears, the rules of the Court would not admit of, because *all* the parties did not appear together to demand the new trial. Upon this occasion, as will be seen by the report of what passed in the Court, (and which report is inserted below,) that Lord Cochrane stated, that he did not authorize any one to say, he had been *mis-taken* as to the colour of *De Berenger's uniform*, and that he had never seen a brief till after the trial.

COURT OF KING'S BENCH, JUNE 14.

After the Special Paper had been gone through, Lord Cochrane presented himself to the Court, and spoke to the following effect: "Scarcely recovered, from the shock produced by the late charge of a very serious offence, which was preferred against me, I have to request the indulgence of the Court, not only on that ground, but also because I am not habituated to, nor acquainted with the form of proceedings in a Court of Law. I feel it essentially necessary, on the present occasion, to apply to your Lordships, in order that what I conceive to be justice may be done to me with reference to the proceedings on the late trial—and I hope I shall be able to satisfy your Lordships, that a new trial ought to be granted, as far, at least, as I am concerned and implicated in the transaction to which I allude. It has been my misfortune, I am sorry to say, to form an intimacy—I beg your Lordships' pardon—I did not mean to use the word intimacy—but to form an acquaintance with individuals, whose habits, conduct, and general character, have been most unfavourable to me. I have been informed, my Lords, that it is not competent for Counsel to move, on an occasion of this sort, for a new trial; and, therefore, I am induced to apply to your Lordships, by a personal application in my own behalf."

Lord Ellenborough—"You must have been misinformed on that subject. An application of this kind may be made by Counsel, and perhaps with more convenience and advantage to yourself."

Lord Cochrane—"I understand there has been a decision of this Court, which precludes any person, convicted with others of a conspiracy, from appearing before the Court to make an application for a new trial, unless the whole of the conspirators are present when the application is made?"

Lord Ellenborough—"That rule applies whether you make the application by Counsel, or personally."

Lord Cochrane—"It is only to avoid placing Counsel in a situation where the request would be refused, that I am induced to trespass on your Lordships, and to crave the indulgence of the Court."

Lord Ellenborough—"We cannot hear you, unless all the parties to the transaction are in Court. The application can only be made when all the Defendants are present. The rule of law upon this point has even been laid down in Court this morning."

Lord Cochrane—"I humbly request your Lordships' indulgence to make a short statement to the Court, of circumstances which appear to me to be exceedingly material to the elucidation of this transaction."

Lord Ellenborough—"We are extremely sorry that we cannot, in a case of this sort, yield to any individual the right to make such an application. The rules of law are laid down for the high and the low. We cannot listen to the circumstances you state yourself to be about to lay before the Court."

Lord Cochrane—(exhibiting several papers in his hand)—"My Lords, I do entreat your Lordships to allow me to read a statement to the Court, which, I think, is extremely necessary to the full elucidation of the circumstances of this case."

Mr. Justice Dampier—"The rule of Court is imperative, and we cannot suffer it."

Lord Cochrane—"The circumstances on which I make this application are extremely brief. I do not come before your Lordships to make an irrelevant statement, but one completely pertinent to the transaction. I will produce such facts as, I trust, will satisfy your Lordships that I am justified in making this application. I hold in my hands affidavits to establish the truth of the circumstances I am about to state."

Mr. Justice Le Blanc—"We cannot hear them."

Lord Ellenborough—"We cannot extend to you that indulgence which we would not show to other persons. The rule of practice in this Court is imperative. We are extremely unwilling to interrupt you on such an occasion, but we cannot forego a rule solemnly laid down.—We must oppose the same objection to an application made by an individual, as we should interpose if it were made by Counsel."

Lord Cochrane—"I trust that I shall be able to satisfy the Court, that it is most proper to grant a new trial in this case. If your Lordships will permit me to proceed, I shall be able to prove to your Lordships, by these affidavits, that the justice of the case requires that a revision of it should take place, as far as I am concerned. I shall be able to show to your Lordships, that I am innocent of the offence imputed to me; and that those who are guilty in this transaction, and

over whom I have no control, do not dare to appear in Court."

Lord Ellenborough—"We must really abide by the rules of the Court, which are imperative upon us. No distinction can be made between the poor and the rich in the administration of public justice."

Lord Cochrane—"It has been my great misfortune to be connected with persons over whom I have no sort of control whatever; I hope, therefore, that your Lordship will extend your indulgence so far as to permit me to read affidavits."—His Lordship was then proceeding to read an affidavit, when

Lord Ellenborough again interposed—"The rules of this Court, as I have already said, must be observed. They exclude you, and every other person in a similar situation, from making such an application. The principle on which we have acted this day towards other persons (the Askews), must now be observed towards you. It would be said, very naturally, if this were not the case, that laws were made for the poor, and not for the rich. We cannot suffer your Lordship to proceed."

Lord Cochrane—"I will briefly state to your Lordships the facts which occurred at the late trial, on which I found my application. On that occasion, there were several circumstances which were not laid before the Court by my Counsel, (and here I mean not to impute any blame to them), which would have been extremely material to my defence; and, my Lords, there was even in the brief an admission stated on my part, which I never meant to have made—a statement, however, which I am convinced merely arose from error: I mean, my Lords, the statement of my having admitted that the stranger came to my house with a red coat on.—That admission, my Lords, I never intended to have made."

The Court again interposed, and said, his Lordship could not be suffered to proceed.

His Lordship then put up his papers, and withdrew.

CORN BILL.—Instead of an answer, or any attempt at an answer, to my Address to "my worthy but deluded "neighbours of Southampton," I have received three most abusive anonymous letters from that town. This is not a proof, at any rate, of the weakness of my arguments. This is so far from displeasing me, that it affords me great satisfaction; because I conclude, that the few base and brutal people in Southampton (and what town is wholly without such?) are enraged at perceiving, that I have produced conviction in the minds of all the better-informed, impartial, and worthy part of my neighbours. Southampton is not less distinguished by the general good sense and

good manners of its inhabitants, than by the goodness of its situation and the beauty of its environs, to which even Sir Henry Inglesfield's pen has not been able to do justice. But, for all this, the people of Southampton possess no particular privilege, as to any publications which they may choose to make. When they choose to appear in print, they must submit to have their productions criticised; and if the criticism be at all worth their notice, it is worth something better, at any rate, than anonymous abuse.—One of these anonymous letters reminds me of my being so long in *Newgate*. But, though it might be very wrong in me to write about the flogging of English Local Militia-men, and against the use of German troops upon that occasion; though, as Judge Gross said, that act might be nearly bordering upon *high-treason*; though it might be very just to imprison me two years, and make me pay a thousand pounds for that offence; what had all, or any part of, this to do with my arguments on the *Corn Bill*? What had the *Corn Bill* to do with the flogging of English Local Militia-men, and the employment of German troops? If any one, in answer to Lord Bacon's philosophical works, were to remind the reader, that that famous Lord Chancellor was punished, at last, for taking bribes, the reader would certainly believe, that the writer wanted the power to answer the philosophy of Lord Bacon.—It would have pleased me to receive, or to see in print, some answer, with or without a name, to my Address. I could then have cleared up whatever remained doubtful in the minds of my neighbours, for whom, speaking generally, and leaving the Rose politics out of the question, I really do entertain as great a respect as for any set of inhabitants that I have ever known, the Quakers of Pennsylvania always excepted. I shewed no want of respect for them; and, if any of them had thought me in error, I produced grounds sufficient, at any rate, to warrant the expectation of an answer. The answer might have been as cutting as you please. That is all fair; but, if any thing at all was said, there should have been an attempt, at least, at an answer.—One of these anonymous writers reproaches me with calling Mr. Rowcliffe a *tallow-chandler*, when, it appears, he is a *wine-merchant*. I did not say he was a *tallow-chandler*. I really did not know that he was any trade

at all. I sent into our village to ask what trade he was of, and nobody here could tell me. I merely supposed him, for argument's sake, to be a *tallow-chandler*, as I might, for argument's sake, suppose the Lord Chancellor to be a *tallow-chandler*, in order to enforce what I might have to say, in opposing any principle, or statement, of his.—I really did not know Mr. Rowcliffe personally, nor had I any knowledge of his calling or profession. I presumed, as it became me to presume, that he was a very worthy citizen and magistrate. But it was clear to me, that either he was very ignorant indeed of the subject on which he had, under his hand, put forth a publication, or that he had been led, to oblige others, or to gratify his own whim, to publish what was not true. I believe, in fact, that he was wholly ignorant of the subject. But a man may be a very worthy gentleman, and a very worthy Mayor, and yet no political economist. And the only fault I impute to him, is, that of having made a publication on a subject, which he did not understand; a fault, to be sure, which is not very rare; but, at the same time, it is a fault which every one who appeals to the press must run the risk of seeing exposed. Besides, it was a duty in me to expose this fault, because Mr. Rowcliffe had promulgated some errors of a very dangerous tendency. He had pointed out the groves of wheat as objects of public hatred. Now, though as a *wheat-grower*, I do not care a pin, for my own part, for any popular feeling or prejudice; yet I was, surely, fairly entitled to shew that my calling was not one which ought to expose me to such prejudice. This consideration had, however, no weight with me; nor was I actuated by any predilection for the calling of a farmer, whom I regard as no more useful in society than a shoe-maker or a taylor, or a wine-merchant, and (thereby on account of his calling) to be entitled to more respect. My motive was, that of putting the public right, as to certain important points, with regard to which Mr. Rowcliffe's publication was misleading them. And, surely, if I was able to do this, it was my duty to do it? Upon what ground, then, do I deserve abuse instead of an answer? Unless, indeed, the Mayor of Southampton can shew, that the publishing of false notions and nonsense, without liability to exposure, be amongst the privileges secured by the Charter of that ancient Corporation. If, indeed, Mr. Rowcliffe

had kept his Resolutions in his closet; if the town had deliberated in secret; if no publication had been made by them, then the thing would have been different. But Mr. Rowcliffe, or the town through him, had thought proper to put the result of their deliberations into the public newspapers. They had appealed to the sense of the public at large. And were they, above all the rest of the world, to expect security against criticism? He who resorts to the use of the sword is an assassin, if he does not suppose that the sword is to be opposed to him; and he who resorts to the use of the press, if he knows, or expects, the press not to be open against him, is a coward of the basest description; a description which I am far from supposing to apply to Mr. Rowcliffe, who, I should hope, instead of partaking in the base feelings of these anonymous writers, will, if he be convinced of his error, thank me for having pointed it out.—As to the subject itself, it is done with, for the present, and, I hope, will never be revived. The CORN BILL is thrown out: and, while I express my pleasure thereat, I cannot help lamenting, that similar energy is not shewn in petitioning upon other subjects, far more interesting to the people. It is painful to observe, that the fear of dear bread; that the paltry consideration of the price of the loaf, in which the mass of the nation are in no degree interested; that the imaginary difference in the price of food should set the whole country in a flame, and produce the instantaneous rejection of a law, proposed and supported by the Government, while the people are torpid as stocks and stones, as to all those matters in which their *rights and liberties* are involved. By pointing out to them the *real causes* of the high price of provisions; namely, the *taxes* and the *depreciation of the currency*, I shew them, that, if they wish to reduce prices, they must prevail on the Parliament to take off taxes, and restore the currency to its former value. *Here* their petitioning would have some sense in it; but, in their recent proceedings, there is no sense at all.—If the people of Southampton, or any part of them, are disposed to reject my arguments and statements, I refer them to Mr. Haskisson, who, in his place in Parliament, has said the same what I have said. Let them attack *him*, and not me; for surely, if we are both in error, he is more to blame than I am. He was, many years, a *Secretary of the Treasury*, under that

Heaven-born Minister, Pitt, having, for his fellow in office, that veteran placeman, Mr. George Rose. He ought to know the real causes of high price, and the likelihood of a fall if there be any. Yet he says as I say. Attack *him*, then, and not me.—A correspondent, for whom I have the greatest respect, seems not to have clearly understood me, as to one or two points. He says, that I assert, that taxation and depreciation of the country are the real and sole causes of the high price of corn, an assertion, says he, not warranted by the fact; for taxation and depreciation continue, and yet corn is cheap. My correspondent, intent upon the main drift of the argument, omitted to observe, that I every where qualify my assertion by saying, that these are the sole permanent causes; the sole average causes; or the sole causes, on an average of years. These qualifications I have invariably used; and I have, to a tiresome repetition, stated, for fear of this very objection, that the variation in the price, between one year and another, depends wholly on the amount of the crop and the weather of the harvest, with the exception only of that gradual and imperceptible rise, which, year after year, the taxation and depreciation are producing. We have a proof of this gradual progress in the price of the loaf at the present time, compared with the price of the loaf in 1802 and 1803. Great crops and fine harvests then brought down the price of the quarter loaf, at one time, so low as eight-pence, in London. The great crops and fine harvests of the two last years have not been able, as yet, to bring down the loaf to less than about eleven-pence, in London. This shews, that the very largest crops and finest harvests are unable to contend against their two powerful opponents, taxation and depreciation, which march on, steady and inflexible, like one of our own battalions, unaffected by the chilling frosts, or by the rays of the sun; while the crop is affected by every blast that blows, and by every ray of heat that lights upon the earth.—Another point, on which my correspondent has remarked, is this: You say, he observes, that the Bill would not be unjust; you say, that corn is as much entitled to a protecting law as candles are; you shew clearly, that, in whatever degree wheat is imported, less will be grown in England; and yet, you are an enemy to the Bill.—But, as to the justice of the Bill; a measure may be not at all unjust and yet very

impediment; which, it is my opinion, is the case with regard to this Bill. And, before my correspondent concluded, that there was something *inconsistent* in my being an enemy to the Bill, and at the same time, saying, that the corn was *as much* entitled to protection as candles are, and that the importation of corn would cause *less to be grown in England*, he should have waited to hear me say, that **CANDLES OUGHT TO BE PROTECTED**, and that it would be **AN EVIL** to cause *less corn to be grown in England*. My opinion, which I have before explicitly stated, is in opposition to both these. I see no reason for protecting English-made candles; and I see no harm that could arise from our sending away our copper and tin, and steel and cloth, and crockery-ware, and getting, from finer climates, corn, oil, and wine, in return. If men do not raise corn, they will not lose money by raising corn. If they have not capital employed in farming, they will not have to pay taxes upon land, horses, &c. and will have no poor-rates to pay. If the country (though the idea is absurd) were wholly fed from abroad, those who are now farmers would find something else to do.—But, my grand objection to the Bill, an objection which over-balances every thing else, is, that, in case of future high prices, it would have given a *wrong direction to the public outcry*. It would have set the people to clamouring against landlords, farmers, millers, and bakers, and have thus taken their attention away from the real causes of public distress. This alone was sufficient to make me oppose the Bill. I know that taxes must be raised; that prices, upon an average of years, must keep pace with the taxes and the currency; that, if the taxes be not laid so directly upon the farmer, they must reach him indirectly; but, the difference would have been, that, if the Bill had been passed, all the blame would have been laid upon the grower of corn, and the manufacturer of it into bread.—I do not say, that this will not be the case as it is; but it would have been *sure* to be the case, if the Bill had been passed.

SPAIN AND FRANCE.—The *Times* newspaper, having failed in its endeavours to cause a bloody list of proscriptions to be made in France, is now attempting to cause one to be made in Spain. It will not suffer the king (our own beloved Ferdinand) to choose his servants and coun-

sellors. I should be very loath to say, that a good government will be established in Spain; but, at any rate, *some good* has been done in that country. There are, at least, *some* persons, who do not think as they formerly did. The old order of things cannot wholly return.—In *France*, a Constitution has been settled on, and is about to be put into execution. I must see more of it, before I can judge of its effects; but there are three things, which are of great importance. The Church is to be supported like the army, out of the taxes, having no hold, of any sort, upon the land; the sale of the church lands and the lands of the nobility is to remain good, and the titles of the holders of the lands are confirmed; and, which is of still greater importance, the *Code Napoleon* is to remain *in full force*, and that most admirable work is to continue a blessing to France, and an example for other nations.

THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.

The Treaty by which this celebrated individual abdicated the thrones of France and Italy, has at last become public; and if any thing had been wanting to shew the superiority of Napoleon's mind, even in the midst of what has been held his greatest misfortune, it would be found in this remarkable and very interesting document. Here also we have a complete refutation of all the impudent fabrications that have been propagated, respecting his conduct, since the moment it was known that he preferred the happiness of France to the ephemeral glory of a crown, which there was a chance, at least, of his perpetuating in his family, had he, instead of giving up the contest, taken advantage of the general disposition in his favour, and plunged the nation into a civil war for his personal rights. I have said before, and I repeat it, that the act of abdication was the most magnanimous act of Napoleon's life; and could I bring my mind to think of forgiving him at all for his apostasy from liberty, I should be disposed to admit his conduct, in this instance, as some sort of palliation for his past guilt. His enemies, who accused him of insolence when he was at the zenith of his power, were equally forward in charging him with meanness when his fortunes were at the lowest ebb. With regard to his alleged baughtiness, I never knew a well authenticated instance of this in his own person. He may have often repelled the approaches of the sycophant and the

knave; and those who filled offices under him, may have displayed the insolence which not unfrequently characterises courtiers. But, in the one case, the crimes deserved the punishment, and whether, in the other, the reward followed or not, it is very clear that Napoleon was no way answerable for the haughty deportment of his servants. As to the accusation of meanness, the whole aspect of the treaty demonstrates, not only the greatest presence of mind, but a degree of fortitude and courage which, I am firmly persuaded, few men alive would have evinced in a similar situation. If, as his traducers say, Napoleon was unable to maintain his ground; if his crimes had rendered all France inimical towards him; and if, as we have been a thousand times told by the *Times* and the *Courier*, he was bereaved of hope itself, and was on the eve of becoming his own executioner! If, I say, he had become so obnoxious, and his mind had been so depressed as these hireling newspapers represented, it is utterly inconceivable how he could think of proposing terms respecting himself, and contrary to all our ideas of human nature, to suppose that, in such deplorable circumstances, he would have been occupied with the concerns of others. One would have thought that, in place of arranging the articles of a treaty so important as that under consideration, his mind would have been wholly engaged with his personal safety; that, instead of stipulating for rank, for power, and for riches, he would have been anxious to escape the dangers which were said to surround him, and to seek a refuge in some far distant land. Nothing of this, however, occurred. On the contrary, we find him, in place of *accepting* terms from, actually *dictating* terms to, his supposed conquerors. Viewing matters in this light, all ideas of humiliation, all notion of defeat and disgrace vanish from the mind. Instead of a "debased, broken-down, low-spirited wretch," as his *gentle* calumniators were pleased to call him, we behold Napoleon acting a part as if he had in reality closed his last campaign in as brilliant a manner as any of his former military expeditions. We discover no cringing, no faint-heartedness, no over-anxiety to gain the favour or insure the good graces of his opponents. The conditions of the treaty evidently originated with himself. They indicate, that they must have been proposed with a manly dignity, and in a tone calculated to insure

attention; while the ready acquiescence of the Conquered Powers, in stipulations so highly advantageous to Napoleon, to the members of his house, and to all his other adherents, puts it beyond all question that the Allied Sovereigns well knew the extent of his power, and that, notwithstanding appearances, he was still able to command respect. The spirit which has since manifested itself in France, on several occasions, when circumstances reminded the army in particular, of the great military achievements of the Emperor, shews, that the Allies acted wisely in what they did. Here, however, the conductors of our newspaper press, who find their harvest in rousing the hostile passions of their species, have the audacity to censure the conduct of the Allied Powers for the part which they acted. Wishing to conceal their hatred to France, and their chagrin at her now relatively happy condition; eager to procrastinate a war which they had found so profitable; and totally insensible to suffering humanity; these prostituted writers, under the hollow pretence of piety, and a regard for public morals, have never ceased venting their spleen against Napoleon, and against all who shewed any disposition to do justice to his character. In the *Times* of Wednesday last, we find the following specimen of the usual cant of that journal, of its affected jealousy for the national honour, and of its rooted hatred of Napoleon:—
 "We have received Paris papers to the 12th instant. The *Journal des Débats*, a paper of some credit, contains the following article, which, if accurate, may be considered as of no small importance to the future tranquillity of Europe:—
 "General Bertrand, who accompanied Bonaparte to the Isle of Elba, is on his return to Paris. When he left the Island, the *ci-devant* Emperor had become entirely deranged, and the Physicians despaired of his recovery.' We say, this fact is of importance; because, however deep was the disgrace which Bonaparte had encountered, yet in a country where every principle of reason and of morality had been shaken,—where the Revolution had set afloat so many wild and extravagant ideas, and the peace had disappointed so many vain and ambitious projects, it was naturally to be expected that the restless and intriguing would recur with partiality to their former idol; and the very reflection that such a chief was still ready to

"step forth, in the event of a Revolution, was enough to afford a strong temptation to revolutionary movements. The Allies seem to have unwittingly strengthened these sentiments, by the respect which they so inconsistently lavished on a convicted criminal. The Treaty of the 11th of April speaks for itself in this particular. For the honour of our own country, however, we must correct a misrepresentation of the part which Lord Castlereagh took in that treaty. His Lordship altogether declined signing as a party to its general contents. The Allied Powers, after they had signed it, applied to the British Government for their accession to it; but this was refused, except merely so far as regarded the arrangements for securing the Duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, to the Archduchess and her Son in perpetuity, and the island of Elba to Bonaparte for life. To these articles alone was Lord Castlereagh's signature affixed; so that it is not true that the imperial and kingly titles of Bonaparte and his family have ever been acknowledged by the British Government, or that the British Government are parties to any of the pecuniary stipulations contained in the treaty."—It is not my intention here to animadvert on the cowardly conduct of a public writer, who unceasingly levels his shafts against, and constantly exults over, one who, at the same time, he admits is a fallen enemy. True courage spares such a one; it is only the dastard who considers him an object of triumph. It is not my intention, I say, at present, to enlarge upon this topic. But it may not be amiss to remark a little upon what is said respecting Lord Castlereagh declining, on the part of our Government, to become a party to the general contents of the treaty with Napoleon.—If this statement had been true, how comes it that Lord Castlereagh's name appears at the treaty, in conjunction with the Ministers of the other Allied Powers, without any exception whatever appearing to have been taken to a single article by his Lordship? It is possible that he may have declined signing as a party to its general contents," though the strict rules of diplomacy renders this extremely improbable. Besides, it may be recollected, when this treaty was first spoken of, that the *Times* and the *Courier* both denied that there had been any concurrence at all on the part of our Government. They, in fact, expressly

affirmed, that Lord Castlereagh had positively refused to put his signature to a treaty which was polluted with the name of Bonaparte. When they said this, they forgot, at least wished the public to forget, the existence of the treaty of Amiens. I have no doubt they now wish the same public to banish from their remembrance, what they also so recently said about the French Emperor being treated as an outcast from society; for they are at last forced to admit, that even the representative of our Government has not only associated his name, in a treaty, with that of Napoleon, but has actually pledged the honour of this country to guarantee the entire sovereignty of "the island of Elba to Bonaparte for life!" What! have we found it necessary, after all the sacrifices we have made for the deliverance of Europe; and after the glorious and triumphant accomplishment of that grand object; have we, I ask, been compelled, in such fortunate circumstances, to become the abettors of a convicted criminal?—For years past have the good people of this country been told, that Bonaparte was a murderer, a blasphemer, an adulterer, a thief, a robber, a liar; in short, every crime which could possibly be committed, or conceived, has been attributed to him. Either the public were told the truth on these occasions, or they were told falsehoods. If the latter, whether are they or their deceivers most deserving of punishment, for submitting so long to be the dupes of such delusion? As to the injustice done to the character of Napoleon, I am not so sanguine as to expect that any will be acknowledged by his enemies.—But if it be all true that has been said of him; if he is in verity that "terrible monster" which he has been so often and so pathetically described; if no faith can possibly be kept with him; and if he ought to be "hunted from society," as a being who carries pestilence in his train; what becomes of all our high pretensions to piety and morality, when it is seen, that we do not merely tolerate the existence of such a man, but enter into a solemn compact with him, by which we recognise his right of property to an extent of territory capable of yielding a revenue equal to that enjoyed by many of the Potentates of Europe?—The *Times*, out of its affected zeal for what it calls the national honour, attempts to make a distinction between the recognition of Napoleon's title, and the actual transfer of the Isle of

Elba. But, if there is any difference at all in the matter, it would have been infinitely more to the honour of this country to have kept from Napoleon the *means* of doing evil, than to refuse to acknowledge his imperial and kingly rank; for, in the one case, if he is the dangerous and unprincipled character described, he has it in his power, with money in his hands, to sow discord when and where he pleases; whereas in the other, possessed of little more than the vain and empty titles of his former greatness, he would be more the object of contempt and ridicule than that of fear.—It was highly indecent, therefore, in this base writer, to accuse the Allies of “strengthening revolutionary movements,” and of acting “inconsistently” in their conduct towards Napoleon, after the participation which, it is plain, we have had in the business. Before any one attempted to censure the Allies for what they have done, they should have been prepared to shew, that they themselves had no concern whatever in the transaction. It is not enough to say, that they discovered what appeared to them to be bad, and concurred only in the good; for, if there is any truth in the axiom of law, that the partial vitiation of a contract proves fatal to the whole, then the becoming an accessory to any part of the treaty with Napoleon, implicates the party so acceding in the morality or immorality of the entire transaction. But even were it otherwise, I have yet to learn that it was less moral, on the part of the Allies, to sanction the payment of one million of francs to the Empress Josephine, than it was, in Great Britain, to consent to the arrangements which secured the full sovereignty of the Italian States to the Empress Maria Louisa, and to her son and his heirs in succession. Have we not always said, at least, have not the writers in the *Times* and the *Courier* repeatedly affirmed, that Josephine was the *lawful* wife of Napoleon, and that Maria Louisa was only his *mistress*, and the young King of Rome a *bastard*? They have even gone so far as to assert, that this child was not the offspring of the Arch-duchess, but a spurious child imposed upon the credulous people of France.—Where, then, was the morality, where the honour of giving our sanction to an article of a treaty which secured to the *mistress* and the *bastard* of a vile Emperor, (according to these base newspapers) the possession of extensive dominions, while we refused to

sanction an allowance to the *lawful* wife, which bore no manner of proportion to that granted to her more fortunate rival? Was it morality, was it honour, that made us concur in that stipulation of the treaty, which conferred the entire sovereignty of the Isle of Elba upon the *worthless* Napoleon, while we refused to accede to that part of the same treaty, by which the French Emperor provided for the security of the persons and property of all Frenchmen who had attached themselves to the fortunes of his family? Was it, in becoming a party to this generous act, that the Allies strengthened revolutionary movements; or were they less moral and less honourable than us when they consented, while we refused, to that other article, by which Napoleon secured a safe conveyance home, with their arms and baggage, their decorations, and pensions, to the Polish troops in the service of France, “as a testimony of their honourable services?”—Really one knows not what these *honourable* men of the *Times* and *Courier*; these modern sticklers for what they call *evangelical morality*, would be at. What they denounce crime and vice to-day, they extol to the skies to-morrow, as the first of virtues; what they pronounce dishonourable and immoral in the Allies, when it does not readily meet their views, becomes all at once magnanimous and praiseworthy, when they find it adopted by the party whose cause they have determined on all occasions to espouse. When it was given out that this Government had positively refused to become a party to the treaty with Napoleon, there was no part of it which these writers censured with greater malignity than that which secured to him the entire possession of the Isle of Elba. It was then the changes were rung, from day to day, upon all the abusive epithets they were in use to lavish upon him; it was then that his crimes were multiplied and magnified to a tenfold greater degree than they had been at any former period; and in all this it was plainly discovered that it was wished to render the Allied Sovereigns odious for the part, it was supposed, they had exclusively taken in the business.—Now it has been discovered, that we also had a share in the transaction, and actually subscribed to that article, which these men were so loud in condemning as the basest and the most dishonourable of the whole. But, instead of this discovery leading these infamous traducers

to do justice to the motives of the Allies, they have become the more bold and audacious, and, in defiance of all decency, totally regardless of all principle, they endeavour, by the vilest sophistry, to convert into crime the magnanimity of others, merely because it gratifies their malignant and revengeful dispositions towards an individual, whose conduct, if fairly balanced in the scale, would, perhaps, be found ten times more pure than that of his base accusers. That Napoleon has been guilty of many errors, none will deny; but that he has perpetrated the crimes which have been ascribed to him, is what not one amongst a thousand pretend to believe. At least, if they do say they believe those charges, it is not because they have examined them, but because they have taken them upon the word of others, whose motives they have not been at the trouble to investigate. The only crime, in my opinion, of which Napoleon has been guilty, is that against liberty. Here he has enough to answer for, without loading him with imaginary crimes, which can serve no other purpose than to divert the attention from the real nature of his offence. It is to his enmity to freedom that all his misfortunes are to be traced, and had these misfortunes been much greater than they have been, he would, for this cause alone, have deserved them all. But while we reprobate and deplore the conduct of the man upon grounds which are tenable, let us not forget the good which he has done to France, in consolidating those admirable laws and institutions to which the Revolution gave birth, and the benefits of which, I am persuaded, notwithstanding the great faults he committed, it was his intention to communicate to surrounding nations. Inasmuch as his downfall may have prevented or retarded this, it may be considered a matter of regret; but, viewed as the just reward of his apostasy from liberty, it is a circumstance which no one who values genuine freedom can seriously deplore.

ARTICLES OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE ALLIED POWERS AND HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.

Art. 1. His Majesty the Emperor Napoleon renounces for himself, his successors, and descendants, as well as for all the members of his family, all right of sovereignty and dominion, as well to the French Empire, and the Kingdom of Italy, as over every other Country.

Art. 2. Their Majesties the Emperor Napoleon and Maria Louisa shall retain their titles and rank, to be enjoyed during their lives. The mother, the brothers, sisters, nephews, and nieces of the Emperor, shall also retain, wherever they may reside, the titles of Princes of his family.

Art. 3. The Isle of Elba, adopted by his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon as the place of his residence, shall form, during his life, a separate principality, which shall be possessed by him in full Sovereignty and property; there shall be besides granted, in full property, to the Emperor Napoleon, an annual revenue of 2,000,000 francs, in rent charge, in the great book of France, of which 1,000,000 shall be in reversion to the Empress.

Art. 4. The Duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, shall be granted, in full property and Sovereignty, to her Majesty the Empress Maria Louisa; they shall pass to her son, and to the descendants in the right line. The Prince her son shall from henceforth take the title of Prince of Parma, Placentia and Guastalla.

Art. 5. All the Powers engage to employ their good offices to cause to be respected by the Barbary Powers the flag and territory of the Isle of Elba, for which purpose the relations with the Barbary Powers shall be assimilated to those with France.

Art. 6. There shall be reserved in the territories hereby renounced, to his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon, for himself and his family, domains or rent-charges in the great book of France, producing a revenue, clear of all deductions and charges, of 2,500,000 francs. These domains or rents shall belong, in full property, and to be disposed of as they shall think fit, to the Princes and Princesses of his family, and shall be divided amongst them in such manner that the revenue of each shall be in the following proportion, viz.

	<i>Francs.</i>
To Madame Mere.....	300,000
To King Joseph and his Queen....	300,000
To King Louis.....	200,000
To the Queen Hortense and her children.....	400,000
To King Jerome and his Queen....	400,000
To the Princess Eliza.....	300,000
To the Princess Paulina.....	300,000
	2,500,000

The Princes and Princesses of the House of the Emperor Napoleon shall retain besides their property, moveable and immoveable, of whatever nature it may be, which they shall possess by individual and

public right, and the rents of which they shall enjoy (also as individuals.)

Art. 7. The annual pension of the Empress Josephine shall be reduced to 1,000,000, in domains, or in inscriptions in the great book of France: she shall continue to enjoy in full property, all her private property, moveable and immoveable, with power to dispose of it conformably to the French laws.

Art. 8. There shall be granted to Prince Eugene, Viceroy of Italy, a suitable establishment out of France.

Art. 9. The property, which his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon possesses in France, either as extraordinary domain, or of private domain attached to the Crown, the funds placed by the Emperor, either in the great book of France, in the Bank of France, in the *Actions des Forêts*, or in any other manner, and which his Majesty abandons to the Crown, shall be reserved as a capital, which shall not exceed 2,000,000, to be expended in gratifications in favour of such persons, whose names shall be contained in a list to be signed by the Emperor Napoleon, and shall be transmitted to the French Government.

Art. 10. All the Crown diamonds shall remain in France.

Art. 11. His Majesty the Emperor Napoleon shall return to the Treasury, and to the other public chests, all the sums and effects that shall have been taken out by his orders, with the exception of what has been appropriated from the Civil List.

Art. 12. The debts of the Household of his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon, such as they were on the day of the signature of the present Treaty, shall be immediately discharged out of the arrears due by the public Treasury to the Civil List, according to a list, which shall be signed by a Commissioner appointed for that purpose.

Art. 13. The obligations of the Mont-Napoleon, of Milan, towards all the creditors, whether Frenchmen or foreigners, shall be exactly fulfilled, unless there shall be any change made in this respect.

Art. 14. There shall be given all the necessary passports for the free passage of his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon, or of the Empress, the Princes, and Princesses, and all the persons of their suites who wish to accompany them, or to establish themselves out of France, as well as for the passage of all the equipages, horses, and effects belonging to them. The Allied Powers shall in con-

sequence furnish Officers and men for escorts.

Art. 15. The French Imperial Guard shall furnish a detachment of from 1,200 to 1,500 men, of all arms, to serve as an escort to the Emperor Napoleon to St. Tropez, the place of his embarkation.

Art. 16. There shall be furnished a corvette, and the necessary transport vessels, to convey to the place of his destination his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon and his household; and the corvette shall belong, in full property, to his Majesty the Emperor.

Art. 17. The Emperor Napoleon shall be allowed to take with him and retain as his guard 400 men, volunteers, as well officers, as sub-officers and soldiers.

Art. 18. No Frenchman, who shall have followed the Emperor Napoleon or his family, shall be held to have forfeited his rights as such, by not returning to France, within three years; at least they shall not be comprised in the exceptions which the French Government reserves to itself to grant after the expiration of that term.

Art. 19. The Polish troops of all arms, in the service of France, shall be at liberty to return home, and shall retain their arms and baggage, as a testimony of their honourable services. The officers, sub-officers, and soldiers, shall retain the decorations which have been granted to them, and the pensions annexed to those decorations.

Art. 20. The high Allied Powers guarantee the execution of all the Articles of the present Treaty, and engage to obtain that it shall be adopted and guaranteed by France.

Art. 21. The present Act shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged at Paris within two days, or sooner if possible.

Done at Paris, the 11th of April, 1814.

(L.S.) The Prince de METTERNICH.

(L.S.) J. P. Comte de STADION.

(L.S.) ANDRE Comte de RASOUMOFSKY.

(L.S.) CHARLES ROBERT Comte de NESSELRODE.

(L.S.) CASTLEREAGH.

(L.S.) CHARLES AUGUSTE Baron de HARDENBERG.

(L.S.) Marshal NEY.

(L.S.) CAULINCOURT.

TO THE EMPEROR ALEXANDER.

The reception which your Majesty has experienced in England must compel you to reflect. The coarse but hearty welcome you, a stranger, have met with, compared

with the discordant tones lavished upon the Prince Regent, who was born and educated among the people of this country, and to whom, therefore, he must be thoroughly known, will convince you, that in a Sovereign something besides rank and power are requisite to gain the people's affection; AND ON A PEOPLE'S AFFECTION RESTS THE SECURITY OF A SOVEREIGN.

Emperor! to flattery I am a stranger, and unto flatterers be thou a foe.—Report speaks highly of thy intellect, and of thy heart. Justify that report: Let thy travels be to the advantage of Russia, and of mankind in general. At thy return be a second PETER, in thy endeavors to *humanize* and liberate thy subjects. Reign by love, and not by fear and terror. Shed not thy subject's blood through ambition; or for the gratification of courtiers. Drain not the people's substance to pamper sycophants, or encourage vice or treachery; and, finally, let thy subjects see in thee a pattern of justice, of temperance, and of morality.—To them appear not a criminal. The consequences thou now seest, and then will experience.

ARISTIDES.

THE POPE.—While Emperors, Kings, and Princes, are celebrating their grand jubilee in the capital of the British empire, to the inexpressible gratification of John Bull and his numerous family, accounts have arrived that his Holiness the Pope has also been exhibiting himself to the pious inhabitants of the ancient capital of the world. "The Holy Father," says an article under the head Rome, in the Paris Papers, "made his grand entrance into the Vatican, on the 24th instant. Before day-break an immense crowd, of all ranks, hastened through the gate at which his Holiness was expected to enter. He was received by their Majesties the King and Queen of Spain, and the Queen of Etruria, on quitting his carriage, at the country-house, La Justiniana, where he rested an hour.—Messrs. Fagan and Dodds, the English Consuls, were then presented, and most graciously received. The Ministers from the Courts of Vienna, Portugal, Naples, &c. also formed part of the cavalcade, and the whole entered Rome amid the acclamations of the people. Several Addresses were, in the course of the day, presented to his Holiness." From this, it appears, that the war in which we were lately engaged, was really a war for religion, not

withstanding all that scoffers and infidels have said on that score. Not only have we Consuls at Rome, to congratulate the Holy Father on his restoration to the chair of St. Peter, but we were lately informed by the *Courier*, that the Pope had sent Cardinal Gonsalvi; his Minister for Foreign Affairs, to England, with a letter to the Prince Regent, thanking him for the active part his Royal Highness had taken in re-establishing the Roman Catholic Church upon its former basis. I do not know whether his Holiness styled our Regent "a true Son of the Church;" but I am sure if he did not, he made a most ungrateful return for the benefits conferred on him by his Royal Highness. It has been said, that the Prince Regent is secretly attached to Catholic Emancipation, and would immediately confer that boon upon the Irish nation, were it not for the naughty interference of some of his father's Ministers. My opinion is, that those who are the loudest in their cry in behalf of the Irish, go the wrong way to work to better their condition: Instead of bawling about their eligibility to fill public situations, by which only a few at the most would be benefited, I think the best boon we could confer upon the Irish, would be to render them more *civilised*, and to destroy that abominable system of *middle-men*, which intervenes between the landholder and the peasant, and renders the situation of the latter more abject and deplorable, than that of the negroes in the West India Islands, respecting whom so much clamour is now raised against France, though there was not a word to be heard on the subject while these Islands remained in our own possession, or in that of the Allies. I was, at first, inclined to think that the Prince Regent, by the reception which, it is said, he gave to the Pope's Legate, intended this as a pledge to some concessions in favour of the Irish Catholics; but the late proclamation issued in Ireland, by which the Catholic Board has been declared an illegal Assembly, satisfies me that it is not the intention of his Royal Highness to shew any greater countenance to the successor of the great Apostle, than what he has already done. This has greatly quieted my alarms, for I was afraid that we were on the eve of again becoming a Catholic nation in reality. I dislike the cant and rant of most of our modern sectarians, and would even prefer the reign of the Pope, to that empire over minds which these madmen and visionaries

are every where attempting to establish.—But I still give the preference to the Episcopal Church; not because I consider its clergy the most virtuous of men, but because they are, in general, more tolerant and less bigotted, than either the Catholic clergy or the preachers among the Dissenters.

POWER AND RIGHT.

SIR,—Hume says, "the origin of all Right is Power;" and another of equal celebrity asserts, that the nation that holds "the trident of Neptune" must always rule the world by commanding its wealth. If those observations be just, which I believe no one will doubt, why do your friend Cobb make such a pother about taxes; for have they not been very generally caused by the system adopted for "the liberation of Europe?" Do we not possess a naval force more than a match for all the rest of the world? Have we not sugar, coffee, ginger, pepper, nutmegs, &c. for which nearly all Europe must depend upon us? Why, then, do we hesitate in laying a thumping export duty on them, in order to reimburse ourselves, in part, at least, for the vast expense we have been at, by obliging the Continental consumers to pay us a proper tribute on them, as the best means we can adopt for that end, or why our boasted naval superiority and maritime rights? BOB SHORT.

Clifton, June 13th, 1814.

CORN LAWS.

SIR,—After the nonsense which we have of late been subjected to read, on the subject of the Corn Bill, it does one good, at last, to meet with a little common sense. I allude to your Letter to the People of Southampton; and I sincerely hope it may tend to produce a more correct way of thinking through the country in general. There is one point upon which I cannot altogether agree with you; and that is, the impropriety and inefficiency of any restriction at all. It is allowed, that the taxes, direct and indirect, affecting the growers of corn in this country, amount to some pounds per acre; of course to a considerable sum per quarter of wheat, call it twenty shillings. Is not the same protecting power, which imposed this burden upon the British agriculturist, bound in justice to tax foreign corn in the same proportion, when imported into this country, however small the quantity may be? You seem to allow that every quarter im-

ported must diminish the growth at home, which is, in truth, allowing that it must affect the price. To the extent of the taxes, the British farmer is entitled to protection against even the chance of loss: it is not only justice but good policy, and by it the real interest of the consumers of corn will be best consulted.—Moreover, as you yourself have shewn, it is a measure *imperious* upon the Government. It is the fruit of their system—and to them it ought to have been left. We should then have seen none of that hypocritical opposition, on the part of those who must be convinced of its absolute necessity—if the interest of the debt is to be paid. At page 720 of your last number, (in the same Letter to the good People of Southampton) you allude to the depreciation as one cause of the high prices, and as another reason for restriction—that is, as alleged by the farmers. But it must be evident, that the depreciation is always a sufficient protection against its own effects. It has no doubt a very important share in the rise of prices, but this circumstance affects the foreign grower of corn in the same way as the British. A Polish farmer, or rather merchant, who, twenty years ago, sent his wheat to this country, and sold it with advantage at forty shillings a quarter, cannot do so now. Two pounds sterling were then equal to a certain quantity of gold or silver. Now, they will not produce so much of these metals by a third at least, and in that proportion (other things supposed equal) must be paid in the present depreciated paper. The state of the foreign exchange is the unerring index to every foreigner upon this subject. It is odd, that with the immense exports from this country of late, and still more from the predictions and assertions in Parliament, by men who ought to know these matters, that a change has not taken place: But we must have patience!—There is nothing for it but patience!—I am, Sir, your constant Reader, TYRO.

Mid-Lothian, 8th June, 1814.

FRENCH HOUSE OF COMMONS.—The Chamber of Deputies at Paris, which corresponds with the plan of our House of Commons, held its first sitting on the 13th inst. Though the debates were no way interesting, being of a personal nature between two of the members respecting the right of foreigners to a seat in the Assembly, I have given the Report of it below as a curiosity, and that some idea may be

of the spirit and manner in which these new representatives of the French people conduct their deliberations:—

CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES.

Sitting of the 18th of June.

The President communicates to the Chamber two Messages, by which the King names M. Lainé, President, and M. Maine Biran, and Calvet, Quæstors.—M. Felix Faulcon, in giving up the President's office, thanks the Chamber in a short speech.—M. Pictet then desires to be heard. On Saturday last, M. Dumolard had made a speech against him, contending, that as a native of Geneva he had no right to a seat in the Chamber. M. Pictet began by declaring, that it was painful to hear one's self spoken of, or to speak of one's self; yet it was impossible for him to preserve silence upon the charges brought against him and against the city of Geneva. He did not expect to hear his native city denounced. It is objected to Geneva that she has ceased to be French. He begged leave first to deposit his titles on the table. He then declared, that in 1789 the King gave to a Genevese, having property in France, the right of being elected to the States General. He awaited with calmness and respect the decision of the Chamber: whatever it might be, he should always be happy in having been a Member of it at the ever-memorable epoch in which Louis the 18th ascended the throne of his ancestors.—The printing of this speech was called for, when M. Dumolard appeared in the Tribune. It was, at first, wished that he should give in his explanation before a Commission, but he observed, that having been publicly accused, he had a right to make a public reply. After some moments of agitation, he obtained silence.—All those, he said, who heard his speech, could not suppose that he had the slightest intention of a personal attack upon M. Pictet. He asked a constitutional question, and he was not to blame if M. Pictet was the only person to whom the case applied. The question was simply this, to know if a foreigner could be admitted among the number of Deputies of the French people; and if, in order to have that title, he ought

not to adjust the quality of a foreigner. The Chamber alone could pronounce upon the legality of its Members. M. Pictet says, that an attack has been made upon Geneva.—“This,” says M. Dumolard, “I deny, I merely meant to say this—you are a Genevese, Member of the Sovereign Council of Geneva, as your father was—you will still be so—Can you have a seat here?”—M. Debouchet moved that the two speeches be printed.—M. Bouvier opposed it, as both speeches contained personalities.—The President was about to put to the vote the motion for printing the two speeches.—*Several voices*.—No printing—no printing.—M. Bouvier.—The personalities in the speeches render them unfit for being made public. I move that they be merely referred to a Committee.—This motion was agreed to.

POLITICAL OCCURRENCES.—Europe, notwithstanding the fall of Napoleon, is still much politically convulsed. Some of the foreign journals speak of insurrections in Corsica; and it is said, though I believe without any truth, that this island is to be transferred to the French Emperor, on condition of his resigning his pension.

It is certain that the affairs of Norway are not yet settled, but some hopes are entertained, from a disposition said to be evinced by Sweden to retain Pomerania, that the independence of the Norwegians may be ultimately respected.

Some blood appears to have been shed in Switzerland, where commotions prevail respecting the adoption of the new Constitution, recommended by the Allies for the different Cantons.

The following article from Madrid indicates that considerable ferment prevails through Spain, in consequence of the recent proceedings of the King, which, it is thought, will be productive of very serious consequences:—“*Madrid, June 2.*—All the news from the interior agree in the same details—every where the cry is, *Long live Ferdinand—Prish the Constitution.* This zeal requires to be repressed. It is excited by agitators who abuse the ignorance of the people, and are preparing for us fatal re-actions.”

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

CORN BILL.—Still I must notice the proceedings as to this Bill. The people have been sadly deluded by those vendors of falsehood, the newspaper editors. The notions, which the people have spread abroad are a disgrace to their country, not less than the acts of folly and of violence which they have produced. I have just been told, that, at HAVANT, in this county, Mr. HUSKISSON has been *burnt in effigy*; and that, at some other places, loaves of bread have been carried in procession, decorated with ROSES!—as if Mr. Huskisson had endeavoured to make *corn dear*, and Mr. Rose to make *corn cheap*. At Southampton, the better informed part of the people are, if I am rightly informed, coming to their senses. I have been told, that many are ready, and even forward, to dissent having had any hand in these “*Resolutions*,” which, had it not been for their inflammatory tendency, would have been perfectly contemptible. My Address to them has, I am told, been *re-published* in the town. I am exceedingly glad of this; for, all I want is, that men of only common understanding should have the opportunity and inclination of reading that Address.—What ought to be the shame of those, who have led the people into the excesses of burning and hanging in effigy upon this occasion! And what is remarkable, too, is that these are the very persons who have, for many years past, been accusing others of seditious attempts! This Corn Bill was a measure proposed by the Ministers; supported by them, having a great majority of the Parliament in its favour; and yet the people have some of its supporters in effigy, and are hardly contented for the act. The riots, upon these occasions, have no where been, as far as I have heard, attempted to be suppressed.—Would this have been the case, if the object of such assemblages had been to obtain a reform of Parliament? Mr. HUSKISSON, in my opinion, is mistaken in supposing,

that the Corn Bill would have had any very great effect; but, certainly, he did no more than his duty in stating what was the real cause of the high prices, and in cautioning the country against expecting to see bread cheaper, upon an average of years, while the taxes continued.

FINANCE.—This brings us to the matter so closely connected with the price of corn; namely, the FINANCES.—The Chancellor of the Exchequer has now made out and delivered his account for the year 1814; that is to say, for that year, ending on the 5th of April, 1815.—The expenses, exclusive of the interest of the Debt, are calculated at 63 millions, and the whole together will make up about 104 millions. Now, in order to get this money, there has been made a loan of 24 millions, without any promise that there shall be another loan this year.—The nation is drunk, just at this moment, and, therefore, not in a state to listen to any serious matter, respecting its affairs. But I will just open the subject now, reserving myself for a future opportunity to enter fully into it. When the rabble have associated themselves with the sight and the talk of Emperors and Kings, and Princes and Princesses; when the noise and nonsense of the jubilee are over, we may hope to obtain a hearing upon the subjects touching our liberties and prosperity.—I shall, therefore, in waiting for the serenade (which is not far distant), just state, that none of the taxes are to be repealed *this year*; that the expenses of the year will EXCEED the amount of all the present taxes, by about 30 millions, at least. Now, if all the present taxes be not kept up, there must, it appears to me, be loans in time of peace; for, will any one believe, that the expenses of army, navy, ordnance, &c. which now amount to more than 40 millions a year, will be reduced to less than 20 or 30 millions a year? What, then, is the consequence to be expected? Why, that all the present taxes will be kept up. Or, at least, that taxes to the same amount will continue to be collected. It is the same

in effect, whatever the tax be laid on. If it be raised, it presses upon all classes pretty much alike, put it upon what you please; and, I have often been astonished at all this complexity of custom-houses and excise-offices, &c. &c. when the purpose would be more easily answered by one single tax upon the *land*, which always remains in the same place, is always visible, has always responsibility within itself, and the produce of which tax might be brought to account with a very trifling expence. The weight of such a tax must fall with the most perfect impartiality. From the *land* come all the *necessaries of life*. Our bread, our meat, our beer, our coats, hats, shirts, shoes, and stockings. We must *all* have these; and if the land was the only thing taxed, we should all pay taxes in proportion to our means of paying. What is it to the farmer that his land is taxed? He makes the eaters of the produce pay the tax. Now, his *sole* is taxed, for instance, at 17s. 6d. a bushel, out of 20s. We could buy salt, at a few miles from this place, at 2s. 6d. a bushel; and we give 20s. a bushel for it. But if we give 17s. 6d. for the salt which prepares the bacon for the stomachs of our ploughmen, who is fool enough to suppose that we do not get the 17s. 6d. *back again*, as well as the 2s. 6d. in the price of our corn, meat, wool, hides, fleece, butter, cheese, and poultry? And who is to give it us back, but those who are fed and clothed by the articles of produce?—It is the *tax* at the *depreciation of the currency*, which, upon an average of years, make the rise in prices; and as there is no reason to expect that these causes will become less powerful with peace, there can be no reason to suppose, that, leaving the difference of seasons out of the question, the corn will be cheaper in peace than it has been in war.—Why is salt 20s. a bushel, instead of 2s. 6d.? Because the maker of the salt has to pay 17s. 6d. a bushel in tax, and in the expence appertaining to the tax. And do the people of Havant, who langued and burnt Mr. Huskisson in effigy, suppose, that the grower of corn, is not to be paid back the amount of his taxes as well as the maker of salt? The people of Havant (for this disgraceful act should be made known) formed a procession, having their victim seated upon an ass, followed by a choice drawn by men. After parading about some time, they arrived at a Church, on which,

after suitable admonitions, and exhortations as to the necessity of speedy repentance, the finisher of their law *hanged* him, while others were employed in making a fire, under the gallows, to consume the suspended body. The execution being accomplished, the mortal remains, viz. the ashes of the offender, were collected, placed in the chaise in a suitable receptacle, and carried away for interment, to the slow and discordant sound of broken bells and other instruments of hideous noise. Now, all Mr. Huskisson's crime was, telling the people very sensibly and very honestly, that, with our present taxes, they could not, upon an average of years, reasonably expect to eat their bread at less than double the price at which they ate it before the year 1792. He said further, that we could not expect to see the taxes diminished; and the statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer has already confirmed his opinion: And yet the people of Havant hang and burn him in effigy!—The people of Havant have never, that I have heard of, petitioned against any *tax*; never against any *expence*; never against war with the Republicans of France, or with the Americans; never against any subsidy, grant, place, pension, barrack, or depot; never against any measure by which the public money was expended, and the taxes augmented, and the currency depreciated. What right have they, therefore, to complain of the high price of bread, in which price are included a large part of the taxes, necessary to meet the expenditure, of which expenditure they have never complained? They act as foolishly, or rather, as unjustly, as a man, who, after having ordered an expensive entertainment, should hang and burn the landlord in effigy for bringing in his bill.

AMERICAN WAR.—A correspondent calls my attention to the capture of *another* of our men of war by the Americans. It seems, that the *Epermen*, captured by the *Peacock*, was a ship of *equal force*; but the striking circumstance is, that the latter had only *two men wounded*, while we had *ten killed and fifteen wounded*.—This is a subject of deep regret with my correspondent, who calls upon me, as a friend to the country, and jealous of its honour, to give utterance, or, rather, circulation, to his opinions as to the causes of this wonderful and alarming change in the maritime affairs of the world, and the relative maritime cha-

character of England. I will not give circulation to these opinions; not because they are not just; not because they are not calculated to do great good; but, because I see *great danger to myself* in doing it; and because I have suffered quite enough in this way. But, I have no doubt, that his opinions will find vent, and that they will produce a suitable effect on the minds of all those who have sense enough to attend to them.—In the meanwhile, this war with America calls aloud for the expression of my apprehensions as to the ultimate consequences, with regard to our naval power, and also with regard to our future weight in the world.—It is *possible*, that the war which we are now waging against America, may end in the total defeat of all her armies, and in the consequent subjugation of the country. It is *possible*, that such may be the result of the expeditions now sailing thither from France and elsewhere. But I do not think it is *probable*; I do not think, that we can *rationaly* count upon such a result. And if we do not obtain that end, we shall only have added to the military and naval means of America; swelled her exasperation against us beyond all bounds; and added *hundreds of millions* to our own debt. After such a war, — *should* *we* *not* *be* *weak*, *exhausted*, *pressed* *to* *the* *earth*, *especially* *if* *it* *lasted* *for* *some* *years*; *while* *the* *navy* *of* *America* *would* *just* *then* *begin* *to* *make* *a* *figure* *in* *the* *world*; *and*, *joined* *to* *that* *of* *France*, *upon* *any* *future* *occasion*, *would* *make* *a* *change* *in* *our* *situation* *sufficient* *to* *make* *the* *stoutest* *Englishman* *tremble* *for* *the* *safety* *of* *the* *country*.—As to the hatred, which it is supposed the royal government of France will entertain towards the Republicans of America, it is to discover very little knowledge of the history or the motives of nations to suppose, that any feeling of this sort will have much effect. France (for the nation and the government are the same in this respect) will feel much deeper, and remember longer, the triumphant air which England now takes. She will see, that her rival now triumphs; she has felt the effect of her maritime power; and, will she not be glad to see another maritime power rise up? Will she not, as much as possible, favour the commerce of America? She is in no danger from the *richthip* of America. She must wish for a maritime ally, who is opposed to, and who wishes to reduce the power of England. Such an ally America will present to her; and the danger of this war

is, that it may finally dispose the whole of the people of America to such an alliance. —Therefore, there is great *risk* in this war. The force that we are able to send, if we disregard the expence, is very great indeed; but, I take it, if the war be of any duration, we must pay regard to that expence. There are persons, who think that the matter will be *soon settled*; that it is the work of a summer; that we have only to take New York, or Charleston, or Boston, and that the people will compel the government to surrender upon our terms. This is a very great error. The people are divided in their politics. The parties are violent against each other; but they are all of one mind as to their government, and the sort of government that they shall live under. The war, such a war as we are now about to carry on, will unite them. They will forget their political animosities in their common danger; and, though their armies have little *discipline*, the people are as brave as we are, at least, and will be animated with that sort of spirit, with those motives of action, which are the true and infallible source of effectual national defence.—I should hope, however, that, notwithstanding what fell from Sir Joseph Yorke, there is no design of making war for the disposal of Mr. Madison, and that the unfortunate dispute may be settled without any further irritation; without making *all* the people of America willing to ally their country closely to France, as the sure means of safety and tranquillity to themselves.—This is what I fear as the consequence of the war; and I must again beg the reader to bear in mind, that, if the war be of any duration, nothing short of complete subjugation will prevent this consequence.—The war in Canada is unpopular in some part of the American States; but a war for the conquest of Canada is very different indeed from a war for the defence of the homes of the Americans, and for the preservation of their sort of government. They have a *million of militia-men* armed; and, though not disciplined in our sense of that word, they all know how to *use arms*; they have all been accustomed to shoot from their boyish days. They are all *marks-men*, and so they were found to be during the last war. The branch, perhaps, in which they are most deficient is that of the *artillery*. But, is it not to be supposed, that they will find instructors in this art where they have found the inventors of the steam-boat? And is it not also probable, that they will find more

than enough of French engineers? The public should not, therefore, be too sanguine as to the result of this war. There is no doubt but our fleet and army will do all that they can. Every thing that skill and courage can accomplish, proportioned to the means, we may confidently expect at their hands; but the distance is so great, the conveyance of troops and of all sorts of means of war is so expensive, and attended with so many difficulties and so much delay, that it really is a war less promising of success than any other in which we could possibly have been engaged.

THE RUSSIAN TROOPS.—It was intended to bring some thousands of these from France to England, and a camp has been prepared for them upon Tichfield Common, about two miles from Botley.—People from all the neighbouring towns have been erecting booths, bringing beer and other things of necessary consumption. The Common wore yesterday the appearance of a town; and to-day, it is said, that the tents are to be taken away! The people have sadly housed themselves, upon this occasion.—But certainly, the change in the intention of the government is very wise; for, as all the world asked, why could not the Russians go home in the same ships that were to bring them to England? Being safe on board, why should they land here, before they went home? They are now, it seems, going home in their own ships, directly from France. Of this I am very glad; and, I do hope, that we shall now begin to look a little like a nation at peace.—The militia-men, at any rate, will now return to their occupations, and relieve the parishes of the pauper of maintaining so many of their families.—The Russians will have seen enough of the South of Europe without coming to England. They will, I hope, profit from what they have seen; and, with that hope, I heartily wish them a safe voyage home.—Our hosts are, it seems, to traverse France in their way to England. The people of a great part of France will thus have a sight of an *English invader's army* quitting their soil. This, too, is likely to produce an impression that may finally produce good; for, in all such cases, we ought to look to the final result, and not to the momentary effect. As we were the first to invade, we, it seems, are to be the last to quit, the soil of France. This circumstance will, I dare say, have its due weight with the people of France.

FRENCH LIBERTY OF THE PRESS AND JURIES.—Amongst the other things, which is provided for by the new French Constitution, is, the *Liberty of the Press*. It is stated in the newspapers, that the Legislature is engaged in framing a law to *DEFINE the extent of that Liberty*. This I am very glad to see. This, be the definition what it may, will be a happy thing for those who write, print, and publish in France. Because, with a *written law* before their eyes, they will know for a *certainly* what they may publish and what they may not publish. If they are forbidden to write against the royal family, the ministers, or any persons in power, though the *truth* of all they say can be proved clear as daylight, they will know, that they must not write truth respecting such persons; and all the world will know it too. Consequently writers will be in *no danger* upon that score, and the world will not be deceived by the press; by the name of Liberty of the Press. But, I hope, the definition will be *clear*. Our expounder, Blackstone, leaves us sadly in the dark. He says, that, by our law, the press is *quite free*, only that every one is *answerable* for what he writes and prints! That is to say, we may write and print *just what we please*; but we are liable to be *punished* for so doing. The liberty of the press he makes to consist in this; that there is *no previous licence*, as in other countries. *Our stage* he said nothing about; for that is subject to a previous licence. But what does this distinction amount to? I am of opinion, that a man, writing under a terrible responsibility, would be apt to make less free than one who wrote under the inspection of a licence. A law, *clearly defining* how far a man may go, would place the press in the best possible state; because, then, the writer would be in no danger from the uncertainty of the law as applied to his performance; and the public would be informed of the matters, on which he dared not to touch.—There is, however, one principle, from which, in my opinion, that law ought not to depart: namely, that in every case, a man should be held innocent, if he were able to produce complete proof of the *TRUTH* of his statements; and, in case of making *false assertions* or *inimities*, he should be punished according to the degree of *mischiefs* produced, or likely to be produced, by his writings, and of the *malice* by which he was proved to be so.

tuated. The adherence to this principle would make the work of legislating upon the subject very short and simple. It would make the life of a writer safe and pleasant; and it would make the press a blessing to France; the protector of innocence and the scourge of the wicked, however high their station. But, if the law be *vague* in its descriptions of offences by the press; if it deal in general terms; if it talk in a loose way about *inflammatory publications*; if it prate about the harmony of society and the peace of families, without laying down some clear, distinct, unchangeable principle; if it leave a latitude for *interpretation, construction, and discretion*, there may as well be no law at all.—The French are, too, it seems, to have *Juries* in their Courts of Justice; and, it is stated, in the orations preceding the Code Napoleon, that it was Napoleon himself, whose pertinacity produced that part of the Code. The French had Juries under Napoleon; so that by his fall they have not gained this part of their Constitution. But I, for my part, see nothing *gained* here, unless care be taken as to the *formation* of such Juries; for we know, from sad experience, that Juries may be made the instruments of the blackest injustice and most hellish cruelty. Hume tells us, that Judge Jeffries, whom he calls the *bloody*, spread the western counties over with gallowses, and gibbets, and mangl'd carcases; but, he seems to forget the *bloody Juries*, who aided him in the work of murdering their neighbours. *Russell* and the gallant *Sidney* were told, that they had been found guilty by a *Jury of their country*; but the Parliament, at a subsequent period, declared the verdict to be *corrupt and infamous*, and reversed the acts of attainder, grounded upon that verdict.—Numerous other instances might be produced from our own history; and, therefore, it is not enough to tell me, that the French people are to have *juries* to *protect their lives and properties*. I must know first, how these Juries are to be *formed*; I must see what security there is for a man's being tried by persons *impartially* called together; I must see whether all the persons, in a district, fit to be Jurors, are to be enlisted and compelled to serve in their regular turn; I must see whether it be impossible to pack, as we call it, these deciders upon the guilt or innocence of those who are brought to trial.—If this be the case, Juries

will be a blessing to France; but, if not, they will be the greatest of curses; for they may become the convenient screen for corrupt and cruel Judges, the most dangerous as well as the most base instruments of an artful tyranny, under the same old form of liberty and law. If Juries are what they ought to be, they are a safe guard against the partiality, the corruption, and the cruelty of Judges; but, if not, they are the greatest encouragement to partiality, corruption, and cruelty in Judges; because, where there is a Jury, fitted to the purpose of such Judges, the blame, if any be imputed, falls upon the Jury from the public; and as they melt away out of sight immediately, there remains no object for public indignation to fix upon. A Judge, *without a Jury*, knows that the eyes of the public will be fixed on *him only*; and, if disposed to act unjustly, he will be under much greater restraint, than if he had a Jury to serve him in quality of *'scape goat*. The object of the Jury has been held to be that of the safety of parties against the partiality of the Judge; but, if it be so conceived in France as to make the Jury a mere tool in the hands of the Judge, the state of things will be infinitely worse than if there were no Jury at all.—The legislators of France, therefore, should take great care, as I hope they will, that the *sources* of their Juries be pure; that they be not composed of men destitute of understanding, and of the powers of discrimination; that they be *impartially* taken amongst all the persons, fit for Jurymen, in the district or department; that all these be compelled to serve in their regular turn, unless prevented by some sufficient cause; and that they shall not be exposed, either directly or indirectly, to any undue bias, or corrupt influence.—The Code Napoleon, criminal as well as civil, is admirable. It was framed by the wisest men in Europe. It took a long time and infinite labour in the forming.—But, unless this point as to Juries be very carefully attended to, *liberty and property* will be mere names; mere sound without any practical benefit; and, as it must be the wish of every real friend of freedom, that the people of France should be really free, it is to be hoped, that this important matter will receive the greatest attention.

LORD COCHRANE.—The *accusations* which occurred to my mind as to the Nobleman's case, have been completely answered.

by the explanation which I have seen in the public newspapers, and which was read in Court by his Lordship, when he was brought up to hear judgment pronounced against him.—I have now no doubt whatever of his Lordship's innocence. The only disagreeable sensation which remains with me, is the dread of his being made to suffer, to its full extent, the disgraceful punishment which his Lordship has been sentenced to endure. From what I know of his Lordship's mind, I am satisfied that he is far from being depressed on account of his situation. A consciousness of his own innocence, is sufficient to bear him up, under the worst that can befall him. But it is impossible to prevent those who are friendly to his Lordship feeling deeply, and being overwhelmed with grief, at the idea of his being the innocent victim of the crimes of others. His Lordship, as appears from the Parliamentary Report, has addressed a Letter to the Speaker of the House of Commons, in which he "asserts his innocence of the charge of which he has been convicted, and requests that he may be allowed timely notice, and a full opportunity of attending in this House, whenever the subject may be brought before it."—To this the Speaker immediately returned for answer, "that, according to the usage of Parliament, timely notice, and a full opportunity of attending, were always given to any member of this House, before the consideration of a question in which he was personally interested."—It is somewhat consolatory, therefore, that my Lord Cochrane has still an opportunity of being fully heard, and of bringing forward all the proofs of his innocence, which he was prevented doing during the trial, by the inattention of others, and by the forms of Court, when his Lordship was brought up for judgment. It is to be hoped that Parliament will determine in this instance, as if the case of my Lord Cochrane were the case of every individual member of the House; for who among them can say, that he has not, during some period of his life, been innocently placed in a suspicious situation, through circumstances which he could neither foresee nor controul: and where is the man who will pretend, that it never can be his fate to be brought to the bar of any Court of Justice by a train of occurrences, similar to those in which Lord Cochrane has been involved, and yet be as innocent as his Lordship asserts he is,

and as I firmly believe him to be. Until his Lordship has an opportunity of verifying his innocence completely, which I have no doubt he will be soon able to do to the satisfaction of every candid mind, I have given below the statement which he read in Court, and the additional affidavit, by which his Lordship confirms all that he formerly said on the subject, and clears up some important points which were not explained on the trial. I am glad to find, that the effect already produced upon the public mind by this statement is highly favourable to his Lordship; and I am confident in the expectation, if the facts there stated are supported by the affidavits, which his Lordship will now have an opportunity of bringing forward, that there is not a man in the country (except indeed he entertains a personal enmity towards Lord Cochrane) that will not join with me in opinion, that he is completely innocent.

COURT OF KING'S BENCH, JUNE 20.

After an arrest of judgment had been unsuccessfully moved for on the part of some of the other defendants,

Lord Cochrane addressed the Court, and observed, that the attention with which their Lordships had listened to those who had addressed them on behalf of the other Defendants, emboldened him to hope that they would indulge him with equal patience—although he did not address them by Counsel, a circumstance which he imputed to the reason he had assigned when he had addressed their Lordships on a former day. In order to occupy as little of their Lordships time as possible, he had committed to writing, in as short a compass as he could, that statement which he conceived it necessary to the defence of his character to make. The Noble Lord then read the following statement:—

"It has been my very great misfortune to be apparently implicated in the guilt of others, with whom I never had any connexion, except in transactions, so far as I was apprised of them, entirely blameless. I had met Mr. De Borenger in public company, but was on no terms of intimacy with him. With Mr. Cochrane Johnstone I had the intercourse natural between such near relatives. Mr. Butt had voluntarily offered, without any reward, to carry on Stock transactions, in which thousands, as well as myself, were engaged, in the face of day, without the smallest imputation of any thing incorrect. The other four De-

endants were wholly unknown to me, nor have I ever, directly or indirectly, held any communication with them. Of Mr. De Berenger's concern in the fraud, I have no information, except such as arises out of the late trial. With regard to Mr. Johnstone and Mr. Butt, I am willing to hope that they are guiltless. They repeatedly protested to me their innocence. They did not dare to communicate any such plan to me, if such was projected by them, or either of them; be they guilty, then, or be they, one or both, erroneously convicted, I have only to lament, that, without the most remote suspicion of their proceedings, if they, or either of them, were concerned in the fraud, I have, through my blameless intercourse with them been subjected to imputations, which might, with equal justice, have been cast upon any man who now hears me. Circumstanced as I am, I must keep myself wholly unconnected with those whose innocence cannot be so dear to me as my own. Well had it been for me if I had made this distinction sooner.—I do not stand here to commend myself—unhappily I must seek only for exculpation; but I cannot exist under the load of dishonour, which even an unjust judgment has flung upon me. My life has been too often in jeopardy, to make me think much about it; but my honour was never yet breathed upon; and I now hold my existence only in the determination to remove an imputation as groundless as it is intolerable.—The evidence which I now tender to your Lordships, will aid me in performing this duty towards myself, my rank, and my profession. I first offer the affidavit, which I have repeated at a risk that I formerly had no opportunity of encountering. I have been told, that I then incurred the moral guilt of perjury, without exposing myself to the legal penalties. I know nothing of such distinctions. I have repeated the statement upon oath—and I am now answerable to the laws, if I have falsely sworn. The affidavits of three persons, who saw De Berenger at my house on the 21st of February, fully confirm my statement; and I have only been prevented from bringing forward a fourth, by his sailing to a distant station, before I could possibly stop him for this purpose. The grounds upon which I have been convicted are these:—That notes were found in Berenger's possession which had been changed for others, that had once been in

mine; that Berenger came to my house, after returning from his expedition; and that my account of what passed at this visit is contradicted by evidence. "The first ground, has been clearly explained away; it amounts to nothing more than that which may happen to any man who has money transactions. Mr. Butt voluntarily made purchases and sales of stock for me, and having received a small loan of money from him, I repaid him with Bank notes, which he used for his own purposes. He says that he exchanged these notes, and that a part of the notes which he received in exchange he paid to Mr. Cockburn Johnstone, who states, that he gave them to Berenger in payment of some drawings; but with this story, whether true or false, I have no manner of concern, and consequently no wish to discuss it. In what way soever the notes, which were received in exchange for mine, reached De Berenger, I can only say that mine were given to Mr. Butt in discharge of a *barr's* debt; and I have no knowledge whatever of the uses to which he applied them.—Berenger's coming to my house I before accounted for, upon the supposition of his being unconcerned in the fraud; but is it not obvious that he might have come there to facilitate his escape, by going immediately on board of my ship, with the additional prospect of obtaining employment in America? It has been said that there was a suspicious degree of familiarity in his treatment of me and my house. I can only observe, that over his conduct I had no controul. But he knew, it seems, of my change of abode, which had occurred within a few days. I trust it will be recollected that he is proved to have left town three days after such change; and that, though not intimate with me, he had the means of knowing where I resided, even if he should not have inquired at my former lodgings, where my address was left. Indeed, if taking refuge in my ship, in order to facilitate his escape, was part of his scheme, it was very likely that he would have ascertained the precise place of my abode previous to his quitting London. Again, I am said to have left the tinner's (where I think I should hardly have gone had I expected such a messenger) as soon as I heard of the officer's arrival. I was in apprehensions of fatal news respecting my brother then in France, from whom I had received a letter but three days before, with the intelligence

of his taking the note; and I more than suspected, with the surgeon's assistance, that the note was written by De Berenger, of February, 1838, he brought it with him. And, therefore, on receiving the note from Berenger, whose name I was unable to decipher, and as that note announced, that the writer, whom I learnt from my servant had the appearance of an officer in the army, was desirous of seeing me, I hastened to learn intelligence so anxiously expected; nor had I the least doubt that it related to my brother. When, however, I found that the person was De Berenger, and that he had only to speak of his own private affairs, the apparent distress he was in, and the relief it gave my mind to know that he was not the bearer of the news I dreaded, prevented me from feeling that displeasure which I might otherwise have felt at the liberty he had taken, or the interruption it had occasioned. Comments have been made on my saying so little to the servant who brought me that note; but the fact is, I did ask him several questions, as appears by his affidavit. That I did not learn the name of the writer from the note itself, I have truly accounted for, by its being written so close to the bottom of the paper that I could not read it. This assertion is said to be contradicted by the circumstance of the writer having found room to add a postscript, as if there was only one side to the paper. Of the postscript I have no recollection, but it might have been written even opposite the signature. That I did not collect from the handwriting that it was addressed to me by Berenger, is nothing extraordinary; my acquaintance with that person was extremely slight; and till that day I had never received more than one or two notes from him, which related to a drawing of a lamp. I was too deeply impressed with the idea that the note was addressed to me by an officer who had come with intelligence of my brother, to apprehend that it was written by De Berenger, from whom I expected no communication, and with whose handwriting I was not familiar. All that I could afterwards collect of the notes more than what is stated in my affidavit, is, that he had something to communicate which would affect my feeling mind. As regards to that effect, which confirmed my apprehensions, that the writer was the messenger of fatal news of my brother, De Berenger had really been my agent in this notorious transaction. I should

have acted, or where I should have chosen to receive him, it is impossible for me to say; but I humbly apprehend that my own house was not the place I should have selected for that purpose. The pretended Du Bourg, if I had chosen him for my instrument, instead of his making me his convenience, should have terminated his expedition, and found a change of dress elsewhere. He should not have come immediately and in open day to my house. I should not so rashly have invited detection, and its concomitant ruin.—But this is not the only extravagance of which I am accused. What supposition, short of my absolute insanity, will account for my having voluntarily made the affidavit which has been so much canvassed, if I really knew the plot in which Berenger appears to have been engaged? Let me entreat your Lordships consideration of the situation in which I stood at the moment in which that affidavit was made. I was suspected of being connected with the pretended Du Bourg; if I had known that Berenger was the person who had assumed that name, could I possibly have betrayed him, and consequently myself, more completely than by publishing such a detail to the world? The name of Berenger never was mentioned till brought forward in my affidavit; which affidavit was made, as sworn by Mr. Wright, a witness on the trial, with the circumstance present to me, and remarked by me at the time I delivered it to him to be printed, that if De Berenger should happen to be Du Bourg, I had furnished a sine to his detection. The circumstance of his obtaining a change of dress at my house never could have been known, if I had not voluntarily discovered it; and thus I am represented as having brought him publicly to my own house, of being the first to disclose his name, and of mentioning a circumstance which, of all others, it was the most easy to conceal; and if divulged, the most certain to excite suspicion! Is it not next to impossible that a man, conscious of guilt, should have been so careless of his most imminent danger?—My adversaries dwell upon some particulars of this affidavit, which they pretend to find contradicted by the evidence. The principal one is my assertion that Berenger wore a green coat. I have asserted this assertion upon oath, under all the risks of the law; and I also solemnly affirm, upon my honour, which I regard as an obligation no less sacred, that I only saw him in that dress. The wit-

masses on the part of the prosecution have asserted, that he wore a red coat when he arrived in town. *Objection.* But may he not have changed it in the coach, on his way to Green-street? Where was the difficulty, and for what purpose was the portmanteau? My own fixed opinion is, that he changed his dress in the coach, because I believe that he dared not run the risk of appearing in my presence till he had so changed it. I tender affidavits of those who saw him, as I did, in his green coat at my house. That he should have changed his dress before I saw him, is most natural, upon the supposition of his wishing to conceal from me the work he had been about; but it is like many other confirmations of my innocence, fated to excite no attention in the minds of those who only seek food for their suspicions. Much is said of the star and other ornaments, as if any proof had been given of his wearing these in my presence. He took especial care, I doubt not, to lay them aside on his way, when he had divested himself of his official capacity, long before I saw him. The small portmanteau, before mentioned, which it is admitted he brought with him, in all probability furnished him with the green coat, and received the red coat and its ornaments, and very possibly for this reason no remark has been made upon it. A good deal of observation has been bestowed upon De Berenger's unwillingness to appear before Lord Yarmouth in uniform; and the inference was, that this uniform could not have been the green dress of his corps, otherwise he must have felt the reverse of uneasy at being seen in it by his Colonel. Does any Volunteer Officer go out of a morning to make calls in his regimentals? Could so unusual a circumstance have failed to excite remark from Lord Yarmouth? To me, indeed, he had explained himself—he had of necessity told me his nearly desperate state, in asking me to receive him on board my ship; but is there any thing so very incredible in the statement that he was unwilling to tell his whole case to every body? It may now doubtless be perceived that he might have had other reasons for disliking to go out in a green dress. Let it, however, be recollected that my statement was, that he only asked me for a hat in lieu of his military cap, and that the black coat was my own voluntary offer. The idea of his applying to Lord Yarmouth, or to any other of his friends, originated with me, and I proposed it in consequence of his calling to my re-

collection, this statement he had received from them. I then had the suspicion arising, not dissipated, that he said so. In what manner this suspicion was ultimately disposed of, I can only conjecture, as my recollection might, from the evidence given on this point. He presented himself to me in a grey great coat, and a green under coat; and if the persons whose affidavits I now tender had been examined on the trial, and they did attend for that purpose, I do feel persuaded that a very different impression would have been made on the Jury and the world at large, than that which they appear to entertain; and that your Lordships might have been disposed to take an opposite view of the case as it affected me. Those witnesses would have corroborated the particulars of my affidavit relative to De Berenger's dress when I first saw him at my house, namely a grey great coat, and a green under-coat, or jacket. Unfortunately, through some mistake or misconception, not on my part, they were left unnoticed, and, of course, were not examined. I have now to offer their several affidavits to your Lordships. I would further submit to your Lordships, that my affidavit was made on the impulse of the moment, as soon as I heard that placards had been posted, stating that the pretended Col. De Bourg had gone to my house; and, in the conscious rectitude of my own conduct, I not only introduced the name of the only officer I saw at my house on the day stated, but narrated every occurrence that took place, and all the conversation that passed at the interview, to the best of my recollection. If I am censured for having been too ingenuous in my communication, I trust it will be admitted, that as ingenuousness disclaims all connection with guilt, it is indicative only of my innocence. If your Lordships will be pleased to reflect on all that I have offered respecting De Berenger, and to bear in mind the avowed intercourse which I had with two other Defendants, respecting whose conduct I have been compelled to speak, at least upon a supposition of their guilt, I am confident you will perceive how easily any man, living so circumstanced, might have been placed in the very situation. But, waving the supposition of De Berenger acting under the direction of either of the other Defendants, I do still contend that, ~~any man~~ ^{any man} who had stood second, and was slightly known to De Berenger, ~~and the same man~~ ^{and the same man}, with not affecting

drawn into the snare which, undeservedly, I am still willing to hope, has befallen the others.—The artifices which have been used to excite so much prejudice against me, I unfeignedly despise, in spite of the injury they have done me. I know it must subside, and I look forward to justice being rendered my character sooner or later. It will come most speedily, as well as most gratefully, if I shall receive it at your Lordships' hands. I am not unused to injury, of late I have known persecution. the indignity of compulsion I am not yet able to bear. To escape what is vulgarly called punishment, would have been a easy thing; but I must have belied my feelings by acting as if I were conscious of dishonour. There are ways even of removing beyond the reach of ignominy, but I cannot feel disgraced while I know that I am guiltless. Under the influence of this sentiment, I persist in the defence of my character. I have often been in situations where I had an opportunity of shewing it. This is the first time, thank God, that I was ever called upon to defend it."—The Noble Lord then handed in several affidavits. The first was one from himself; it was as follows:—

Sir Thomas Cochrane, commonly called Lord Cochrane, one of the above named Defendants, maketh oath and saith, that the several facts and circumstances stated in his affidavit, sworn on the 11th day of March last, before Mr. Graham, the Magistrate, are true. And this deponent further saith, that, in addition to the several facts and circumstances stated in his said affidavit, he deposeth as follows, that is to say, That he had not, directly or indirectly, any concern whatever in the formation, or any knowledge of the existence of an intrac-tion to form the plot charged in the Indictment, or any other scheme or design for affecting the public funds. That the sale of the pretended Omnium, on the 21st day of February, was made in pursuance of orders given to his broker, at the time of the purchase thereof, on or about the 14th of that month, to sell the same whenever a profit of one per cent. could be realized; and that those directions were given, and the said broker took place without any knowledge, information, hint, or surmise, on the part of this deponent, of any concern or attempt whatever, to alter the price of the funds; and the said sale on the 21st, took place entirely without this deponent's knowledge.—That when this deponent returned home from Mr. King's man-sion, on the 21st of February, which was the day

rectly after the receipt of a note, he fully expected to have met an Officer from abroad, with intelligence of his brother, who had by letter to this deponent, received on the Friday before, communicated his being confined to his bed, and severely afflicted by a dangerous illness, and about whom this deponent was extremely anxious; but this deponent found Captain De Berenger at his house, in a grey coat and a green jacket. That this deponent never saw the defendants Ralph Sandom, Alex. McRae, John Peter Holloway, and Henry Lyte, or any or either of them, nor ever had any communication or correspondence with them, or any of either of them, directly or indirectly. That this deponent, in pursuance of directions from the Admiralty, proceeded to Cadiz, to join his Majesty's ship "The Tourant," to which he had been appointed on the 8th day of February last. That the ship was then lying at Chatham. That previous to the eighth day of February; this deponent applied to the Admiralty for leave of absence, which was refused, until this deponent had joined the said ship, and had removed her down to Long Reach; that this deponent in pursuance of those directions removed the said ship from Chatham to Long Reach; and after that was done, viz. on Saturday the 12th day of the said month, this deponent wrote to the Admiralty to apply for leave of absence for a fortnight, for the purpose of lodging a specification for a patent, as had been previously communicated by this deponent to their Lordships; that leave of absence was accordingly granted for 14 days, commencing on the 14th of the said month; that this deponent was engaged in London, expecting the said specification till the 28th of the said month, when the said specification was completed, and this deponent left town about one o'clock on the morning of the 1st of March, and arrived at Chatham about daylight on the same morning; that on the 6th or 8th of the same month of March, this deponent received an intimation that placards were posted in several of the streets, stating that a pretended Col. de Bourq had gone to this deponent's house in Green-street; that at the time this deponent received this intimation he was on board the said ship at Long Reach, and in consequence went to Admiral Surridge, the Port Admiral at Chatham, to obtain leave of absence, which was granted; previous to the receipt of the leave forwarded by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, this deponent arrived in London, on the 10th of that month, to the heat of his belief; and that after his arrival, he himself, conscious of his own innocence, and fearing no consequences from a development of his own conduct, and de-

only to rescue his character from erroneous impressions, made by misrepresentations in the public print, without any communication whatever with any other person, and without any assistance, on the impulse of the moment, prepared the before-mentioned affidavit, which he swore before Mr. Graham the Magistrate, on the 11th; that at the time he swore such affidavit, he had not seen or heard the contents of the Report published by the Committee of the Stock Exchange, except partial extracts in the Newspapers; that when the deponent understood that the prosecution was to be instituted against him, he wrote to Admiral Fleming, in whose service Isaac Davis, formerly this deponent's servant, then was, under cover to Admiral Bickerton, at Portsmouth, and that Admiral Bickerton returned the letter, saying that Admiral Fleming had sailed for Gibraltar; that this deponent sent his servants Thomas Dewman, Elizabeth Rush, and Mary Turpen, on the trial of his indictment, to prove that an Officer came to this deponent's house on the morning of the said 21st of February, and to prove the dress that he came in; but that the said Thomas Dewman only was called; and, as this deponent has been informed, he was not interrogated as to the dress in which the said Officer came to his house; and this deponent further says, that had the said witnesses been examined according to the directions of this deponent, and who were in attendance on the Court for that express purpose, they would, as he verily believes, have removed every unfavourable conclusion respecting this deponent's conduct, drawn from the supposed dress in which the said De Berenger appeared before this deponent on the 21st of February, and on which circumstances much stress was laid in the charge to the Jury, the said De Berenger's dress being exactly as stated in this deponent's former affidavit herein-before mentioned: and this deponent solemnly and positively denies, that he ever saw the said De Berenger in a scarlet uniform decorated by medals, or other insignia; and he had not the least suspicion of the said De Berenger being engaged in any plot respecting the funds, but merely believed he wished, for the reasons stated in deponent's former affidavit, to go on board this deponent's ship, with a view to obtain some military employment in America; and this deponent declined complying with his request to send him on-board his ship without permission, or an order from the Lords of the Admiralty; and this deponent further saith, that he was in no degree intimate with the said Berenger; that he had no personal knowledge of his private or

public character; that he never asked the said De Berenger to his house, nor did he ever breakfast or dine with him, or deposit at his house, on any occasion whatsoever; and further this deponent saith, that he hath been informed and verily believes that the Jury who tried the said indictment, and the Counsel for the defence, were so completely exhausted and worn out by extreme fatigue, owing to the Court having continued the trial without intermission for many hours beyond that time which nature is capable of sustaining herself, without refreshment and repose, that justice could not be done to this deponent.

The next affidavit proposed to be read was one from Thomas Dewman.—Lord Ellenborough remarked that this affidavit could not be read, inasmuch as the person who had made it had been examined on the trial, and might have been then questioned upon the subject, if the Counsel of the defendants had thought proper. Several other affidavits from witnesses who had attended the trial, but who had not been examined, were likewise attempted to be read, but Lord Ellenborough said there was no instance on record in which such affidavits were permitted to be read.—Lord Cochrane said his object was, if possible, to obtain a new trial, so that these witnesses might be examined, as they would have been, but for an error in his Counsel's brief, over which he had not looked, from a perfect consciousness of his own innocence.—Sir Simon Le Blanc observed, it was quite without precedent to have the affidavit of a witness read, who had been at the trial, but who had not been called.

An affidavit of the Hon. W. E. Cochrane, brother of Lord Cochrane, was then read, for the purpose of shewing the existence of his illness in the month of February last, and the consequent anxiety with which Lord Cochrane went home to his house from Snow-hill, when he heard that a stranger, whose name he could not decipher from his note, awaited his arrival.

"The Honourable William Erskine Cochrane, Major in the 15th Regiment of Dragoons, now residing in Portman square, in the County of Middlesex, on his oath saith, that he was seized with a violent and alarming illness on the 1st of January, 1844, at Cambo, in the south of France; and that this Deponent remained in a state of dangerous illness until the 18th of the following month; that early in February last he wrote to his brother, Lord Cochrane, to acquaint his Lordship with this Deponent's situation, as De-

patient had the very strong hope of recovery, and telling him that he had received a notification that he would be ordered to England, where he should proceed; if ever able to undertake the journey. And this Deponent further said, that the annexed certificate was given to him for the purpose of being laid officially before a Board of Medical Officers at St. Jean de Luz, by the Surgeon of this Depoent's regiment, and is in the said Surgeon's hand writing."

This was accompanied by a confirmation from the Surgeon, who attended this gallant Officer, and a statement of the particulars of the disease by which he was attacked.

CORN LAWS.

MR. COBBETT.—Having been from home some time past, on my return I found your Register, containing your Letter to the People of Southampton, with those that have been since published, containing further remarks on the Corn Bill. In the last number you say, that instead of sending abuse in anonymous letters, they should have answered you; but you could scarcely expect that. You have so completely exposed their gross ignorance, exhibited them in so contemptible a light, that their rage must be almost boundless. But, Mr. Cobbett, is there not a danger of falling into error ourselves, when the errors of others are of so gross a nature as to make it an easy task to expose them? We are apt to go on with confidence, in a hasty careless manner, and, satisfied with having done what we proposed, send the article to the press, without that minute revision which a cooler state of mind would induce us to give. These remarks are drawn from me, by a belief, that *you—you*, Sir, are wrong in your supposition; that the increase in the price of the quartern loaf is attributable to the weight of taxes which the landlord and farmer has to pay. You certainly do couple another cause with taxation; namely, the alteration in the currency; but you have not attempted to show what share taxes have had, and what belongs to the alteration in the currency. When two causes are assigned for one effect, it is desirable that each should be traced in its operation; this you have attempted to do, with taxes. In page 740 of your Register, you enumerate many of the taxes paid by the land-owner and farmer, and contend, that those taxes must be paid by the consumer of the produce of the land. You also enumerate many other taxes paid

by the community in general as consumers. Upon this I must pause; for here I find that all are producers and all consumers; and the question may therefore be put into a more simple form, recollecting that our present enquiry is, as to the cause of high prices generally; and here, Mr. Cobbett, I must assert, in opposition to what you have said in your Letter to the Southampton Petitioners, that taxes cannot cause a general rise in prices; nor will you, I believe, persist in it, when you review the subject. Mr. Huskisson, whose opinions you say are the same as yours on this subject, puts it in a shape that admits of a cooler argument, when he states, that in 1792, all our Government establishments required but 16 millions a year; and that a peace establishment, at present, will probably be between 50 and 60 millions. Now, Sir, supposing the taxes to have increased in precisely the same proportion, has the quartern loaf done the same? According to your statement, on the peace which terminated in 1792, the loaf was at 7d. 5-10; and, during 1803-4, it averaged 9d.; and now, I suppose, is nearly 1s. But, Sir, if the taxes were added to the original cost of the article, must not the rise have been much greater? We will take the difference between the taxes of 1792, and the present period, at 60 millions. Is it possible, Mr. Cobbett, that the producers of the taxed articles could reimburse themselves by increasing the prices of the articles, until they obtained 60 millions more than their former prices? The thing is impossible: if we consider the effect of taxation, *by itself*, on prices, we must suppose, that in 1792, there was 20 millions of currency in England. Had the currency not increased, how would it have been possible for the prices of last year to have been paid? Had we only the same 20 millions of currency, that sum would have been equal to all the sales made in the country, and the price of every particular article would have held a due proportion. Food, clothing, furniture, labour; every thing must have continued the same in price. For, could any one article have risen, without others being lowered, if we imagine quantities to continue the same? Suppose the seller of food to ask a higher price, whatever excuse he might have for the alteration, a consumer would say, "Mr. Farmer, I have only so much money; if you persist in your demand, I certainly must pay you as far as my means will go;

but I shall have less money to expend in other things; and these other things must consequently fall in price. I shall have less money to pay to my draper, tailor, shoemaker, to my brewer, and all those who furnish me with the comforts of life. Now, Mr. Farmer, these good people are all your customers, as well as I am, and in proportion to the increase in your charge to me, you lessen *their means* of purchasing from you. They of course will eat less, and you will be at last obliged to *come down* to the means which the consumer has of paying you for your produce. If you cannot afford to pay your rent and taxes, without raising your prices, I am sorry for you; for you really cannot get more money from us than we have; if you get more from one, you will have less from another; so that at last it will be the same." I will not say, that such reasoning would convince the farmer; but I will assert, that such would be the effect of any demand for higher prices, if the quantities of goods and money continued the same. The farmer, however, *has the tax to pay*; that is imperative upon him; there is no bargain in that business; the Government *will* be paid, or they *will* *ruin*. What is to be done? The farmer cannot obtain higher prices, because money, which measures the price of every thing, has not increased; he must, therefore, pay a smaller rent to the owner of the farm. Disguise it as we may, it is the owner—the person in the receipt of the revenue which is left, after paying for the labour expended! It is the proprietor of property that really pays all the taxes; and every tax laid on the cultivator of the soil, or on the produce, is deducted at last from the rent. This, certainly, does not take place where leases are held; because here is a positive engagement to pay a stipulated sum, which may not be altered in consequence of a heavy tax; when the farmer, having to pay all the rent which the land will fairly afford, after supporting himself and family, and in addition, a tax to the Government not contemplated when he made his lease, he may be ruined: for observe, if by increased exertion he should produce more food, this only makes it cheaper, and will not enable him to pay the additional demand with greater ease.—We know well, that if the farmer be ruined under such circumstances, the owner of the property will also be injured; his *land* will be exhausted; and, being liable to the payment of

a tax, will not let for the sum it did formerly. The farmer will, at last, pay a part of his rent to Government, and the remainder to the owner of the land. The same takes place with the owners of houses: if a house be liable to the payment of a tax, it will bring less rent. This will appear very evident if we imagine one house to be offered for 100*l.* a year; which is liable to the payment of 50*l.* in taxes; and another equally good is offered for 150*l.* per year, but liable to no tax. Is it not evident, I say, that the owner is the loser? Precisely the same thing takes place with all property that yields a revenue to the proprietor; and how can the owners of property indemnify themselves by high prices, if it were possible, which it is not, from the limited ability of the other parts of the community, it would react upon themselves. If the farmer and land proprietor charged higher for their goods, they in their turn would be charged higher for every thing they had to purchase; so that at last they would have precisely the same quantity of clothing, furniture, and other means of enjoyment which they would have had, without any rise in price having taken place; the only difference being, that there must be more money in circulation; for without that a general rise in prices is impossible, supposing the various articles brought to market in the same quantities as before. Although I think that what has been said, is sufficient to shew, that taxes, without an increase in the money of the country, cannot raise prices, yet I will venture to risk the taking up of a little more room in your admirable REGISTER, by shewing the fallacy of the proof produced by you at page 717. You suppose a man cultivating his own farm of 100 acres, which yields him 300 quarters of wheat, at 4*l.* per quarter, making an income from his farm of 1200*l.* per year; but his land is subject to a tax of 3*l.* per acre, so that he pays to the Government 3*l.* out of his 1200*l.* You go on to suppose, that if the tax were taken off, that he could afford to sell at 3*l.* per quarter, instead of 4*l.* It is true he could afford it, and he could now afford it at 3*l.* if he were to make 800*l.* serve him instead of 900*l.* per year. But why should he sell his corn at less after the tax was taken off than he did before? Do not owners of land always take as high a price for the produce as it will fetch in the market? Has a land proprietor, such as Mr. Coke, any

thought of selling his wheat, or letting his land, at one half their present price, because he could afford to live at the rate of 200*l*. a year, as well as the owner and cultivator you have imagined? Does not the owner, in fact, take, in the shape of rent, all, or nearly all, that the farmer has left, after supporting himself and paying the various expenses attending cultivation, taxes, &c.? and does not the farmer always take as high a price as he can get for his food? You imagined that wheat was at 4*l*. a quarter instead of 3*l*. on account of the tax: I should say, that the quantity of currency in the country had brought things generally to certain prices, and among other things, wheat, to the price of 4*l*. a quarter. Well, supposing the same money to continue in the country, would the farmer take 1*l*. a quarter less because he could afford it?—is it likely? Do you expect that he would do it voluntarily; and why should he be compelled by the consumer. Even supposing, for the sake of argument, that the farmer were to lower the price, the rest of the community would have one-fourth more money to expend on other things, which must, of course, make other articles rise: and thus the fall in the price of food would cause other things to be dearer, unless, indeed, we could imagine that a greater part of the money of the people remained unemployed, and thus less came into the market. This would be equal to taking a part of the currency out of circulation, which is certainly a sufficient cause for lowering the price. But again, the farmer and owner would have only the same money to lay out he had before the tax was taken off, and the rest of the people would have the 3*l*. per acre, which formerly passed through the hands of the Government. Why should this be? Why should not the farmer charge as high prices as he did before, if others do not alter their prices? and now, how can prices be altered, if there be the same goods and the same quantity of money as before, seeing that in the nature of things one is the measure of the other. Increase the quantity of goods, whether food, clothing, or any other, or all saleable things, and let the money remain the same in quantity, and each particular quantity must fall in price, as the whole of the goods is equal to the whole of the money. When a tax is laid on, the Government receives a part of the revenue arising from property (after supporting the labourer),

and as taxes are increased, Government comes in for a greater and a greater proportion; they may at last take nearly all, and make the owners mere funnels, as you strongly expressed it. But this has nothing to do with prices. Prices are determined by the proportion which exists between the saleable goods and the currency of a country. In the supposition of candles paying 6*d*. per pound duty, you say, that the duty being added to the original cost 6*d*. the candles are sold at 1*s*. per lb. It is here that nearly every one is misled by appearances—it is so obvious it strikes so plainly the dullest mind, that taxes may and do increase the prices of some things, that they take it as a proof of taxes having a power to produce that effect generally; whereas, if we suppose, before a tax were laid on candles, and when they were sixpence a pound, that 100,000*l*. of the currency of the country was employed in the sale and purchase of candles, and after the tax, and the consequent rise to 1*s*. per lb. 200,000*l*. of the currency must be kept in employment by them. Is it not clear, that there being less money left for the purchase of other articles, they must all fall in price equal to the rise in candles, thus establishing the equilibrium. Government may by a tax divert a larger proportion of the currency to one article, but it must be taken from the other articles; if one be dearer, others must be cheaper—always supposing no additional currency thrown into circulation. The same reasoning applies to beer, to spirits, to salt, in fact, to every thing: in vain might Government tax every article equally with a view to raise prices—they would remain stationary, there would not be money to pay an increase in price.—The real cause of the general rise in prices is to be found in the increase in the quantity of circulating money. This cause may be divided into two branches: the first is the increase in the quantity, which naturally results from successful commerce. The second, from swelling up our currency by Threadneedle-street, and other substitutes for metallic money. With respect to the former cause, it has happened to us, in common with other nations that have had a commerce, flourishing and highly profitable to those engaged in it; an accumulation of the precious metals has always been the consequence of prosperous trading, unless where they have been banished by similar means to those which we have used to send

arms' out of the country, namely, making the currency overflow by an excessive issue of paper. Our Government may have had powerful reasons for issuing, or causing to be issued bank notes, such as lessening the value of what they had to pay to the stockholders; but the cause, the sole cause, in my opinion, of the general rise in prices, is to be found in the increase of the currency. —With respect to the late Corn Bill, I think it was intended to do good, and would have done good. But it certainly appeared to be doing much evil in giving an improper direction to the public mind; perhaps, taking all the circumstances attending it into consideration, 'tis better that it did not pass into a law. But if the people do not come to their senses, we shall, in a few years, become dependant upon other countries for a supply of food, in a much greater degree than we have yet been;—and it is possible that a bad harvest may take place throughout the corn countries of Europe,—when each country, to protect itself, will prohibit exportation; and where then will Friend Ross find cheap food for the poor?—There is now time for considering and discussing the subject, and I should feel grateful for the insertion of those few hasty remarks in your *Register*: want of time will not permit me to take any pains in dressing them to meet the public eye.—I am, Sir, your constant reader and admirer, T. H.

Sufford, June 22, 1814.

GAMING.

MR. CORBETT.—Permit me to express my thanks to you for the very just and striking views presented to the public in your last week's *Register*, on the immoral tendency of every species of gaming; and the pernicious effects of indulging children in habits of playing at cards, and other games of chance. The sentiments you have there expressed do equal honour to your understanding, and your benevolence; and I shall be much gratified if the same able pen would pourtray the direful effects of another species of gaming, which receives annually the sanction of the British Legislature: I mean the State Lotteries. The present time is peculiarly favourable for such a discussion; being now no longer engaged in a war for the support of our holy religion, we may surely dispense with a tax (although a voluntary one) which bears very heavily upon the morals, as well as on the pockets, of many

of our deluded fellow-countrymen.—Amongst our numerous moral writers, I do not recollect much has been written to discountenance so baneful a practice.—There is, however, one, whose sentiments very much coincide with yours. He is a Clergyman of our Established Church; but he does not rank either with the orthodox or the evangelical. I will, with your permission, give you a quotation:—
“If we wish to encourage the free expansion of the benevolent principle in children, we ought never to put a card into their hands;—young people are brought up, with the notion that card playing is a pretty innocent recreation. They, therefore, at a very early period, learn to associate the idea of gaming with many ideas of pleasure; and not, as they ought, with sensations of shame, of pain, and disappointment. I hardly know any admonition which a parent ought more assiduously to instil into his child than this—that all gaming is a species of robbery by delusion; it engenders fraud, and ends in misery:—even the less species of gaming, which are deemed so perfectly harmless, and so nicely adapted to fill up the yawning vacancies of fatuity;—even these lead directly to a fatal deprivation of the moral principle, by extinguishing the benevolent affections.—I never knew a confirmed and habitual card-player, who had not a callous and unfeeling heart. It is, indeed, impossible for any one long to retain the genial glow of one benevolent sympathy, who habitually associates, like the inveterate card-player, sensations of triumph and of pleasure, with the vexation and disappointment of others;—even the least, and most innoxious species of gaming, have a fatal tendency to imbue, with the taste of pleasure, the emotions of malevolence; and, indeed, we cannot long be partakers in a single amusement, into which one drop of the spirit of gaming has been infused, without its diminishing the power of that susceptibility of catching the sensations of others, and of mingling them with our own; from which sympathy flows, and by which benevolence is excited—must not then the higher and more criminal species of gaming tend, with a direct and accelerated influence, to chill the benevolence of the heart, and to tear the sense of duty from the mind?—Does not the spirit

"gaining, rankling in the heart, and gradually, but rapidly, undermining all within, infallibly creates the cruel and designing villain? Does he not soon learn to gladden the unwary without shame, and even to triumph in proportion to the misery and indigence which he produces? Hear this, ye heroes and heroines of Euro. Would to God it would raise one blush on your livid cheeks, or one emotion of remorse in your callous hearts!!!"—I am, yours, &c.

F. R.

June 22, 1814.

POLITICAL OCCURRENCES.—The accounts from Spain represent matters there to be in a very unsettled state. Ferdinand, it is said, has issued a Decree for punishing those officers who served under King Joseph. "By this Decree (says the *Courier*) all military officers down to the rank of Captains, are banished for life, with their wives and families; the wife during the life time of her husband, but the children under twenty-one years of age are not included."—I can well understand how a wife might think it no punishment to become a partner in her husband's exile. But to inflict a penalty on a child for the supposed crime of the parent, the more especially when that child has reached an age which puts him beyond parental controul, appears to me the height of injustice. When to this, however, it is added, that "the same rule applies to such Captains as are supposed to have acted under the authority of their chiefs," no language is sufficient to stigmatise the enormity of such a Decree. There are many who must have served involuntarily under the French, when King Joseph was in possession of Madrid, and who only waited for another order of things, to declare accordingly. Yet no exception is made in their favour, though they did declare the moment an opportunity offered. But the Decree does not stop here. "All Civil Authorities, from the Counselor of State down to the Commissaries of war, partake of the same fate (with their families) as Military Officers holding rank above that of a Captain; and all other

Civil Officers, who received salary under the Government of King Joseph, are declared unworthy of holding any situation under the Crown." The *Times* writer says, that this Decree "is entitled to great commendation, as tempering justice with mercy!"—My persuasion is, that no such Decree exists; for instead of discovering either justice or mercy in it, I do not think that the most tyrannical despot that ever existed, even aided by all the cold-blooded advice which this writer is in the daily practice of giving to Sovereigns, could have framed an edict so hostile to the principles of justice and mercy.

The advocates of war are still eager to promote a traffic by which they have been so greatly enriched. They seize with avidity every circumstance which they think has a warlike appearance, and put it forth to the public with a degree of anxiety which at once discovers their motives and their views. In the *Courier* of last night a striking instance of this sort of feeling was given.—It appears that, owing to the necessary arrangements not having been completed for the evacuation of the city of Mentz by the allied troops, that garrison is still occupied by a body of Austrians and Prussians. This circumstance, however, in consequence, being converted into a proof, that neither of these Powers are willing to give up the place; and the *Courier* was at no loss to present its readers with a private letter, said to have been received from Paris, confirming this fact, and stating, "that an immediate rupture between Austria and Prussia is apprehended."—That these Powers, and probably Russia also, may quarrel about the arrangement of the territory falling to each in consequence of the peace appears very probable. But this does not appear to me the moment for this, because the final occupation of these territories remains to be settled at the ensuing Congress; and because I do not think that either of the Allied Sovereigns will again rashly involve themselves in a war, until they have, in some measure, recovered the strength which they lost in the late tedious and exhausting contest.

